Enactive View Research Articles

The origin and function of external representations

External representations ( ERs) are objects or performances in the world whose proper function is to communicate about other things in the world. Why and how did we make them, and what do they give us? We outline a simple framework for thinking about ERs grounded in modern machine learning. We propose a minimal set of neural mechanisms needed for open-ended ER production. Our constructivist enactive view contrasts with nativist views which propose specialist neural modules requiring symbolic internal representations. We propose a plausible set of (biological and cultural) evolutionary steps to full Gricean symbolic communication via a set of increasingly complex enactive algorithms for ER production. A pragmatic space of games is defined, which includes not only fully cooperative language games but also science, art, and evolved signal manipulation games. This space is defined by the complexity of learning needed by sender and receiver. We propose that one important step towards open-ended ER use was selection for bush reading, which like mind-reading is an inferential process requiring complex contextual and syntactic understanding of cues about events displaced in space and time. Bush reading pre-adapted receivers to be receptive, competent, and perspicacious interpreters of later intentionally produced signals about hidden topics such as felt mental states. This paved the way for minimally Gricean communication, which subsequently could be bootstrapped into explicit theories of mind, folk psychology narratives, and symbolic language in general. Recent findings in cognitive archaeology are integrated within the framework, and new experiments in machine learning suggested.

What could come before time? Intertwining affectivity and temporality at the basis of intentionality

AbstractThe enactive approach to cognition and the phenomenological tradition have in common a wide conception of ‘intentionality’. Within these frameworks, intentionality is understood as a general openness to the world. For classical phenomenologists, the most basic subjective structure that allows for such openness is time-consciousness. Some enactivists, while inspired by the phenomenological tradition, have nevertheless argued that affectivity is more basic, being that which gives rise to the temporal flow of consciousness. In this paper, I assess the relationship between temporality and affectivity from both a phenomenological and an enactive perspective. I argue that, as opposed to the classical phenomenological view (which favours temporality), and to the enactive view (which favours affectivity), we must take affectivity and temporality as co-emergent. Jointly, affectivity and temporality constitute the basic structures of intentionality. Additionally, using examples from phenomenological psychopathology, I conclude that all intentionality is defined by an anticipatory and affective structure that gives rise to general feelings related to our bodily possibilities in the world.

F/acts Ways of Enactive Worldmaking

Knowing is an activity through which agents and world produce themselves. This is often expressed by the enactive claim that agents bring forth a world. I analyse this idea for different modes of agent–environment engagement: interactional, transactional, and constitutional. Something is produced in each case. Bringing forth a world is not only an epistemic but an ontological claim. Acts in their fine structure result from a process of fact production, or f/acts. F/acts co-emerge with their 'preconditions', e.g.intentions, affordances, across the subject/object divide. F/acts define their inner temporality and affectivity, comprising both event and experience. A plurality of worlds is admitted in this enactive view, without entailing antirealism. We cannot bring forth just any world. World resistance organizes action and experience. I touch on the implications for objectivity and free will and discuss the primordiality of activity, community, and relationality. From a notion of groundlessness in early enactive work, I suggest that a participatory universe is better conceived as a meshwork of groundless grounds.

What Self in Self-Organization? Engaging Varela's Epistemology for the Co-embodied Self

I focus on an early article by Francisco Varela, 'Not One, Not Two' (1976), to argue that his non-dualistic epistemology entails a paradigm shift towards a fundamentally co-embodied, and thus social, view of self. Varela argued that the mind–body duality could be resolved by understanding the mind as embodied. Both Varela and Evan Thompson have later elaborated on this and suggested an enactive, essentially embodied view of the self in terms of selforganized, organismic autonomy. I will argue that the enactive view of the self remains ambiguous with regards to the role of social interactions: are they constitutive for the minimal self-organization of the self or do they only play a shaping, secondary factor? I rely on Varela's epistemology in 'Not One, Not Two' to support my argument that the minimal self-organizational network that is the human self entails both individual bodily and joint co-embodied processes so that the self is already and constitutively social.

