Episodic Foresight Research Articles

Exploring the Use of Experience Sampling to Assess Episodic Thought

SummaryMental time travel is the ability to mentally relive events in one's own past (episodic recall) and pre‐live potential personal future events (episodic foresight). Recent research has used experience sampling to reveal when and how often we think about the past and future in everyday life; however, it remains unclear how much of thought is episodic, involving the sense of self that underpins mental time travel. In this study, we investigate the use of experience sampling to assess the frequency of episodic past and future thought in everyday life. Participants (n = 214) were exposed to 20 short message service prompts over 1 or 2 days. Half of thoughts were sited in the present; of the remainder, future‐oriented thoughts were more frequent than past‐oriented thoughts. Participants reported 20% of thoughts as episodic. This study suggests that experience sampling methodology can provide a means of assessing episodic thought during everyday activities.Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Episodic foresight in normal cognitive and pathological aging

The ability to project the self forward in time to pre-experience personal events is referred to as episodic future thinking. Different theories have been proposed to try to explain the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying episodic future thinking. In this paper we focus on studies concerning the episodic prospection capacity in cognitive aging and in neurodegenerative diseases such as Alzheimer's disease and semantic dementia. Older adults usually produce fewer episodic details than young adults when recalling past events and when imagining future events. Patients with early to moderate Alzheimer's disease have impaired capacity in the generation of episodic details for retrieved past events and imagined future events. Similarly patients with early to moderate semantic dementia have difficulties in episodic future thinking whereas they succeed to retrieve episodic past events. These patterns are discussed with regard to the respective role of the episodic and personal semantic representations in future personal thoughts as a function of temporal distance by purposing a new neurocognitive model (TEDIFT).

Prospection and the Present Moment: The Role of Episodic Foresight in Intertemporal Choices between Immediate and Delayed Rewards

Humans are capable of imagining future rewards and the contexts in which they may be obtained. Functionally, intertemporal choices between smaller but immediate and larger but delayed rewards may be made without such episodic foresight. However, we propose that explicit simulations of this sort enable more flexible and adaptive intertemporal decision-making. Emotions triggered through the simulation of future situations can motivate people to forego immediate pleasures in the pursuit of long-term rewards. However, we stress that the most adaptive option need not always be a larger later reward. When the future is anticipated to be uncertain, for instance, it may make sense for preferences to shift toward more immediate rewards, instead. Imagining potential future scenarios and assessment of their likelihood and affective consequences allows humans to determine when it is more adaptive to delay gratification in pursuit of a larger later reward, and when the better strategy is to indulge in a present temptation. We discuss clinical studies that highlight when and how the effect of episodic foresight on intertemporal decision-making can be altered, and consider the relevance of this perspective to understanding the nature of self-control.

Understanding deliberate practice in preschool-aged children.

Deliberate practice is essential for skill acquisition and expertise and may be a direct consequence of episodic foresight. However, little is known about how deliberate practice develops in children. We present two experiments testing children's ability to selectively practise a behaviour that was going to be useful in future and to reason about the role of practice in skill formation. Five-year-olds demonstrated an explicit understanding of deliberate practice both in selectively choosing to practise a future-relevant skill and in predicting skill change in others based on their practice. Four-year-olds showed some capacities, but failed to demonstrate consistent understanding of the relationship between practice and skill improvement. Children's understanding of this relationship was significantly related to their understanding of how information leads to knowledge, suggesting that both may draw on similar cognitive developmental changes.

Psychopathy, Mental Time Travel, and Legal Responsibility

Neil Levy argues that the degree to which psychopaths ought to be held blameworthy for their actions depends on the extent to which they are capable of mental time travel—episodic memory and episodic foresight. Levy claims that deficits in mental time travel prevent psychopaths from fully appreciating what it is to be a person, and, without this understanding, we can at best hold psychopaths blameworthy for harming non-persons. In this paper, I build upon and clarify various aspects of Levy’s view. Specifically, I begin by outlining the neurobiological data on mental time travel, and I argue that psychopaths, or at least some psychopaths, appear to have the deficits Levy ascribes to them. I then expand upon the legal implications of his argument by using an analogy between juveniles and psychopaths to argue that the penological justification for retributive punishment against psychopaths ought to be substantially diminished.

