Epistemic Injustice Research Articles

Hysteria, Hermeneutical Injustice and Conceptual Engineering

ABSTRACT In this paper, we look at what Miranda Fricker (2007) calls “hermeneutical injustice” as it arises in the medical context. By drawing on the history of hysteria, I argue that the concept of hysteria has been held in place by power structures affected by negative prejudice against women. In this sense, the concept of hysteria fits the central conditions of the concept of hermeneutical injustice as characterized by Fricker. Yet, reflection on the case of hysteria also signals the need for widening the understanding of hermeneutical injustice. I thus propose to ameliorate the concept of hermeneutical injustice and show how, once thus ameliorated, it can be used as a powerful tool to advocate for the amelioration of the concept of woman. I then return to the concept of hysteria and argue that it is still in use in everyday contexts, where it embodies identity prejudice against women and constitutes a particularly pernicious form of put-down that perpetrates various forms of epistemic injustice. I conclude that also in that kind of context the concept of hysteria should be abandoned. Like with other loaded concepts, the only admissible uses of that concept would then be in contexts of reclaiming or re-appropriation.

Conceptualising school-level responses to sexual harassment of women teachers as institutional gaslighting

This paper conceptualises the inaction of school leadership teams in response to systemic sexual harassment as institutional gaslighting, a theoretical tool to date unutilised in studies of sexual harassment in educational settings. Drawing on case studies of two women teachers who experienced sustained sexual harassment in Australian schools, and whose leadership responded with denial, minimisation and intentional mixed messaging, we argue that schools are home to and perpetuate unequal epistemic terrains, where women’s knowing is under­mined by dominant operations of the school that work to maintain structural and cultural norms. These norms, we suggest, are informed by hegemonic masculinity and feminine stereotypes of irrationality and deviance, and prevent violence against women in schools being addressed. We argue that institutional gaslighting is a productive concept to expose the epistemic injustice that delegitimates women’s knowledge of their experience and help in addressing systemic issues with responding to sexual harassment in schools.

Epistemic injustice and the “Nature of Science”

AbstractScientists and science educators have argued that learners (students, preservice teachers, and inservice teachers) should understand knowledge construction in science, in addition to figuring out disciplinary core ideas. Given this goal, some science education scholars created a construct called the “Nature of Science” (NOS), which aims to simplify the complex work of scientific knowledge production for learners. Since the 1980s, the NOS construct has shaped national and international science education reforms with the goal of creating a more scientifically literate populace. In this article, we name and question assumptions built into the NOS construct using the philosophical perspective of epistemic injustice. Using specific lenses of contributory injustice and testimonial injustice, we analyzed the 97 most‐cited peer‐reviewed NOS journal articles to examine which scholars are selected to create the NOS construct. We also examined how researchers using NOS position learners in relation to the construct. We found that White men are primarily named by NOS scholars to inform the construct. We also found that NOS research often positions learners from a deficit perspective compared to the construct. We conclude by discussing the potential injustices perpetuated by the NOS construct, and offer a vision for a more complete story of science in sites of learning.

Delusions: Seeking epistemic justice for the most unusual of stories

The label of delusion can be so powerful that people so labelled are no longer believed or supported in preferred ways by those around them. This leads to a lack of meaningful and non-pathologising support for their significant, and at times unusual, beliefs. This phenomenon constitutes a form of epistemic injustice. To address this issue, this paper outlines specific approaches practitioners can adopt to better respond to such beliefs, illustrating these strategies with real-world examples from practice. By doing so, it aims to foster a form of epistemic justice that respects the knowledge and experience of people labelled as delusional and supports them to understand and lessen the impact of these often-distressing experiences. This paper is informed by research undertaken with people who had been labelled by psychiatry as “delusional”.

Epistemic Shortcuts and Unjust Diagnostic Practices

ABSTRACT When diagnosing psychological disorders, doctors are expected to take the mental anguish of patients and offer fast and accurate explanations. The pressure that comes with this often leaves doctors in need of epistemic shortcuts for faster diagnoses. One such epistemic shortcut is to lean on statistical data when offering a diagnosis. When used justly, doctors consider a patient’s testimony, exhibited symptoms and statistical data relating to the general features of the patient such as age, weight and sex to determine if a patient has a given disorder or illness. Practices such as this have the capacity to yield good results at a quick pace, however, such practices may also be abused. With a focus on gender statistics and psychological diagnoses, I argue that systematic practices of epistemic injustice may occur when the statistical data becomes over-valued and the epistemic privilege of patients to be able to assert their own bodily and mental experiences is ignored. This places patients at risk of misdiagnosis, long-term damage and pain, or even death. It also produces patient mistrust both of themselves and of the medical community, which can carry further repercussions for public health.

