Thomas Gehrig [2004] has presented an interesting theoretical model comparing organizational forms with respect to the incentive they create to invest in generating innovative ideas. The paper extends the well-known analysis by Sah and Stiglitz [1986] by introducing endogenous information acquisition. In particular the paper powerfully demonstrates that the ranking of organizational forms derived in a fixedinformation environment may not generalize. Moreover, there may no longer be a simple ranking. The purpose of this note is to suggest how the framework could be further generalized by more fully modeling the actual implementation decisions of organizations based upon their research output. Specifically, modeling the decision scheme introduces, with respect to the organizational form, endogenous type I and type II errors (i.e., rejecting a good project and accepting a bad project, respectively). Obviously, extending the model does not invalidate Gehrig [2004] 's results, as the exogenous case always remains a possibility. However, the generalization may allow us to reintroduce a partial ranking of organizational forms, in particular with respect to the informational content of research activities and the marginal costs of acquiring information. Obviously, a complete analysis must be left for future research, as it would go well beyond a comment.