The current state of managing collaboratively in an era of accelerated United States national action is assessed against the earlier approaches identified by Daniel J. Elazar and others during periods of cooperativefederalism. The literature on the management of intergovernmental relations within cooperative federalism is examined, as are Elazar's contributions to managing within a noncentralizedfederal matrix. Three management approaches associated with increased national power and decreased collaborative intergovernmental relations are identified: nation-centered federalism, growing emphasis on nationwide action, and executive leadership. Collaborative management within intergovernmental relations is then reconstructed by looking at the extent of bargaining and adjustment, shifting of program venues to state and local governments, growing intergovernmental managerial sophistication, and limits on federal enforcement ability. More extensive field research needs to be conducted to understand the true extent and depth of collaborative management in the federal system. Daniel J. Elazar's concept of collaboration within federalism is a core element of the theory of federal democracy. In the United States, he argues that four elements came together to form the pattern of intergovernmental interaction known as cooperative federalism: a federalist theory of governments, a dual governmental structure, some specific cooperative programs, and some administrative techniques for intergovernmental collaboration.' If the essence of federalism is indeed based on this type of self-rule plus shared rule, then it must rest on varying forms of contractual noncentralization or the structured dispersion of powers among many centers. Constitutionally guaranteed, dispersion of authority is the key to the widespread and entrenched diffusion of power under federalism.2 Under such arrangements, the federal system as a jural relationship is to respect that which is within each unit's ambit of authority and the terms