Young Children Have Difficulty Predicting Future Preferences in the Presence of a Conflicting Physiological State

This study examined children's predictions about their future preferences when they were in two different physiological states (thirsty and not thirsty). Ninety 3‐ to 7‐year‐olds were asked to predict what they would prefer tomorrow: pretzels to eat or water to drink after having consumed pretzels, and again after having had the opportunity to quench their thirst with water. Results showed that although children initially preferred pretzels to water at baseline, they more often indicated that they would prefer water the next day after they had consumed pretzels. After consuming water, however, the same children indicated they would prefer pretzels the next day. Children's verbal justifications for their choices rarely made reference to their current or future states, but rather justifications were more likely to make reference to their general preferences when they were no longer thirsty compared to when they were thirsty. Results suggest that current physiological states have a powerful influence on future preferences. The findings are discussed in the context of the development of episodic foresight, the Bischof‐Kohler hypothesis, and the important and often overlooked role that children's current states play in future decision making. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Episodic foresight and schizophrenia

People with schizophrenia have difficulty engaging in specific future-directed thoughts and behaviours, such as generating phenomenological characteristics of future events (a component of episodic foresight), and executing directed preparatory behaviours (a component of prospective memory). However, it remains unclear whether they also exhibit difficulties using episodic foresight to appropriately guide future-directed behaviours. People with schizophrenia and non-clinical controls were administered a behavioural measure that met strict criteria for assessing episodic foresight. In keeping with our focus on the functional application of foresight, this measure required participants to identify a problem, self-generate a resolution, and execute the appropriate future-directed intention. Relative to controls, people with schizophrenia were less likely to spontaneously acquire items that would later allow a problem to be solved, and were also less likely to subsequently use these items to solve the problems. There was no interaction between group and task, indicating that these two components of foresight were disrupted to an equivalent degree. In the clinical (but not the control) group, item acquisition and item use were correlated with general cognitive capacity. No significant associations with clinical variables emerged. The capacity to apply episodic foresight in a functionally adaptive way is disrupted in schizophrenia and may at least partially reflect broader cognitive dysfunction. Future work is now needed to clarify the implications of these difficulties in everyday life, as well as how these difficulties might be remediated. People with schizophrenia have known difficulties with episodic foresight, and it now appears that those difficulties extend to the performance of foresightful preparatory behaviours. Because preparatory behaviours are central to routine and adaptive planning, difficulties with episodic foresight may contribute to or be a result of some of the functional difficulties experienced by people with schizophrenia. Further research is needed to determine whether interventions might be developed for people with reduced episodic foresight. Interventions may include the use of remedial tools that support and encourage the performance of foresightful behaviour, or cognitive training programs that actively improve the ability and propensity to exercise foresight independently.

Episodic foresight and anxiety: Proximate and ultimate perspectives.

In this paper, we examine the relationship between episodic foresight and anxiety from an evolutionary perspective, proposing that together they confer an advantage for modifying present moment decision-making and behaviour in the light of potential future threats to fitness. We review the body of literature on the role of episodic foresight in anxiety, from both proximate and ultimate perspectives. We propose that anxious feelings associated with episodic simulation of possible threat-related future events serve to imbue these simulations with motivational currency. Episodic and semantic details of a future threat may be insufficient for motivating its avoidance, but anxiety associated with a simulation can provoke adaptive threat management. As such, we detail how anxiety triggered by a self-generated, threat-related future simulation prepares the individual to manage that threat (in terms of its likelihood and/or consequences) over greater temporal distances than observed in other animals. We then outline how anxiety subtypes may represent specific mechanisms for predicting and managing particular classes of fitness threats. This approach offers an inroad for understanding the nature of characteristic future thinking patterns in anxiety disorders and serves to illustrate the adaptive function of the mechanism from which clinical anxiety deviates.

