During the telephone conversation in which he was offered the vice-presidency, Nelson A. Rockefeller recalled Gerald R. Ford saying: I want you on the domestic and Henry [Kissinger] on the foreign side and then we can move on these things (p. 52). At that time, Kissinger was both the secretary of state and the national security adviser. With this model in mind, Rockefeller, who had twice previously declined the vice-presidential nomination when he was governor of New York, accepted Ford's offer. He hoped that during the period of post-Watergate healing he could assume a domestic policymaking role in that office that would transcend the vice-presidency's traditional inconsequentiality. In the end, Michael Turner concludes, Rockefeller failed. There was ambiguity in Ford's initial commitment, ambiguity Rockefeller failed to clarify because it opened the door to one last slim shot at his lifetime ambition, the presidency. However, the long delay caused by the vice-presidential confirmation hearings kept Rockefeller from the scene while Ford's domestic White House was being structured in a decentralized way and while roles were being carved out by key aides. In addition, as New York's former four-term governor and a serious presidential contender for a decade and a half, Rockefeller as vicepresident could not function on a level of equality with other advisers. Such a role was uncomfortable for him and for the others around President Ford, especially Donald Rumsfeld, who himself harbored presidential ambitions. Two major attempts by Rockefeller to have an impact on Ford's domestic policy were his effort, after being appointed as vice chairman of the Domestic Policy Council, to define a comprehensive framework for the administration's 1976 legislative agenda and his proposal to meet energy financing needs through the creation of the proposed massive Energy Research and Finance Corporation (ERFCO). The first of these was shortcircuited when Ford announced a spending ceiling in October 1975 of $395 billion, thus severely limiting resources for any new domestic programs. The second survived major intra-administration infighting, only to languish in a Congress that knew the measure's prime mover, Rockefeller, was a lame duck vice-president, and suspected that the administration was not wholeheartedly behind it. Turner's treatment, based on a large number of interviews with high-level presidential and vice-presidential aides of the Ford era, offers excellent insight into peak executive decision-making processes. The author's understanding of Rockefeller's role would have been enhanced, however, by greater familiarity with his record as governor of New York. No one knowledgeable about that era, for example, can read of the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) proposal without thinking of its similarity in scope and concept to the numerous public authorities created by Rockefeller in the state. Such issues as the effect on the ERDA proposal of the fact that it was offered in the midst of the New York fiscal crisis (which was triggered by the default of one of these authorities, the Urban Development Corporation) are given insufficient attention by the author. The Rockefeller experience demonstrated that the vice-president is likely to be more effective as a minister without portfolio than as an on-line policy adviser. It also demonstrated, once again, that the vice-presidency can be only what the president wished it to
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