Employment Subsidies Research Articles

Taxing Overtime or Subsidizing Employment

This paper compares the macroeconomic implications of overtime taxation and wage and employment subsidies in a dynamic general equilibrium model in which hours and bodies are imperfect substitutes due to team work and externality-based commuting costs. To obtain reliable estimates, I calibrate the model to the substitutability between the workweek and employment using business cycle information. I find that subsidizing employment can achieve the same employment increase as taxing overtime but at a lower cost in terms of output, productivity, wages and welfare. The wage subsidy that achieves the same employment increase turns out to be very costly from a fiscal point of view

Non-Parametric Inference for the Effect of a Treatment on Survival Times with Application in the Health and Social Sciences

In this paper we perform inference on the effect of a treatment on survival times in studies where the treatment assignment is not randomized and the assignment time is not known in advance. Two such studies are discussed: a heart transplant program and a study of Swedish unemployed eligible for employment subsidy. We estimate survival functions on a treated and a control group which are made comparable through matching on observed covariates. The inference is performed by conditioning on waiting time to treatment, that is time between the entrance in the study and treatment. This can be done only when sufficient data is available. In other cases, averaging over waiting times is a possibility, although the classical interpretation of the estimated survival functions is lost unless hazards are not functions of waiting time. To show unbiasedness and to obtain an estimator of the variance, we build on the potential outcome framework, which was introduced by J. Neyman in the context of randomized experiments, and adapted to observational studies by D. B. Rubin. Our approach does not make parametric or distributional assumptions. In particular, we do not assume proportionality of the hazards compared. Small sample performance of the estimator and a derived test of no treatment effect are studied in a Monte Carlo study.

The effects of an employer subsidy on employment outcomes: A study of the work opportunity and welfare‐to‐work tax credits

AbstractEmployer subsidies such as the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) and the Welfare‐to‐Work Tax Credit (WtW) are designed to encourage employment by partially reimbursing employers for wages paid to certain welfare recipients and other disadvantaged workers. In this paper, I examine the effects of these subsidies on employment, wages, and job tenure using unique administrative data from Wisconsin. My ability to precisely identify the subsidy‐certified workers allows me to distinguish the effects of program participation from mere eligibility. Using propensity score matching estimation, I find some evidence of short‐term improvements in labor market outcomes, but little evidence of sustained benefits. © 2008 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.

Temporary Help Service Firms' Use of Employer Tax Credits: Implications for Disadvantaged Workers' Labor Market Outcomes

Temporary help services (THS) firms are increasing their hiring of disadvantaged individuals while also increasing their use of employment subsidies for doing so. Do these subsidies—the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) and Welfare‐to‐Work Tax Credit (WtW)—create incentives that improve employment outcomes for THS workers? We examine the distinct effects of THS employment and WOTC/WtW subsidies on earnings and job duration using new survey and administrative data. We find that, even controlling for a broad range of worker and firm characteristics, some important differences persist between THS workers, WOTC/WtW‐certified workers, and those who are both THS and WOTC/WtW certified. THS workers who are WOTC certified have similar job duration to eligible unsubsidized workers but much higher quarterly earnings. Among WOTC‐certified workers, those in THS firms have similar quarterly earnings to those in other industries but much shorter average job duration. Panel estimates suggest that these effects do not persist over time.

How does reciprocal behaviour of workers influence the wage setting of unions?

Traditional wage setting models assume that unions maximise the total income of workers, whereas actually they should maximise worker utility. These models implicitly equate utility with income, but this is not valid if workers’ utility depends on their sense of fairness and includes a non-pecuniary benefit from work. This paper presents a model combining efficiency wages with bargaining theory, drawing inspiration from the gift-exchange approach by Akerlof [Q J Econ 97(4):543–569, 1982]. It shows that the mutual gift exchange between firms and workers generates a non-pecuniary benefit which contributes to the workers’ utility in a non-monotonic way depending on the strength of workers’ sense of fairness. The model shows that if an employment subsidy is paid to workers it generates more jobs than when paid to firms.

An Evaluation of the Working Income Tax Benefit

The federal government has implemented an earned income tax credit—what it has called the Working Income Tax Benefit—in the 2007 Budget. Edmund Phelps argued that the earned income tax credit in the United States should be replaced with an employment subsidy. This paper assesses the importance of Phelps's concern, and related issues, for Canada. This debate is important for two reasons: the plight of those blocked by the “welfare wall” is dire, and the entire community has an interest in lower structural unemployment in an environment that involves an aging population and an accompanying labour shortage.

