Epistemic Role Research Articles

Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience, by Michael S. Brady.

<i>Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience</i>, by Michael S. Brady.

EPISTEMOLOGY AND RADICALLY EXTENDED COGNITION

AbstractThis paper concerns the relationship between epistemology and radically extended cognition. Radically extended cognition (REC) – as advanced by Andy Clark and David Chalmers – is cognition that is partly located outside the biological boundaries of the cognizing subject. Epistemologists have begun to wonder whether REC has any consequences for theories of knowledge. For instance, while Duncan Pritchard suggests that REC might have implications for which virtue epistemology is acceptable, J. Adam Carter wonders whether REC threatens anti-luck epistemology. In this paper, I argue that the possibility of REC has no systematic consequences for theorizing in epistemology. I suggest an alternative relationship between the two: epistemology can play a role in diagnosing cases of REC. Thus, by establishing that entities partially located outside biological boundaries don't play certain epistemic roles, one can establish that they don't play the related cognitive roles either. I conclude the paper by illustrating this last point.

Recognizing the Epistemic Role of Experience in Ethics: Reflections Inspired by Putnam, McDowell, Wittgenstein, and Dewey

Abstract Standard, or ordinary, modern philosophy, with its inadequately examined assumption of what amounts to a Cartesian-inspired epistemological stance accompanied today with materialist reductionist patterns of seeing and thinking, presents significant obstacles to recognizing the cognitive force of the diverse experiences that arise within and are made possible by our need and interest-based practices whose roots lie in our bio-social nature.1 This denial of epistemic value to experience has negative consequences in general but particularly for understanding the ethical dimension of our lives, not the least being learning what is required to foster our ethical maturation in a pluralistic world.

Explanation and the Evolutionary First Law(s)

Analogies between Newtonian mechanics and evolutionary processes are powerful but not infinitely versatile tools for generating explanations of particular biological phenomena. Their explanatory range is sensitive to a preliminary decision about which processes count as background conditions and which as special forces. Here I argue that the defenders of the zero-force evolutionary law are mistaken in defending their decision as the only appropriate one. The Hardy–Weinberg principle remains a viable option that is consistent with the epistemic role of Newton’s own first law, and the strengths and weaknesses of each analogy are sufficiently distinct to justify their continued coexistence.

Pathways to pluralism about biological individuality

What are the prospects for a monistic view of biological individuality given the multiple epistemic roles the concept must satisfy? In this paper, I examine the epistemic adequacy of two recent accounts based on the capacity to undergo natural selection. One is from Ellen Clarke, and the other is by Peter Godfrey-Smith. Clarke’s position reflects a strong monism, in that she aims to characterize individuality in purely functional terms and refrains from privileging any specific material properties as important in their own right. I argue that Clarke’s functionalism impairs the epistemic adequacy of her account compared to a middle-ground position taken by Godfrey-Smith. In comparing Clarke and Godfrey-Smith’s account, two pathways emerge to pluralism about biological individuality. The first develops from the contrast between functionalist and materialist approaches, and the second from an underlying temporal structure involved in using evolutionary processes to define individuality.

Knowing, Unknowing, Believing stances and characters’ dialogic identities in theHarry Potterbooks

In a previous paper (Philip et al. 2013) we presented the analysis of the main characters’ identities, as they emerge from the dialogues in Chapter 10 of the seventh book of the Harry Potter series, in relation to their Knowing, Unknowing, and Believing epistemic stances. The aim of the present study is to expand this analysis to all seven books of the same saga, in particular focusing on how Harry and Lord Voldemort negotiate, construct, and develop their identities and how they evolve in what they know, believe, and do not know through the dialogues in the seven books. This study also aims to compare this linguistic analysis to a literary one. The results show that the epistemic roles in the dialogues support the characters’ identities in the narrative.

Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience

Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience

The Intellectual Given

Intuition is sometimes derided as an abstruse or esoteric phenomenon akin to crystal-ball gazing. Such derision appears to be fuelled primarily by the suggestion, evidently endorsed by traditional rationalists such as Plato and Descartes, that intuition is a kind of direct, immediate apprehension akin to perception. This paper suggests that although the perceptual analogy has often been dismissed as encouraging a theoretically useless metaphor, a quasi-perceptualist view of intuition may enable rationalists to begin to meet the challenge of supplying a theoretically satisfying treatment of their favoured epistemic source. It is argued, first, that intuitions and perceptual experiences are at a certain level of abstraction the same type of mental state, presentations, which are distinct from beliefs, hunches, inclinations, attractions, and seemings. The notion of a presentation is given a positive explication, which identifies its characteristic features, accounts for several of its substantive psychological roles, and systematically locates it in a threefold division among types of contentful states. Subsequently, it is argued that presentations, intuitive no less than sensory, are by their nature poised to play a distinctive epistemic role. Specifically, in the case of intuition, we encounter an intellectual state that is so structured as to provide justification without requiring justification in turn—something which may, thus, be thought of as ‘given’.

