Employee Shareholders Research Articles

The IEBM handbook of human resource management

List of ContributorsAcknowledgementsIntroductionHUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENTCulture, David Cray Culture, cross-national, Betty Jane Punnett Decision making, Richard Butler Deconstruction analysis and management, Karen Legge Downsizing, Kim Cameron Groups and teams, Friso den Hertog and Thera Tolner Hawthorne experiments, Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld and Jennifer M. MyattHuman capital, Anne Daly Human relations, Pauline GrahamHuman resource development, Martin HilbHuman resource flows, Gary Florkowski Human resource management, Randall S. Schuler Industrial democracy, Tove Helland HammerInterest groups, Justin Greenwood Interpersonal skills, John Hayes Labour process, Chris Smith Leadership, Frank HellerManagerial behaviour, Rosemary Stewart Occupational psychology, David Guest Organization behaviour, Arndt Sorge Organization culture, Geert HofstedePersonnel management, George F. ThomasonProblem solving, Jane Cranwell-Ward Productivity, Robert F. Conti Stress, Jane Cranwell-WardTotal Quality Management, Miryam Barad Women managers in organizations, Ellen A. Fagenson-Eland and Barbara ParkerWork ethic, Frank Heller and S. Antonio Ruiz-Quintanilla Work and leisure, Milan Zeleny Work systems, Greg J. Bamber and David E. Simmons GLOBAL DIMENSIONSBata system of management, Milan Zeleny Fordism, Terry WallaceHuman resource management, international, Rosalie L. Tung Human resource management in Europe, Chris Brewster Human resource management in Japan, Yoko Sano Industrial relations in developing countries, Segun Matanmi Industrial relations in Europe, Colin Gill Industrial relations in Japan, Koji Okubayashi Industrial relations in the USA, Hoyt N. WheelerJapanization, Nick Oliver FOCAL POLICY AREAS OF HRMCareers, Peter HerriottCommitment, Yoko Sano Communication, W. David Rees Communication, Cross-cultural, Joo-Seng TanDiscipline and dismissals, Derek Torrington Empowerment, Adrian Wilkinson Financial incentives, Ian SmithJob design, Yitzhak Fried, Anne Cummings and Greg R. Oldham Job evaluation, Alan Arthurs Management development, Gillian Stamp Motivation and satisfaction, Andr? Bnssing Payment systems, Ian Kessler Performance appraisal, Vandra L. Huber and Sally Riggs Fuller Profit sharing and employee shareholding, Richard LongRecruitment and selection, Sally Riggs Fuller and Vandra L. Huber Relocation, Helen De Cieri and Sara L. McGaughey Training, Paul Taylor Training, economics of, Paul RyanINDUSTRIAL AND LABOUR RELATIONSCollective bargaining, George Strauss Corporatism, Colin CrouchEmployee deviance, Gerald Mars Employee relations, management of, John Purcell Employers' associations, Wyn Grant Employment and unemployment, economics of, Robert J. Flanagan Employment law, R. C. SimpsonEqual employment opportunities, Robin J. Kramer Flexibility, Paul BlytonIndustrial conflict, Paul K. Edwards Industrial and labour relations, Michael Poole Industrial sabotage, John M. (Part contents)

The Governance Structure and Performance of Large European Corporations

This article first describes the governance structure ofgroups of large European corporations, viz. the Anglo-Saxon, theGermanic and the Latinic types of firms. It then discussesperformance criteria of which four are used: productivity or netvalue added per employee, growth, employment and total compensationto shareholders. It is found that Continental corporations have aperformance which is equal to or better than that of the Anglo-Saxongroup. Combining the structural and performance outcomes, theexplanation seems to be that the dominance of capital markets andthe market for corporate control force Anglo-Saxon managements tomaximize returns on capital, whereas Continental firms have a widerrange of options.

Employee Shareholders Or Institutional Investors? When Corporate Managers Replace Their Stockholders*

ABSTRACTDuring the past decade, the shares of publicly traded companies moved increasingly into the hands of institutional investors. As large investors pressed companies to restructure, companies were observed in turn to restructure their shareholder base. Drawing on a 1989 survey of 761 US publicly traded companies, firms facing a hostile takeover environment or with large institutional holdings are found to seek greater employee stockholding. Large firms and those that had adopted takeover defences are more likely when threatened with takeovers or short‐term pressures to seek more employee and less institutional stockholding. Though managers are employed by owners, investor efforts to discipline their managers can lead the latter to replace the former.

Theories and Evidence on the Growth and Distribution of Profit Sharing and Employee Shareholding Schemes

In this paper, theories and evidence on profit-sharing and employee share-ownership schemes are presented. Various theories and explanations are first assessed. The analysis of general patterns of historical movement are based on three main theoretical approaches (evolutionary, cyclical and favourable conjunctures). In cross-sectional analysis, the range of specific explanatory variables include: industry characteristics, management “styles”, labour force characteristics, and various industrial relations patterns. These theories are examined in relation to recent time-series evidence from the UK and data from the third British Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS 3). It is found that the explanatory variables typically used in employment research predict the incidence of most types of employee shareholding scheme (but not the relative incidence of profit-related payments or bonuses). Moreover, it is shown that the financial performance of firms and the absence of industrial action are linked with the presence of schemes in the firm. This also suggests a theory of the application of employee financial participation that would help organisations survive and be successful in the very competitive world we are facing.

