In 1998 the Good Friday Agreement (GFA), aimed at resolving the conflict in Northern Ireland, was met with celebrations. However, there were initial delays in establishing the institutions provided for by the GFA and they have subsequently been suspended on seven occasions. As kin-states, the role of the British and Irish governments in facilitating continued negotiations between the local parties has been central to overcoming these difficulties. This article focuses on the role that the British and Irish governments played during efforts to restore the Stormont Assembly during two prolonged periods of suspension. In order to do so it draws on the theory of external ethnonational guarantors (EEGs) and examines whether the British and Irish governments’ actions were in line with identified best practices: (1) EEGs must cooperate to ameliorate the conflict; (2) EEGs must not intervene on behalf of their co-nationals; (3) EEGs must pay careful attention to the internal dynamics of the conflict, including the dynamics within their co-national community.