Wahrnehmung und Erkenntnis

The article investigates and defends central elements of Quine’s naturalized epistemology. Davidson’s coherentist attacks on Quine’s empiricismare dismissed. The view is advocated that sensory experience plays an essential epistemic role, and that, therefore, the study of perception must be taken seriously in the theory of knowledge. The author rejects, however, Quine’s behavioristic conception of experience as stimulation of sensory receptors and instead argues for a richer conception, according to which an experience is a sensory state of things appearing in certain ways to us. Finally, it is shown that this standpoint allows us to acknowledge a given element in experience without falling victim to a myth.

Ideal rationality and logical omniscience

Does rationality require logical omniscience? Our best formal theories of rationality imply that it does, but our ordinary evaluations of rationality seem to suggest otherwise. This paper aims to resolve the tension by arguing that our ordinary evaluations of rationality are not only consistent with the thesis that rationality requires logical omniscience, but also provide a compelling rationale for accepting this thesis in the first place. This paper also defends an account of apriori justification for logical beliefs that is designed to explain the rational requirement of logical omniscience. On this account, apriori justification for beliefs about logic has its source in logical facts, rather than psychological facts about experience, reasoning, or understanding. This account has important consequences for the epistemic role of experience in the logical domain. In a slogan, the epistemic role of experience in the apriori domain is not a justifying role, but rather an enabling and disabling role.

Worst Friends or Best Enemies?

This article examines the question of whether the atheist and the believer can understand each other, to the point of being friends intellectually. The answer is no. The atheist and the believer can be best enemies, but their epistemic disagreement is definitely radical. For it is not a disagreement on religious belief itself, but about what allows the believer to believe. The article examines some aspects of John Greco’s concept of ‘friendly theism’, the discussion of conciliationism and anti-conciliatonism, and the epistemic role of the Holy Spirit.

Counteractuals, Counterfactuals and Semantic Intuitions

Machery et al. (Cognition 92: B1–B12, 2004; Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79: 332–356, 2009a, Analysis 69: 689–694, b; Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86: 618–635, 2012) claim that analytic philosophers of language are committed to a method of cases (MC) according to which theories of reference are assessed by consulting semantic intuitions about actual and possible cases. Since empirical evidence suggests that such intuitions vary both within and across cultures, these experimental semanticists conclude that the traditional attempt at pursuing such theories is misguided. Against the backdrop of Kripke’s anti-descriptivist arguments, this paper offers a novel response to the challenge posed by Machery et al., arguing that they either misplace or exaggerate the role played by (MC). The lesson is that while semantic intuitions carry evidential weight in evaluating certain subjunctive conditionals reflecting counterfactual possibilities, they neither play an epistemic role in determining the actual reference of proper names, nor in evaluating certain indicative conditionals reflecting so-called counteractual possibilities. Moreover, once an asymmetry is acknowledged in Machery et al’s vignette between the narrator and the subject’s suppositions about the actual world, a corresponding ambiguity can account for the alleged culturally determined variation in semantic intuitions.

The scope and limits of a mechanistic view of computational explanation

An increasing number of philosophers have promoted the idea that mechanism provides a fruitful framework for thinking about the explanatory contributions of computational approaches in cognitive neuroscience. For instance, Piccinini and Bahar (Cogn Sci 37(3):453–488, 2013) have recently argued that neural computation constitutes a sui generis category of physical computation which can play a genuine explanatory role in the context of investigating neural and cognitive processes. The core of their proposal is to conceive of computational explanations in cognitive neuroscience as a subspecies of mechanistic explanations. This paper identifies several challenges facing their mechanistic account and sketches an alternative way of thinking about the epistemic roles of computational approaches used in the study of brain and cognition. Drawing on examples from both low-level and systems-level computational neuroscience, I argue that at least some computational explanations of neural and cognitive processes are partially independent from mechanistic constraints.