The Effect of Extending the Duration of Eligibility in an Italian Labour Market Programme for Dismissed Workers

Liste di mobilita (LM) is an Italian labour market programme targeted to dismissed workers. It combines a ‘passive’ component granting monetary benefits to employees dismissed by firms larger than 15 employees, and an ‘active’ component providing an employment subsidy to any firm hiring workers from the LM. Eligibility duration varies with the worker’s age at dismissal. Using a new linked administrative panel data set for an Italian region, we exploit the variability of these provisions to evaluate the impact of extending the duration of eligibility on re-employment probabilities and wages over the 36 months subsequent to enrolment in the programme. The average treatment effect is identified via a Regression Discontinuity Design. We validate the design by a set of overidentification tests. For most of the sub-groups we analyse, we find that a longer eligibility period has no impact on re-employment rates. A negative impact emerges for women entitled to monetary benefits at the end of the second year of eligibility, but it disappears one year later. A major negative impact emerges for workers aged 50 or more granted the monetary benefits; it is most likely due to the fact that they can use the LM as a bridge to retirement.

Do Employment Subsidies Work? Evidence from Regionally Targeted Subsidies in Turkey

Do Employment Subsidies Work? Evidence from Regionally Targeted Subsidies in Turkey

Differential effects of active labour market programs for the unemployed

The differential performance of six Swedish active labour market programs for the unemployed is investigated in terms of short- and long-term employment probability and un-employment-benefit dependency. Both relative to one another and compared to more intense job search, the central finding is that the more similar to a regular job, the more effective a program is for its participants. Employment subsidies perform best by far, followed by trainee replacement and, by a long stretch, labour market training. Relief work and two types of work practice schemes appear by contrast to be mainly used to re-qualify for unemployment benefits.

Dealing With Monopsony Power: the Case for Using Employment Subsidies'

We show in a monopsony model that a minimum wage may raise hours which are already too high but has ambiguous effects on the number of employees and utility. Employment subsidies, in contrast, unambiguously improve worker utility and bring the market equilibrium closer to the efficient outcome.

The Impact of Payroll Tax Reductions on Employment and Wages: A Natural Experiment using Firm Level Data

Past evidence on the incidence of payroll tax subsidies on employment and wages for disadvantaged workers has been quite mixed. Therefore, this paper makes use of a unique panel of firm level data and a natural experiment to analyze the incidence of wage subsidies on full-time manual workers and pre-tax wages. Using a number of straightforward evaluation estimators we find that employment subsidies increased full-time manual employment and pre-tax wages. Moreover, we find that employment subsidies have increased employment but not wages by more in low-wage exporting industries. This is line with a textbook description of labor markets where it is predicted that the incidence of employment subsidies on employment and wages is larger the more elastic is product and therefore labor demand and where the employment effect is larger and the wage effect is smaller the more elastic is labor supply because of a binding minimum wage.

Comparing the Effectiveness of Employment Subsidies

This paper provides a theoretical and quantitative analysis of various types of wellknown employment subsidies. Two important questions are addressed: (i) How should employment subsidies be targeted? (ii) How large should the subsidies be? We consider measures involving targeting workers with low incomes/abilities and targeting the unemployed. To make our analysis particularly useful to policy makers, we focus on policies that are welfare i.e. policies that (a) improve employment and welfare, (b) do not raise earnings inequality and (c) are self-financing. This criterion enables us to identify policies which satisfy these favorable properties and to determine the size of the subsidies required for this purpose. We construct a simple, dynamic model of hiring and separations, derived from microfoundations, and calibrate it with German data. The calibration shows that hiring vouchers targeted at the long-term unemployed and low-income/ability workers can be approximately welfare efficient, while low-wage subsidies do not satisfy this criterion. Even in terms of inequality reduction low-wage subsidies are outperformed by targeted hiring vouchers. Furthermore, hiring vouchers targeted at the long-term unemployed are more effective than hiring vouchers targeted at low-income/ability workers. These subsidy rankings also hold if the self-financing constraint is relaxed and the government spends a given additional amount on the subsidies.

Active Labor Market Policy Effects for Women in Europe — A Survey

programs, monitoring and sanctions, job search assistance, and employment subsidies. The results are remarkably uniform across studies. We relate the results to the relevant level of female labor force participation. We survey the recent literature on the effects of active labor market policies on individual labor market outcomes like employment and income, for adult female individuals without work in European countries. We consider skill training programs, monitoring and sanctions, job search assistance, and employment subsidies. The results are remarkably uniform across studies. We relate the results to the relevant level of female labor force participation. Keywords: job search, female labor supply, wages, unemployment, schooling, training, monitoring, participation.

