Empiricist View Research Articles

Inertial forces, absolute space, and Mach’s principle: The genesis of relativity

The cornerstone of Newtonian mechanics is the inertial frame of reference. With this frame we can understand the difference between real and fictitious or pseudo forces and the importance of these two types of forces in Newton’s analysis of his rotating bucket. This analysis was the basis of his belief in absolute space. Mach, who believed strongly in an empiricist view of science, showed that the existence of inertial forces leads to a refutation of absolute space. He replaced absolute space with a frame of reference at rest with respect to the distant fixed stars considered as a rigid system. His principle, which was not expressed explicitly by him, is that the inertia of a body is a consequence of its interaction with all other bodies in the universe. Mach’s refutation of absolute space made Einstein’s general theory of relativity possible. Einstein later abandoned Mach’s principle and found the source of inertia in the nonzero curvature of the space-time metric, a fact that does not diminish the importance of Mach in Einstein’s early thinking.

Editorial

Editorial

Politics, Power and Contingency: Judging Hutton and Responding to Mendus

My purpose in the article was twofold: to commend to political theorists a method of critical analysis that can usefully be applied to texts that circulate within public life, and to apply it myself in reading the Hutton Report. Like many people, I was incredulous when the report appeared and suspicious of its conclusions. But I was also curious as to how it managed to appear simultaneously both objective and biased. Consequently, I wanted to investigate how political power was operating at a deeper discursive level. I welcome this opportunity to respond to Susan Mendus's detailed and thoughtful response, both to defend my methodology and to clarify those points where I think she misinterprets its implications. Because her reply is so clearly structured, I have replicated that structure in my responses.TRUTHI distinguished in the article between two competing views of truth, each of which may be situated in presuppositions regarding agency, language and meaning. In the first part of her reply, Mendus contests my observations regarding the empiricist and legalistic view of truth that I associated with the Hutton Report. She makes three observations here.First, she is sceptical that Hutton subscribed to this positivist-juridical conception at all and as evidence, she cites an early section of the report where he explains his intention to reproduce parts of the inquiry's transcript of evidence so that the public can understand why he reached his conclusions. ‘These are not’, Mendus concludes, ‘the words of a man who denies the need for interpretation.’

Review of Developmental Origins of Aggression.

RICHARD E. TREMBLAY, WILLIAM W. HARTUP, and JOHN ARCHER (Eds.) Developmental Origins of Aggression New York: Guilford Publications, 2005, 488 pages (ISBN 1-59385-110-3, US$60.00 Hardcover) Violence has become a hot topic. Omnipresent in the daily media, the subject of numerous national initiatives and investigations, we like our animal kin seem preoccupied with the subject. Despite this, however, and in the face of a rapidly progressing research literature, there is a paucity of good review material on the subject. It has been 30 years (de Wit & Hartup, 1974) since such an has been published. Edited by (including chapters by) three of the field's most productive investigators, this book fills a much-needed gap. The aim of this book is to provide an overview of the state of knowledge on the developmental origins of aggressive behavior (p. xiii). Framed by introductory and concluding chapters (subtitled Where do we stand today? and Where are we going?, respectively), the volume is composed of two parts. Chapters 2-10 describe different types of and carefully detail the developmental change in that occurs with age. Chapters 11-20 examine proximal and distal determinants of aggression. Much has happened in the intervening 30 years since the previous overview. Research has shifted from studies of small samples of school-aged to large sample, longitudinal studies of across the lifespan, from infancy to early adulthood. Theoretical and empirical focus has shifted from the aggressive act (including events and situations) to the development of aggressive individuals assessed using the tools of recent technological advances (e.g., molecular genetics, blood and saliva sampling of hormones and neuromodulators, brain imaging). Correlational methods have been replaced with an increasingly sophisticated array of statistical techniques. Together these provide the materials for the telling of a very different story about the development of from that based primarily upon the social learning paradigm that dominated the final decades of the previous century. The dichotomy that pitted 18th century Rousseau (defending the thesis that humans are fundamentally good) against the century earlier Hobbes (viewing the wicked as that had not grown up) had in the 1970s tilted in favour of the empiricist view that individuals were blank slates to be written upon for either good or ill by societal influence. Synonymous with Bandura's (1973) social learning theory, iconic is the image of a child punching a Bobo doll in imitation of a recently viewed model. Most of the research on the development of human in the last few decades of the 20th century was... attempting to find how schoolchildren learn to aggress from their environment (Tremblay & Cote, p. 453). Addressing the question of the origins of aggression, Chapters 1-10 investigate during the first three years of life, concluding that children appear not to be learning to use physical as they grow older; rather they appear to be learning not to use physical aggression (p. xiii, italics in the original). Based on several longitudinal studies examining intra-individual change, first appears towards the end of the first year of life and peaks in humans between 2 and 3 years of age. Children first bite, hit, push, and kick... then gradually, they may come to choose more indirect, social oriented forms of aggression (Gendreau & Archer, p. 25). Phylogenetic and ontogenetic sophistication indicates a general developmental principal of diversification and sophistication in the expression and inhibition of aggression. Emerging at so early a point in human development there is little time in which to learn aggressive behaviour. This is no regression to Hobbes' position, however. From an evolutionary perspective, is adaptive and has a function. …

