Epistemic Claims Research Articles

Children’s developing understanding that even reliable sources need to verify their claims

In a society inundated with information, fostering empirical habits of mind in young children is critically important. Perhaps the most fundamental epistemic principle is that claims, no matter who is making them, must be supported by sufficient evidence. Building on past research on young children’s selective social learning, three experiments with 3- to 7-year-old children (N = 136) investigated when children come to understand this central principle. The results suggest clear age differences: By age 4, children consistently selected an individual who verified their claims over one who did not and by age 6, children were able to do so even if that act of verification conflicted with that individual’s past history of reliability. Further, with age, children’s ability to explicitly justify those choices in terms of informants’ epistemic practices improved dramatically. Overall, this work presents an important next step in investigating children’s developing understanding of the process by which evidence supports epistemic claims.

Why Epistemic Reductionism Won\u2019t Save the Moral Error Theorist

Moral error theorists often respond to the epistemic companions in guilt strategy by adopting the Disparity Response: reject the putative parity between moral and epistemic reasons and claim that though the former are irreducibly normative, the latter aren’t. I argue such a response fails. Expanding on Das’ Australas J Philos 95(1):58–69, (2017) work I present a master argument against Disparity Responses: the arguments moral error theorists use to advance their conceptual claim apply in the epistemic domain also. This prohibits the error theorist from adopting epistemic reductionism. I use Jonas Olson’s work as exemplary of moral error theory. I demonstrate that Olson’s (2014) argument that the rhetorical authority of moral claims is best explained by the error theorist’s conceptual claim applies equally in the epistemic case. Olson (2018) attempts to avoid this by claiming that epistemic claims are reducible to claims about whether our doxastic attitudes live up to their functions. There are two problems with Olson’s (2018) argument. Firstly, functional reasons are a species of a common genus – standards reasons – and since Olson’s authority argument against moral reductionism applies to standards reasons, it applies to functional reasons. Secondly, Olson’s (2018) claim that we cannot also cast moral reasons as functional is under-supported. I suggest that there is plausible evidence that we can and undermine his arguments against this claim. I do not argue that the epistemic companions in guilt strategy demonstrates the falsity of moral error theory. Rather, I argue that the Disparity Response to the epistemic companions in guilt strategy fails.

The Show Must go on! Legitimization Processes Surrounding Certified Fraud Examiners’ Claim to Expertise

This article investigates how the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) sought to gain legitimacy among its members as a group possessing expertise in the prevention and detection of fraud. Using theoretical concepts devised by Goffman [1959. The presentation of self in everyday life. Garden City, NY: Doubleday] about performance and impression management, the ACFE’s performance is studied from the perspective of the show put on by the association’s leaders, and through our analysis of the response to this show from its members. Thanks to sophisticated data collection (ethnographic endeavor, interviews with CFEs, and document analysis), we found that the ACFE’s promotional machinery comprises pragmatic, moral, and epistemic claims. Our analysis indicates that pragmatic legitimacy plays a central role in enrolling members as ambassadors of the CFE designation – in spite of the skepticism that they tend to have regarding the association’s moral and epistemic claims. We are therefore confronted with a spread of claims to expertise taking place despite a degree of internal discordance – as if member discomfort with certain aspects of their association’s discourse is immaterial to the construction of the association’s external legitimacy. Ultimately, our findings lead us to reflect on the social value associated with the spread of credentialism in today’s society.

Turn-sharing revisited: An exploration of simultaneous speech in interactions between couples

This paper investigates one particular type of simultaneous speech, namely turn-sharing, in the Freiburg Sofa Talks, a corpus of video-recorded dyadic conversations between partners, friends, and siblings who are recollecting events they have experienced together in the past. The focus is on interactions in German and French. In turn-sharing, participants aim at saying the same thing at the same time, using these moments to convey something to each other, and occasionally to a third party in the room. We identify two different types of turn-sharing, choral performance and chiming in, which are brought off by different micro-practices with verbal, prosodic, and bodily resources. Each type achieves something different interactionally, either displaying a shared affective stance towards something in an alternative world or embodying an epistemic claim to know as much as the main speaker. We conclude that choral performance and chiming in are two sedimented formats for turn-sharing that are achieved with different practices using semiotic resources that are comparable, if not identical, across languages.

