This paper considers the lack of corporate social responsibility in the organic food supply chain in a new context, that is, the fraudulent subsidies claiming behavior of the manufacturers and the lack of organic food supervision of the fast-growing e-commerce retailers in China. We construct a three-party evolutionary game model among government regulatory departments, manufacturers and e-commerce retailers to analyze the evolution process of the behaviors of manufacturers and e-commerce retailers under government's changing regulation. The results show that: (1) The government can promote the production of organic food by the moderate supervision of manufacturers; Low intensity supervision cannot restrain fraudulent subsidies claiming behavior, while high intensity supervision will restrain the orderly development of organic food industry. (2) The greater the government subsidies on technology and R & D of manufacturers, the more conducive the manufacturerss will be to overcome technical problems and realize the scale of the organic food industry, so that it will eventually evolve towards the direction of active production of organic food. (3) The government's low-intensity fine on e-commerce retailers when they fail to fulfill their responsibilities is not enough to prompt them to choose the strategy of responsibility fulfillment, and the greater the fine is, the more conducive it is for them to evolve towards fulfilling their social responsibilities. (4) Appropriate government funding for e-commerce retailers will encourage them to fulfill their responsibility, but excessive funding will make e-commerce retailers over rely on government funding. Our research provides a better understanding of the irresponsible behavior of organic food supply chain enterprises, our management insights can help improve the government's regulation performance of such behavior, and can also provide a reference for other countries facing similar challenges.