Empiricism, rationalism and positivism in library and information science

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the importance and influence of the epistemologies: “empiricism”, “rationalism” and “positivism” in library and information science (LIS).Design/methodology/approachFirst, outlines the historical development of these epistemologies, by discussing and identifying basic characteristics in them and by introducing the criticism that has been raised against these views. Second, their importance for and influence in LIS have been examined.FindingsThe findings of this paper are that it is not a trivial matter to define those epistemologies and to characterise their influence. Many different interpretations exist and there is no consensus regarding current influence of positivism in LIS. Arguments are put forward that empiricism and positivism are still dominant within LIS and specific examples of the influence on positivism in LIS are provided. A specific analysis is made of the empiricist view of information seeking and it is shown that empiricism may be regarded as a normative theory of information seeking and knowledge organisation.Originality/valueThe paper discusses basic theoretical issues that are important for the further development of LIS as a scholarly field.

The Pragmatics of Empirical AdequacyThanks are due to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and to the University of Melbourne for support of this research. This paper has benefited from discussion with members of the Philosophy and History and Philosophy of Science departments at the University of Melbourne and the Philosophy department at La Trobe University, as

Empirical adequacy is a central notion in van Fraassen's empiricist view of science. I argue that van Fraassen's account of empirical adequacy in terms of a partial isomorphism between certain structures in some model(s) of the theory and certain actual structures (the observables) in the world, is untenable. The empirical adequacy of a theory can only be tested in the context of an accepted practice of observation. But because the theory itself does not determine the correct practice of observation, its failure to pass the test does not show the failure of an isomorphism between the empirical substructure of some model(s) of the theory and observable structures in nature. Further, because the choice of a practice of observation is a pragmatic one grounded in epistemic goals we seek in observation, van Fraassen's anthropocentric view of observability is epistemically unmotivated.

Eliciting and developing junior secondary students' understanding of the nature of science through a peer collaboration instruction in science stories

This article reports a study to elicit junior secondary students' understandings of the nature of science (NOS) through a peer collaboration instruction based on science stories specially developed to present several aspects of NOS. The study also investigated how students reacted to the stories and whether they were able to extract the aspects of NOS presented in the stories. The results show that many students held a serendipitous empiricist view of experimentation and took scientific theories as absolute truth representing reality. Although the science stories impacted on students in substantial ways and the peer collaboration setting helped them develop shared understandings, many students changed from one set of inadequate views of NOS to another rather than to adequate views. This was attributed to students interpreting the stories in idiosyncratic ways other than those intended by the instruction and focusing their attention selectively on certain aspects of the stories that appeared to confirm and reinforce their inadequate views. The implications of the findings are discussed.

Analogy Counterarguments and the Acceptability of Analogical Hypotheses

The logical empiricists held that an analogical hypothesis does not gain any acceptability from the analogy on which it is founded. On this view, the acceptability of a hypothesis cannot be discounted by criticizing the foundational analogy. Yet scientists commonly appear to level exactly this sort of criticism. If scientists are able to discount the acceptability of analogical hypotheses in this way, then the logical empiricist view is mistaken. I analyze four forms of analogy counterargument, disanalogy, misanalogy, counteranalogy, and false analogy, with examples from the debate over the asteroid impact hypothesis. These counterarguments do address the acceptability of analogical hypotheses, indicating that analogies can confer acceptability, confirmation notwithstanding.1Introduction2The asteroid impact hypothesis3Analogy counterarguments3.1Disanalogy3.2Misanalogy3.3Counteranalogy3.4False analogy4Acceptability5Conclusions

