Employer Sanctions Research Articles

A Survey of Employment Sanctions Imposed Upon Ex-Offenders By California Law

One of the most important aspects of an ex-offender's re-integration into society is his or her ability to find and keep employment. However, because of his or her status as an ex-offender, the ex-offender may find both informal and informal barriers to employment. The informal barriers may include such things as the unwillingness of employers to hire the ex-offender based upon the stigma of a criminal conviction. Formal barriers go beyond social attitudes to include legal impediments to employment as a result of the status of ex-offender. This paper is an attempt to catalog the formal barriers to employment that exist in the form of employment sanctions imposed upon the ex- offender as a matter of California law. For the most part, this paper is not concerned with whether an individual sanction is just and necessary for the protection of the community, or if it is unjust and unduly burdensome upon the ex-offender, or if it is something in between. The main purpose is to simply see what employment sanctions currently exist, to provide a road-map of the barriers that are out there for an ex-offender. The core of the paper is the compilation of these sanctions into a table. As a precursor to this table, the methodology is described, along with a summary of the findings that briefly incorporates questions of policy raised by these findings and suggestions for further research.

Gender Differences in the Labor Market: Impact of IRCA's Amnesty Provisions

How to address the current record-high number of unauthorized workers within our borders has been a hotly debated topic. Although a number of studies have examined the effect of employer sanctions (Bansak and Raphael 2001; Deborah A. Cobb-Clark, Clinton R. Shields, and B. Lindsey Lowell 1995) and border enforcement (Pia Orrenius and Madeline Zavodny 2003), only a handful have examined the impact of amnesty on newly legalized immigrants (Sherrie A. Kossoudji and Deborah A. Cobb-Clark 2002; Neeraj Kaushal 2006). While amnesty is being considered a current solution to immigration concerns, the impact of past amnesty programs on the labor market outcomes and economic well-being of immigrants has not been documented widely, and the analysis has been limited largely to men. In this paper, we examine whether amnesty, a provision of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), affected the labor market outcomes and wages of the legalized population. The analysis is carried out by gender to address male and female differences in labor supply and earnings. Legalization was intended to bring undocumented workers “out of the shadows,” which may have affected their well-being by reducing workplace vulnerabilities, increasing job mobility, and improving working conditions (Sherrie A. Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002). Using data from the Legalized Population Survey (LPS) and a comparison sample from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLYS79), we develop a quasi-experimental framework to assess the impact of IRCA’s amnesty provisions on the legalized population. Gender Differences in the Labor Market: Impact of IRCA’s Amnesty Provisions

Wal-Mart, Immigration Workers and the U.S. Government–A Case of Split Personality?

Congress adopted employer sanctions as a way to combat unlawful migration into the United States in 1986. Employers were prohibited from employing unauthorized workers subject to civil and criminal penalties. Government enforcement of such sanctions, however, has been sporadic, inconsistent and ultimately unsuccessful at deterring migration. The government’s enforcement record communicates ambivalence about employment of unauthorized workers, moreover, the government’s policies on unauthorized workers, worker protection laws and employer sanctions, exacerbate the exploitability of this group of workers. Rather than deter unauthorized migration, the government’s policies facilitate and encourage a substantial number of employers like Wal-Mart to hire unauthorized workers. The author uses the Wal-Mart employer sanctions case to argue that employer sanctions should be abolished. In addition, the author argues that the total number of immigration visas available for lower-skill workers needs to be substantially increased.

Abuse of Fixed-Term Employment Contracts and Sanctions in the Recent ECJ’s Jurisprudence

Abuse of Fixed-Term Employment Contracts and Sanctions in the Recent ECJ’s Jurisprudence

The Differential Wage Impact of the Immigration Reform and Control Act on Latino Ethnic Subgroups*

Objective. This article tests whether employer sanctions for hiring undocumented workers, a provision of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), adversely affected the hourly earnings of Latino workers.Methods. Using the Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group Files from 1983–1990, a natural experiment framework is developed to assess the differential wage impact of employer sanctions on Latino ethnic subgroups.Results. Estimates of wage changes indicate that workers of Mexican descent saw a sizeable pre‐post IRCA decline in their hourly earnings relative to Cuban or Puerto Rican workers. Moreover, this change in wages is not observed among non‐Latino white workers. Controlling for the level of enforcement explains part of this decline immediately following the passage of IRCA, and enforcement efforts continue to be a significant factor several years later.Conclusions. The majority of evidence is consistent with the contention that employer sanctions adversely affected the earnings of Mexican workers.

