Epistemic Criteria Research Articles

How Should Creationism and Intelligent Design be Dealt with in the Classroom?

Until recently, little attention has been paid in the school classroom to creationism and almost none to intelligent design. However, creationism and possibly intelligent design appear to be on the increase and there are indications that there are more countries in which schools are becoming battle-grounds over them. I begin by examining whether creationism and intelligent design are controversial issues, drawing on Robert Dearden's epistemic criterion of the controversial and more recent responses to and defences of this. I then examine whether the notion of 'worldviews' in the context of creationism is a useful one by considering the film March of the Penguins. I conclude that the 'worldviews' perspective on creationism is useful for two reasons: first it indicates the difficulty of using the criterion of reason to decide whether an issue is controversial or not; secondly, it suggests that standard ways of addressing the diversity of student views in a science classroom may be inadequate. I close by examining the implications of this view for teaching in science lessons and elsewhere, for example in religious education lessons and citizenship lessons and at primary level where subject divisions cannot be made in so clear-cut a manner. © 2011 The Author. Journal compilation © 2011 Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.

Admissibility and Event-Rationality

Brandenburger et al. (2008) establish epistemic foundations for rationality and common assumption of rationality (RCAR), where rationality includes admissibility, using lexicographic type structures. Their negative result that RCAR is empty whenever the type structure is complete and continuous suggests that iterated admissibility (IA) requires players to have prior knowledge about each other, and therefore is a strong solution concept, not at the same level as iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies (IEDS). We follow an alternative approach using standard type structures and show that IA can be generated in a complete and continuous type structure. A strategy is event-rational if it is a best response to a conjecture, as usual, and in addition it passes a “tie-breaking” test based on a set E of strategies of the other player. Event-rationality and common belief in event-rationality (RCBER) is characterized by a solution concept we call hypo-admissible sets and, in a complete structure, generates the strategies that are admissible and survive the iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies (Dekel and Fudenberg (1990)). Extending event-rationality by adding what a player is certain about the other’s strategies as a tie-breaking set to each round of mutual belief we get common belief of extended event-rationality (RCBeER), which generates a more restrictive solution concept than the SAS (Brandenburger et al. (2008)) and in a complete structure produces the IA strategies. Contrary to the negative result in Brandenburger et al. (2008), we show that RCBER and RCBeER are nonempty in complete, continuous and compact type structures, therefore providing an epistemic criterion for IA

Globalization and the Growth of International Educational Testing and National Assessment

Education has long been characterized as a central requirement for national economic development and political democratization in the contemporary world. Moreover, international benchmarking has been identified as the “basis for improvement. . . . It is only through such benchmarking that countries can understand relative strengths and weaknesses of their education systems and identify best practices and ways forward” (OECD 2006, 18). Statements such as this example signal an international consensus that has emerged— at least among “developed” countries—about the legitimacy and, even more so, the necessity of international testing and national assessment. As David P. Baker and Gerald K. LeTendre (2005) observe, both international testing and national assessment are linked to efforts to reform educational systems and are often themselves stimuli for further cycles of reform. The results of international testing, they note, will fuel further interest in national assessment. Here we develop an argument about the global forces that have led to the explosive growth of national educational assessment and international testing. In particular, we argue that the international acceptance of testing comes from key ideological forces in the world polity that are associated with the accelerating globalization of national and international cultural, economic, and political structures. As we develop and warrant this argument, we also qualify it by pointing out that national adaptations to this larger world culture may vary depending on the presence and capacities of international organizations and regional associations that act to mediate and adapt these changes to conditions in individual countries. In addition, we consider the effects of subnational movements in introducing pressures for change that may favor more national assessment.

Argumentation in School Science: Breaking the Tradition of Authoritative Exposition Through a Pedagogy that Promotes Discussion and Reasoning

The value of argumentation in science education has become internationally recognised and has been the subject of many research studies in recent years. Successful introduction of argumentation activities in learning contexts involves extending teaching goals beyond the understanding of facts and concepts, to include an emphasis on cognitive and metacognitive processes, epistemic criteria and reasoning. The authors focus on the difficulties inherent in shifting a tradition of teaching from one dominated by authoritative exposition to one that is more dialogic, involving small-group discussion based on tasks that stimulate argumentation. The paper focuses on how argumentation activities have been designed in school science. Examples of classroom dialogue where teachers adopt the frameworks/plans are analysed to show how argumentation processes are scaffolded. The analysis shows that several layers of interpretation are needed and these layers need to be aligned for successful implementation.