Toward a Critical Theoretic Perspective in Information Systems

The field of library and science (LIS) has built its practice and research perspective on a logico-analytic philosophy, which has generated useful, tangible technologies. Lately there is interest in nonempirical philosophies, such as hermeneutics and critical theory, to fulfill better LIS' service-oriented mission of providing information to user populations. One dimension of critical theory, Jurgen Habermas' theory of communicative action, can expand LIS' conception of and supplement logico-empirical research methods and research practices. This article examines how LIS, particularly research into librarian-patron interaction and system design, favors an empiricist view of language and, as a consequence, may be limiting its effectiveness. It proposes how the field might expand to include communicative action in fulfilling its mission and research agenda.

Reality: fundamental topics in metaphysics

In this compelling work, Peter Lopston provides an accessible exploration of the major topics in metaphysics. He considers problems such as essence, existence, substance, purpose, space, time, mind, causality, God, freedom and the possibilities of immortality. In addition, he looks at the major historical metaphysical systems and defends the metaphysical project as a whole. The book offers both historical and contemporary perspectives and includes Lopston's lucid arguments, in which he propounds a naturalist and common-sense view of the world. Lopston defends the ineliminability and the logical or categoreal mutual irreducibility of individual substances; he advocates an empiricist view of space but a rationalist view of time; and he presents a treatment of possible worlds that limits them to cases with only actual members. In a special contribution he explores the idea of metaphysical luck, which leads to puzzling and significant results. Replete with historical references, explanations of terminology, and directional signposts, the book provides an excellent companion to metaphysical studies - filling a gap for scholars and specialists in this field.

Constructivism Examined

In this paper I examine constructivism as a view of learning which has come to dominate educational debates about learning in the field of teacher education. The major claims of a variety of constructivist theories are considered and found to be largely wanting, in that they either differ little from common sense empiricist views, or else provide misleading and incomplete views of human learning, with consequently misleading implications for teaching in classrooms.

Revisitando a Crítica de Bruner: O Desvio da Proposta Cognitivista nos Estudos de Solução de Problemas

A crítica feita por Bruner que a Psicologia Cognitiva tornou-se tecnicista e fragmentada é analisada por meio de uma revisão das pesquisas sobre transferência de solução de problemas, focalizando-se nestas os objetivos, metodologia e resultados obtidos. A conclusão é a de que a crítica procede, na medida em que se observa nas pesquisas cognitivistas um maior rigor metodológico do que teórico, revelado na ausência de uma definição precisa de transferência, produzindo resultados fragmentados. Observa-se ainda, uma visão tecnicista do processo, investigado, geralmente, como desempenho de estudantes universitários, resultado de manipulação de estímulos e avaliado em uma única sessão experimental.

‘Waters’ or ‘Water’? — master narratives in water history and their implications for contemporary water policy

While it is sometimes suggested that ‘water’ was regarded as an element prior to the discovery of its compound nature in the 18th century, most premodern understandings of water emphasized the diverse characteristics of many waters. Such views were developed and sustained within several distinct contexts: Aristotelian natural philosophy, classical natural history, folklore and religion, and the promotion of mineral waters. During the 19th century this empiricist view of waters as many was replaced by an essentialist view in which water was a commodity with varying amounts and kinds of undesirable impurities. The continuing importance of these distinct conceptions of water is evident in the competition for public attention and consumer confidence between the bottled water industry, which is predicated on the concept of many unique waters, and the public water industries, which present water as a monolithic commodity. It will be important for water policy makers to be sensitive to a wide range of conceptions of water that retain appeal. Such conceptions may have significant impact on public assessment of water technologies.