The Dislocation of News Journalism: A Conceptual Framework for the Study of Epistemologies of Digital Journalism

This article focuses on news journalism, social media platforms and power, and key implications for epistemology. The conceptual framework presented is intended to inspire and guide future studies relating to the emerging sub-field of journalism research that we refer to as “Epistemologies of Digital Journalism”. The article discusses the dependencies between news media and social media platforms (non-proprietary to the news media). The authority and democratic role of news journalism pivot on claims that it regularly provides accurate and verified public knowledge. However, how are the epistemic claims of news journalism and the practices of justifications affected by news journalism’s increased dependency on social media platforms? This is the overall question discussed in this article. It focuses on the intricate power dependencies between news media and social media platforms and proceeds to discuss implications for epistemology. It presents a three-fold approach differentiating between (1) articulated knowledge and truth claims, (2) justification in the journalism practices and (3) the acceptance/rejections of knowledge claims in audience activities. This approach facilitates a systematic analysis of how diverse aspects of epistemology interrelate with, and are sometimes conditioned by, the transformations of news and social media.

Ontology of the Collective Experimentalist

In this article, the collective experimenter, arising in scientific projects from those modeled on the Alvarez group to megascience, is studied in the framework of the model of trading zones, as well as Actor-Network Theory. The collective experimenter is defined as a network of actors whose forms are trading zones, including the core – the empirical collective subject of cognition – and the peripheral part. The multitude of actors of the collective experimenter includes the core, as well as the community of intentions and the external actors that are part of the periphery of the collective experimenter. Attention is focused on the differences between the author of epistemic claims, the subject of cognition and scientific collaboration. A classification of collective experimentalists is proposed that includes four types of ontologies. The classification is applied to JINR scientific projects, and within its framework projects of the Alvarez type, big science, proto-megascience and megascience are distinguished. Ways of developing projects to the megascience-level through the formation of cores-communicative communities in the structure of the collective experimenter are proposed. Premised on the results obtained, recommendations are formulated for the development of the JINR experiments program.

Dialogic Consensus in Medicine-A Justification Claim.

The historical emphasis of medical ethics, based on substantive frameworks and principles derived from them, is no longer seen as sufficiently sensitive to the moral pluralism characteristic of our current era. We argue that moral decision-making in clinical situations is more properly derived from a process of dialogic consensus. This process entails an inclusive, noncoercive, and self-reflective dialogue within the community affected. In order to justify this approach, we make two claims-the first epistemic, and the second normative. The epistemic claim follows from Habermas' "ways" of knowing. We argue that the dialogue emanating from this episteme focuses on the relevant facts about the patient, as well as on the values attached to these facts, thus allowing facts and their meanings to serve as the basis for reflective action appropriate to the circumstances. The normative claim follows from Habermas' discourse theory of morality and communicative action. It determines that clinical decision-making should be approached from the perspective of the actual reality of people in their situation of illness, set in their socio-cultural background, and hence be grounded in the second-person perspective. Relocating ethical decision-making from a monological space into one characterized by dialogue is especially appropriate to the clinical encounter.

Defining in talk-in-interaction: Recipient-design through negative definitional components

This article examines a recurrent format that speakers use for defining ordinary expressions or technical terms. Drawing on data from four different languages—Flemish, French, German, and Italian—it focuses on definitions in which a definiendum is first followed by a negative definitional component (‘definiendum is not X’), and then by a positive definitional component (‘definiendum is Y’). The analysis shows that by employing this format, speakers display sensitivity towards a potential meaning of the definiendum that recipients could have taken to be valid. By negating this meaning, speakers discard this possible, yet unintended understanding. The format serves three distinct interactional purposes: (a) it is used for argumentation, e.g. in discussions and political debates, (b) it works as a resource for imparting knowledge, e.g. in expert talk and instructions, and (c) it is employed, in ordinary conversation, for securing the addressee's correct understanding of a possibly problematic expression. The findings contribute to our understanding of how epistemic claims and displays relate to the turn-constructional and sequential organization of talk. They also show that the much quoted ‘problem of meaning’ is, first and foremost, a participant's problem.