Passionate Utterance and Moral Education

This paper explores Stanley Cavell's notion of ‘passionate utterance’, which acts as an extension of/departure from (we might read it as both) J. L. Austin's theory of the performative. Cavell argues that Austin having made the revolutionary discovery that truth claims in language are bound up with how words perform, then gets bogged by convention when discussing what is done ‘by’ words. In failing to account for the less predictable, unconventional aspects of language, the latter therefore washes his hands of the expressive passionate aspects of speech. To ignore such aspects is to ignore an important moral dimension of language. Finally, I bring Cavell's approach to bear on the epistemic criterion, which Michael Hand applies in his paper ‘Should We Teach Homosexuality as a Controversial Issue?’. I suggest that Hand's approach, by failing to account for the linguistic dimension of truth and the expressive quality that accompanies this dimension, presents an overly narrow conception of moral education.

The epistemological limits of experience-based exclusive religious belief

AbstractAlvin Plantinga and other philosophers have argued that exclusive religious belief can be rationally held in response to certain experiences – independently of inference to other beliefs, evidence, arguments, and the like – and thus can be ‘properly basic’. We think that this is possible only until the believer acquires the defeater we develop in this paper, a defeater which arises from an awareness of certain salient features of religious pluralism. We argue that, as a consequence of this defeater, continued epistemic support for exclusive religious belief will require the satisfaction of non-basic epistemic criteria (such as evidence and/or argumentation). But then such belief will no longer be properly basic. If successful, we will have presented a challenge not only to Plantinga's position, but also to the general view (often referred to as ‘reformed epistemology’) according to which exclusive religious belief can be properly basic.

WHAT SHOULD WE TEACH AS CONTROVERSIAL? A DEFENSE OF THE EPISTEMIC CRITERION

Abstract There is an emerging consensus that to teach something as controversial is to present it as a matter on which different views are or could be held and to expound those different views as impartially as possible. This raises an important normative question that has yet to receive the attention it deserves from educational theorists: how are we to decide which topics to teach in this way? The answer suggested by Robert Dearden is that we should apply the epistemic criterion: a matter should be taught as controversial when contrary views can be held on it without those views being contrary to reason. In this essay, Michael Hand aims to defend that answer. In the first part of the article he revisits Dearden’s rather thin and unsatisfactory justification for the epistemic criterion and attempts to mend its deficiencies. In the second part, Hand examines an alternative to the epistemic criterion in the area of moral education, an alternative he labels the political criterion, and explains why he thinks we should reject it.

A Looser "Canon"? Relating William Abraham's "Canon and Criterion in Christian Theology" to Biblical Interpretation

Abstract In his important book, William Abraham criticizes "a long-standing misinterpretation of ecclesial canons as epistemic criteria." He also defines "canon" in such a way that Scripture is not the canon but rather one entity in a network of "materials, persons, and practices officially or semi-officially identified and set apart as a means of grace and salvation by the Christian community." This paper discerns and evaluates the entailments of Abraham's viewpoint for biblical interpretation. Although Abraham's approach offers the opportunity to explore a more classic and even Eastern Orthodox perspective, biblical and historical considerations should moderate his critique of the Western heritage. His theological emphasis on means of grace is a helpful corrective. Yet we must avoid false dichotomies between soteriology and epistemology: Regulating the church's dogmatic and ethical teaching is a crucial way in which biblical texts mediate grace. A brief example from Eccl 12:9–14 enables us to see more clearly what it means to read Scripture "canonically": one of Scripture's gracious functions is goading us to read soteriologically, yet we do so in light of the pressure exerted by the received wisdom teaching that is passed on to us through biblical texts.

A Looser "Canon"? Relating William Abraham's "Canon and Criterion in Christian Theology" to Biblical Interpretation

Abstract In his important book, William Abraham criticizes "a long-standing misinterpretation of ecclesial canons as epistemic criteria." He also defines "canon" in such a way that Scripture is not the canon but rather one entity in a network of "materials, persons, and practices officially or semi-officially identified and set apart as a means of grace and salvation by the Christian community." This paper discerns and evaluates the entailments of Abraham's viewpoint for biblical interpretation. Although Abraham's approach offers the opportunity to explore a more classic and even Eastern Orthodox perspective, biblical and historical considerations should moderate his critique of the Western heritage. His theological emphasis on means of grace is a helpful corrective. Yet we must avoid false dichotomies between soteriology and epistemology: Regulating the church's dogmatic and ethical teaching is a crucial way in which biblical texts mediate grace. A brief example from Eccl 12:9–14 enables us to see more clearly what it means to read Scripture "canonically": one of Scripture's gracious functions is goading us to read soteriologically, yet we do so in light of the pressure exerted by the received wisdom teaching that is passed on to us through biblical texts.