Employee shareholders in two privatised utilities

This article draws on a survey of over 400 employees in two privatised companies. It examines the relationship between the depth of share ownership and social class and prior political orientations, and suggests that employee attitudes are best understood as a function of these standard sociological factors.

The Impact of Profit-Sharing and Employee Shareholding Schemes

The Impact of Profit-Sharing and Employee Shareholding Schemes

Michael Poole, The Origins of Economic Democracy: Profit Sharing and Employee-Shareholding Schemes and Michael Poole and Glenville Jenkins, The Impact of Economic Democracy: Profit Sharing and Employee Shareholding Schemes

Michael Poole, The Origins of Economic Democracy: Profit Sharing and Employee-Shareholding Schemes and Michael Poole and Glenville Jenkins, The Impact of Economic Democracy: Profit Sharing and Employee Shareholding Schemes. Un article de la revue Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations (Volume 46, numéro 4, 1991, p. 703-915) diffusée par la plateforme Érudit.

EMPLOYEE SHAREHOLDERS

Journal Article EMPLOYEE SHAREHOLDERS Get access Employee shareholders and unfairly prejudicial treatment , Re a Company (No. 00477 of 1986) , [ 1986 ] B.C.L.C. 376 (Ch.) HUGH COLLINS HUGH COLLINS *Brasenose CollegeOxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Industrial Law Journal, Volume 16, Issue 1, 1987, Pages 268–272, https://doi.org/10.1093/ilj/16.1.268 Published: 01 June 1987

The Realities and Legal Problems of the Employee Shareholding System

The Realities and Legal Problems of the Employee Shareholding System

Cooperative production and accelerated development: A review of potential and constraints

Producer cooperatives or, more generally, firms with extensive worker participation are only marginal to most economies. There is, nevertheless, considerable interest in the potential for greater productivity of such firms, and in their distributional implications. A number of examples suggest that, under the right conditions, cooperatives can make a useful contribution to regional development. This paper discusses three such cases: (i) the Mondragon Group in Spain and the Dairy and Sugar Cooperatives of Gujerat and Maharashtra, India. It considers the case for interventions along cooperative lines to assist in the rationalization of industries. Tentative conclusions are: (i) cooperative or participatory production appears to be easier to organize and sustain in less overwhelming, hierarchical societies; (ii) not all productive activities benefit equally from cooperative organization; (iii) industrial producer cooperatives are probably most suited to regions of limited labor mobility; (iv) cooperatives probably require quite broad-based participatory processes, which requires an incentive structure that links rewards to performance; (v) public role should be limited; and (vi) widespread employee shareholding is useful.

Financial participation of employees. Jean Remus, Administrator, Foundation for the Promotion of Employee Shareholding and Saving (Paris). Abstract from International Labour Review, Jan.‐Feb., 1983, p. 1

Financial participation of employees. Jean Remus, Administrator, Foundation for the Promotion of Employee Shareholding and Saving (Paris). Abstract from International Labour Review, Jan.‐Feb., 1983, p. 1

Employee Share-Ownership and Motivation

The concept of employee share-ownership has been widely applied in Britain, Europe, America and Australia, yet there has been little research into the attitudes and expectations of the employee-shareholders. The author has attempted to provide research data on these variables by issuing a questionnaire to employees involved in a share-ownership scheme in a West Australian firm. The dimensions measured are challenge, support, responsibility, commitment, income, wealth, stability, career, satisfaction, application and participation. Based on the results, a model of motivation for employee shareholders has been. developed. There is a critical level of share-ownership required to produce favourable results on most, but not all variables. The conclusion is that employee share-ownership and employee motivation are related but the former is not sufficient to ensure the latter; a combination of employee share-ownership and employee participation in planning may be required to produce the desired results.

Employee funds in Europe

Interest in this important subject was stimulated by the articles written about it in July 1976, January 1977 and May 1977 by John Wellens. He draws attention to the lack of interest the trade unions and the employer associations in the UK have shown in the idea of employee shareholding. The start of a new round of wage bargaining suggests that in this third phase of incomes policy there will be no discussion on how incomes policy is linked to the wider problem of capital growth, wealth creation and the distribution of profits. But there will be a fourth phase of incomes policy in due course and since the conservative party is strongly in favour of employee share ownership schemes, the debate on their merits and demerits need not be too long delayed. As a member of the EEC it is worth recalling that the European debate about employee funds commenced at the end of the second World War. The war left destruction of productive capacity, disorganised local and community services and much poverty. Rebuilding the economic systems called for national purpose, national solidarity, restraint by the trade unions: they were forthcoming in good measure. And so, with the assistance of capital loans by America, rehabilitation of several countries took place.