Epistemic Interpretation Research Articles

Quantum Reconstructions as Stepping Stones Toward ψ-Doxastic Interpretations?

In quantum foundations, there is growing interest in the program of reconstructing the quantum formalism from clear physical principles. These reconstructions are formulated in an operational framework, deriving the formalism from information-theoretic principles. It has been recognized that this project is in tension with standard ψ-ontic interpretations. This paper presupposes that the quantum reconstruction program (QRP) (i) is a worthwhile project and (ii) puts pressure on ψ-ontic interpretations. Where does this leave us? Prima facie, it seems that ψ-epistemic interpretations perfectly fit the spirit of information-based reconstructions. However, ψ-epistemic interpretations, understood as saying that the wave functions represents one’s knowledge about a physical system, recently have been challenged on technical and conceptual grounds. More importantly, for some researchers working on reconstructions, the lesson of successful reconstructions is that the wave function does not represent objective facts about the world. Since knowledge is a factive concept, this speaks against epistemic interpretations. In this paper, I discuss whether ψ-doxastic interpretations constitute a reasonable alternative. My thesis is that if we want to engage QRP with ψ-doxastic interpretations, then we should aim at a reconstruction that is spelled out in non-factive experiential terms.

Logic Meets Wigner’s Friend (and their Friends)

We take a fresh look at Wigner’s Friend thought-experiment and some of its more recent variants and extensions, such as the Frauchiger-Renner (FR) Paradox. We discuss various solutions proposed in the literature, focusing on a few questions: What is the correct epistemic interpretation of the multiplicity of state assignments in these scenarios? Under which conditions can one include classical observers into the quantum state descriptions, in a way that is still compatible with traditional Quantum Mechanics? Under which conditions can one system be admitted as an additional ‘observer’ from the perspective of another background observer? When can the standard axioms of multi-agent Epistemic Logic (that allow “knowledge transfer” between agents) be applied to quantum-physical observers? In the last part of the paper, we propose a new answer to these questions, sketch a particular formal implementation of this answer, and apply it to obtain a principled solution to Wigner Friend-type paradoxes.

Person, People, Planet: Eco-Systematic Analysis of Older Adults’ Experiences of Engagement with Nature and Discourse About Nature

ABSTRACT This study combined ecological, environmental, nature-based, and epistemic interpretations of older adulthood to gain a previously unresearched look at how older adults feel that their relations with nature are treated by others. Sixty older adults were interviewed in-depth, and data was analyzed using the Eco-Appreciation framework and Thematic Content Analysis. The results indicate the concurrence of processes of withdrawal of older adults from spaces of nature and discourse about nature. These processes obstruct older adults’ wellbeing; entail the infliction of existential epistemic injustices and “eco-ageism” toward them; and emphasize the crucial role social work can play in responding thereto.

The surplus value of knowledge

AbstractThe Meno problem, asking for the surplus value of knowledge beyond the value of true justified belief, was recently much treated within reliabilist and virtue epistemologies. The answers from formal epistemology, by contrast, are quite poor. This paper attempts to improve the score of formal epistemology by precisely explicating Timothy Williamson's suggestion that ‘present knowledge is less vulnerable than mere present true belief to rational undermining by future evidence’. It does so by combining Nozick's sensitivity analysis of knowledge with Spohn's fact‐asserting epistemic interpretation of conditionals. Accordingly, the surplus value of knowledge lies in a specific kind of stability of knowledge, which differs, though, from that claimed by other so‐called stability analyses of knowledge.

Evidentialität in autochthonen altgermanischen Schriftdenkmälern im Vergleich zur deutschen Gegenwartssprache

Abstract The paper presents a diachronically based concept of the evidential function in the language. It is argued for a specific discourse evidentiality of the oldest autochthonic German poetry which encoded not epistemic interpretations of outer sources of information, but rather a strong guarantee for the truth of reported events. The origins of this kind of evidentiality can be found both in ontogenesis of a given language, e. g. language acquisition, and in its phylogenesis.

An Alternative Foundation of Quantum Theory

A new approach to quantum theory is proposed in this paper. The basis is taken to be theoretical variables, variables that may be accessible or inaccessible, i.e., it may be possible or impossible for an observer to assign arbitrarily sharp numerical values to them. In an epistemic process, the accessible variables are just ideal observations connected to an observer or to some communicating observers. Group actions are defined on these variables, and group representation theory is the basis for developing the Hilbert space formalism here. Operators corresponding to accessible theoretical variables are derived, and in the discrete case, it is proved that the possible physical values are the eigenvalues of these operators. The focus of the paper is some mathematical theorems paving the ground for the proposed foundation of quantum theory. It is shown here that the groups and transformations needed in this approach can be constructed explicitly in the case where the accessible variables are finite-dimensional. This simplifies the theory considerably: To reproduce the Hilbert space formulation, it is enough to assume the existence of two complementary variables. The interpretation inferred from the proposed foundation here may be called a general epistemic interpretation of quantum theory. A special case of this interpretation is QBism; it also has a relationship to several other interpretations.