Scientific practice as ecological-enactive co-construction

Philosophy of science has undergone a naturalistic turn, moving away from traditional idealized concerns with the logical structure of scientific theories and toward focusing on real-world scientific practice, especially in domains such as modeling and experimentation. As part of this shift, recent work has explored how the project of philosophically understanding science as a natural phenomenon can be enriched by drawing from different fields and disciplines, including niche construction theory in evolutionary biology, on the one hand, and ecological and enactive views in embodied cognitive science, on the other. But these insights have so far been explored in separation from each other, without clear indication of whether they can work together. Moreover, the focus on particular practices, however insightful, has tended to lack consideration of potential further implications for a naturalized understanding of science as a whole (i.e., above and beyond those particular practices). Motivated by these developments, here we sketch a broad-ranging view of science, scientific practice and scientific knowledge in terms of ecological-enactive co-construction. The view we propose situates science in the biological, evolutionary context of human embodied cognitive activity aimed at addressing the demands of life. This motivates reframing theory as practice, and reconceptualizing scientific knowledge in ecological terms, as relational and world-involving. Our view also brings to the forefront of attention the fundamental link between ideas about the nature of mind, of science and of nature itself, which we explore by outlining how our proposal differs from more conservative, and narrower, conceptions of “cognitive niche construction.”

Not in the drug, not in the brain: Causality in psychedelic experiences from an enactive perspective.

Psychedelics are psychoactive substances that receive renewed interest from science and society. Increasing empirical evidence shows that the effects of psychedelics are associated with alterations in biochemical processes, brain activity, and lived experience. Still, how these different levels relate remains subject to debate. The current literature presents two influential views on the relationship between the psychedelic molecule, neural events, and experience: The integration view and the pluralistic view. The main aim of this article is to contribute a promising complementary view by re-evaluating the psychedelic molecule-brain-experience relationship from an enactive perspective. We approach this aim via the following main research questions: (1) What is the causal relationship between the psychedelic drug and brain activity? (2) What is the causal relationship between brain activity and the psychedelic experience? In exploring the first research question, we apply the concept of autonomy to the psychedelic molecule-brain relationship. In exploring the second research question, we apply the concept of dynamic co-emergence to the psychedelic brain-experience relationship. Addressing these two research questions from an enactive position offers a perspective that emphasizes interdependence and circular causality on multiple levels. This enactive perspective not only supports the pluralistic view but enriches it through a principled account of how multi-layered processes come to interact. This renders the enactive view a promising contribution to questions around causality in the therapeutic effects of psychedelics with important implications for psychedelic therapy and psychedelic research.

An enactive view of identity transformation: Implications for correctional rehabilitation

An enactive view of identity transformation: Implications for correctional rehabilitation

A Plea for Wild Philosophy

Teaching philosophy online in secondary schools differs from offline teaching. The explanations usually offered for this difference show the cognitivist assumptions of mainstream pre-university philosophy education, meaning that philosophy education assumes that the aim of its practice is the enhancement of internal mental abilities. This paper argues that this view of the goal of education is unwarranted and unnecessarily restrictive, and that it implies an undesirable dichotomy between learning to be competent and being competent. An alternative, based on ecological and enactive views of cognition, is presented as a better conception of philosophical cognitive competence in general, and of the difference between offline and online teaching in particular. This alternative suggests that the difference resembles the difference between life in a zoo and life in the jungle, and that we should teach pupils to do wild philosophy.

