Party Entry Research Articles

Exogenous Shocks and Party System Development: What is the Effect on New Party Entry?

ABSTRACT Since 2020, the world has been officially battling a COVID-19 pandemic. Even countries with established crisis management plans and years of experience in handling political and economic crises, have been shaken. In the midst of the pandemic’s rampant effects, how politicians handle the crisis is of crucial importance to the preservation, development, and protection of nations in the future. Who is in power determines not only the stability, but the political course of countries. Hence, what happens to the party system as a result of an exogenous shock is a question we need to answer. Importantly, we have little evidence on how the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic affected party competition. Building on the party systems literature, we examine the effect of the pandemic on electoral volatility, party system size, and the number of new party contestants. We hypothesise that, in countries where the incumbent government handles the crisis less effectively, electoral volatility tends to be higher, party system size tends to be larger, and more new parties tend to enter the electoral race. Drawing on evidence from national parliamentary elections held by electoral democracies from March 2020 to April 2022, the empirical results support our hypothesis.

Does Proportionality Increase Turnout? A Study of Adaptation to Oscillating Electoral Systems

Does proportionality increase turnout? This article studies a national electoral reform in early twentieth-century Argentina that was implemented asymmetrically across districts, creating a natural laboratory in which some districts oscillated between electoral systems across elections. Leveraging this unusual variation in a difference-in-differences design, this article shows that a shift from multi-member plurality rules towards a slightly more proportional system—which removed one-third of the contested seats from the grasp of the dominant party—led to a four percentage point increase in turnout. An investigation into causal mechanisms indicates that more proportional rules, by increasing the odds that smaller parties obtain seats, promoted strategic party entry and intensified electoral competition, both between and within parties. These findings complement existing quasi-experimental results that focus exclusively on elections in European democracies, confirm that parties are able to adapt immediately to changes in electoral rules, and refute the belief that proportionality does not affect turnout in Latin America.

The activation of nationalist attitudes: how voters respond to far-right parties’ campaigns

ABSTRACT The rise of far-right parties represents one of the main challenges for European democracies. Previous research has shed light both on their electoral strategies, and on the nationalist attitudes of their electorates. Yet, the causal mechanism by which far-right party discourse activates voters’ preferences is still unclear. This paper revisits the literature on campaign effects in the context of challenger party entry, and argues that the activation of attitudes on ‘wedge issues’, such as immigration and European integration, is the outcome of a process of learning and partisan updating. The empirical analyses focus on the electoral breakthrough of far-right parties in Britain and Germany, and rely on three-wave panel surveys to address reverse causation. Results show that voters update their vote intentions in light of their Eurosceptic and xenophobic attitudes only when they learn the policy positions of the far-right party vis-à-vis the other parties. These findings shed light on the nature of far-right party support, set a scope condition for research on priming and persuasion in election campaigns, and contribute to normative debates about the functioning of electoral democracy.

Contagion From Abroad. How Party Entry in Western Europe is Influenced by Party Family Members Abroad, 1961–2016

New parties are a key mechanism behind party system innovation as voters are offered new choices. To explain party entry (i.e. participation in a lower house election for the first time), the state-of-the-art has typically focused on domestic determinants. This, however, assumes that party entry takes place in an international vacuum. Building on the policy diffusion literature, we explore how party family members abroad influence party entry in the focal country. Based on a new dataset on the evolution of each party family in 17 Western European party systems between 1961 and 2016, including 2191 new parties, our mixed-methods approach combining spatial econometric models with pathway case analysis demonstrates that party entry is influenced by the entry and electoral success of their party family abroad. This has important implications for the literature on party entry and the international diffusion of policy platforms.

It is not me, it is you: The emergence of secessionist parties in Western democracies

AbstractAlthough there exists a voluminous amount of existing literature that studies secessionist parties and the emergence of political parties more generally, there exists little that looks at the emergence of secessionist parties specifically. This article models the emergence of secessionist parties across western democracies and argues that the emergence of said parties is structured by both sociodemographic and political realities. This article shows that the structures of secessionist party entry differ across the arena in which parties compete: what influences emergence in subnational (provincial) elections differs than in national elections.