Epistemic modality and grounding: constructions expressing positive epistemic judgement in Spanish and Italian from the perspective of cognitive grammar (with particular reference to the verbs credere and creer)

Abstract This paper examines the means of expressing positive epistemic judgement in Spanish and Italian: modals in their epistemic interpretation, epistemic adverb + indicative/subjunctive, with particular attention to the verbs creer/credere and their possible combination with the subjunctive. The constructions are analysed through the prism of cognitive grammar, specifically Langacker’s theory of grounding. It is argued that the different types of epistemic judgement are analogous to nominal grounding elements (demonstrative pronouns, the definite article and relative quantifiers). The subjunctive after epistemic adverbs and verbs (such as tal vez or credere) is seen as the verbal counterpart of the relative quantifier some. Analyses suggest that this analogy helps to define the semantic difference between similar structures with the indicative and to resolve questions concerning the function of the subjunctive in epistemic contexts, such as the degree of uncertainty or the speaker’s attitude towards the propositional content.

Morphosyntactic and semantic properties of Romanian modal verbs putea and trebui

The paper presents some key aspects related to the semantics of Romanian modal verbs putea, ‘can’/’may’ and trebui, ‘must’, focusing mainly on identifying the interaction between these verbs on the one hand and temporal and aspectual marking on the other. It is shown that certain temporal relations are associated with certain modal flavors. These interactions are better understood by teasing apart two distinct temporal anchors (the temporal perspective, i.e. the time of the modal evaluation), and the temporal orientation (i.e. the time of the event introduced by the lexical verb). Certain patterns emerge: for instance, deontic readings are associated with future orientation, epistemic interpretations are associated with present temporal perspective etc. Non-episodic contexts are shown to resist such generalizations.

An epistemic interpretation of responses to advice resistance on Chinese phone-ins of family problem counseling

Abstract At present, Epistemics is a popular theory in Western conversation analysis, but few scholars investigate the responses to the advice resistance on phone-ins from the perspective of Epistemics. This paper explores the responses to the advice resistance on Chinese phone-ins of family problem counseling from the perspective of Epistemics. It is found that when responding to the caller’s advice resistance, the host often implements two conversation practices, such as maintaining his/her original higher epistemic status or constructing higher epistemic status in another epistemic domain. These practices are consistent with the possibility of the host’s knowledge orientation to strong self-confidence in his/her own professional knowledge but the lack of confidence in the caller’s relevant knowledge. This study can provide enlightenment for the smooth development of advice interaction on phone-ins of family problem counseling and expand the application scope of Epistemics.

Measures of embedding for interval-valued fuzzy sets

Interval-valued fuzzy sets are a generalization of classical fuzzy sets where the membership values are intervals. The epistemic interpretation of interval-valued fuzzy sets assumes that there is one real-valued membership degree of an element within the membership interval of possible membership degrees. Considering this epistemic interpretation, we propose a new measure, called IV-embedding, to compare the precision of two interval-valued fuzzy sets. An axiomatic definition for this concept as well as a construction method are provided. The construction method is based on aggregation operators and the concept of interval embedding, which is also introduced and deeply studied.

Expertise and information: an epistemic logic perspective

In this paper we present a modal logic framework to reason about the expertise of information sources. A source is considered an expert on a proposition varphi if they are able to correctly refute varphi in any possible world where varphi is false. Closely connected with expertise is a notion of soundness of information: varphi is said to be “sound” if it is true up to lack of expertise of the source. That is, any statement logically weaker than varphi on which the source has expertise must in fact be true. This is relevant for modelling situations in which sources make claims beyond their domain of expertise. Particular attention is paid to the connection between expertise and knowledge: we show that expertise and soundness admit precise interpretations in terms of S4 and S5 epistemic logic, under certain conditions. We go on to extend the framework to multiple sources, defining two notions of collective expertise. These also have epistemic interpretations via distributed and common knowledge from multi-agent epistemic logic. On the technical side, we give several sound and complete axiomatisations of various classes of expertise models.

Learning to Live with Strange Error: Beyond Trustworthiness in Artificial Intelligence Ethics.

