Epistemic Properties Research Articles

Where do field-specific notions of research quality come from?

Abstract Researchers’ notions of research quality depend on their field of research. Previous studies have shown that field-specific assessment criteria exist but could explain neither why these specific criteria and not others exist, nor how criteria are used in specific assessment situations. To give initial answers to these questions, formal assessment situations (reviews of publications) and informal assessment situations (seminar and conference discussions) in two specialties (plant biology and medieval history) were analysed through observations and qualitative content analysis. The empirical findings reveal a large variety of quality criteria used by researchers, which cannot be subsumed under conventional notions of originality, reliability, or validity. The identified field-specific quality criteria can be explained by differences between the two fields’ research practices and between the epistemic properties of the two fields.

Efficient analysis of belief properties in process algebra

Protocols are typically specified in an operational manner by specifying the communication patterns among the different involved principals. However, many properties are of epistemic nature, e.g., what each principal believes after having seen a run of the protocol. We elaborate on a unified algebraic framework suitable for epistemic reasoning about operational protocols. This reasoning framework is based on a logic of beliefs and allows for the operational specification of untruthful communications. The information recorded in the semantic models to support reasoning about the interaction between the operational and epistemic aspects intensifies the state-space explosion. We propose an efficient on-the-fly reduction for such a unifying framework by providing a set of operational rules. These operational rules automatically generate efficient reduced semantics for a class of epistemic properties, specified in a rich extension of modal μ-calculus with past and belief modality, and can potentially reduce an infinite state space into a finite one. We reformulate and prove criteria that guarantee belief consistency for credulous agents, i.e., agents that are ready to believe what is told unless it is logically inconsistent. We adjust our reduction so that the belief consistency of an original model is preserved. We prove the soundness and completeness result for the specified class of properties.

The Epistemology of Democracy and the Market: Rejoinder to Elliott

ABSTRACT Epistemic democratic theory often focuses on defending democracy from various forms of elitism, such as epistocracy. However, democracy’s informational properties may also be compared with those of the market, and not other forms of political decision-making. While Kevin Elliott’s critique of the market’s epistemic properties is a welcome contribution that broadens the range of comparisons epistemic democratic theory engages with, Elliott mischaracterizes arguments made by market theorists, overlooks their justifications for employing unrealistic assumptions, and ignores instances where they agree with his critiques and arguments. This paper examines arguments regarding the epistemology of democracy and the market, and discusses the comparative knowledge requirements each competitive system requires of its participants within the wider context of epistemic democratic theory.

The Hard Problem of Access for Epistemological Disjunctivism

Abstract In this paper, I identify the hard problem of access for epistemological disjunctivism (ED): given that perceptual experience E is opaque with respect to its own epistemic properties, subject S is not in a position to know epistemic proposition (i) (that E is factive with respect to empirical proposition p) just by having E and/or reflecting on E. This is the case even if (i) is true. I first motivate the hard problem of access (Section 2) and then reconstruct and analyze three of the ways in which EDists have argued for the internal accessibility of the factive character of perceptual experience. These arguments explain internal access in terms of the unity of perceptual and rational capacities (Section 3), favoring support (Section 4), and the outward-looking model of self-knowledge (Section 5). My conclusion (Section 6) is that none of these responses works. I then suggest how ED might be modified to succeed as an access internalist epistemology.

Creating good knowledge together: heartful-communal storytelling at the intersection of caregiving and academia

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explore a novel storytelling approach that investigates lived experience at the intersection of motherhood/caregiving and Ph.D. pursuits. The paper contributes to the feminist tradition of writing differently through the process of care that emerges from shared stories.Design/methodology/approachUsing a process called heartful-communal storytelling, the authors evoke personal and embodied stories and transgressive narratives. The authors present a composite process drawing on heartful-autoethnography, dialogic writing and communal storytelling.FindingsThe paper makes two key contributions: (1) the paper illustrates a novel feminist process in action and (2) the paper contributes six discrete stories of lived experience at the intersection of parenthood and Ph.D. studies. The paper also contributes to the development of the feminist tradition of writing differently. Three themes emerged through the storytelling experience, and these include (1) creating boundaries and transgressing boundaries, (2) giving and receiving care and (3) neoliberal conformity and resistance. These themes, like the stories, also became entangled.Originality/valueThe paper demonstrates how heartful-communal storytelling can lead to individual and collective meaning making. While the Ph.D. is a solitary path, the authors' heartful-communal storytelling experience teaches that holding it separate from other relationships can impoverish what is learnt and constrain the production of good knowledge; the epistemic properties of care became self-evident.