The lived, living, and behavioral sense of perception

With Jan Degenaar and Kevin O’Regan’s (D&O) critique of (what they call) ‘autopoietic enactivism’ as point of departure, this article seeks to revisit, refine, and develop phenomenology’s significance for the enactive view. Arguing that D&O’s ‘sensorimotor theory’ fails to do justice to perceptual meaning, the article unfolds by (1) connecting this meaning to the notion of enaction as a meaningful co-definition of perceiver and perceived, (2) recounting phenomenological reasons for conceiving of the perceiving subject as a living body, and (3) showing how the phenomenological perspective does a better job at fulfilling D&O’s requirement for grounding notions of mentality in ‘outer’ criteria than they do. The picture that thus emerges is one of perceptual meaning as an integration of lived, living, and behavioral aspects – a structure of behavior that cannot be captured by appeal to sensorimotor capacities alone but that is adequately illuminated by the enactive notion of adaptive autonomy.

Knowing the Knowing. Non-dual Meditative Practice From an Enactive Perspective.

Within a variety of contemplative traditions, non-dual-oriented practices were developed to evoke an experiential shift into a mode of experiencing in which the cognitive structures of self-other and subject–object subside. These practices serve to de-reify the enactment of an observing witness which is usually experienced as separate from the objects of awareness. While several contemplative traditions, such as Zen, Mahāmudrā, Dzogchen, and Advaita Vedanta emphasize the importance of such a non-dual insight for the cultivation of genuine wellbeing, only very few attempts in contemplative science have turned toward the study of non-dual-oriented practices. This article starts from a recently developed theoretical cognitive science framework that models the requirements of a temporary experiential shift into a mode of experiencing free from cognitive subject–object structure. This model inspired by the enactive approach contributes theoretically grounded hypotheses for the much-needed rigorous study of non-dual practices and non-dual experiences. To do so, three steps are taken: first, common elements of non-dual-oriented practices are outlined. Second, the main ideas of enactive cognitive science are presented including a principled theoretical model of what is required for a shift to a pure non-dual experience, that is, an experiential mode that is unbound by subject–object duality. Third, this synthesized theoretical model of the requirements for the recognition of the non-dual is then compared with a specific non-dual style of meditation practice, namely, Mahāmudrā practice from Tibetan Buddhism. This third step represents a heuristic for evaluating the external coherence of the presented model. With this, the aim is to point toward a principled enactive view of non-dual meditative practice. In drawing the implications of the presented model, this article ends with an outlook toward next steps for further developing a research agenda that may fully address the concrete elements of non-dual practices.

Emotion and correctional practice: Theoretical foundations of an enactive practice framework

Theoretical issues in the explanation and intervention of offending behavior have been well-documented. We suggest that these issues are particularly prevalent in the way that emotion is targeted through dominant approaches to correctional explanation and practice. These approaches typically target specific emotional states which are judged to be ‘offence-relevant’, assume that emotional states act as an impediment to planned behavior, and prescribe primarily response-focused emotion regulation strategies as intervention. We suggest that a practice framework situated in the enactive view of human functioning could be a useful alternative perspective. The enactive perspective suggests that emotions are evaluative embodied desires, which serve to motivate adaptive action at physiological, social, or cultural levels. Implications of an enactive framework are discussed.

Facilitating Scientific Events Guided by Complex Thinking: A Case Study of an Online Inter/Transdisciplinary Advanced Training School