Creating participatory expert bodies. How the targeted selection of policy advisers can bridge the epistemic-democratic divide

ABSTRACTThis study explores the room for reconciliation between democratic and epistemic claims to modern policy-making. The key institutional design question it deals with is how to compose arenas of policy advice and consultation in such a way that they are able to generate both reliable, knowledge-based policy solutions and represent the perspectives of those affected – without becoming dysfunctional. After an inclusive re-conceptualisation of ‘participation’ and ‘expertise’, the study compares different group selection mechanisms in terms of their epistemic and democratic merits and makes the case for the ‘targeted selection’ of policy advisors in the phase of policy development. It delineates conditions of creating ‘participatory expert bodies’ that are primarily made up of societal stakeholders from intermediary organisations, who can assume the double role of expert and civil society representative and are supported by researchers, civil servants and lay citizens.

Older (but not younger) preschoolers reject incorrect knowledge claims.

As epistemic and normative learners, children are dependent on their developing skills for evaluating others' claims. This competence seems particularly important in the current digital age in which children need to discern valid from invalid assertions about the world in both real-life and virtual interactions to ultimately gather and accumulate robust knowledge. We investigated whether younger and older preschoolers (N=48) understand that a speaker's knowledge claim ('I know where X is') may be correct or incorrect given objectively accessible information (about whether the speaker had perceptual access to a critical event). We found that both younger and older preschoolers accepted correct knowledge claims that matched observable reality, but that only older preschoolers reliably rejected incorrect knowledge claims that did not match reality (the speaker lacked perceptual access). Nevertheless, a considerable proportion of younger preschoolers both rejected incorrect knowledge claims and gave valid explanations, suggesting that the ability to scrutinize epistemic claims develops gradually from around 3 to 4years of age. These findings may help integrate research on children's norm and theory of mind development. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? Preschoolers understand that non-epistemic claims (e.g., 'This is an X!') may be correct or incorrect, and they track a speaker's relevant characteristics in testimonial situations. It is not known what preschoolers understand about the validity of epistemic (knowledge) claims (e.g., 'I know that X'). What does this study add? Younger and older preschoolers accepted correct knowledge claims (children observed that a speaker saw a critical event and was thus knowledgeable). Only older preschoolers reliably rejected incorrect knowledge claims (the speaker did not see the critical event). Nevertheless, a considerable proportion of younger preschoolers showed competence in their evaluation of, and reasoning about, incorrect knowledge claims. Findings suggest that the ability to evaluate epistemic claims develops gradually from around 3 to 4years of age.

The Rietdijk-Putnam (Penrose) Argument.

In this paper, I discuss an argument inspired by the relativity of simultaneity (RoS). That argument purports to establish views such as four-dimensionalism, eternalism and, chiefly, determinism. I will present the most important versions of the argument and point out the differences between them — including Gödel’s version and the idealistic view of time that naturally goes with it. Gödel’s version differs from the others in that he doesn’t endorse determinism. The argument depends crucially on how one interprets Special Relativity (SR). In addition, defenders of the argument make certain semantic and epistemic claims, which lead to an alleged incompatibility between indeterminism and our best theory of time. At the end, I will describe the main reactions to the argument and I will make some general remarks on each of them.