Automatically Verifying Expressive Epistemic Properties of Programs

We propose a new approach to the verification of epistemic properties of programmes. First, we introduce the new ``program-epistemic'' logic L_PK, which is strictly richer and more general than similar formalisms appearing in the literature. To solve the verification problem in an efficient way, we introduce a translation from our language L_PK into first-order logic. Then, we show and prove correct a reduction from the model checking problem for program-epistemic formulas to the satisfiability of their first-order translation. Both our logic and our translation can handle richer specification w.r.t. the state of the art, allowing us to express the knowledge of agents about facts pertaining to programs (i.e., agents' knowledge before a program is executed as well as after is has been executed). Furthermore, we implement our translation in Haskell in a general way (i.e., independently of the programs in the logical statements), and we use existing SMT-solvers to check satisfaction of L_PK formulas on a benchmark example in the AI/agency field.

Changes in Scholars’ Ways of Knowledge Production Shaped by Systematic Measures

This paper considers the role played by systematic measuring in academic conducts. The introduction of entrepreneurial culture into academia fosters competitive atmospheres through its emphasis on personal merit, which entails quantitative performance measurement. As knowledge production is one of scholars’ core missions, this study aims to articulate impacts on ways of knowledge production influenced by environmental factors, comprising measuring instruments, institutional management, funding bodies and state policy. By interviewing 41 scholars in Taiwan and exploring their accounts of academic practices, this paper empirically analyses how knowledge production has been shaped by policy environments. These modifying behaviour patterns include a selection of research topics, a design for research agenda, strategies for grant applications and publications, engendering delicate changes in the epistemic properties of research. From this, it characterizes power relations between researchers, scientific communities and the state in the neoliberal age.

ЕПІСТЕМІЧНІСТЬ СЛІВ НА ПОЗНАЧЕННЯ ВПЕВНЕНОСТІ / НЕВПЕВНЕНОСТІ

The article explores epistemic nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs that convey different levels of confidence/uncertainty. The material of the study was a selection of fiction texts of modern English literature for 1 million words. The epistemic nature of words used to indicate certainty / uncertainty is studied. Epistemicity is defined as the property of words to manifest epistemic properties and is calculated as the ratio of the number of epistemic words (EW) to the total number of words for indicating certainty / uncertainty in the selection according to the formula Eep÷Et*100%, where Eep is the number of epistemic uses of the word, Et is the total number of uses of this word in the selection. The place of EWs in utterances was considered and EWs were separated from non-epistemic ones. Epistemic verbs, adjectives, and nouns occur in affirmative, negative, and interrogative object-determining utterances before the subordinate part of the statement. Epistemic verbs in interjections and epistemic adverbs occur in any part of the utterance, marking it epistemically. EW are not considered in the past and future tenses and in phrases with personal pronouns other than I, we in positive utterances and you in questions. We also study epistemic adjectives and nouns in impersonal expressions. EW cannot be adjectives of adjacent words, discursive markers, and adverbs of action. The analysis of 28 epistemic verbs showed that for verbs, epistemicity ranges from 0‒95%, and the most used epistemic verbs are think, seem, know, see. For 21 epistemic adjectives, epistemicity ranges from 0‒75%, and the most used epistemic adjectives are sure, impossible / not possible, certain, possible. Adverbs show the highest level of epistemicity (50‒100%), and among the 25 epistemic adverbs maybe, really, probably, kind of, sort of, perhaps are used most often. Nouns show the lowest epistemicity in the range of 0‒50%, and among 17 epistemic nouns, fact, feeling, doubt, idea, chance are most often used.