Undocumented Immigration and Host-Country Welfare: Competition Across Segmented Labor Markets*

Abstract. In this paper's model, undocumented workers are endogenously sorted into secondary labor markets. When further illegal immigration occurs, some new migrants follow their fellows into already migrant-dominated jobs, lowering migrant wages and raising real incomes of host-country labor and capital. Some submarkets switch from employing legal workers to employing migrants, lowering demand for and wages of legal workers. Undocumented immigration is Pareto-improving when enforcement reserves primary-sector jobs for legal workers. Pareto-dominant policies target the number of migrant-dominated submarkets, not the number of migrants. This appears consistent with U.S. enforcement practices. The effects of deportations, employer sanctions, and amnesties are explored.

Smuggling Humans: A Theory of Debt-Financed Migration

We introduce financial constraints in a theoretical analysis of illegal immigration. Intermediaries finance the migration costs of wealth-constrained migrants, who enter temporary servitude contracts to repay the debt. These debt/labor contracts are easier to enforce in the illegal than in the legal sector of the host country. Hence, when moving from the illegal to the legal sector becomes more costly—for instance, because of stricter deportation policies—fewer immigrants default on debt. This reduces the risks for intermediaries, who are then more willing to finance illegal migration. Stricter deportation policies may thus, ex ante, increase rather than decrease the flow of illegal migrants. Furthermore, stricter deportation policies worsen the skill composition of immigrants. While stricter border controls decrease overall immigration, they may result in an increase of debt-financed migration. We also show that there are complementarities between employer sanctions and deportation policies. We use available evidence to check the empirical consistency of the theory. (JEL: J61, K42, O17)

Concessional Amnesty and the Politics of Immigration Reforms

This paper establishes a political support model of immigration reforms. The analysis highlights the distinction between border enforcement and employer sanction measures in that the former can be more aptly characterized as an income transfer from employer to native labor interests, whereas the latter generates deadweight losses that are borne entirely by producers. We show that while amnesty may appear to run contrary to the original intent of the immigration reform, it may nevertheless facilitate rent capture by the politician by “wiping the slate clean” and reducing the deadweight loss of employer sanction measures.

Illegal immigration and employer sanctions

Illegal immigration and employer sanctions

Strategic Amnesty and Credible Immigration Reform

Why do countries that impose employer sanctions to deter the illegal entry of foreign workers nevertheless grant amnesty to illegal immigrants? In this article, I provide a positive theory of amnesty provision in a model where the constrained optimal immigration reform, involving the joint use of employer sanctions and border interdictions, is time‐inconsistent. In particular, my framework demonstrates that host countries of immigration can enhance the credibility of their immigration reforms by “binding their own hands” and strategically granting a socially excessive amount of amnesty to illegal workers.

Immigration Reform and the Earnings of Latino Workers: Do Employer Sanctions Cause Discrimination?

Using the Current Population Surveys, the authors investigate whether sanctions against employers for hiring undocumented workers, a provision of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), adversely affected the hourly earnings of Latino workers in the southwestern United States. The analysis exploits the fact that agricultural employers were exempt from the sanctions and from employee-verification requirements for the first two years following IRCA's passage. The authors find substantial pre-post IRCA declines in the wages of Latino non-agricultural workers relative to Latinos in agriculture. They do not observe similar shifts in the relative wages among non-Latino white workers. When using non-Latino black and white non-agricultural workers as alternative control groups, they find that Latino wages declined relative to black wages but not relative to white wages. Finally, they find that the pre-post IRCA inter-sectoral and inter-ethnic relative wage declines for Latino non-agricultural workers do not reflect longerterm trends.

Immigration Reform and the Earnings of Latino Workers: Do Employer Sanctions Cause Discrimination?

This paper investigates whether employer sanctions for hiring undocumented workers introduced by the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) adversely affected the hourly earnings of Latino workers in the southwestern U.S. We exploit the staggering of the sanctions and employee verification requirements across sectors to estimate this effect. In particular, IRCA's employer-sanctions provisions were not extended to agricultural employers until two years after their imposition on non-agricultural employers. Hence, Latino agricultural workers provide a control group against which to compare changes in the wages of Latinos in non-agricultural employment. We find substantial pre-post IRCA declines in the hourly earnings of Latino non-agricultural workers relative to Latinos in agriculture. This pattern, however, is considerably stronger for Latino men than Latina women. We do not observe similar inter-sectoral shifts in relative wages among non-Latino white workers. In fact, the relative wage changes for non-Latino white workers are of the opposite sign. Finally, the pre-post IRCA relative decline in Latino non-agricultural wages reverses the pre-IRCA trend, where we observe the relative earnings of Latino non-agricultural workers increasing

Employer Sanctions Against Immigrant Workers

The employer-sanctions law has neither helped reduce undocumented immigration nor improved wages and working conditions of U.S. workers, but has become a tool to suppress workers' rights to organize.