Neoliberalism in South African higher education language policy: A decolonial perspective

The global spread and hegemony of English as a medium of teaching, learning and research has come to be closely associated with neoliberalisation of higher education in the universities across the world, and has negatively impacted on epistemic issues, especially in Global South universities. No permanent solution has been found on challenges of English hegemony, particularly in African higher education. This article adds to the advancement of neoliberal discourse in higher education in South Africa by analysing neoliberal manifestations in its higher education language policy agenda. The article used desktop analysis to assess relevant literature on mainstream neoliberal ideologies and manifestations in the language policy reform post-apartheid. Drawing on relevant literature and through critical discourse analysis, it integrated evidence from the selected sources associated with mainstream neoliberal ideologies and then analysed the neoliberal manifestations in the language policy reforms pursued in South African post-apartheid context to bring out how the neoliberal actors in the higher education sector have reconfigured neoliberal principles. The decolonial perspective premised on concepts such as coloniality of being, power and knowledge was used to critique the neoliberal manifestations in South African higher education language policy directives. The paper presents the argument that universities in the country are deeply entrenched in linguistic hierarchisation which perpetuates epistemic injustices in teaching and learning. The African higher education should endeavour to underpin its language policies in indigenous knowledge systems to help harness the African content while existing in a global space where all knowledges should be regarded as equally relevant.Contribution: This article contributes to the emerging discourse of neoliberalism in higher education in the Global South and its impact on language policy formulation and implementation.

Philosophy in prison

The UK prison system is in crisis: overcrowded, understaffed, ill fitted to whatever purpose imprisonment might be intended to have. Prison education is particularly under pressure, especially since a majority of prisoners are functionally illiterate. The charity Philosophy in Prison seeks to address the complex problems of prison education by offering philosophical conversations in prisons: oral, so accessible to most, but driven by difficult philosophical questions that are puzzling to anyone. This process faces down the disadvantage suffered by many within the criminal justice system, that their voices are not heard (the problem of epistemic injustice). For these conversations have an equalising effect, since the problems they address are puzzling to anyone, whether new to it or expert. That general puzzlement allows the participant both to see the viewpoints of others, and to have their own viewpoint seen by others. This matters: it shows each prisoner that they do have standing, in themselves, after all. (This article is published in the thematic collection ‘The arts and humanities: rethinking value for today—views from Fellows of the British Academy’, edited by Isobel Armstrong.)

The Exclusion Problem in Preclinical Studies: A Case of Epistemic Injustice?

ABSTRACT Researchers in neuroscience and biomedicine tend to exclude female animal subjects from preclinical studies. As a result, they fail to consider sex as a biological variable (SABV) while testing some drug or treatment, and this in turn hinders the development of safer and more efficacious treatments for women patients (section 1.1). In section 2, I consider the proposal that this exclusion is an epistemic injustice to women patients and argue that it fails. More strongly, I show that if we accept Miranda Fricker’s notion of epistemic subjectivity, we cannot account for the exclusion even as an epistemic wrong against women patients. To account for the intuition that the exclusion is an epistemic wrong, I briefly outline a broader notion of what it means to be an epistemic subject. In section 3, I argue that the exclusion is an epistemic wrong because it violates the epistemic claim-rights of women patients. For this I use Lani Watson’s work on epistemic claim-rights. In 3.1, I defend the claim that women patients have an epistemic claim-right against researchers’ exclusion of female animal subjects from preclinical studies. Finally, in 3.2, I consider some important upshots of my thesis.

Epistemic Injustices Online

AbstractIn typical instances of epistemic injustice, the victims and perpetrators are distinct across social groups – as marginally or dominantly situated. When epistemic injustice happens, the dominantly situated typically rely on prejudicial stereotypes to prevent the marginally situated from participating in epistemic activities. This is a manifestation/ exercise of their social power. However, with anonymity on the internet, a marginally situated person can effectively pose as a dominantly situated person and vice versa. When this happens, we cannot always tell who is behind a post. Consequently, relying on differential power relations, as in typical cases of epistemic injustice, might be ineffective online. In this paper, I argue for three ways that anonymity might complicate instances of epistemic injustice online.

