Abstract

This paper proposes a methodological turn for the epistemology of disagreement, away from focusing on highly idealized cases of peer disagreement and towards an increased focus on disagreement simpliciter. We propose and develop a normative framework for evaluating all cases of disagreement as to whether something is the case independently of their composition—i.e., independently of whether they are between peers or not. The upshot will be a norm of disagreement on which what one should do when faced with a disagreeing party is to improve the epistemic properties of one’s doxastic attitude or, alternatively, hold steadfast.

Highlights

  • The epistemology of disagreement is a well-established research field in social epistemology

  • Here is, our first stab at the norm of disagreement: The Epistemic Improvement Disagreement Norm1(EIDN1): Given a value ranking R of sets of state epistemic properties mapped with respect to proximity to epistemic goal G, for all cases in which A and B disagree about whether p—where A has a doxastic attitude with content p with a set of epistemic properties E1 and B has a doxastic attitude with content not-p with a set of epistemic properties E2: (i) If E1 is lesser than E2 on R, A should conciliate. (ii) If E1 is good11 or better than E2 on R, A should hold steadfast

  • Is our second stab at this: The Epistemic Improvement Disagreement Norm2(EIDN2): Given a value ranking R of sets of state epistemic properties mapped with respect to proximity to epistemic goal G, for all cases in which A and B disagree about whether p—where A has a doxastic attitude with content p with a set of epistemic properties E1 and B has a doxastic attitude with content not-p with a set of epistemic properties E2: (i) If E1 is lesser than E2 on R, A prima facie should conciliate in virtue of her disagreement with B. (ii) If E1 is good or better than E2 on R, A prima facie should hold steadfast in virtue of her disagreement with B

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Summary

Introduction

The epistemology of disagreement is a well-established research field in social epistemology. Synthese is permissible for one to believe in the face of disagreement (Lackey, 2013) Peer disagreement, which is an idealized (or at best rare) kind of disagreement between individuals with roughly the same evidence and cognitive capacities In this way, the guiding question of the literature has turned out to be this one instead: What would it be rational for two acknowledged epistemic peers to believe upon discovering that they are in disagreement?2. The ambition is to answer the chief normative question—what is permissible for one to believe in the face of disagreement as to whether p?—for all, including everyday cases of disagreement, between, e.g., people of varied cognitive talents, and whose doxastic attitudes enjoy substantively different epistemic properties.

Two forms of epistemic evaluation
Symmetries and asymmetries in doxastic disagreement: a methodological turn
A promising predecessor: the knowledge disagreement norm
Against the knowledge goal: knowledge norm link
Against the knowledge ranking thesis
The epistemic improvement approach to the epistemology of disagreement
Second stab: prima facie and basing conditions
Third stab: the epistemic impact of disagreement
Final account: conciliation and epistemic improvement
EIDN at work
Concluding remarks
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