Epistemic Norms Research Articles

Lying about the future: Shuar-Achuar epistemic norms, predictions, and commitments

Is there variation across cultures in what counts as a lie? Here we present evidence for a potentially unique conceptualization of lying in Shuar-Achuar communities in Ecuador, contrasting this conceptualization with people in twelve other countries and non-Shuar-Achuar Ecuadorians. In Shuar-Achuar communities, but not others, predictions of the future that turn out to be false are considered lies, even when the events that render them false are unforeseen. Failed commitments, on the other hand, are not seen as lies when unforeseen events prevent them from being kept. To explain this phenomenon, we suggest that there is an epistemic norm that regulates predictive speech acts in Shuar-Achuar communities, linked to the view that the future can be known under certain special circumstances. This norm holds that claiming knowledge of the future is a form of lying when events prove the prediction false. Commitments, on the other hand, do not imply certainty about the future and so are not considered lies when circumstances prevent them from being fulfilled. In addition, we found several other factors that influence whether speech acts are categorized as lies, including the speaker's expertise, group membership, and the nature of the outcome.

From Epistemic Norms to Logical Rules: Epistemic Models for Logical Expressivists

In this paper I construct a system of semantics for classical and intuitionistic propositional logic based on epistemic norms governing belief expansion. Working in the AGM-framework of belief change, I give a generalisation of Gärdenfors’ notion of belief systems which can be defined without reference to a logical consequence operator by using a version of the Ramsey Test. These belief expansion systems can then be used to define epistemic models which are sound and complete for either classical or intuitionistic propositional logic depending on which of the two notions of epistemic validity, identified by Levi and Arló-Costa, is used. Finally, I offer a discussion on how these results can be understood as providing a model theory within the framework of logical expressivism.

Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering

In this paper, we argue that there are epistemic norms on evidence-gathering and consider consequences for how to understand epistemic normativity. Though the view that there are such norms seems intuitive, it has found surprisingly little defense. Rather, many philosophers have argued that norms on evidence-gathering can only be practical or moral. On a prominent evidentialist version of this position, epistemic norms only apply to responding to the evidence one already has. Here we challenge the orthodoxy. First, we argue that there is no significant normative difference between responding to evidence you have and gathering more evidence. Second, we argue that our practices of epistemically criticizing agents for their poor evidence-gathering indicate the existence of epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Finally, we show that our thesis has important implications for recent debates about the relationship between epistemic norms and inquiry.

Evidentialism and Epistemic Duties to Inquire

Abstract Are there epistemic duties to inquire? The idea enjoys intuitive support. However, prominent evidentialists argue that our only epistemic duty is to believe well (i.e., to have doxastically justified beliefs), and doing so does not require inquiry. Against this, I argue that evidentialists are plausibly committed to the idea that if we have epistemic duties to believe well, then we have epistemic duties to inquire. This is because on plausible evidentialist views of evidence possession (i.e., views that result in plausible theories of evidentialist justification), inquiry is sometimes a necessary constitutive means of forming doxastically justified beliefs—beliefs that are proportioned to and based on one's evidence. So, either evidentialist views of evidence possession commit them to epistemic duties to inquire or they lead to independently implausible theories of evidentialist justification. My discussion also has important implications for the zetetic turn in epistemology, since I argue that evidentialists who are staunchly opposed to epistemic norms on inquiry have reason to reconsider.

Suspension of Judgement: Fittingness, Reasons, and Permissivism

AbstractThis paper defends three theses on the normativity of the suspension of judgment. First, even if beliefs have to fit the truth and disbelief the false, suspension can still have satisfiable fittingness conditions. Second, combining this view with specific theses on the link between fittingness and normative reasons in favour of attitudes commits one to the existence of reasons to suspend judgement, which are neither reasons to believe nor reasons to disbelieve. These independent reasons, in turn, generate a form of epistemic permissivism. Finally, I argue that there are different routes to derive this commitment to independent reasons for suspending judgement. Not only fittingness-centred approaches to epistemic normativity but also many analyses in terms of reasons are committed to this form of epistemic permissivism.