Przywództwo w nowych partiach politycznych w Polsce i jego znaczenie dla przekroczenia progu reprezentacji oraz instytucjonalizacji partii

LEADERSHIP IN NEW POLITICAL PARTIES IN POLAND AND ITS IMPORTANCE FOR OVERCOMING THE THRESHOLD OF PARTY REPRESENTATION AND FOR PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION After the period of relative stabilization of the Polish party system at the parliamentary level in the first decade of the 21st century, changes related to the entry of new parties on the political scene took place in the second one. While in 2007 only four established parties (PO, PiS, SLD and PSL) got seats in the parliament, and the party system at the parliamentary level was described as “concreted”. In subsequent elections of 2011, 2015, 2019, newly created parties managed to overcome the threshold of party representation. What they have in common is that they were founded shortly before the election by recognizable leaders and immediately achieved election success, which they were not able to repeat in subsequent elections, they lost their importance and were replaced by newer parties. The aim of the article is to define what role the leader plays in achieving electoral success of new parties and what is the importance of leadership for the party’s survival and further election success. These issues are considered in the context of changing the organizational model and the concepts of party institutionalization.

The Change of Motives to Become and to be a Party Member. An Empirical Analysis of the German Party Membership Studies 1998, 2009 and 2017

In this paper, the thesis is put forward that selective outcome incentives for party membership gain relevance over time. Two possible mechanisms are identified as the cause of this increase in importance: a supply-side mechanism based on processes of societal change that took place through generational succession and a demand-side mechanism focusing on shifts in the self-image and organizational structure of political parties. The supply-side mechanism should lead to changes in the motives of potential members, whereas the demand-side mechanism alters the incentives potential and current members are exposed to.The empirical analyses are based on the German Party Membership Studies of 1998, 2009 and 2017. These three studies are nationwide representative surveys of the members of the following six parties: Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Christian Social Union (CSU), Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), Free Democratic Party (FDP), Alliance90/The Greens (Bündnis90/Die Grünen), and The Left (Die Linke). Within the German Party Membership Studies, both the motives for joining the party and the current membership motives are surveyed.Empirically, it is shown that there is indeed an increase in the importance of selective outcome membership motives over the period under study. The mechanisms behind this increase in importance are investigated using multivariate Age-Period-Cohort (APC) models based on the cumulated data of the German Party Membership Studies. These analyses are based on a total of nearly 30,000 cases. The results of the APC analyses are largely consistent with the supply-side explanation of the increased importance of selective outcome motives for party entry and membership. The demand-side explanation is only partially confirmed.

Regional assemblies and executives, regional authority, and the strategic manipulation of regional elections in electoral autocracies

ABSTRACT In this introduction, we set out to analyse the relationship between regional elections and regional authority and the extent to which regional elections are held free and fair. We hypothesize that the incentives to interfere increase when regions exercise more authority but the possibilities to interfere decline when the regional executive is elected. A quantitative analysis confirms that directly elected and stronger regional bodies make them more attractive for central meddling, but the presence of elected executives makes central interference less likely. We zoom-in on nine electoral autocracies that have featured in the past five annual reviews of regional elections to explore how regional elections become less free and fair. We identify six strategies to manipulate regional elections which are applied in at least two electoral autocracies: simultaneity between regional and national elections, limiting party entry, gerrymandering, nationalizing regional election campaigns, party switching, and centralization of authority.

정치적·사회적 갈등의 통합을 위한 권력구조 및 선거제도 개선방안

During the 20th presidential election process, in addition to ideological and regional conflicts, which were chronic ills of Korean politics, gender conflicts and generational conflicts developed to a very serious level. The results showed that the candidates for support differed significantly depending on region, generation, and gender. If this trend continues, it is highly likely that politics will deeply entrench political hatred beyond political apathy throughout society by failing to perform its original role, social integration, and only playing a reverse function that deepens and triggers conflict. The current presidential system implies a winner-take-all structure, making it impossible to divide power. The election system fixes the two-party structure, limiting the people's various political options, and deepening the confrontation between the two political forces. There are pros and cons of the system, and it is necessary to choose the system over how to solve the problems of Korean society. Social integration is not only impossible under a system in which politics does not resolve various conflicts in society and expands social conflicts into political conflicts, but it can also lead to a crisis situation in the country. It is time for constitutional concerns to be fiercely demanded. Politics should be changed to a power structure that can be achieved on the basis of compromise and cooperation. To this end, it is desirable to change the four-year term of office to a four-year term of office and elect the president by a runoff vote, but to elect half of the members in the general election in the early half of the administration and the other half in the midterm elections. The public will have the opportunity to conduct an interim evaluation of the president and the National Assembly through two parliamentary elections. If a representative can be evaluated every two years to give prizes and punishments, it will be difficult for a imperial president or an irresponsible National Assembly to exist. If the National Assembly has the right to recommend the prime minister, it will be able to play an active role in selecting the prime minister if the opposition party wins the two-year parliamentary elections. It may also be possible to form a coalition government between the ruling and opposition parties. In addition, it is necessary to revise Article 28 of the “Act on the Operation of Public Institutions” to adjust the term of the head of a public institution from three years to two years, like directors and auditors. If the opposition party wins the parliamentary elections in line with the presidential and parliamentary elections, it should pave the way for the opposition party to recommend the heads of public institutions. We must be able to guarantee the pluralities of politics. If the president is elected on a runoff system, and the two-year parliamentary elections are elected based on the multimember district system, a new way for minority parties can be opened. The presidential candidate of the minority party is not forced to resign, but can unite according to the results of the first round of voting. If various political forces coexist in the National Assembly due to the entry of minority parties, they can act as a coordinator in the conflict phase. It should be reorganized into a constitutional system based on compromise and securing pluralism. Only then can political forces move in a direction that can coordinate and integrate conflicts.