Wittgenstein’s epistemological frame in »On Certainty«

It is well known that Wittgenstein wasn't interested in epistemic claims (A. Gargani, 1982), or epistemology, not until the last years of his life (A, Kenny, 1973), when he wrote -On Certainty- [1950—51). Our task isn't to expose his answer to the sceptical question which he elaborated partly againsl, Moore and especially against Descartes though the last has not been mentioned. The theme of this paper is to investigate the possibility which the logico-syntactical approach of Wittgenstein’s philosophical grammar has for the principal epistemic terms, like belief and'knowledge.The analysis is guided by considering P. K. Moser's (1988) interpreta- tion of paragraph 253 from -On Certainly-. The result is that his critique of' doxastic theories in Pollock's classification (1986) of the contemporary epis- temological theories for unexhaustivity is not adequate, because the same lack Is shown by undoxastic theories.Through the epistemic terms like doubt, grond/ reason, foundation/ basis and those already mentioned, it follows that Wittgenstein's epistemological frame heads to direct realism, challenging the confusion in Pollock's classification, discovering the current of Wittgenstein's hints at the same time.'

Financializing epistemic norms in contemporary biomedical innovation

The rapid, recent emergence of new medical knowledge models has engendered a dizzying number of new medical initiatives, programs and approaches. Fields such as evidence-based medicine and translational medicine all promise a renewed relationship between knowledge and medicine. The question for philosophy and other fields has been whether these new models actually achieve their promises to bring about better kinds of medical knowledge—a question that compels scholars to analyze each model’s epistemic claims. Yet, these analyses may miss critical components that explain how these models actually work and function. Using the case of translational medicine, this paper suggests that analyses which treat these models as a primarily epistemic interventions miss the way that new approaches are increasingly shaped by specific financial and commercial agendas. Ultimately, social epistemological analyses that are attentive to market forces are required to make sense of emerging bioscientific research models, which are increasingly tethered to or a manifestation of increasingly financialized models of science research and innovation.

The sociocultural functions of episodic memory.

The functional use of episodic memories to claim epistemic truth must be placed within sociocultural contexts in which certain truths are privileged. Episodic memories are shared, evaluated, and understood within sociocultural interactions, creating both individual and group identities. These negotiated identities provide the foundation from which epistemic claims to truth can be made.

‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ against epistemic deontologism: beyond doxastic involuntarism

According to epistemic deontologism, attributions of epistemic justification are deontic claims about what we ought to believe. One of the most prominent objections to this conception, due mainly to William P. Alston, is that the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ (OIC) rules out deontologism because our beliefs are not under our voluntary control. In this paper, I offer a partial defense of Alston’s critique of deontologism. While Alston is right that OIC rules out epistemic deontologism, appealing to doxastic involuntarism is not necessary for generating that tension. Deontologists would still have a problem with OIC if doxastic voluntarism turned out to be true or if deontologism did not require voluntarism. This is because, in short, epistemic justification does not imply ‘can’. If, as deontologists maintain, epistemic justification implies ‘oughts’, then epistemic justification must also imply ‘can’ given OIC. But since epistemic justification does not imply ‘can’, OIC dictates that we reject deontologism. I end by exploring the possible consequences of this incompatibility between OIC and deontologism. My conclusion is that at least one of the following claims must be true. Either (1) ‘ought’ does not imply ‘can’, (2) attributions of epistemic justification are not deontic claims, or (3) epistemic claims lack necessary or categorical normative authority.

Conceptualizing the Landscape of Decision Making for Complex Problem Solving

ABSTRACTComplex problem resolution often involves the need for a pragmatic integration of knowledge from stakeholders with competing epistemic claims. The decision-making process regarding complex problem resolution is characterized by four basic sources of knowledge: disciplines, societies, organizations, and individuals. From the perspective of the public administration, we conceptualize the structure of the interactions between the disciplines and other sources of knowledge potentially relevant to the resolution of a public problem. To aid this exercise we examine a series of cases that we believe represent relevant aspects of complex problem resolution. We describe these basic interactions as collaborative, agnostic, or adversarial. This is a reorientation to the knowledge at play in the problem at hand. The study of public administration is well suited as a body of knowledge to address complex problems because it has a rich history of cooperation with other disciplines, practitioners, and stakeholders in the public.