Relationships between student scientific epistemological beliefs and perceptions of constructivist learning environments

This study was conducted to explore the interplay between students’ scientific epistemological beliefs and their perceptions of constructivist learning environments. Through analysing 1,176 Taiwanese tenth-graders’ (16-year-olds) questionnaire responses, this study found that students tended to perceive that actual learning environments were less constructivist orientated than what they preferred. Students having epistemological beliefs more orientated to constructivist views of science (as opposed to empiricist views about science) tended to have a view that actual learning environments did not provide sufficient opportunities for social negotiations (p < 0.01) and prior knowledge integration (p < 0.01); and moreover, they show significantly stronger preferences to learn in the constructivist learning environments where they could (1) interact and negotiate meanings with others (p < 0.001), (2) integrate their prior knowledge and experiences with newly constructed knowledge (p < 0.001) and (3) meaningfully control their learning activities (p < 0.001). The main thrust of the findings drawn from this study indicates that teachers need to be very aware of students’ epistemological orientation towards scientific knowledge, and to complement these preferences when designing learning experiences, especially to provide constructivist-based lessons to enhance science learning for students who are epistemologically constructivist orientated.

?Laboratory exercises help me memorize the scientific truths?: A study of eighth graders' scientific epistemological views and learning in laboratory activities

Upon analysis of 25 Taiwanese eighth graders' questionnaire responses, actual laboratory observation recording, and interview details, the present study was conducted to explore the interplay between students' scientific epistemological views (SEVs) and their learning in school laboratory activities. It was revealed that, although higher achievers tended to have a greater frequency of verbal negotiations directly related to laboratory details, students' SEVs were also related to their laboratory verbal interactions. It was found that students having SEVs more oriented to constructivist views of science, called constructivist students, tended to focus more on negotiating the meanings of experiments with their peers than did students having SEVs more in line with empiricist views of science, called empiricist students (p < 0.05). Constructivist students perceived actual laboratory learning environments as less open-ended and less integrated (p < 0.05) and they tended to prefer a more student-supported and open-ended approach to experimentation (p < 0.05). Interview details showed that constructivist learners tended to explore deeply the involved concepts of laboratory activities, resulting in a richer understanding. On the other hand, empiricist learners placed greater emphasis on “doing” laboratory work, following the codified procedures of science textbooks, and they believed that laboratory exercises made scientific concepts more impressive, acting as memory aids. This study concludes that an appropriate understanding of the constructivist epistemology of science should be an essential prerequisite for implementing so-called “constructivist science teaching.” © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Sci Ed 83:654–674, 1999.

Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge

Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge

The framing of knowledge and practice in psychology: A response to john

It is now indisputable that psychologists' traditional reliance on a narrow empiricist view of science has excessively constrained psychological discourse and, paradoxically, hindered empirical research. Related to this, it is increasingly apparent that the scientist-practitioner model has been predicated on a constitutive tension which has generated a range of problems in the practice domain. Increasing recognition of these issues has given impetus to sociologically oriented and “postmodern” critiques. However, there are particular problems with many of the alternative strategies developed on the basis of these critiques that tend to undermine their viability. Moreover, a current reconfiguring of the clinical science-practice relationship mitigates some of the objections that have been raised. Additionally, emergent practice demands in key jurisdictions necessitate adoption of something like a scientist-practitioner model. It is argued that the tensions symbolised in the composite of “scientist” and “practitioner” reflect underlying cultural and philosophical issues which need to be worked through within their own terms, and thus the model cannot be dismissed as a mere rhetorical device. Overall, it is concluded that a modified form of the scientist-practitioner model needs to be retained — primarily because there is as yet no suitable alternative.

Empirical adequacy: A partial structures approach

Abstract Based on da Costa's and French's notions of partial structures and pragmatic truth, this paper examines two possible characterizations of the concept of empirical adequacy, one depending on the notion of partial isomorphism, the other on the hierarchy of partial models of phenomena, and both compatible with an empiricist view. These formulations can then be employed to illuminate certain aspects of scientific practice. An empirical theory must single out a specific part of the world, establish reference to that part, and say—by way of contingent, substantial claim about the world—that its models fit that . Now, how exactly can this be done? Bas C. van Fraassen (1993, p. 9)

Het Ik En De Persoonsidentiteit In Russells Logisch Atomisme

(1997). The ‘I’ and Personal Identity in Russell's Logical Atomism. Bijdragen: Vol. 58, No. 1, pp. 29-55.

Realismus in duhems naturgemässer klassifikation

Pierre Duhem is an outstanding exponent of empiricism. According to the empiricist view scientific laws and theories merely describe formal relations between observable phenomena. Duhems' important notion of natural classification is intended to explain the predictive success of science. I shall argue that it can only be interpreted realistically. Besides the success of science, two further arguments are put forward in favor of realism: (i) the fact that laws of nature are necessary, and (ii) the extension of observation by using instruments.