Degrees of Epistemic Criticizability

Abstract We regularly make graded normative judgements in the epistemic domain. Recent work in the literature examines degrees of justification, degrees of rationality, and degrees of assertability. This paper addresses a different dimension of the gradeability of epistemic normativity, one that has been given little attention. How should we understand degrees of epistemic criticizability? In virtue of what sorts of factors can one epistemic failing be worse than another? The paper develops a dual-factor view of degrees of epistemic criticizability. According to the view, degrees of epistemic criticizability are (i) an inverse function of degrees of doxastic justification and (ii) a function of degrees of agent culpability. The paper develops an account of each factor, and explains how they should be weighted. The paper also addresses the importance of modelling degrees of epistemic criticizability in a broader context. I focus on the role that such a model can play in the ethics of epistemic criticism.

Norms, epistemic norms, context, and counterfactuals

The paper defends an account of the context-sensitivity of norms that draws on the resources of counterfactual conditionals. The account combines two assumptions: the assumption that permission is rule-abiding performance in some contextually relevant situations; and the assumption that the contextually relevant situations are picked out by the mechanism that selects the possible worlds relevant for the evaluation of counterfactual conditionals. The account explains the non-monotonicity of permissions and solves a puzzle, raised by Timothy Williamson, about the seeming failure of permissions to distribute over conjunction. In the domain of epistemic norms, the account solves an analogous puzzle and deals successfully with so-called blindspot propositions.

Deep Disagreement, Epistemic Norms, and Epistemic Self-trust

Abstract Sometimes we disagree because of fundamental differences in what we treat as reasons for belief. Such are ‘deep disagreements'. Amongst the questions we might ask about deep disagreement is the epistemic normative one: how ought one to respond to disagreement, when that disagreement is deep. This paper addresses that question. According to the position developed, how one ought to respond to deep disagreement depends upon two things: (i) Whether one remains, in the context of disagreement, permitted to trust oneself in following one's epistemic norms and in relation to that (ii) whether one has the shared stock of social-epistemic experiences with followers of one's rival's norms such that one could reasonably be expected to see their way of doing things as a genuine epistemic alternative to one's own. Section 1 introduces a model of deep disagreement such that deep disagreements occur when disputants disagree because they follow different epistemic norms. Section 2 surveys the possible theoretical stances to take towards the epistemic-normative question. Section 3 develops an account of what it is to follow an epistemic norm. Section 4 applies this conception of norm-following to the epistemic-normative question. Section 5 discusses two points of clarification.

Breaking the plaster: Making do with the fragility of the body

AbstractDrawing on a personal experience with temporary impairment following a foot bone fracture, I here reflect on forms of marginalization fragile bodies face under normative social and organizational structures. Combining reflexive narratives, poetry, art‐making, diary notes and open questions I ask myself and the reader, with feminist literature insights inspiring my thinking and writing, I seek to problematize taken for granted assumptions around usability and accessibility of objects and spaces in society and organizations. I discuss learnings I derived from this experience, developing their relevance for broader social, academic and political debates. Namely, I argue for the importance of rethinking embodied fragility as agility from which ableist environments might learn new practices. I also discuss slowness as well as engagement with embodied research methods, feminist reading and writing as redemptive getaways for making sense of embodied trauma in ways that resist social and epistemic norms that augment inequalities.

Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity, and What It Explains, by Ernest Sosa

No one has done more for analytic virtue epistemology than Ernie Sosa; indeed, one is tempted to delete ‘virtue’. This is his latest development of his teleological version of the virtue-theoretic perspective. It is characteristically excellent and will no doubt be a classic contribution to epistemology. I highly recommend it. The central commitment of teleological virtue epistemology is that core epistemic phenomena are explained by appealing to virtues that aim at the epistemic good. Sosa’s contention is that epistemic normativity is just telic (I’ll use ‘teleological’ and ‘telic’ interchangeably) normativity directed at the epistemic good. He has been developing this basic idea over the course of many decades; this book is the latest development. While it focuses on four rather distinct subject matters, the parts that are most central to the development of telic virtue epistemology (at least for this reviewer) are Parts II and III. The former is about how to fit suspension of judgment into a telic virtue epistemology. As we’ll see, suspension of judgment causes serious trouble for the telic part of telic virtue epistemology. In Part II Sosa aims to fix this trouble. Part III is about a host of foundational epistemic issues. Sosa’s aim is to further refine his theory in light of these issues.