Unmasking the Truth Beneath the Beauty: Why the Supposed Aesthetic Judgements Made in Science May Not Be Aesthetic at All

In this article I examine the status of putative aesthetic judgements in science and mathematics. I argue that if the judgements at issue are taken to be genuinely aesthetic they can be divided into two types, positing either a disjunction or connection between aesthetic and epistemic criteria in theory/proof assessment. I show that both types of claim face serious difficulties in explaining the purported role of aesthetic judgements in these areas. I claim that the best current explanation of this role, McAllister's ‘aesthetic induction’ model, fails to demonstrate that the judgements at issue are genuinely aesthetic. I argue that, in light of these considerations, there are strong reasons for suspecting that many, and perhaps all, of the supposedly aesthetic claims are not genuinely aesthetic but are in fact ‘masked’ epistemic assessments.

Educational research as a practical science

This article offers a philosophical contribution to recent debates about the assessment of quality in educational research. It shows how criticisms of the quality of educational research—pointing to its failure to meet epistemic criteria of rigour and practical criteria of relevance—are an inevitable manifestation of the flawed assumption that educational research is to be understood as a species of modern social science. It draws on Furlong and Oancea’s study of quality in practice‐based research, Gadamer’s critique of modern social science and Lagemann’s historical account of the origins and evolution of educational research in the USA, to argue for a reconstruction of educational research as a species of Aristotelian practical science.

Distinguishing between knowledge and beliefs: students’ epistemic criteria for differentiating

“I believe that he/she is telling the truth”, “I know about the solar system”: what epistemic criteria do students use to distinguish between knowledge and beliefs? If knowing and believing are conceptually distinguishable, do students of different grade levels use the same criteria to differentiate the two constructs? How do students understand the relationship between the two constructs? This study involved 219 students (116 girls and 103 boys); 114 were in 8th grade and 105 in 13th grade. Students had to (a) choose which of 5 graphic representations outlined better the relationship between the two constructs and to justify their choice; (b) rate a list of factual/validated, non-factual/non-validated and ambiguous statements as either knowledge or belief, and indicate for each statement their degree of truthfulness, acceptance and on which sources their views were based. Qualitative and quantitative analysis were performed. The data showed how students distinguish knowledge from belief conceptually and justify their understanding of the relationship between the two constructs. Although most students assigned a higher epistemic status to knowledge, school grade significantly differentiated the epistemic criteria used to distinguish the two constructs. The study indicates the educational importance of considering the notions of knowledge and belief that students bring into the learning situation.

Should we teach homosexuality as a controversial issue?

Philosophers of education disagree on how the question of the moral status of homosexual acts should be tackled in the classroom. Some argue that the question should be taught as a controversial issue, that we should present rival moral positions as even-handedly as possible; others maintain that we should actively promote the view that homosexual acts are morally legitimate or unproblematic. Here I attempt to resolve this disagreement. In the first part of the article I defend the use of Robert Dearden's epistemic criterion for identifying the questions that should be taught as controversial issues. In the second part I argue that the question of the moral status of homosexual acts does not satisfy this criterion because moral objections to homosexuality are rationally indefensible. I conclude that we ought to affirm the moral legitimacy of homosexual acts in the moral education of children and young people.

Is the mind Bayesian? The case for agnosticism

This paper aims to make explicit the methodological conditions that should be satisfied for the Bayesian model to be used as a normative model of human probability judgment. After noticing the lack of a clear definition of Bayesianism in the psychological literature and the lack of justification for using it, a classic definition of subjective Bayesianism is recalled, based on the following three criteria: an epistemic criterion, a static coherence criterion and a dynamic coherence criterion. Then it is shown that the adoption of this framework has two kinds of implications. The first one regards the methodology of the experimental study of probability judgment. The Bayesian framework creates pragmatic constraints on the methodology that are linked to the interpretation of, and the belief in, the information presented, or referred to, by an experimenter in order for it to be the basis of a probability judgment by individual participants. It is shown that these constraints have not been satisfied in the past, and the question of whether they can be satisfied in principle is raised and answered negatively. The second kind of implications consists of two limitations in the scope of the Bayesian model. They regard (1) the background of revision (the Bayesian model considers only revising situations but not updating situations), and (2) the notorious case of the null priors. In both cases Lewis’ rule is an appropriate alternative to Bayes’ rule, but its use faces the same operational difficulties.