Position papers on artificial intelligence (AI) ethics are often framed as attempts to work out technical and regulatory strategies for attaining what is commonly called trustworthy AI. In such papers, the technical and regulatory strategies are frequently analyzed in detail, but the concept of trustworthy AI is not. As a result, it remains unclear. This paper lays out a variety of possible interpretations of the concept and concludes that none of them is appropriate. The central problem is that, by framing the ethics of AI in terms of trustworthiness, we reinforce unjustified anthropocentric assumptions that stand in the way of clear analysis. Furthermore, even if we insist on a purely epistemic interpretation of the concept, according to which trustworthiness just means measurable reliability, it turns out that the analysis will, nevertheless, suffer from a subtle form of anthropocentrism. The paper goes on to develop the concept of strange error, which serves both to sharpen the initial diagnosis of the inadequacy of trustworthy AI and to articulate the novel epistemological situation created by the use of AI. The paper concludes with a discussion of how strange error puts pressure on standard practices of assessing moral culpability, particularly in the context of medicine.

Epistemic Possibility, Concessive Knowledge Attributions, and Fallibilism

I argue that modal terms have an epistemic interpretation on which concessive knowledge attributions are semantically contradictory. This is compatible with the fallibilist view that the basis on which we know something need not entail it, but not with the view that what is known need not be epistemically certain or necessary. The apparent contradictoriness of concessive knowledge attributions is not due to mere implicature, nor to assertion updating the modal base. And it is contextually invariant. Concessive knowledge attributions contrast markedly with concessive assertions and Moorean conjunctions, whose infelicity is plausibly due to norms of assertion. I briefly explain why the strict fallibilism I recommend is compatible with our ordinary use of ‘know,’ and with our knowing much on the basis of perception. Its contextual shiftiness closely parallels our variably strict use of temporal and other invariant terms with strict application conditions.

Methodological requirements and some basic issues of quantum mechanics

Waves and particles are alternative modes of being for the elements of atomic dimensions. This feature appears to be evident at the experimental level but remains a conundrum at the theoretical level. The squared wavefunction |Ψ|2 yields the probability of finding a particle at a particular position and time, namely, the wave is conceived as a derivation or a physical condition of the particle and not a condition of the quantum. What the wavefunction represents, whether it really exists, whether it is a purely formal representation and if the observer influences the wavefunction are the major arguments of quantum mechanics (QM). The double nature of electrons, photons, and so on has been clearly recognized, and the two natures should be established by precise formulations. This work adheres totally to this methodological criterion and puts forward two formal definitions. The measurement process and wave collapse problems are also discussed. Finally, we verify the theoretical conclusions using the double slit experiment and the photoelectric effect. Probability plays a crucial role in the quantum literature, and the definitions of the wave and the particle should be illustrated by exploiting the probability theory; however, the various probability theories are not univocal and propose irreconcilable views. Therefore, in a preliminary stage, we unify the ontological and epistemic interpretations of probability using four theorems that have been already published. In summary, this work is developed on the basis of two methodological criteria, which seek to improve the probability theory and fix the definitional formulas of QM.

If they must, they will: Children overcommit to likeliness inferences from deontic modals

Modal verbs like must express two distinct non-actual meanings: deontic (e.g. obligation) and epistemic (e.g. likelihood inference). How do young children understand these modals? What factors affect their interpretation as deontic or epistemic? We report a picture preference task testing preschool children‟s interpretations of Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian (BCS) morati 'must' as deontic or epistemic. Prior work on English must shows that despite an early deontic comprehension bias at age 3, by age 5 children have flipped to a strong epistemic bias, including constructions for which adults prefer deontic interpretations (must + eventive verbs). However, properties of English leave open multiple explanations for this non-adult behaviour, as must is primarily epistemic in the input, and must + eventive verb constructions can also receive epistemic interpretations. BCS morati provides a natural comparison: morati is overwhelmingly deontic in the input, and BCS syntax provides categorical cues to deontic versus epistemic interpretation. Our results show that BCS children are more adult-like at age 3 than English children, a difference we attribute to clearer syntactic cues to flavour in BCS. But, by age 5, BCS children behave like English counterparts, selecting epistemic scenes even for constructions that are deontic-only in BCS. We argue this cross-linguistic result is best explained pragmatically: deontic uses of both morati and must invite a likelihood inference that obligations will be normatively carried out. This inference was first proposed to explain diachronic meaning changes from root > epistemic. We show older preschool children commit to this likelihood inference more than adults.

