British Empiricism Research Articles

Wittgenstein’s Methodology of Gestalt Psychology

This article proposes a methodological understanding of Wittgenstein’s remarks about Gestaltpsychology. Wittgenstein is not so much concerned with Gestaltpsychology proper but rather with its understanding of the nature of the problem of seeing (and seeing-as) as dealt with by British empiricism. Gestaltpsychology offers a more sophisticated physiological explanation of seeing and seeing-as than empiricism has done, yet also this explanation bypasses the (conceptual) problem. Physiological explanations are not eschewed by Wittgenstein, he even gives himself interesting physiological hypotheses. The problem with physiological explanations is that they focus on particular items in the brain as underpinning our use of concepts like seeing and seeing as, whereas they are constituted by our reactions and responses to what we see. Such reactions are embedded in language games and acquire their meaning by our ‘forms of life’ rather than the human brain. This interpretation is finally applied to Wittgenstein’s and Köhler’s explanation of social understanding

John Henry Newman: Shaping the Philosopher

AbstractThe difficulties in placing Newman in a philosophical school or in putting some sort of shape on Newman the philosopher stem in part from Newman's (understandable) near failure to guide the reader as to his overt philosophical method. On the other hand, in the many discussions and controversies that occupied Newman throughout his life—whether conducted through letters or more formal writings—there is gathering witness to a consistent philosophical way in Newman. This paper seeks to put some shape on Newman the philosopher by two principal methods. First, by considering some inaccurate or wholly misleading philosophical labels which have been attached to Newman both in his day and in contemporary times. These help, as it were, to shape Newman the philosopher from without. Second, by examining those elements of his writing that have a philosophical cast, and teasing out hints and clues to Newman the philosopher. The paper argues that while Newman can most certainly be thought of as a philosopher, his subtle philosophical way situates him only problematically in any particular philosophical school, though there can in his work be traced connections to particular philosophical programmes, such as, for example, British empiricism.

Weird Fallibilism

In the friendly dispute between the philosophers of science Paul Feyerabend and Imre Lakatos, both authors proclaim their allegiance to fallibilism: a term first coined by Charles Sanders Peirce, though often associated more strongly with Karl Popper. Yet Lakatos charges that Feyerabend’s position amounts to scepticism rather than fallibilism, given that the latter accounts for theoretical change but not theoretical progress. Famously, progress for Lakatos occurs by way of a progressive research program, one that expands in scope over time, tackles an ever more challenging range of problems, and often yields surprising verifications of its theories. But fallibilism is cheap if it merely entails the truism that the scientific consensus of any given moment might turn out to be false. If we describe knowledge in terms of the ancient and still influential formula “justified true belief,” there is good reason to hold that neither justification nor truth are attainable goals, and that they cannot even be approached asymptotically (as in the very different proposals of Alvin Plantinga and Martin Heidegger). Contra Lakatos this is not grounds for scepticism, but for what I term “weird fallibilism,” using “weird” in a technical sense drawn from my book on the American horror writer H.P. Lovecraft. Weird fallibilism is characterized by two fundamental claims: (1) truth never corresponds to reality, and (2) objects never correspond to their own qualities, a point in direct conflict with the “bundle of qualities” theory of objects handed down from British Empiricism. On this basis, a modification of the “justified true belief” criterion for knowledge is briefly sketched.

“Yet a New Phase, Wherein the Abstract Become Concrete”. Josiah Royce’s Theory of Experience Between Philosophy and Psychology

Abstract This paper aims to focus on the concept of experience and reconstruct its evolutions within Royce’s thought. To do so, I divide this paper in three parts. I begin by analysing Royce’s concept of experience, which takes roots in his interpretation of the British empiricists, such as Locke, Berkeley and Hume, in The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (1892). In the second part I outline Royce’s theory of experience from a philosophical and psychological point of view. My claim is that, in his philosophical writings, Royce argues that cognitions are not abstract ideas but plans of actions: meanings and concepts are embodied, situated and time-oriented. I refer also to Royce’s contribution to the psychological field, with regard to embodied aspects of cognitions. According to Royce, cognitions are enriched with elements related to sensorimotor, imaginative and perceptual faculties. Action and perception are no separated aspects of cognitions, because perception implies sensorimotor dynamics. At the same time, the perception of the object is entangled with the imagination of the would be, i.e., the result of doing different actions with the object.