Aim/Purpose This paper aims to illustrate, through an exploratory ideographic case study, how a Complex Thinking framework can inform the design of scientific events and the facilitation of scientific Inter and Transdisciplinary groups towards positive emergent outcomes, both at the level of the functioning of the group and the collective complexity of their thinking. Moreover, it aims to show how the choice of facilitation strategies can contribute to positive emergent outcomes in the context of a fully online event, with its inherent constraints. Finally, this study aims to conduct an exploratory qualitative evaluation of the participants’ experiences during School, with a focus on the processes and how they relate to the aims of the School and the goals of the facilitation. Background Science needs to embrace modes of knowing capable of generating more complex (differentiated, integrated, recursively organized, emergent), ecologically fit, and creative responses, to meet the complexity of the world’s challenges. New formats and strategies are required that attend to the facilitation of Inter and Transdisciplinary scientific events and meetings, towards creative and complex outcomes. A Complex Thinking framework provides suggestions for the facilitation of Inter and Transdisciplinary meetings and events through targeting key properties which may lead to the emergence of complex and creative outcomes. Methodology We adopt an ideographic case study approach to illustrate how a complex systems approach, in particular a Complex Thinking framework, grounded in an enactive view of cognition, guided the design choices and the facilitation strategies of an online Inter and Transdisciplinary Advanced Training School (Winter School). We aim to illustrate how the facilitation strategies were selected and used to promote deep and creative interactions within the constraints of an online environment. We adopt an exploratory qualitative approach to investigate the participants’ reports of their experiences of the School, in light of the principles and goals that guided its design and facilitation. Contribution This paper opens a new area of theoretical and applied research, under the scope of a Complex Thinking framework, focused on the facilitation of Inter and Transdisciplinarity at scientific events, meetings, and discussions towards complex and creative outcomes. Findings The results of the exploratory qualitative analysis of the participants’ experiences regarding the event suggest a critical role of its methodology in fostering rich, deep, and constructive interactions, in leading to the emergence of a collective group experience, to the integration of ideas, and in facilitating transformative personal experiences, under the effects of the emergent group processes. It suggests that the strategies employed were successful, anticipating and overcoming the particular constraints of an online event. Recommendations for Practitioners This case study suggests that a Complex Thinking framework can fruitfully guide the design of facilitation strategies and activities for scientific events and meetings, activating a number of key relational processes that contribute to or boost the emergence of positive group experiences and the production and integration of novel ideas. Recommendations for Researchers This study calls for action-oriented and applied research focused on the developmental evaluation of innovations, regarding the facilitation of scientific creativity and integration, within the scope of a Complex Thinking approach. Impact on Society This paper calls for new modes of organization and formats of scientific activities, suggesting that Inter and Transdisciplinary events and meetings may benefit from intentional management and facilitation of interactions between participants to produce transformative impacts. It demonstrates the importance of the organizational principles used to plan and run events that engage multiple and various societal agents, from academics to practitioners and social activists, towards enhancing their richness and relevance to complex real-world challenges. Future Research This study highlights the need for process-focused systematic case study research using complex systems-informed designs to explore how and which facilitation strategies may promote which (interaction of) properties of Complex Thinking and associated processes and how, and under which conditions, these lead to more complex and creative outcomes.

Autopoietic Enactivism, Phenomenology, and the Problem of Naturalism: A Neutral Monist Proposal

In this paper, I compare the original version of the enactive view—autopoietic enactivism—with Husserl’s phenomenology, regarding the issue of the relationship between consciousness and nature. I refer to this issue as the “problem of naturalism.” I show how the idea of the co-determination of subject and object of cognition, which is at the heart of autopoietic enactivism, is close to the phenomenological form of correlationism. However, I argue that there is a tension between an epistemological reading of the subject-object correlation that renounces to search for its metaphysical ground, and the enactivist focus on the biological basis of cognition, which seems to imply a view of nature as the metaphysical ground of the conscious mind. A similar problem arises in Husserl’s phenomenology in the contrast between the idea of the fundamental subject-object correlation, the concept of nature as a correlate of transcendental constitution, and the investigation of the corporeal and material grounding of consciousness. I find a way out of this problem by drawing on the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology. I argue that the investigation of the temporality of experience in genetic phenomenology leads us to investigate the metaphysical ground of the subject-object correlation, understood dynamically as co-constitution and co-origination. Then I propose to complement phenomenology and enactivism with a form of neutral monism, which conceives of the co-constitution of subject and object as grounded in a flow of fundamental, pre-phenomenal qualities.