Epistemic interpretations of decentralized discrete-event system problems

Epistemic interpretations of decentralized discrete-event system problems

Inquisitive logic as an epistemic logic of knowing how

In this paper, we present an alternative interpretation of propositional inquisitive logic as an epistemic logic of knowing how. In our setting, an inquisitive logic formula α being supported by a state is formalized as knowing how to resolve α (more colloquially, knowing how α is true) holds on the S5 epistemic model corresponding to the state. Based on this epistemic interpretation, we use a dynamic epistemic logic with both know-how and know-that operators to capture the epistemic information behind the innocent-looking connectives in inquisitive logic. We show that the set of valid know-how formulas corresponds precisely to the inquisitive logic. The main result is a complete axiomatization with intuitive axioms using the full dynamic epistemic language. Moreover, we show that the know-how operator and the dynamic operator can both be eliminated without changing the expressivity over models, which is consistent with the modal translation of inquisitive logic existing in the literature. We hope our framework can give an intuitive alternative interpretation to various concepts and technical results in inquisitive logic, and also provide a powerful and flexible tool to handle both the inquisitive reasoning and declarative reasoning in an epistemic context.

Could wavefunctions simultaneously represent knowledge and reality?

In discussion of the interpretation of quantum mechanics the terms ‘ontic’ and ‘epistemic’ are often used in the sense of pertaining to what exists, and pertaining to cognition or knowledge respectively. The terms are also often associated with the formal definitions given by Harrigan and Spekkens for the wavefunction in quantum mechanics to be psi -ontic or psi -epistemic in the context of the ontological models framework. The formal definitions are contradictories, so that the wavefunction can be either psi -epistemic or psi -ontic but not both. However, we argue, nothing about the informal ideas of epistemic and ontic interpretations rules out wavefunctions representing both reality and knowledge. The implications of the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph theorem and many other issues may be rethought in the light of our analysis.

Revisiting McGee’s Probabilistic Analysis of Conditionals

This paper calls for a re-appraisal of McGee’s analysis of the semantics, logic and probabilities of indicative conditionals presented in his 1989 paper Conditional probabilities and compounds of conditionals. The probabilistic measures introduced by McGee are given a new axiomatisation—built on the principle that the antecedent of a conditional is probabilistically independent of the conditional—and a more transparent method of constructing such measures is provided. McGee’s Dutch book argument is restructured to more clearly reveal that it introduces a novel contribution to the epistemology of semantic indeterminacy, and shows that its more controversial implications are unavoidable if we want to maintain the Ramsey Test along with the standard laws of probability. Importantly, it is shown that the counterexamples that have been levelled at McGee’s analysis—generating a rather wide consensus that it yields ‘unintuitive’ or ‘wrong’ probabilities for compounds —fail to strike at their intended target; for to honour the intuitions of the counterexamples one must either give up the Ramsey Test or the standard laws of probability. It will be argued that we need to give up neither if we take the counterexamples as further evidence that the indicative conditional sometimes allows for a non-epistemic ‘causal’ interpretation alongside its usual epistemic interpretation.

Some Remarks on QBism and Its Relevance to Metaphors for the Therapeutic Process Based on Conventional Quantum Theory

Background: Signs and symptoms of dis-ease are considered observable manifestations of an immaterial Vital Force. Likewise, experimental results on quantum systems are thought to indicate the presence of something that does not show up. Consequently, the discourse of conventional quantum theory (CQT) – with non-locality and entanglement being objective (i.e., ontic) facets of reality – has been considered a useful metaphor for the therapeutic process (TP) in homeopathy/CAMs. Thus, Patient-Practitioner-Remedy (PPR) entanglement postulated an ontic non-local interaction between patient (Px), practitioner (Pr), and potentised medicine/curative procedure (Rx), resulting in the patient’s “journey to cure.” QBism is a new epistemic interpretation of quantum theory. Rooted in the subjectivity of Bayesianism, QBism refutes the notion that the quantum state of a system is a separate ontic property of reality. In QBism, non-locality and entanglement are considered an agent’s “subjective degrees of belief,” i.e., they are personally epistemic. Objective: To examine whether previous CQT-based entanglement metaphors for the therapeutic process need re-evaluation in the light of QBism. Method: Px and Rx quantum states/wavefunctions – Ψ_Px, and Ψ_Rx – are reinterpreted in QBist terms. Unlike CQT, this means each quantum state/wavefunction is postulated to represent only the local subjective “degrees of belief” of an agent who in this case, is the Pr. Results and Conclusion: Compared to earlier CQT quantum entanglement metaphors, QBism’s interpretation of the probabilities inherent in the Px and Rx quantum state/wavefunctions are Bayesian and subjective. Their resulting highly personal epistemology makes them more aligned with (and therefore potentially more useful to) how practitioners might experience the evolution of the TP. Also, because QBism predicts non-locality and entanglement can only be subjective properties of a practitioner’s own beliefs, the overall significance of previous ontic non-local CQT-based entanglement metaphors for the TP is questioned.