La previsión episódica en la etapa pre-escolar: equivalencia entre medidas y su relación con los procesos de orientación futura y la teoría de la mente

Este trabajo examina la equivalencia entre diferentes medidas de previsión episódica y su relación con los procesos orientados a futuro, y la teoría de la mente en la edad pre-escolar. Los procesos orientados a futuro y la previsión episódica (PE), han sido señalados como componentes importantes para ciertos logros evolutivos como la planificación, la auto-regulación y adaptación social. También se ha postulado que pensamiento futuro episódico y teoría de la mente están relacionados, en virtud de su sustrato neural compartido. El primer estudio tuvo por objetivo analizar la coherencia de desarrollo entre las medidas de PE, y de estas con la postergación de la gratificación auto-impuesta controlando según la aptitud general de razonamiento, y participaron 15 niños de 3 y 4 años. El segundo, tuvo por objetivo explorar la relación entre PE, los procesos orientados a futuro, la teoría de la mente controlando según lenguaje, participando 78 niños de 4 años. Los resultados muestran que las diferentes medidas para evaluar la PE son equivalentes. También se encontró un alto grado de coherencia comportamental entre las medidas evaluadas. Sin embargo, los datos no aportan evidencia evolutiva que permitan incluir a la PE dentro de los constructos más amplios estudiados.

Spatial navigation, episodic memory, episodic future thinking, and theory of mind in children with autism spectrum disorder: evidence for impairments in mental simulation?

This study explored spatial navigation alongside several other cognitive abilities that are thought to share common underlying neurocognitive mechanisms (e.g., the capacity for self-projection, scene construction, or mental simulation), and which we hypothesized may be impaired in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Twenty intellectually high-functioning children with ASD (with a mean age of ~8 years) were compared to 20 sex, age, IQ, and language ability matched typically developing children on a series of tasks to assess spatial navigation, episodic memory, episodic future thinking (also known as episodic foresight or prospection), theory of mind (ToM), relational memory, and central coherence. This is the first study to explore these abilities concurrently within the same sample. Spatial navigation was assessed using the “memory island” task, which involves finding objects within a realistic, computer simulated, three-dimensional environment. Episodic memory and episodic future thinking were assessed using a past and future event description task. ToM was assessed using the “animations” task, in which children were asked to describe the interactions between two animated triangles. Relational memory was assessed using a recognition task involving memory for items (line drawings), patterned backgrounds, or combinations of items and backgrounds. Central coherence was assessed by exploring differences in performance across segmented and unsegmented versions of block design. Children with ASD were found to show impairments in spatial navigation, episodic memory, episodic future thinking, and central coherence, but not ToM or relational memory. Among children with ASD, spatial navigation was found to be significantly negatively related to the number of repetitive behaviors. In other words, children who showed more repetitive behaviors showed poorer spatial navigation. The theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed.

Episodic foresight deficits in long-term opiate users.

There is considerable literature showing that opiate use is associated with a range of neurocognitive deficits, including deficits in executive control and episodic memory. However, no study to date has assessed whether these neurocognitive difficulties extend to the ability to mentally time travel into one's personal future. This is a surprising omission given that executive control and episodic memory are considered to be critical for episodic foresight. In addition, opiate-related brain changes have been identified in the neural regions that underlie the capacity for episodic foresight. In the present study, we assessed how episodic foresight is affected in the context of chronic opiate use, as well as the degree to which any deficits are related to difficulties with executive control and episodic memory. Forty-eight long-term heroin users enrolled in an opiate substitution program and 48 controls were tested. The results showed that, relative to controls, the clinical group exhibited significant impairment in episodic foresight but not episodic memory (as indexed by an adapted version of the Autobiographical Interview). For executive function, the clinical group was impaired on only one of three measures (Inhibition). These data provide important preliminary evidence that episodic foresight might be particularly susceptible to the neurocognitive effects of opiate use, as the difficulties identified were not secondary to more general executive control or episodic memory impairment. Because a number of widely used relapse prevention protocols require the ability to mentally project into the future, these data have potentially important practical implications in relation to the treatment of substance dependence disorders.

