We study the determinants of the spawning of new entities by an organization when members control significant productive assets and have the agency to leave with these. Cooperatives, a highly prevalent organizational form worldwide in almost all industries, are particularly prone to such corporate defection. Building on the entrepreneurial spin-offs and the corporate divestiture literatures, we pay equal attention to the members’ incentive to leave with their assets as well as the organization’s interest in retaining, redeploying, or letting go these assets. Interestingly, cooperatives only have an outlying control over these assets: they can influence the retention of these assets within their scope despite not having the legal control over these. Our empirical context is a winemaking cooperative where cooperative-, individual-, and asset-level data enable us to analyze member defection, democratic governance in the organization, and resource redeployment. We find that economics drivers push members to defect while their operating as an incorporated entity accelerates this process. Nevertheless, both democratic governance and resources redeployment processes can help in retaining members within the cooperative. These findings contribute to expand our understanding on cooperatives and also provide further insights on the functioning of traditional corporations such as multi-business firms.