Empathy, Intentionality and "Other Mind": from Phenomenology to Contemporary Versions of Naturalism

Purpose. This article discusses researching the nature and basic structure of acts of empathy. Such research first requires answering the question: are empathic acts intentional acts of our consciousness? If the answer to this question is affirmative, then there is a need to answer the following questions: what are the features of acts of empathy as intentional ones? And can such acts be qualified as opening a special and complex type of access (epistemic, social, and ethical) to "other minds"? Theoretical basis. The research is based on the problems set by the phenomenological tradition and the developed analytical philosophy, which found their continuation in the philosophy of mind. With the tendency to naturalization, representatives of these areas have another common sphere in the research of mental reality. The changes that both traditions are undergoing can be observed in the transformation of fundamental theoretical concepts such as "intentionality". The linguistic turn gives impetus to the development of new theoretical approaches to the understanding of consciousness, which give preference to the research of language rather than the research in the structure of the Self. The change in methodological guidelines is due to a few factors. In particular, this is a noticeable progress in empirical sciences and the dominance of Behaviorism guidelines in psychology, as well as the fact that the Anglo-American tradition inherits several features intrinsic to British empiricism. Today, three main directions of understanding intentionality can be distinguished. Starting from Brentano and Husserl, we have a classical theory – mental intentionality (phenomenological). As part of analytical philosophy and philosophy of language, we can talk about linguistically interpreted intentionality. Sellars’ model of intentionality has a definite linguistic component. Also, a modern version that functions in the philosophy of consciousness: attempts to naturalize intentionality (this is, for example, the research of Galen Strawson and Daniel Dennett). Originality. The problem is studied not in the context of the phenomenological or analytical traditions in their isolation, but in a problematic-conceptual way, which allows us to reach a new level of generalization and reveal the theoretical advantages of combining both traditions. Conclusions. Empathic Acts can be defined as intentional within the classical phenomenological tradition. As intentional acts, they have their specificity in that they are directed to the "other mind" and can form the basis for the research of intersubjectivity. For the analytic tradition and early philosophy of consciousness, such statements are not obvious. However, discussions about the role of corporality and the problem concerning embodied cognition are becoming increasingly common today. In such discussions, empathy, as an element in the knowledge of others and a possibility for grounding the social sciences, seems more promising than attempts to make epistemic access to other minds possible on the basis of the argument by analogy or on the basis of the inference to the best explanation.

British Formalist Aesthetics and Its Literary Writing Practice

British Formalist Aesthetics and Its Literary Writing Practice

Experience

This essay argues that “experience” is an essential keyword for Victorian studies. The concept spiked in interest in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Causes for this spike include the division of humanistic knowledge into the modern disciplines, and the pressure that idealist philosophy put on British empiricist thought. Shadworth Hodgson's 1898 The Metaphysic of Experience is featured both as a text exemplifying the paradoxes of Victorian experience-talk and as an invitation to further study.

F. Bacon's doctrine of natural and inductive history as the basis of the epistemological structure of English empiricism

F. Bacon's doctrine of natural and inductive history as the basis of the epistemological structure of English empiricism

Is It Too Late? A Theology of Ecology

Is It Too Late? A Theology of Ecology

The shared project, but divergent views, of the Empiricist associationists

ABSTRACT Despite its long period of dominance, the details of associationism as developed by the British Empiricists in the 18th and 19th centuries are often ignored or forgotten today. Perhaps as a result, modern understandings of Empiricist associationism are often oversimplified. In fact, there is no single core view that can be viewed as definitional, or even weaker, as characteristic, of the tradition. The actual views of associationists in this tradition are much more diverse than any such view would allow, even on fundamental aspects of the concept of association. This paper presents some of the most striking theoretical diversity and most significant discussions within the Empiricist associationist tradition. Recognizing this diversity, Empiricist associationism is best viewed as a project with shared questions and methods rather than a shared substantive theory of mind. This discussion can inform our understanding of the historical tradition, and also inform our current use of association and associationism. The concept of association is more flexible than it is often treated, and even its basic nature and function remain up for debate.