Children’s Perceptions of Their Reading Ability and Epistemic Roles in Monologically and Dialogically Organized Bilingual Classrooms

This study examines how bilingual second-grade students perceived of their reading competence and of the work of reading in two contrasting settings where texts were regularly discussed: a monologically organized classroom (MOC) and a dialogically organized classroom (DOC; as determined by prior analysis of classroom discourse). Interview data revealed that, while every student in the DOC came to describe herself or himself as a good reader by the end of the year, many low-achieving readers in the MOC no longer saw themselves as good readers. Findings further indicated that students in the two classrooms conceived of epistemic reading roles in contrasting ways. In the MOC, students viewed reading as about getting the text’s intended meaning and expressed concern about potentially giving wrong answers. They emphasized the teacher as a provider of information, placed importance on external achievement markers, and saw good reading as a matter of being smart. In the DOC, students saw themselves as agentive makers of meaning who generated ideas and questions. They spoke of a social responsibility to help others (including both peers and teacher) better understand the text. They saw discussion with peers as a way of helping further their own textual understandings, and the teacher as someone who sought to understand and learn from student textual perspectives. In light of existing self-efficacy literature, these findings suggest that student beliefs about epistemic roles, mediated by the predominant nature of classroom discourse, could play an important role in shaping students’ perceived reading competence.

Sub-Abstract Bodies: The Epistemic and Ethical Role of the Body-Mind Relationship in Adorno’s Philosophy

The aim of this paper is threefold. In the first place, I should like to show that Adorno’s philosophy is dependent, to a degree perhaps not always directly recognized in the literature, on a deeply contentious view on the relationship between the mind and the body. In order to show this, I explore and bring out the epistemic and ethical stakes for Adorno’s theory of the relationship between mind and body. Secondly, I move to better articulate precisely what Adorno’s view on the nature of this relationship is. I hold that his position revolves around positing a porous boundary between the domains of the somatic and the cognitive. In closing, I show that Adorno’s account relies on this domain boundary being unidirectionally porous, in that determination of somatic impulses by cognitive content does not seem a live option for Adorno. I go on to note that this smuggles in a dubious position which does a lot of unearned work. The stakes which his implicit account of the body and mind relationship served to secure thereby come once more to look highly vulnerable.

CHOOSING EXPERT STATISTICAL ADVICE: PRACTICAL COSTS AND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

AbstractWe discuss the role of practical costs in the epistemic justification of a novice choosing expert advice, taking as a case study the choice of an expert statistician by a lay politician. First, we refine Goldman's criteria for the assessment of this choice, showing how the costs of not being impartial impinge on the epistemic justification of the different actors involved in the choice. Then, drawing on two case studies, we discuss in which institutional setting the costs of partiality can play an epistemic role. This way we intend to show how the sociological explanation of the choice of experts can incorporate its epistemic justification.

Experimental Modeling in Biology: In Vivo Representation and Stand-Ins as Modeling Strategies

Experimental modeling in biology involves the use of living organisms (not necessarily so-called model organisms) in order to model or simulate biological processes. I argue here that experimental modeling is a bona fide form of scientific modeling that plays an epistemic role that is distinct from that of ordinary biological experiments. What distinguishes them from ordinary experiments is that they use what I call “in vivo representations,” where one kind of causal process is used to stand in for a physically different kind of process. I discuss the advantages of this approach in the context of evolutionary biology.

Emotional insight: the epistemic role of emotional experience

Introduction 1. Towards the Perceptual Model 2. The Perceptual Model 3. Against the Perceptual Model 4. Emotion and Understanding 5. Emotion, Attention, and Virtue Bibliography

Prayer and Love in Franz Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption

This article considers the various passages in Franz Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption which give particular focus to the effective role Rosenzweig assigns to prayer with regard to the realization of divine and human love in the Star, as well as to the epistemic role of prayer in what he calls “entreating the Kingdom.” The conclusion reached is that the various passages relating to prayer in the Star of Redemption reflect a very powerful and inspiring religious vision, but that the detailed labor of systematization remains largely incomplete vis-à-vis the relationship between love and prayer in his thought.

Happiness and well-being: shifting the focus of the current debate

The point of departure of this paper is the recently emphasised distinction between psychological theories of happiness, on the one hand, and normative theories of well-being, on the other. With this distinction in mind, I examine three possible kinds of relation that might exist between (psychological) happiness and (normative) well-being; to wit, happiness may be understood as playing a central part in (1) a formal theory of well-being, (2) a substantive theory of well-being or (3) as an indicator for well-being. I note that, in the relevant literature, happiness is mostly discussed in terms of either (1) or (2). In this paper, I attempt to motivate a shift of focus away from such accounts of happiness and towards (3), i.e. its epistemic role. When examined in connection to (normative) well-being, (psychological states of) happiness and unhappiness should be understood as psychological states that inform individuals about the contribution of various activities, pursuits, or situations to their well-being or ill-being.