Thinking ahead about where something is needed: New insights about episodic foresight in preschoolers

We explored 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds’ capacity to draw on a past experience that entailed the lack of a particular resource (in this case, toys) in one room, but not in another, to make an adaptive choice (i.e., place toys in the room where there were none) for a subsequent visit to the two rooms. Children’s memory for which room had toys and which room did not was explicitly assessed. Children were then queried about where they should place a new set of toys for their next visit to the rooms. In Experiment 1, where children were asked about the “distant” future, 4- and 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, placed the toys in the “no-toy” room at a rate significantly higher than chance. In Experiment 2, where children were asked about the “immediate” future, correct responses of 3-year-olds were still no different from chance, those of 5-year-olds were above chance, and those of 4-year-olds trended in this direction. Our discussion centers on the importance of assessing both “memory” and “foresight” on tasks purported to assess children’s episodic foresight, the role of “temporal distance” on children’s future-oriented behavior, and implications for future research.

Is thinking about the future related to theory of mind and executive function? Not in preschoolers

The capacity to mentally project the self into the future, or what has been termed “episodic foresight” (EpF), is becoming a popular topic of study in developmental psychology. Several theories propose that EpF is related to theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF). However, these links have not been tested using standard behavioral tasks in young children. Accordingly, we administered a battery of EpF, ToM, and EF tasks to 90 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds. After controlling for age and language ability, the EpF tasks were not intercorrelated, nor were they individually related to EF or ToM. As such, this study challenges the claim that EpF, at least as currently assessed in young children, is related to their developing ToM and EF abilities.

How do episodic and semantic memory contribute to episodic foresight in young children?

Humans are able to transcend the present and mentally travel to another time, place, or perspective. Mentally projecting ourselves backwards (i.e., episodic memory) or forwards (i.e., episodic foresight) in time are crucial characteristics of the human memory system. Indeed, over the past few years, episodic memory has been argued to be involved both in our capacity to retrieve our personal past experiences and in our ability to imagine and foresee future scenarios. However, recent theory and findings suggest that semantic memory also plays a significant role in imagining future scenarios. We draw on Tulving’s definition of episodic and semantic memory to provide a critical analysis of their role in episodic foresight tasks described in the developmental literature. We conclude by suggesting future directions of research that could further our understanding of how both episodic memory and semantic memory are intimately connected to episodic foresight.

Episodic foresight and aging.

Decline in episodic memory is one of the most prominent cognitive deficits seen in late adulthood. It is therefore surprising that few studies have examined how the related capacity for episodic foresight might also be affected in this age group. Preliminary evidence suggests that older adults show deficits in generating phenomenological characteristics of future events, but the critical question of whether such deficits extend to generating and executing appropriate future intentions remains to be addressed. Here, we present 2 studies. In Study 1, we report the results of our pilot testing, which was used to develop and validate stimuli for the first measure of this construct that is appropriate for use in adult populations. In Study 2, we administer this measure to 40 older and 40 younger adults. The results indicate that, relative to their younger counterparts, older adults are less likely to spontaneously acquire items that would later allow a problem to be solved, and are also less likely to subsequently use these items to solve the problems. These data provide important initial evidence that the capacity to apply episodic foresight in a functionally adaptive way is impaired in late adulthood. The results also provide important validation data for a novel measure of episodic foresight that has potential application to many other groups, including clinical groups known to have difficulties anticipating and planning for the future.

