1. Introduction Market evidence on the value of a statistical life invariably consists of cross-sectional evidence on risks and prices or wages at a point in time. If information about the level of risk changes over time and people incorporate this information in a rational manner, there will be a corresponding price response. On the basis of these temporal changes, one can estimate the market price-risk tradeoff, eliminating many confounding time-invariant effects that cannot be controlled for using cross-sectional data. This paper examines the market response to the release of government information about the level of risk at hazardous waste sites and provides insight into the rationality of this response. Studies based on experimental evidence and survey data often find that individual beliefs may deviate from objective risk levels.1 People often overestimate highly publicized risks and mortality risks. In the case of hazardous waste risks, bias in risk beliefs often leads to considerable public reaction and pressure for site cleanups, which may be an inefficient outcome. By using market data, one can examine whether this intense public reaction carries over to contexts in which private money is at stake. Government agencies frequently use information provision as a regulatory device, particularly since the advent of the right-to-know movement of the 1980s. Examples of information provision efforts include the Food and Drug Administration's requirement that many prescription drugs indude information inserts, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's requirement that sellers of houses built before 1950 inform buyers about the presence of lead-based paints, and the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) requirement that manufacturing facilities report their annual releases of chemicals above a threshold amount for a list of over 600 substances. Such regulations imply a belief that citizens can learn from information about risk and rationally adjust their prior beliefs towards the objective risk level in light of the information. This article provides market evidence to bolster the results of some survey studies of information transfer that suggest that individuals revise their risk beliefs in response to new information.2 The U.S. federal policy dealing with hazardous waste sites is known as the Superfund program. The most hazardous sites are targeted for cleanup and placed on a government priority roster called the National Priorities List (NPL). Extension of the classic theory of compensating differentials to the housing market implies that environmental disamenities (such as hazardous waste sites) will reduce housing prices (Rosen 1974). The negative impact of hazardous waste sites on the housing prices of nearby residences is well documented. For example, in a previous study (Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi 2000), we used an analysis that focused on the sale of 16,928 houses from 1988 to 1993 that surround Superfund sites in Greater Grand Rapids, Michigan. We found that before the EPA released its risk report, a reduction in the cancer risk from neighborhood Superfund sites by the mean level of risk would increase the average value of a house by $238 (in 1996 dollars).3 To estimate this willingness of residents to pay to avoid cancer risks before the release of the EPA's risk report, we assumed that residents' prior beliefs were equal to the objectively measured risks suggested by the report. Thus, this analysis was based on the very strong informational assumption that residents could, in effect, predict the results of the EPA's site-specific risk assessments. Before the release of the report, the price-risk tradeoff implied a value of a statistical cancer case of $51 million. Once the EPA released its risk information, the implied value of a statistical cancer case was $4 million. These results suggest that after the release of the EPA's risk report, revealed preferences for avoiding Superfund risks were consistent with surveys of the value of a statistical life in the labor market. …
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