A career like no one else can offer: On the conditions for two-party dominance

The determinants of the number of parties competing in any given first-past-the-post election have been widely studied. Much less clear are the conditions required for two parties to dominate all elections across separate districts and at different levels of government. In this paper, I propose a novel model of party formation and show that two parties can only dominate all elections if they provide sufficient opportunities for members while limiting the success of defectors. More specifically, I establish three conditions for two-parties dominance: (i) parties must be divided into a left-wing and a right-wing camp in any two-party equilibrium, (ii) voters at the national level cannot be too concentrated in the centre relative to the most radical districts, and (iii) politicians need to be sufficiently motivated by the desire to win elections at higher levels of government. Furthermore, I establish the existence of a specific two-party equilibrium featuring a centre-left and a centre-right party. I use this equilibrium to illustrate that primaries can reduce the likelihood of entry of third parties. An extension that introduces regionalism shows that high salience of this second dimension of policy is by itself not enough to rule out two-party equilibria.

Political communication on Facebook and populism. The 2019 European Parliament election in Spain

Populist actors have more success than other parties on social media –particularly Facebook– where their posts receive higher levels of engagement. The entry of populist parties onto the Spanish political stage can spread the use of their rhetoric and influence citizens’ political decisions, affecting the configuration of supranational institutions such as the European Union. The aim of this study is to use a quantitative content analysis to verify the presence of populist discourse in the 844 messages published on Facebook by Spanish parties during the 2019 European Parliament election campaign and to analyse their impact on user interaction. The results show that the newest and most extremist parties monopolise the messages with empty, anti-elite populism. However, the use of exclusionary populist discourse is also detected in more moderate conservative parties. Populist parties, especially VOX, lead user interactions, irrespective of whether the populist style appears in the messages. The results of the research show that the populist style is inexorably consolidating in Europe as an electoral communications strategy on Facebook. As with other European countries, extremist and opposition parties also adopt the populist style as a communications strategy. The results suggest that the success of populist actors on social media may be conditioned by the populist attitudes of their followers and less by the characteristics of these parties’ publications.

Editorial: Party Entry and Exit in Times of Crisis

Editorial: Party Entry and Exit in Times of Crisis

Rules for Party Subsidies and Electoral Volatility in Latin America

AbstractPrior research has argued that public subsidies for parties matter for explaining electoral volatility, but the empirical results have been inconclusive. This article addresses this puzzle by examining how different rules for direct state funding affect different types of electoral volatility, using data from lower chamber elections in eighteen Latin American countries from 1978 through 2014. Focusing on volatility caused by new party entry and old party exit (party replacement volatility) and volatility caused by vote switching among existing parties (stable party volatility), it finds that countries with less strict eligibility thresholds for party subsidies tend to have lower levels of party replacement volatility. However, the empirical analysis does not provide sufficient evidence that the eligibility thresholds for party subsidies matter for predicting stable party volatility. Overall, this article suggests that less strict eligibility thresholds for party subsidies help produce stable party systems by reducing risks associated with party replacement volatility.