A global framework for a systemic view of brain modeling

The brain is a complex system, due to the heterogeneity of its structure, the diversity of the functions in which it participates and to its reciprocal relationships with the body and the environment. A systemic description of the brain is presented here, as a contribution to developing a brain theory and as a general framework where specific models in computational neuroscience can be integrated and associated with global information flows and cognitive functions. In an enactive view, this framework integrates the fundamental organization of the brain in sensorimotor loops with the internal and the external worlds, answering four fundamental questions (what, why, where and how). Our survival-oriented definition of behavior gives a prominent role to pavlovian and instrumental conditioning, augmented during phylogeny by the specific contribution of other kinds of learning, related to semantic memory in the posterior cortex, episodic memory in the hippocampus and working memory in the frontal cortex. This framework highlights that responses can be prepared in different ways, from pavlovian reflexes and habitual behavior to deliberations for goal-directed planning and reasoning, and explains that these different kinds of responses coexist, collaborate and compete for the control of behavior. It also lays emphasis on the fact that cognition can be described as a dynamical system of interacting memories, some acting to provide information to others, to replace them when they are not efficient enough, or to help for their improvement. Describing the brain as an architecture of learning systems has also strong implications in Machine Learning. Our biologically informed view of pavlovian and instrumental conditioning can be very precious to revisit classical Reinforcement Learning and provide a basis to ensure really autonomous learning.

Bio-psycho-social interaction: an enactive perspective

What are the respective roles of physiological, psychological and social processes in the development of psychiatric disorders? The answer is relevant for deciding on interventions, prevention measures, and for our (self)understanding. Reductionist models assume that only physiological processes are in the end causally relevant. The biopsychosocial (BPS) model, by contrast, assumes that psychological and social processes have their own unique characteristics that cannot be captured by physiological processes and which have their own distinct contributions to the development of psychiatric disorders. Although this is an attractive position, the BPS model suffers from a major flaw: it does not tell us how these biopsychosocial processes can causally interact. If these are processes of such different natures, how then can they causally affect each other? An enactive approach can explain biopsychosocial interaction. Enactivism argues that cognition is an embodied and embedded activity and that living necessarily includes some basic form of cognition, or sense-making. Starting from an enactive view on the interrelations between body, mind, and world, and adopting an organizational rather than a linear notion of causality, we can understand the causality involved in the biopsychosocial processes that may contribute to the development of psychiatric disorders.

Impact of auditory sense on trust and brand affect through auditory social interaction and control

Voice assistants—or voice-enabled artificial intelligence—have changed the way people interact with their surroundings dramatically. Utilizing an enactive view of social cognition theory, this study demonstrates how voice assistants can act as [semi] autonomous agents to hold instantaneous social interactions with consumers. This research employed two experimental studies. Study 1 used two voice assistant mobile applications, Microsoft Cortana and Google Assistant, and Study 2 used Amazon Alexa and Microsoft Cortana. The contributions this paper makes are two-fold. First, the results illustrate how perceived auditory sense drives perceived auditory control through auditory social interactions with a voice assistant that lead to brand affect and consumers’ trust in the voice assistant. Second, results shed light on the role of surprise as a repelling drive that attenuates the effect of perceived auditory control on brand affect.

Embodied ethics: Levinas’ gift for enactivism

This paper suggests that the enactive approach to ethics could benefit from engaging a dialogue with the phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas, a philosopher who has given ethics a decisive role in the understanding of our social life. Taking the enactive approach of Colombetti and Torrance (PHEN 8:505–526, 2009) as a starting point, we show how Levinas’ philosophy, with the key notions of face, otherness, and responsibility among others can complement and enrich the enactive view of ethics. Specifically, we argue that Levinas can provide, on the one hand, a phenomenological characterisation of ethics itself, of its nature and fundamental meaning, and on the other, an account of how sociality, affectivity and embodiment, as presented in Colombetti and Torrance’s work, combine to bring about the ethical experience. However, we also point out that introducing Levinas to the enactive approach could be challenging. It is not obvious how sense-making and value-making, as centred (a la Jonas) on the precariousness and potential death of the subject, would account for the ethical experience as grounded (a la Levinas) on the precariousness and potential death of the other.