„Schatten Der Irresponsivität“: Pathos ohne Response /Response ohne Pathos. Trauma, Widerstand und Schelers Begriff der seelischen Kausalität

This paper discusses possible forms of loss or weakness of the ability to interact with others and the ways in which this arises. In particular, in the context of socio-affective knowledge and related failures, it focuses on certain deficits that primarily involve the body. The article aims to show that the “destiny” of our inner drives and our lives—the specific solutions to which they are forced in their vicissitudes—is less “blind” than it appears, leaving (albeit minimal) margins of escape, also because it has a relational connotation. Starting from Bernhard Waldenfels’s recent work on the relationship between phenomenology and psychoanalysis, in which this question is addressed from a phenomenological-responsive point of view, this article reflects on the problem by establishing a comparison between Waldenfels’s philosophy and Max Scheler’s phenomenology of values. Beyond the differences that their approaches to the problem of relational deficits present, Waldenfels and Scheler can be put in fruitful dialogue with each other, starting from their common interest in Freudian psychoanalysis. Within this framework, it is possible to evaluate, adopting Scheler’s point of view, both a methodological aspect and a psychological presupposition of Freud’s ontogenesis of sympathy and love: associationism. From this perspective, Freud reveals himself in part as an heir to British empiricism. I will argue that, with and beyond Freud, the human being is not reducible to a mere sum of blind sensations or blind drives and that for both at least certain forms of inability to interact with others are derivative—deformations of normal responsivity and aberrations of normal pulsional-(relational) life—rather than originary phenomena.

ОПЫТ ПОНИМАНИЯ ПРОЦЕССА ПОЗНАНИЯ В КАЗАНСКОЙ ТЕИСТИЧЕСКОЙ ШКОЛЕ ВТОРОЙ ПОЛОВИНЫ XIX ВЕКА В КОНТЕКСТЕ ВЛИЯНИЯ ФИЛОСОФСКОГО ЭМПИРИЗМА

On the example of the analysis of the creativity of representatives of the Kazan theistic school, the presence of an empirical model of metaphysics of knowledge in spiritual and academic science as an alternative to Orthodox religious and philosophical rationalism was revealed. The tradition of interpreting the role of religious feeling in the process of knowledge among teachers of the Kazan Theological Academy is outlined. The role of British empiricism as one of the sources of the empirical version of Orthodox philosophical epistemology has been identified

W stronę obiektywności wartości. Odpowiedź na komentarze

Towards Objectivity of Values. A Response to Comments Beyond immediate references to the introductory paper, one may find in the commentaries a set of other interesting issues. They are left to another occasion, since the focus here is on remarks inviting further elaboration on the main theses’ clarification and grounding. It goes in three directions, to (i) clarify the difference between a rejection of British empiricism as a misleading theory of human cognition and a postulate to replace it with an adequate theory of cognitive reference to the truth of believes about the objects of experience in the world of human culture and civilization, (ii) dismiss from the theory of human knowledge the belief in the construction of mind-representations of the objects of cognition, and to focus instead on the relation of reference in judgments to the independent objects of knowledge within the human world, and (iii) to ground the objective status of the ideal of truth and the other values within the world of culture and civilization arrangements.