Applying a Framework of Epistemic Injustice to Understand the Impact of COVID-19 on People with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities

Applying a Framework of Epistemic Injustice to Understand the Impact of COVID-19 on People with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities

Challenging Prejudice as the Necessary Condition for Testimonial Injustice: Unveiling the Role of Epistemic Vice

ABSTRACT The conception of epistemic injustice as a campaign tool has generated considerable debate. The challenge lies in identifying instances of testimonial injustice within complex real-world situations. Miranda Fricker suggests that credibility deficits and identity prejudice serve as necessary conditions for recognizing testimonial injustice. However, this approach faces conceptual generalisation: certain cases that intuitively seem to fit the definition fail to meet the criteria, while some cases that meet the criteria appear counterintuitive. Addressing this issue by introducing additional conditions alongside the original ones seems ineffective and redundant. Simply reverting to Fricker’s original definition is not a straightforward solution either. Identity prejudice plays a decisive role in Fricker’s establishment of testimonial injustice, but it is itself a broad and vague concept. The blurry boundary between heuristics and prejudices has led to many difficulties. An examination of the nature of prejudice indicates that the initial prejudice condition should be modified. It is epistemic inertia, rooted in our thought processes, that serves as the catalyst rendering heuristics unreliable and triggering various epistemic vices, including identity prejudice. Therefore, the prejudice condition is too narrow, while the superordinate concept of epistemic vice is more fundamental as a necessary condition for testimonial injustice.

Epistemic emotions and self-trust

AbstractEpistemic emotions – namely affective phenomena like curiosity, certainty, and doubt – have been claimed to play a key role in epistemic evaluation and motivation, and, relatedly, to be an integral aspect of the epistemic virtues. In this paper I argue that the experience of epistemic emotions is extensively shaped by self-trust. More specifically, I claim that the set of epistemic emotions that we can undergo, and how these unfold over time, is modulated by the level of trust in one’s abilities as a knower. I do so by drawing on research on epistemic injustice, as well as through the exploration of some features of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and depression. I then argue that the connection between epistemic emotions and self-trust can be best accounted for by conceiving of self-trust, through the framework of philosophical phenomenology, as an affective background orientation which has a structuring role in our cognitive and affective experience.

Religion, Psychiatry, and “Radical” Epistemic Injustices

Religion, Psychiatry, and “Radical” Epistemic Injustices

Defining a Nation: Métis Nation Building in the Face of Epistemic Injustice

Abstract: Over the past four decades, Indigenous political claims "in" Canada have come increasingly to assume a nationalist form. Efforts at instilling a national identity play an abundantly clear role in Indigenous nation (re)building: they hold the potential to concretize internal solidarity, mobilize community to pursue long-term goals, and they aid in overcoming a host of collective action problems. However, for national claims to play such a role, it is necessary that outside groups recognize a community's national identity and accept it as distinct. That is to say, nationhood must be thought about in terms of its occurrence in an (unequally) relational context: claims to a national distinction occur in competition with other claims, in a field of struggle and competition in which actors possess varying abilities to enforce/support claims and to have those claims recognized by others. In this regard, the concept of epistemic injustice is especially useful to engage with the differential capacity of communities to claim and enforce national claims unto others. Our analysis, which focuses specifically on the case of the Métis, pays particular attention to the widespread misrecognitions that occur when a dominant social group marginalizes Métis claims to nationhood. Through this exploration, our article contributes to a better understanding of relational conditions overall and the ways in which identity and nationhood can support the process of Indigenous nation building.

Models of Disability as Research Frameworks in Biology Education Research.

Advancing equity and justice in undergraduate biology education requires research to address the experiences of disabled students. Scholars working in disability studies have developed models of disability that inform Discipline-Based Education Research (DBER). To date, DBER literature has been predominantly informed by the medical and social models of disability. The medical model focuses on challenges that affect people with disabilities on an individual basis, while the social model focuses on how one's surrounding environment contributes to the construction of disability. In this essay, we discuss past DBER research and opportunities for future research using each of these models. We will also discuss a third, less commonly used model that offers exciting opportunities to drive future research: complex embodiment. Complex embodiment positions disability as a social location that reflects a greater societal value structure. Further examining this value structure reveals how ability itself is constructed and conventionally understood to be hierarchical. Additionally, we explain epistemic injustice as it affects disabled people, and how future education research can both address and counteract this injustice. We discuss how expanding the frameworks that serve as lenses for DBER scholarship on disability will offer new research directions.