Science, Values and Loves: Theologies as Expressive Constructions

ABSTRACTInvited to write “a manifesto for [my] own theological position”, I begin with science and human rights as excellent examples of universalist aspirations of modernity. Modern individualism is important too, as particular existential loves shape each life. Science, morality, and personal loves are interwoven in theologies, as creative constructions. The sciences are important, as we need not only individual authenticity but also accountability. My position presented here is science-inspired naturalistic theism. It is not “religious naturalism”, given the categorical difference between facts and values. It is not “natural theology”, as inductive approaches do not reach that far. It comes closer to a “theology of nature”, but it does not assume the epistemic claims involved. I consider theologies to be important expressive constructions.

“Are You In or Are You Out?!” Moral Appeals to the Public in Organ Donation Poster Campaigns: A Multimodal and Ethical Analysis

ABSTRACTOrgan transplantation is a well-established practice in modern medicine. However, many countries, especially those with an opt-in regulation, face the problem of low donation numbers. Respective public campaigns attempt to increase the number of donors by swaying public opinion with the use of carefully selected bits of information. Germany serves as a case study for an opt-in country investing approximately €7.5 million/year in the distribution of respective campaigns. To address diverse populations, large-scale posters in various public spaces still display a multitude of moral messages for organ donation. We developed a detailed multimodal approach for the analysis of health communication by focusing exemplarily on such organ donation poster campaigns as a common mean since the 1990s. In all, we identified 13 campaigns with 83 posters from 1996 to 2016. Here, we focus on both the textual and visual elements of such material to analyze how morally relevant principles and virtues are interwoven. Six categories of moral appeals were identified in the complete sample: altruism, being a decisive person, family responsibility, minimizing suffering, social conformity, and complete reciprocity. Overall, visual items were used to create a variety of social, moral, and epistemic claims with respect to organ donation. Our analysis reveals critical aspects highlighting the potential conflicts that arise from the ambiguity and wrong information of some messages as well as the risk of inappropriate blaming driven by these campaigns.

Memory: Irreducible, Basic, and Primary Source of Knowledge

I argue against preservationism, the epistemic claim that memories can at most preserve knowledge generated by other basic types of sources. I show how memories can and do generate knowledge that is irreducible to other basic sources of knowledge. In some epistemic contexts, memories are primary basic sources of knowledge; they can generate knowledge by themselves or with trivial assistance from other types of basic sources of knowledge. I outline an ontology of information transmission from events to memory as an alternative to causal theories of memory. I derive from information theory a concept of reliability of memories as the ratio of retrieved information to transmitted information. I distinguish the generation of knowledge from reliable memories from its generation from unreliable memories. Reliable memories can generate new knowledge by forming together narratives and via colligation. Coherent, even unreliable, memories can generate knowledge if they are epistemically independent of each other and the prior probability of the knowledge they generate is sufficiently low or high. Ascertaining the epistemic independence of memories and eliminating possible confounders may be achieved through the generation of knowledge from independent memories in different minds, when memories are primary basic sources of knowledge and the testimonies that report them are trivial.

Defeater Goes External

This paper proposes a new externalist account of defeaters, in terms of reliable indicators, as an integral part of a unified externalist account of warrant and defeat. It is argued that posing externalist conditions on warrant, but internalist conditions on defeat lead to undesirable tensions. The proposal is contrasted to some rival accounts and then tested on some widely discussed cases, like the airport case. Misleading defeaters, where Laurence BonJour’s reliable clairvoyants serve as examples, also receive treatment, partly because they illustrate how internalist constraints are inserted into the set up of the problem and therefore unduly constrain the domain of satisfactory solutions. Lastly, the proposal is defended against some objections. Firstly, that by posing externalist conditions on defeat, the account becomes too open. Secondly, that an externalist account fails to take into account the epistemic assessments of our fellows in the epistemic practice of forming beliefs and making epistemic claims, which can be based on accessible warrant only.