Immigration Reform and the Earnings of Latino Workers: Do Employer Sanctions Cause Discrimination?

This paper investigates whether employer sanctions for hiring undocumented workers introduced by the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) adversely affected the hourly earnings of Latino workers in the southwestern U.S. We exploit the staggering of the sanctions and employee verification requirements across sectors to estimate this effect. In particular, IRCA's employer-sanctions provisions were not extended to agricultural employers until two years after their imposition on non-agricultural employers. Hence, Latino agricultural workers provide a control group against which to compare changes in the wages of Latinos in non-agricultural employment. We find substantial pre-post IRCA declines in the hourly earnings of Latino non-agricultural workers relative to Latinos in agriculture. This pattern, however, is considerably stronger for Latino men than Latina women. We do not observe similar inter-sectoral shifts in relative wages among non-Latino white workers. In fact, the relative wage changes for non-Latino white workers are of the opposite sign. Finally, the pre-post IRCA relative decline in Latino non-agricultural wages reverses the pre-IRCA trend, where we observe the relative earnings of Latino non-agricultural workers increasing.

A Survey of the Economics of Illegal Migration

This contribution gives a short survey of the economic discussions on illegal migration. It starts with two major statements. First, illegal migration is itself determined by migration legislation defining who may enter, stay and/or work legally and therefore who is illegal. If there were no legal barriers to entry, residence or work – as pertains within nation states, or for EU nationals within the European Union – illegal migration would be a non-issue. Secondly, there is a demand for illegal immigrants by certain vested interest groups. They influence the political/economic process in such a way that migration laws are not enforced strictly. Next we discuss several policy options to deal with illegal migration – external border controls, internal controls, employer sanctions and amnesty programmes. We conclude that as a short-term policy, employer sanctions are the most effective instrument to reduce incentives for the illegal employment of aliens. However, illegal employment of both natives and foreigners is the result of inefficiencies in the labour market. Finding and eliminating the causes and nature of these inefficiencies provides the only possible long-term strategy to reduce economic incentives for illegal immigration. A good labour market policy is the only valid option for combating illegal employment.

Employer sanctions on hiring illegal labor: An experimental analysis of firm compliance

The employer sanctions provision of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act penalizes employers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers. Under IRCA, employers are subject to civil and/or criminal penalties; however, given the widespread availability of counterfeit documentation, in some cases it becomes difficult to discern the employment eligibility status of some workers. Using experimental methods, this study provides some evidence that marginal increases in employer compliance rates are significantly higher when employers have perfect information on the employment eligibility status of its potential workers than when they do not. The experimental results suggest that increases in government spending for employer sanctions enforcement may be more effective if the informational asymmetry faced by employers is solved first. A possible solution to this problem may lie in the adoption of tamper-proof documentation such as a national identification card.

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996: An Overview

"On September 30, 1996, President Clinton signed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (1996 Act), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. After an intense lobbying effort by the business community, most provisions relating to legal immigration were omitted from the final bill. Instead, the 1996 Act focuses on illegal immigration reform and includes some of the toughest measures ever taken against illegal immigration." Aspects considered include border enforcement, penalities against alien smuggling and document fraud, deportation and exclusion proceedings, employer sanctions, welfare provisions, and changes to existing refugee and asylum procedures.

The Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions and Marriage Fraud

Increasingly, the United States has looked to the criminal law to address the problem of undocumented immigration. This article focuses on the criminalization of immigration related activities of citizens or permanent legal residents. Citizens and permanent residents employ and marry undocumented persons. Statutes such as the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 and the Immigration Marriage Fraud Act of 1986 render these acts criminal and are the focus of this article. The author challenges the use of criminal sanctions to deter undocumented or unauthorized immigration for being ineffective at deterring the conduct as well as for being inconsistent with American values.

Employer Sanctions in the United States, Canada and Mexico: Exploring the Criminalization of Immigration Law

This article is a comparative study of United States, Mexico and Canadian laws regulating the employment of persons who lack documents or authorization to work. The author contends that the United States criminalization of the employment relationship is inconsistent with human rights and the objectives of providing a thriving and healthy workspace free from abuse and exploitation.

Latin American Immigration and U.S. Schools

Latin American Immigration and U.S. Schools