Knowledge production and epistemic injustices

This article explores the complexities emerging from the knowing subject engaging in knowledge generation through artificial intelligence and digital technologies. By exploring a recent literature review as our case study, the possible existence of biases that may distort the studied reality and generate epistemic inequalities is investigated. A reflexive approach drawn from decolonial and feminist perspectives is applied. Findings underline the presence of epistemic biases, such as the invisibility of the knowing subject and knowledge representation, indicating that they are not simple isolated biases but part of a systemic problem that transcends specific scientific and technological practices. Ultimately, the complexity leading to epistemic biases is highlighted, encompassing interconnected systems, including the scientific, technological, and institutional.

Towards an Epistemic Compass for Online Content Moderation

The internet provides easy access to a wealth of information that can sometimes be false and harmful. This is most apparent on social media platforms. To combat this, platforms have implemented various methods of content moderation to flag or block content that is inaccurate or violates community standards. This approach has limitations – from the epistemic injustices that might occur due to content moderation practices to the concerns about the legitimacy of these for-profit platforms’ epistemic authority. In this paper, I highlight some of the epistemic challenges of online content moderation with a focus on how it harms internet users and moderators. If we are to moderate content effectively and ethically, we must attend to these challenges. Hence, I map out an epistemic compass for online content moderation that looks to attend to these challenges. I argue for a pluralistic model of content moderation that categorises content online and distributes the task of content moderation between human moderators, automated moderators, and community moderators in a way that plays to the strengths of each content moderation model. My compass is beneficial for two reasons: first, it allows room for the internet to realise its potential as a democratising force for knowledge, and second, it helps minimise the epistemic downsides of relying on profit-driven companies as epistemic authorities.

Are there 34,000 human emotions? Deconstructing patterns of scientific misinformation

ABSTRACT Background Scientific misinformation is a much-discussed topic, and the COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the importance of reliability in science and research. However, limiting misinformation is complicated because of the growing number of communication channels, in which scientific and nonscientific content are often mixed. Methods This case study combines the examination of references, online observation, and a content and frequency analysis to investigate the dissemination of scientific misinformation in the interplay of different genres and media. Results Using the example of the claimed existence of 34,000 human emotions, this study demonstrates how questionable statements are spread in science, popular science, and pseudoscience, making it particularly challenging to track and correct them. Conclusions The findings highlight epistemic authority, trust, and injustice within and between scientific and nonscientific communities. The author argues that, in the digital age, researchers should defend and monitor scientific principles beyond academia.

Just pluralism: thinking about concepts of mental disorder in global context

This paper will investigate justice requirements that a pluralist stance on concepts of mental disorder should meet for use on a global scale. This is important given that different concepts of mental disorder are connected to particular interventions which may be more or less successful in specific contexts. While taking a broadly normative view on mental disorders, I will describe relevant concepts in a more fine grained manner, referring to their connections to particular approaches to biology, the self, or community. Drawing on research on epistemic injustice, I highlight the requirement that the set of multiple concepts be sufficiently flexible to enable the participation of those possessing relevant local knowledge. Using insights from health justice, I point out that the set of concepts should be conducive to distributive and procedural justice with regard to mental health and should support interventions on social determinants of health. These requirements apply to two dimensions of pluralism: regarding what concepts to include and how to relate them to one another. I conclude by explaining how an ontology of partial overlaps connected to a concept of health as metaphysically social can help address the challenges arising particularly regarding the latter dimension.

Integration of democratic values in natural sciences education: A Literature Review of the last 50 Years

This study examines how democratic values have been promoted through natural sciences education over the last 50 years, providing a comprehensive analysis based on a systematic review of relevant literature. The central problem addressed is understanding the role of natural science education in fostering democratic values such as equity, participation, critical thinking, and ethical responsibility. This research aims to identify and analyze strategies, methodologies, and transformative experiences that contribute to the promotion of democratic values. This study employs the PRISMA methodology to ensure a rigorous and structured systematic review. Data were collected from multiple databases using detailed Boolean equations. Tools such as ScientoPy and VOSviewer were used for data preprocessing, clustering, and network visualization, followed by qualitative analysis to categorize the findings. Educational programs in natural sciences have increasingly integrated democratic values, fostering a culture of inclusivity and participation; the incorporation of ICT has enhanced equity and participation, while civic education has been fundamental in developing critical and informed citizens; citizen science initiatives have empowered students to engage in democratic deliberation and address epistemic injustice; cooperative learning methods in science classes have effectively promoted gender equity and inclusion; and emphasis on sustainability and environmental justice in science education has promoted democratic values and empowered students to take action on global challenges. In conclusion, natural science education is an effective vehicle for promoting democratic values, but it is an understudied field. By integrating practices that emphasize inclusivity, critical thinking, and ethical responsibility, science education not only enhances students’ scientific understanding but also prepares them to be active, informed, and responsible citizens.