워즈워스의 빌둥과 숭고: 쉴러의 미학으로 『서곡』 읽기

This paper is an attempt to re-examine Wordsworth’s poetic claim of his spiritual growth in The Prelude with German ideas of Bildung and the sublime. I start with Schlegel’s remarks that the prevailing tendencies of his age are the French Revolution, Fichte’s transcendental philosophy, and Wilhelm Meister, which I think could also be an apt summary of what is contained in The Prelude because all the Bildungsgeschichte of the age across Europe were motivated more or less by the same historical occasion, the French Revolution. Bildung, in this context, may well be understood as the process of materializing in an individual’s life the idea of freedom, one of the ideals the French Revolution was supposed to make into reality, which would explain why The Prelude should be understood along with its German equivalents in the same philosophical context. My argument is that Wordsworth’s poetic claim of his own poetic growth could best be made sense of by Schiller’s idea of “pathetic sublime” because Wordsworth’s Bildung in The Prelude is prominently accelerated by the “sublime” experiences within the key episodes such as Simplon Pass, Snowdon, and the “Sleep no more” scene of Book X. In the first main section, I recover Goethe’s idea of Bildung from his classic Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahr for the comparison with the other kinds of Bildung in Wordsworth’s poetry. In the second, I explained the Bildung of “Tintern Abbey” which is based mainly on British empiricist philosopher such as David Hartley. In the third, I critically reviewed the works by other scholars who have studied The Prelude in the light of Kantian sublime to prepare my own reading of The Prelude with Schillerian sublime as the rationale for Wordsworth’s Bildung in the final section.

The Magus of the North: Johann Georg Hamann’s Treatment of the Artistic Genius

In the 18th century, questions abound on the new branch of sciencethat is the discipline of aesthetics. In connection with this, first inFrance and England, then also in the German sphere of thought,artistic genius as the producer of an aesthetically valued artworkbecomes an object of interest. The term ‘genius’ enters Germanvernacular in the middle of the 18th century, when the scholarand philosopher Johann Georg Hamann commences his life work.Interpretations of the works of Hamann, an influential irrationalistor anti-rationalist of the Enlightenment era, are topical even today.At the time, the Enlightenment-inspired, nascent German geniustheory is greatly influenced by the French tradition. However,Hamann becomes a radical changer of the concept of genius. Duringhis sojourn in London (1757–1758), Hamann undergoes a religiousconversion, which subsequently becomes a catalyst for his entireworks and philosophy. Influenced by the British empiricist geniustradition, from his first writings (Socratic Memorabilia and Aestheticsin a Nutshell), Hamann enters into dispute with the spirit of theEnlightenment that dominates German aesthetics, represented byGottsched, Mendelssohn, Lessing, etc., remaining in oppositionthroughout his creative career. In his innovative literary works, richin metaphors, he proposes his own holistic idea of genius, whichcentres around an artistic genius with a God-given talent, whosecreativity is directly connected to his faith in God and the perfectnature he created. Hamann’s poetic artist, who creates his worksthrough divine sensation, is not limited by a single rule or law, noris he bound by the taste preferences of his audience. Hamann doesnot see artistic creation as a pleasurable artefact which enhancesnature by rational rules, which has to adhere to the limits of goodtaste – that view was prevalent and dominant at the time, especiallyin the French and German Enlightenment ideology. He highlightsthe idea of art as a metaphysical creative process which stems fromfeelings and sensations through faith, which has a deep spiritual meaning. Hamann’s works, in which he addresses the questions ofart and genius, are not dry postulations, but the author’s originalvisions of ingenious creation, which stand out by their intriguinginnovative structure, and often by ironic and humorous undertones.Hamann’s concept of the artistic genius is one of the cornerstonesof German early romanticism, it has influenced numerous authorsin the 19th century and extended into the 20th century throughexistentialist literature. Hamann’s vision of genius does not haveequivalents in the list of genius treatments, it is unique in both contentand form. Hamann’s ideas of genius will remain topical in every erawhen subjective views of art are in focus, which stem from the innercreative freedom of the artist, a creative who crosses boundaries andignores conventions, whose aspiration is guided by something thatcannot be subjected to ordinary explanations. The time has arrivedon the spiral of history today when the phenomenon of the artist isyet again at the centre of discussions, and there is no reason to doubtthat artistic genius will continue revealing itself in times to come.