Reconceiving rationality: situating rationality into radically enactive cognition

Rational beliefs and actions are typically evaluated against certain benchmarks, e.g., those of classical logic or probability theory. Rationality therefore is traditionally taken to involve some sort of reasoning, which in turn implies contentful cognition. Radically Enactive (and Embodied) views of Cognition (REC), on the other hand, claim that not all cognition is contentful. In order to show that rationality does not need to lie outside of REC’s scope of radicalizing cognition, I develop a Radically Enactive notion of Rationality (RER), according to which rationality is embodied, situated and contentless. For RER, an organism acts rationally insofar as it sustains a proficient interaction with its environment, which in turn requires the coordination of cognitive abilities in accordance with environmental constraints. Rationality is thus distinguished from reasoning, for reasoning is understood as a capacity to coordinate representational cognitive abilities.

Prospects of enactivist approaches to intentionality and cognition

We discuss various implications of some radical anti-representationalist views of cognition and what they have to offer with regard to the naturalization of intentionality and the explanation of cognitive phenomena. Our focus is on recent arguments from proponents of enactive views of cognition to the effect that basic cognition is intentional but not representational and that cognition is co-extensive with life. We focus on lower rather than higher forms of cognition, namely the question regarding the intentional and representational nature of cognition found in organisms simpler than human beings, because enactivists do not deny that more sophisticated cognitive phenomena are representational and involve content. After introducing the debate on the naturalization of intentionality (Sect. 2), we briefly review different varieties of enactivism and introduce their central claims (Sect. 3). In Sect. 4 we turn to radical enactivism in order to focus on the arguments for a thoroughly non-representational, enactive account of perception and basic cognition. In particular, we discuss three major issues: First, what is supposed to replace the representational analysis of perception in a radical-enactive explanation of perception? How does the enactive explanation of perception compare to the best scientific work on the neuroscience of perception? Second, what is—on an enactive account—the function of neural processing in the brain for the generation of perception if not to produce representations? This question is especially pressing since one implication of autopoietic enactivism (accepted by radical enactivists) is that even the simplest organisms, i.e. single-celled organisms, have cognitive capacities (Sect. 5). Since they lack brains and nervous systems, enactivists must specify the (possibly) unique contribution of the brain and nervous system in those animals who have them. In Sect. 5, we evaluate the advantages of an autopoietic–enactive approach to the naturalization of intentionality and end with a suggestion how cognition may relate to intentionality and representation.

Economic Reasoning and Interaction in Socially Extended Market Institutions.

An important part of what it means for agents to be situated in the everyday world of human affairs includes their engagement with economic practices. In this paper, we employ the concept of cognitive institutions in order to provide an enactive and interactive interpretation of market and economic reasoning. We challenge traditional views that understand markets in terms of market structures or as processors of distributed information. The alternative conception builds upon the notion of the market as a “scaffolding institution.” Introducing the concept of market as a “socially extended” cognitive institution we go beyond the notion of scaffolding to provide an enactive view of economic reasoning that understands the market participant in terms of social interactive processes and relational autonomy. Markets are more than inert devices for information processing; they can be viewed as “highly scaffolded,” where strong constraints and incentives predictably direct agents’ behavior. Building on this idea we argue that markets emerge from (a) the economic interaction of both supply and demand sides, in continual and mutual interplay, and (b) more basic social interactions. Consumer behavior in the marketplace is complex, not only contributing to determine the market price, but also extending the consumer’s cognitive processes to reliably attain a correct evaluation of the good. Moreover, this economic reasoning is socially situated and not something done in isolation from other consumers. From a socially situated, interactive point of view buying or not buying a good is something that enacts the market. This shifts the status of markets from external institutions that merely causally affect participants’ cognitive processes to social institutions that constitutively extend these cognitive processes. On this view the constraints imposed by social interactions, as well as the possibilities enabled by such interactions, are such that economic reasoning is never just an individual process carried out by an autonomous individual, classically understood. In this regard, understanding the concept of relational autonomy allows us to see how economic reasoning is always embodied, embedded in, and scaffolded by intersubjective interactions, and how such interactions make the market what it is.