Defeat and proficiencies

AbstractVirtue epistemology is the view that beliefs are attempts at truth (or perhaps knowledge) and, as a result, can be assessed as successful, competent, and apt. Moreover, virtue epistemology identifies central epistemic properties with normative properties of beliefs as attempts. In particular, knowledge is apt belief and justified belief is competent belief. This paper develops a systematic virtue epistemological account of defeat (of justification/competence). I provide reason to think that defeat occurs not only for beliefs but for attempts more general. The key constructive idea is that defeaters are evidence that attempting (in a certain way) isn't successful and that defeaters defeat the competence of an attempt when one stands in a certain normative relation to the defeater. I argue that while this account handles paradigm cases of defeat both within epistemology and beyond nicely, cases of external (sometimes also ‘normative’ or ‘propositional’) defeat continue to cause trouble. To handle these cases, I develop a distinctively functionalist version of virtue epistemology. This functionalist version of virtue epistemology allows me to countenance proficiencies, that is, roughly, abilities that have the function to produce successes under certain conditions. It is the normative import of proficiencies that delivers the normative relation that serves to explain defeat in cases of external defeat. In this way, the functionalist version of virtue epistemology ushers the way towards a satisfactory account even of external defeat.

En-garde: Source Evaluations in the Digital Age

Students have difficulty assessing the quality of information. They often rely on content-focused criteria to make reliability assessments and, as a result, may accept inaccurate information. Despite the impact of poor source evaluation skills, educational researchers have not widely examined source evaluation behaviours in authentic environments or tasks. Students’ epistemic cognition, or their thinking about the epistemic properties of specific knowledge claims and sources, is one promising avenue to better understand their source evaluation behaviours. Two studies were conducted to explore students’ epistemic thinking. In Study 1, college students (n = 12) reported their reliability criteria in focus group interviews. Four of these participants (n = 4) also examined the reliability of an online news article. Grounded theory was used to infer students’ epistemic ideals and reliable epistemic processes. In Study 2, students (n = 43) rank-ordered two news articles and justified how they assigned each article’s rank in a written response. Most students were able to accurately rank-order the articles using relevant epistemic processes. Cluster analysis was used to characterize the evaluation criteria used. Surprisingly, more participants who justified their decisions using relevance criteria accurately rank-ordered the articles. The role of direct and indirect indicators of reliability are discussed through the lens of the Apt-AIR framework of epistemic thinking.

Dynamics of wilful ignorance in organizations.

Contemporary society is obsessed with knowledge, leaving its less seductive counterpart, ignorance, in the shadows. However, as an expanding literature suggests, it is equally important to understand ignorance and consider its varieties. This study specifies the nature of wilful ignorance in organizations. It does so by (a) making a distinction between the will of an actor and the epistemic properties of ignorance, and showing how these two form a dynamic relationship, (b) linking wilful ignorance to its various drivers and (c) suggesting how our concept of wilful ignorance can be used in the study of organizations. Rather than reducing the phenomenon into a simple to know/to ignore dichotomy, we concentrate on its processual and dynamic nature. Moreover, we explore the complexities and ambiguity inherently involved in all knowing and ignoring as well as the role of agency in reducing the harmful effects of wilful ignorance in organizations.

Opening Up of Editorial Activities at Chemistry Journals. What Does Editorship Mean and What Does It Involve?

The article unpacks the publishing practices and focuses on the curating work carried out by the editors of chemistry journals. Based on a qualitative analysis of multiple sources in two publishing houses (the American Chemical Society, ACS and Nature Research), it first shows that the role of editor-in-chief covers a wide range of realities and is far from being limited to that of a gatekeeper (the most common metaphor in the literature). In journals that are part of the Nature Research portfolio, in-house editors, who are no longer active scientists, work full time for the journals. The article describes the professional trajectories and skills required to join the publishing house. Interviews highlight collective identity-based actions, attention to the growth and the flow of manuscripts, but also specific epistemic properties of outputs in chemistry. Besides tasks that editors outline “as really the same as they were 100 years ago,” as they spend most of their time handling manuscripts and providing quality assurance, they also travel to conferences to support journals and encourage submissions, visit labs where researchers pitch their work or ask questions about journals, and “educate the actors themselves” about new fields. In both cases studied, the publishing houses partner with institutions to offer events (ACS on Campus programme, Nature masterclass) that a university or department can freely host or buy, where editors organize workshops on all aspects of manuscript preparation. Second, publishing houses, whether non-for-profit or commercial, have embraced a catalog logic, where the journals are not necessarily in competition and have an assumed place and hierarchy. At Nature Research, editors-in-chief head business units inscribed in the company's organization. Despite standardized processes imposed by the procedural chain, there is still room to maneuver in these relatively autonomous structures that are ultimately evaluated on their results (the annual production of a certain number of high-quality papers). On the other hand, ACS is seen as a vessel whose course cannot easily be deviated. The conclusion calls for extending this type of investigation to other contexts or types of journals.