Visual art history and the psychology of perception: Perspectivism and its 20th century abandonment in the visual arts and in Gibson's ecological psychology.

The development of linear perspective in the early 15th century and the discovery of the retinal image two centuries later became cornerstones of an approach to visual perception theory that eventually took shape primarily in the hands of British Empiricist philosophers. Even as this approach has dominated perceptual theory to the present day, the perspectivist influence on pictorial representation within the visual arts steadily diminished over time. Its decisive break with perspectivism came in the early 20th century with transformative 19th century changes in the sciences and technology. Collectively, these events elevated process and change over fixity and stasis, and ultimately led to the collapse of the distinction between space and time in the physical sciences. Even so, approaches to visual perception in psychology remained remarkably untouched by these occurrences until the 1960s when the experimental psychologist James Gibson drew upon them to challenge the legacy of perspectivism and the visual image and their effect on perceptual theory. His ecological approach to perception recognizes animacy as the essential functional property of living things, and in doing so, conceptualizes seeing as a perception-action process. From this stance, Gibson like the visual artists earlier in the century rejected the assumption that visual perception is best characterized as the capturing of static images. Jointly and yet independently, both efforts loosened the grip that perspectivism and the visual image have maintained on the arts and on visual perception theory, respectively, bringing 19th century scientific advances into 20th century psychological thought.

Pragmatism as Transcendental Philosophy, Part 2: Peirce on God and Personality

Pragmatism as Transcendental Philosophy, Part 2: Peirce on God and Personality

Language of Reality and Reality of Language in Francis Bacon’s Philosophy

The most important of Francis Bacon’s argument against Aristotelian syllogistic logic as a main method of investigation was his doctrine of Idols, closely connected to the contemporary Anglican theological views on imperfect human nature. In his criticism of the first notion of human mind, based on mistaken abstraction, Bacon separated “ars inveniendi”, “ars judicandi” and “ars tradendi” and argued for a new nonverbal form of communication, based on “real characters”. Bacon's conventional concept of the universal language, strongly influenced by Aristotle, was not realized by the philosopher himself, but it was of great popularity in both European rationalism and British empiricism in the middle – second half of the 17th century.

Objectivity as the Fruit of Authentic Subjectivity

One of the most important problems of philosophy is the “critical problem”, the problem of bridge between the human mind and the world, the external reality. It is the question of relations between the subject and the object. The interesting solution for this problem is given by Bernard Lonergan SJ (1904–1984), one of the most important Catholic English-speaking thinkers of the twentieth century. It would be difficult to point to someone who influenced the American Catholic philosophy and theology from the inside out more than he did: that is why he is called the “American Rahner „. He tries to connect the great tradition of Thomism and Augustinianism and, on the other hand, classical and modern philosophy, German idealism and English Empiricism. At the heart of his thinking is the theory of the human mind. With the help of transcendental and phenomenological methods, Lonergan demonstrates that the mental structure of man consists of five levels: the empirical level, the intellectual level, the rational level, the responsible level and the level of religious experience, which together create a cumulative process that leads to knowledge and decision. The most important point here is he act of understanding, the insight, which always has a creative moment, especially on the second and third levels, as an effect of the subject’s work. The correct understanding of this moment enables a mediation between the empirical, rational and idealistic understanding of the knowledge process. Correct action on all levels, faithfulness to the nature of the subject, leads to truth – according to Lonergan’s very apt maxim: objectivity is the fruit of the authentic subjectivity.

GEORGE EDWARD MOORE IN THE HISTORY OF ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY OF XX CENTURY

George Edward Moore is the brightest philosopher of British neo-realism. During the first half of XX century he remained the undisputed leader of this philosophical movement, which organically and fruitfully combinedele-ments of classical British empiricism with new original tools for the conceptual analysis of ordinary language expressions. By the example of innovative ideas in moral philosophy, outlined by G.E. Moore in Principia Ethica, there is analyzed the intellectual context of the formation of philosophical metaethics in the XX century.