An Indian Reaction to U.S. Nonproliferation Policy

Abstract

Two events of global significance have molded U.S. nonproliferation policies. First, increase in crude oil prices made nuclear power economical; simultaneously, export of nuclear power plants and nuclear technology became commercially attractive. dispersal of nuclear power plants is perceived by United States as creating technological infrastructure for weapons option. Second, Indian nuclear test of May 18, 1974 heightened American anxieties that a proliferation chain-reaction would follow. Although initial official statements were muted, Henry Kissinger stated a year later: The Indian nuclear explosion of a year ago raises anew spectre of an era of plentiful nuclear weapons in which any local conflict risks exploding into a nuclear holocaust.1 Early U.S. policies in post-1974 period focused upon strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) was directed to study alternative fuel cycles for satisfying energy needs without recourse to breeder technology or reactors recycling plutonium. Other strategems were also employed. President Nixon agreed in 1974 to supply nuclear reactors to Egypt and Israel. intention could have been initially to obtain ingress and, later, control over Egyptian and Israeli nuclear programs. In 1976, Pakistan was offered sale of 110 A-7 aircraft to dissuade her from buying a plutonium reprocessing plant from France. Pakistan's conventional capabilities were sought to be thereby enhanced sufficiently to wean her away from acquiring sensitive technology. President Carter assumed office with a strong personal commitment to nonproliferation. This is evident from his nuclear power policy statement on April 7, 1977 in which he perceived the risk that components of nuclear power process will be turned to providing atomic weapons. elements of an American nonproliferation strategy are embodied in U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA 1978). emphasis therein on denials of sensitive nuclear technologies and materials, and on constraints on nuclear exports through safeguards, is clear. No exports, for instance, of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and sensitive nuclear technologies would be made unless recipient non-nuclear weapon state accepts IAEA safe-