Disagreement and epistemic improvement

This paper proposes a methodological turn for the epistemology of disagreement, away from focusing on highly idealized cases of peer disagreement and towards an increased focus on disagreement simpliciter. We propose and develop a normative framework for evaluating all cases of disagreement as to whether something is the case independently of their composition—i.e., independently of whether they are between peers or not. The upshot will be a norm of disagreement on which what one should do when faced with a disagreeing party is to improve the epistemic properties of one’s doxastic attitude or, alternatively, hold steadfast.

How intelligent neurotechnology can be epistemically unjust. An exploration into the ethics of algorithms

Recently, the epistemic quality of algorithms and its normative implications have come under scrutiny. While general questions of justice have been addressed in this context, specific issues of epistemic (in)justice have so far been neglected. We aim to fill this gap by analyzing some potential implications of behavioral intelligent neurotechnology (B-INT). We claim that B-INT exhibits a number of epistemic features implying the potential for certain epistemic problems, which, in turn, are likely to result in instances of epistemic injustice. To support this claim, we will first introduce and specify the terminology and technology behind B-INT. Second, we will present four fictitious scenarios of using B-INT and highlight a number of epistemic issues that might arise. Third, we will discuss their relation to the concept of epistemic justice, as well as potential instances thereof. Thus, we will show some important and morally relevant implications of the epistemic properties of INT.

How the mere desire for certainty can lead to a preference for men in authority (particularly among political liberals)

AbstractWomen are harmed by stereotypes about their fit for positions of authority and changing these stereotypes is not a simple task. As stereotypes have strong epistemic properties, individuals with a high need for cognitive closure (NCC; i.e., the desire for epistemic certainty) can be more likely to accept these stereotypes and, consequently, to prefer men in positions of authority. Consistent with the reactive liberal hypothesis, this effect could be actually more visible among individuals with both a high NCC and left‐wing political orientations. We supported these hypotheses in a series of three studies. In Study 1 (N = 217), we found that manipulated NCC predicted preference for men in authority through stereotypes of women as not being fit for authority in a measurement‐of‐mediation design. In Study 2 (N = 151), we supported this effect in a mediation‐as‐process design. In Study 3 (N = 391), we found the indirect NCC effect on preference for men in authority was more visible among political liberals. A major implication of this work is that ways of changing the effect of these stereotypes should take into account the NCC, but particularly among individuals with left‐wing beliefs.

Contradiction as a Positive Property of the Mind: 90 Years of Gödel’s Argument

The article discusses the V.V. Tselishchev’s original and unique systematic study of the specific and extremely complicated problems of Gödel results regarding the question of artificial intelligence essence. Tselishchev argues that the reflexive property should be considered not only as an advantage of human reasoning, but also as an objective internal limitation that appears in case of adding Gödel sentence to a theory to build a new theory. The article analyzes so-called mentalistic Gödel’s argument for fundamental superiority of human intelligence over machine one and the non-algorithmic nature of natural thinking. The discussion about the Gödel argument is not entirely speculative, but contains new knowledge. An example of such knowledge are the results of R. Smullyan levels of computers “awareness,” which are may be interpreted in a psychophysical sense. The concept of “zero level of intelligence” is proposed for such a reflexive property as “awareness of selfconsciousness.” Reflexive ranks below the awareness of self-consciousness can be considered negative levels of thinking in the sense that the intelligence, being reduced to them, significantly loses its completeness. Even self-consciousness turns out to be a negative level of thinking, since, according to Smullyan, the subject of self-consciousness is unaware of the type of thought to which he belongs. A thought experiment is proposed that allows us to establish the distribution of the properties of Smullyan stability and normality and to answer the question “Does an intuitive belief in the truth of a formal proof affect the truth of a proposition being proved?” According to intuitionism, the most unpleasant epistemic property is instability: beliefs that are not based on deep intuitions have no value. According to the constructivist philosophy of mathematics, instability is a less negative property than abnormality: the fact that high-ranking beliefs cannot be immersed to the very foundations is not significant because violation of truth due to lowering the rank of reflection is not critical.