Assessing expert interdisciplinary work at the frontier: an empirical exploration

How does one ascertain the quality of interdisciplinary work, when criteria from individual disciplines do not suffice? Assessment is one of the most important and least understood aspects of interdisciplinary research. An empirical study of interdisciplinary work in five established research institutions, reveals that experts prioritize peer review, journal prestige, citation patterns, and successful patent filing, as indicators of quality interdisciplinary work, while also viewing these indicators with skepticism. Three epistemic criteria to assess interdisciplinary work are revealed: (1) the degree to which new insights relate to antecedent disciplinary knowledge in multiple disciplines involved, (2) the sensible balance reached in weaving disciplinary perspectives together, and (3) the effectiveness with which the integration of disciplines advances understanding and inquiry. These criteria may inform the task of reviewers and evaluators of interdisciplinary research outcomes by attending to some of the unique epistemic demands that this type of work presents.

Die Lehre an der Universität Jena als Beitrag zur deutschen Debatte um Lavoisiers Chemie

Summary The German debate about Lavoisier’s chemistry started late, was confined to the theory of combustion, mainly focused on two experiments and was closed relatively soon. The perspective from academic teaching allows a better understanding of these features. There was a far-reaching correspondence between the usual practice of academic chemistry teachers and the epistemic criteria taken to be relevant during the debate about Lavoisier’s chemistry. A case study based on textbooks written or used at the University of Jena between 1790 and 1800 allows drawing conclusions about why and how academic chemists succeeded in integrating what was seen as the “chemical revolution” without revolutionising their own practice. If the debate had any profound impact on German chemistry at all, it was the consolidation of the rupture between academic teachers and their apothecary colleagues.

Infrared metaphysics: radiation and theory-choice. Part 2

We continue our discussion of the competing arguments in favour of the unified theory and the pluralistic theory of radiation advanced by three nineteenth-century pioneers: Herschel, Melloni, and Draper. Our narrative is structured by a consideration of the epistemic criteria relevant to theory-choice; the epistemic focus highlights many little-known aspects of this relatively well-known episode. We argue that the acceptance of light-heat unity (and of the unified theory of radiation more generally) in this period cannot be credibly justified on the basis of common evaluative criteria such as simplicity and standard notions of explanatory power. Whether the consensus was justified by some other criteria remains an open question.

Diversity in clinical guidelines: the role of repertoires of evaluation

Clinical practice guidelines are one of the main tools by which clinicians, policy makers and patients hope to make health care less variable, more reliable and efficient, but there is little understanding of the processes by which clinical guidance is put together by guideline groups. This paper describes the social organisation of knowledge within clinical practice guideline development processes by drawing on the sociology of situated judgement. Two guideline development processes were observed, and the development group meetings ( N = 21 ) recorded and analysed qualitatively. Data analysis suggested that clinical guidance comes to existence through the combination of repertoires of evaluation, organised around four different epistemic criteria: robustness, usability, acceptability and adequacy. This research provides a detailed and layered understanding of the knowledge dynamics involved in developing recommendations for appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstance.

WHAT DO TEACHERS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT TEACHING? A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE OCCUPATIONAL KNOWLEDGE OF TEACHERS

ABSTRACT: Various attempts to specify the nature of professions in general and of teaching in particular in relation to the knowledge that is needed for practice are considered. It is argued that there is no epistemic or moral criterion of professionalism that will sustain the claim of teaching to be a profession. The nature of teachers’ knowledge is examined and the relationship between theory and application is seen to be both crucial to and problematic in our understanding of the nature of teachers’ work. The implications of the discussion for teacher education are assessed.

Is the precautionary principle unscientific?

The precautionary principle holds that we should not allow scientific uncertainty to prevent us from taking precautionary measures in response to potential threats that are irreversible and potentially disastrous. Critics of the principle claim that it deters progress and development, is excessively risk-aversive and is unscientific. This paper argues that the principle can be scientific provided that (1) the threats addressed by the principle are plausible threats, and (2) the precautionary measures adopted are reasonable. The paper also argues that one may use epistemic criteria, such as consistency, coherence and explanatory power, to determine whether a threat is plausible, and that one may use practical considerations, such as effectiveness, proportionality, cost-effectiveness, realism and consistency, to determine whether a response to a threat is reasonable.