Party Polarization and Entry Barriers for a Centrist

Party Polarization and Entry Barriers for a Centrist

Opening Up Transactive Systems: Introducing TESS and Specification in a Field Deployment

Transactive energy systems (TS) use automated device bidding to access (residential) demand flexibility and coordinate supply and demand on the distribution system level through market processes. In this work, we present TESS, a modularized platform for the implementation of TS, which enables the deployment of adjusted market mechanisms, economic bidding, and the potential entry of third parties. TESS thereby opens up current integrated closed-system TS, allows for the better adaptation of TS to power systems with high shares of renewable energies, and lays the foundations for a smart grid with a variety of stakeholders. Furthermore, despite positive experiences in various pilot projects, one hurdle in introducing TS is their integration with existing tariff structures and (legal) requirements. In this paper, we therefore describe TESS as we have modified it for a field implementation within the service territory of Holy Cross Energy in Colorado. Importantly, our specification addresses challenges of implementing TS in existing electric retail systems, for instance, the design of bidding strategies when a (non-transactive) tariff system is already in place. We conclude with a general discussion of the challenges associated with “brownfield” implementation of TS, such as incentive problems of baseline approaches or long-term efficiency.

Intervensi dalam Pemeriksaan Sengketa Tata Usaha Negara

Judicial power is done by a Supreme Court and judicial bodies under it, including the State administrative court with two subjects or parties who are litigating in the PTUN, namely the defendant and the plaintiff. The purpose of this study is to reveal the system for examining interventions in state administration as well as arrangements for interventions in state administrative disputes. the type of research used is normative law with a statute approach. The source of data used is the secondary data. The technique of collecting legal materials used is by reading and quoting by analyzing the relevant laws and then the collection and collection of the literature materials are processed qualitatively. The result shows that there are several possible motivations for the entry of third parties in the judicial process, namely on their own initiative, at the request of the judge, and at the request of one of the parties (the presecutor/defendant) and the state administrative court regulate the entry method and motivation for the intervention of the party to enter the examination process. State Administrative Disputes.

Should We Go Abroad? The Strategic Entry of Ecuadorian Political Parties in Overseas Electoral Districts

ABSTRACT The literature on external voting overlooks why some political parties campaign abroad while others remain focused on the national territory. This article investigates the determinants of the strategic entry of political parties in overseas districts through analysing legislative elections in Ecuador (2007–2017). Based on a study of the incentives and constraints of political party presence abroad, we find that parties are more likely to compete for elections in overseas districts displaying a weaker party competition as well as when they account for previous electoral experience in these districts.

Mind the gap: How party–voter incongruence fuels the entry and support of new parties

AbstractThis article examines to what extent ideological incongruence (i.e., mismatch between policy positions of voters and parties) increases the entry of new parties in national parliamentary elections and their individual‐level electoral support. Current empirical research on party entry and new party support either neglects the role of party–voter incongruence, or it only examines its effect on the entry and support of specific new parties or party families. This article fills this lacuna. Based on spatial theory, we hypothesise that parties are more likely to enter when ideological incongruence between voters and parties is higher (Study 1) and that voters are more likely to vote for new parties if these stand closer to them than established parties (Study 2). Together our two studies span 17 countries between 1996 and 2016. Time‐series analyses support both hypotheses. This has important implications for spatial models of elections and empirical research on party entry and new party support.

Electoral Rules and New Parties: Evidence from a Quasi‐experimental Design

Electoral rules are a crucial institutional factor shaping the entry and success of new parties. However, testing how they affect voting behavior is problematic when using observational data in cross-national studies. As district magnitude is usually correlated with politically salient features affecting the likelihood of voting for new (and small) parties, the latent support of small parties differs across electoral systems. Using a quasi-experimental design in Spain focused on the district viability of a new party,Vox, in two elections held within 196 days, I provide a more robust estimate of the impact of electoral systems on the success of new parties. Strong evidence that the electoral system makes a difference for new parties has been identified: strategic considerations found in the districts whereVoxwas not successful prevented a significant number of voters from supporting the party.

Survival of the fittest. Comparing entry and exit among niche and mainstream parties in advanced democracies, 1945–2011

The turnover of political parties is a key mechanism of renewal of electoral choices. We present an organizational ecological theory on party system change, predicting that party system saturation (i.e., the effective number of parties compared to the party system's carrying capacity) differently affects the entry and exit of niche and mainstream parties from lower house elections. Pooled times-series analyses on 352 elections, 509 parties, and 21 established democracies demonstrate that party system saturation indeed increases the likelihood of exit of mainstream parties but not of niche parties. Strikingly, we also find that party system saturation increases the entry of mainstream parties. Hence, an important paradox arises since oversaturation negatively affects their survival chances.