Marginal Employment Subsidization: A New Concept and a Reappraisal

In this paper, we attempt to renew the interest in marginal employment subsidies. Such subsidies are paid only for a firm's additional employment exceeding some reference level and create larger employment stimuli at lower fiscal costs than general wage subsidies for all workers. If the hiring of a new employee also entails subsidizing an incumbent worker (double marginal subsidization), the replacement of regular paid workers by outsourcing employment to newly established firms – a standard critique of marginal employment subsidies – can be avoided. This additional subsidy reduces the incentive to crowd out regular employment and results in even larger employment effects. Applying the subsidy scheme to the low-skill labor market in Germany, we show that employment can be substantially increased without imposing additional fiscal burden.

TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND COMPENSATION*

Liberalization harms some groups while generating aggregate benefits. We consider various labor market policies that might be used to compensate those who lose from freer trade. Our goal is to find the policy that compensates each group of losers at the lowest cost to the economy. We argue that wage subsidies should be used to compensate those who bear the adjustment costs triggered by liberalization whereas employment subsidies should be used to compensate those who remain trapped in the previously protected sector. Our analysis indicates that the cost of compensation is low, provided that the right policy is used.

Employer search and employment subsidies

In this paper insights into the literature on employment subsidy evaluation and that on employer search are merged to explore uncharted territory: the firm and job characteristics leading to deadweight loss in employment subsidy schemes. A model is developed which integrates various arguments found in the existing employer search literature. Using a survey of Dutch firms for 1999, the model predictions are confirmed. The richness of the data set enables one to construct some measures of deadweight loss which are new to the existing literature. It turns out that firms which experience low screening costs (large firms), firms that forego substantial production due to unfilled jobs (vacancies for full-time jobs) and firms operating in slack labour market conditions cause significantly more deadweight loss.

Active Labor Market Policy Effects for Women in Europe: A Survey

We survey the recent literature on the effects of active labor market policies on individual labor market outcomes like employment and income, for adult female individuals without work in European countries. We consider skill-training programs, monitoring and sanctions, job search assistance, and employment subsidies. The results are remarkably uniform across studies. We relate the results to the relevant level of female labor force participation.

Marginal Employment Subsidization: A New Concept and a Reappraisal

In this paper, we attempt to renew the interest in marginal employment subsidies. Such subsidies are paid only for a firm's additional employment exceeding some reference level and create larger employment stimuli at lower fiscal costs than general wage subsidies for all workers. If the hiring of a new employee also entails subsidizing an incumbent worker (double marginal subsidization), the replacement of regular paid workers by outsourcing employment to newly established firms – a standard critique of marginal employment subsidies – can be avoided. This additional subsidy reduces the incentive to crowd out regular employment and results in even larger employment effects. Applying the subsidy scheme to the low-skill labor market in Germany, we show that employment can be substantially increased without imposing additional fiscal burden.

Between-Firm Redistribution of Profit in Competitive Industries: Why Labor Market Policies May Not Work

Empirical studies document differences in firms' response to the introduction of various labor market policies. In particular, large and mature firms tend to participate more actively in targeted employment subsidy programs (under which firms receive subsidies for hiring disadvantaged workers). This paper offers an explanation for this phenomenon and argues that it might have important consequences for policy making. Namely, such behavior of firms may indicate that large and mature firms benefit from the introduction of a new subsidy program, while small and young firms incur indirect costs. In this case, the policy implicitly redistributes profit from young to mature firms and may discourage startups if the entry into the industry is competitive. The resulting decrease in the number of operating firms is likely to have a significant impact on the policy's outcomes. These effects become more pronounced as heterogeneity between young and mature firms increases.

Employment Subsidies and Substitutable Skills: An Equilibrium Matching Approach

The search-matching model is well suited for an equilibrium evaluation of labor market policies. When those policies are targeted on some groups, the usual juxtaposition of labor markets is however a shortcoming. There is a need for a setting where workers' productivity depends on employment levels in all markets. This paper provides such a theoretical setting. We first develop a streamlined model and then show that it can be extended to deal with interactions among various labor market and fiscal policies. Simulation results focus on the effects of employment subsidies and in-work benefits and on their interactions with the profile of unemployment benefits and with active labor market programs.