Algorithmic Decision-Making When Humans Disagree on Ends

Which interpretive tasks should be delegated to machines? This question has become a focal point of “tech governance” debates. One familiar answer is that while machines are capable of implementing tasks whose ends are uncontroversial, machine delegation is inappropriate for tasks that elude human consensus. After all, if human experts cannot agree about the nature of a task, what hope is there for machines? Here, we turn this position around. When humans disagree about the nature of a task, that should be prima facie grounds for machine delegation, not against it. The reason has to do with fairness: affected parties should be able to predict the outcomes of particular cases. Indeterminate decision-making environments—those in which human disagree about ends—are inherently unpredictable in that, for any given case, the distribution of likely outcomes will depend on a specific decision maker’s view of the relevant end. This injects an irreducible dynamic of randomization into the decision-making process from the perspective of non-repeat players. To the extent machine decisions aggregate across disparate views of a task’s relevant ends, they promise improvement on this specific dimension of predictability. Whatever the other virtues and drawbacks of machine decision-making, this gain should be recognized and factored into governance. The essay has two parts. In the first, we draw a distinction between determinacy and certainty as epistemic properties and fashioning a taxonomy of decision types. In the second part, we bring the formal point alive through a case study of criminal sentencing.

Credible Futures

This paper articulates in formal terms a crucial distinction concerning future contingents, the distinction between what is true about the future and what is reasonable to believe about the future. Its key idea is that the branching structures that have been used so far to model truth can be employed to define an epistemic property, credibility, which we take to be closely related to knowledge and assertibility, and which is ultimately reducible to probability. As a result, two kinds of claims about future contingents—one concerning truth, the other concerning credibility—can be smoothly handled within a single semantic framework.

Arche-writing and data-production in theory-oriented scientific practice: the case of free-viewing as experimental system to test the temporal correlation hypothesis.

Data production in experimental sciences depends on localised experimental systems, but the epistemic properties of data transcend the contingencies of the processes that produce them. Philosophers often believe that experimental systems instantiate but do not produce the epistemic properties of data. In this paper, we argue that experimental systems' local functioning entails intrinsic capacities to produce the epistemic properties of data. We develop this idea by applying Derrida's model of arche-writing to study a case of theory-oriented experimental practice. Derrida's model relativises or dissolves the conceptual distinction between the moment of data production and a subsequent moment of data dissemination. It thus has consequences for understanding both data production (despite being intrinsically local, data production a priori generates transferrable and modellable information) and data dissemination (when modelling information, researchers needs to refer this information to the context of its production). We study a case of data production in a non-exploratory experimental system designed to test a pre-existing hypothesis in visual neuroscience. A case of theory-oriented experimental practice should allow us to identify the autonomous functioning of experimental systems in data production more clearly, insofar as it allows us to study the limits of pre-existing theory in the activities of these systems. We suggest that pre-existing concepts, hypotheses and theories condition the relevance but not the production of experimental data.

Epistemic GDL: A logic for representing and reasoning about imperfect information games

This paper proposes a logical framework for representing and reasoning about imperfect information games. We first extend Game Description Language (GDL) with the standard epistemic operators and provide it with a semantics based on the epistemic state transition model. We then demonstrate how to use the language to represent the rules of an imperfect information game and formalize common game properties as well as epistemic properties. We also show how to use the framework to reason about players' own and each others' knowledge during game playing. Furthermore, we prove that the model-checking problem of the framework is in Δ2P, even though its lower bound is Θ2P. These results indicate that the framework makes a good balance between expressive power and computational efficiency. Finally we provide a sound and complete axiomatic system for this logic. With action, temporal and epistemic operators, the completeness proof requires a novel combination of techniques used for completeness of dynamic logic and epistemic temporal logics. The proof theory provides a feasible tool to analyze properties of a family of games.