Fairness as adequacy: a sociotechnical view on model evaluation in machine learning

This paper develops an account of model evaluation—with an emphasis on fairness concerns—that takes the social situatedness of ML models as its starting point. Such a view entails that ML models are not deemed isolated entities, but rather tools, used for specific purposes and potentially impacting their social environment in manifold ways. This shift of perspective opens up a new problem space and facilitates rethinking criteria for model evaluation. By drawing on the adequacy-for-purpose view in philosophy of science, epistemic norms and desiderata for an adequate deployment of ML models along the dimensions of Social Objectives, Measurement, Social Dynamics, and interaction are then identified. The account thus developed also highlights why any auditing of ML models that ought to assist in consequential decision-making cannot be limited to an assessment of statistical properties, but needs to incorporate a variety of methods from the social sciences instead. Moreover, while the process of model evaluation might be deemed as a mere technical exercise, it is in fact riddled by epistemic and morally normative considerations.

Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion

<i>Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion</i>

The Perils of Rejecting the Parity Argument

AbstractMany moral error theorists reject moral realism on the grounds that moral realism implies the existence of categorical normativity, yet categorical normativity does not exist. Call this the Metaphysical Argument. In response, some moral realists have emphasized a parity between moral normativity and epistemic normativity. They argue that if one kind of normativity is rejected, then both must be rejected. Therefore, one cannot be a moral error theorist without also being an epistemic error theorist. Call this the Parity Argument. In this paper, we address three possible responses to the Parity Argument from moral error theorists: (1) accept the parity but still reject epistemic error theory, (2) reject the parity, (3) accept the parity and defend epistemic error theory. We argue that there are problems with each of these responses, so the Parity Argument stands as a strong counterargument to the Metaphysical Argument. We conclude by drawing some lessons for any future challenges to the Parity Argument.

IV—Lost in (Modal) Space: Demographic Base-Rate Neglect in the Service of Modal Knowledge

AbstractAre there ever good epistemic reasons to neglect base rates? Assuming an empiricist modal epistemology, I argue that we face an interesting tension between some very plausible epistemic norms: a norm requiring us to proportion our beliefs to the evidence may facilitate knowledge of the actual world, whilst inhibiting our acquisition of modal knowledge—knowledge of how things could be, but are not. The potential for this tension in our epistemic norms is a significant result in its own right. It can also rationalize certain forms of demographic base-rate neglect.

Vice epistemology, norm-maintenance and epistemic evasiveness

Vice epistemology studies how character traits, attitudes, or thinking styles systematically get in the way of knowledge, while doxastic responsibility is concerned with what kinds of responses are appropriate towards agents who believe badly. This paper identifies a new connection between these two fields, arguing that our propensity to take responsibility for our doxastic failures is directly relevant for vice epistemology, and in particular, understanding the social obstacles to knowledge that epistemic vices can create. This is because responses to norm violations are an important mechanism by which norms are upheld, and maintaining epistemic norms is crucial for our collective epistemic successes. This paper then identifies a new kind of vice, one which is bad precisely because of the way it undermines the epistemic norms that our blaming practices help maintain, and thus the benefits that said norms create. I call this vice epistemic evasiveness, and it concerns the attitude that one takes towards their own performance as an epistemic agent. Evasiveness is bad because it creates uncertainty about which agents are reliable, it prevents holders of this attitude from learning from their mistakes, and it signals to third parties that the norm is not being upheld, making them less likely to follow the norm.