The future is here: A review of foresight systems in anxiety and depression

Cognitive models of anxiety and depression have long suggested a central role for future-oriented thinking in these disorders. Experimental studies suggest that anxiety and depression are characterised by distinct future-oriented thinking profiles, and that these profiles are markedly different from those of asymptomatic adults. In this paper, we review these profiles and propose two explanatory models marked by two different neurocognitive systems. The Reconstructive Memory Model emphasises a role for emotionally driven learning and retrieval in episodic foresight (i.e., the construction of future-oriented scenarios), and the Valuation Model proposes that an overweighing of risk and uncertainty estimates can be invoked to explain the future-oriented thought patterns. We consider the effectiveness of interventions aimed at altering such thought patterns. We suggest that future research aimed at elucidating the neurobiological underpinnings of future-oriented thinking in anxiety and depression can play an important role in advancing development of effective biological and psychosocial interventions for these disorders.

These pretzels are going to make me thirsty tomorrow: Differential development of hot and cool episodic foresight in early childhood?

The current study examined 3- and 7-year-olds' performance on two types of episodic foresight tasks: A task that required 'cool' reasoning processes about the use of objects in future situations and a task that required 'hot' processes to inhibit a salient current physiological state in order to reason accurately about a future state. Results revealed that 7-year-olds outperformed 3-year-olds on the episodic foresight task that involved cool processes, but did not show age differences in performance on the task that involved hot processes. In fact, both 3- and 7-year-olds performed equally poorly on the task that required predicting a future physiological state that was in conflict with their current state. Further, performance on the two tasks was unrelated. We discuss the results in terms of differing developmental trajectories for episodic foresight tasks that differentially rely on hot and cool processes and the universal difficulties humans have with predicting later outcomes that conflict with current motivational states.

Assessing the role of memory in preschoolers' performance on episodic foresight tasks

A total of 48 preschoolers (ages 3, 4, and 5) received four tasks modelled after prior work designed to assess the development of “episodic foresight”. For each task, children encountered a problem in one room and, after a brief delay, were given the opportunity in a second room to select an item to solve the problem. Importantly, after selecting an item, children were queried about their memory for the problem. Age-related changes were found both in children's ability to select the correct item and their ability to remember the problem. However, when we controlled for children's memory for the problem, there were no longer significant age-related changes on the item choice measure. These findings suggest that age-related changes in children's performance on these tasks are driven by improvements in children's memory versus improvements in children's future-oriented thinking or “foresight” per se. Our results have important implications for how best to structure tasks to measure children's episodic foresight, and also for the relative role of memory in this task and in episodic foresight more broadly.

Brief Report: Episodic Foresight in Autism Spectrum Disorder

Episodic foresight (EpF) or, the ability to imagine the future and use such imagination to guide our actions, is an important aspect of cognition that has not yet been explored in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). This is despite its proposed links with theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF), two areas found to be impaired in ASD. Twenty-five children with ASD (M = 5 years, 10 months; 22 male) and 25 mental-age-matched typically developing children (M = 4 years, 10 months; 22 male) completed a series of EpF, ToM, and EF tasks. Significant group differences were detected on several EpF tasks suggesting that children with ASD show impairments in thinking about their future selves.

The development of mental scenario building and episodic foresight

Episodic foresight is the future-directed counterpart of episodic memory. It is a sophisticated, potentially uniquely human capacity, with tremendous adaptive consequences. Here we review what is currently known about its development through early childhood. We tackle this from two distinct perspectives. First, we present the first systematic evaluation of the development of purported components of mental scenario building as highlighted by a theater metaphor: the stage, the playwright, the set, the actors, the director, the executive producer, and the broadcaster. We find that, although there are diverse developmental trajectories, by 4 years of age children have acquired the basic cognitive components required to mentally construct specific future events. Second, we examine recent attempts to test children's episodic foresight more directly and find that results are in line with those examining the development of required components. This is not to say that children younger than four have no inkling of upcoming events or that older children have nothing left to learn about constructing the future. Episodic foresight, and its neurocognitive foundations, continues to develop throughout childhood.