Epistemic Norms for Public Political Arguments

The aim of the article is to develop precise epistemic rules for good public political arguments, by which political measures in the broad sense are justified. By means of a theory of deliberative democracy, it is substantiated that the justification of a political measure consists in showing argumentatively that this measure most promotes the common good or is morally optimal. It is then discussed which argumentation-theoretical approaches are suitable for providing epistemically sound rules for arguments for such theses and for the associated premises, rules whose compliance implies the truth or acceptability of the thesis. Finally, on the basis of the most suitable approach, namely the epistemological one, such systems of rules for the required types of arguments are presented that fulfil the conditions mentioned.

Conspiracy Theories and Democratic Legitimacy

ABSTRACT Conspiracy theories are frequently described as a threat to democracy and conspiracy theorists portrayed as epistemically or morally unreasonable. If these characterizations are correct, then it may be the case that reasons stemming from conspiracy theorizing threaten the legitimizing function of democratic deliberation. In this paper, I will argue the opposite. Despite the extraordinary epistemic and morally unreasonable claims made by some conspiracy theorists, belief in conspiracy theories is guided by internal epistemic norms inherent in believing. By utilizing the insights of the Peircean epistemic defense formulated by Cheryl Misak and Robert Talisse, I take it that these epistemic norms implicitly commit the theorist to an open democratic society.

Science, Values, and the New Demarcation Problem.

In recent years, many philosophers of science have rejected the "value-free ideal" for science, arguing that non-epistemic values have a legitimate role to play in scientific inquiry. However, this philosophical position raises the question of how to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate influences of values in science. In this paper, we argue that those seeking to address this "new" demarcation problem can benefit by drawing lessons from the "old" demarcation problem, in which philosophers tried to find a way of distinguishing between science and non-science. Many of those who worked on this problem ultimately found that efforts to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for defining science failed, and most concluded that the best solution to the problem was to characterize scientific hypotheses, theories, and research programs in terms of some common norms. We suggest that those seeking to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate value influences on science would do well to adopt a similar approach. Rather than attempting to establish necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying appropriate value influences, it will be more fruitful to evaluate scientific activities based on their adherence to a set of epistemic and ethical norms that can be implemented in scientific practice by means of rules, conventions, policies, and procedures.

What Does It Mean for a Conspiracy Theory to Be a ‘Theory’?

ABSTRACT The pejorative connotation often associated with the ordinary language meaning of “conspiracy theory” does not only stem from a conspiracy theory’s being about a conspiracy, but also from a conspiracy theory’s being regarded as a particular kind of theory. I propose to understand conspiracy theory-induced polarization in terms of disagreement about the correct epistemic evaluation of ‘theory’ in ‘conspiracy theory’. By framing the positions typical in conspiracy theory-induced polarization in this way, I aim to show that pejorative conceptions of ‘conspiracy theory’ are problematic for research open to the possibility of finding depolarization strategies. That is, because they preclude constructive engagement with the epistemic norms governing (the rationales foundational of) belief in conspiracy theories.

How to feminist affect: Feminist comedy and post-truth politics

Under the shifting epistemic and political norms of post-truth politics, the conditions of feminist solidarity and agency are increasingly threatened. This article argues that feminist humour provides models for affective orientations that sustain feminist work and survival during such periods of political crisis. First, I explore a potential issue post-truth politics poses for feminists: That information overload can lead to truth burn-out that threatens intersectional feminist thinking and action. Next, I explain why comedy is well-suited to help maintain feminist work in the context of post-truth politics. I then present a reading of Sarah Cooper’s skit, ‘How to medical’ to explore Cooper’s work and demonstrate how it operates as parodic political critique. I conclude that the affective stance of a feminist comedian models how feminists can keep surviving in the midst of post-truth crises. Such work shows how oppressive power can be engaged closely enough that deep critiques can be developed but with sufficient affective distance that feminist engagement can be sustained over time, through a multiplicity of crises. Cooper’s engagement can thus be read to generate strategies for how to (effectively) feminist affect under post-truth conditions.