Epistemological Empiricism Research Articles

Russell and Jin Yuelin on Truth: A Comparative Study

Jin Yuelin’s logical and philosophical thought was deeply influenced by the philosophy of Bertrand Russell. The same influence existed also in the case of his view on truth, which was considerably close to the views maintained by Russell in his phase of logical atomism. In their investigations, Russell and Jin not only focused on similar topics, but also occupied similar philosophical positions, such as realism in the domain of ontology, empiricism in epistemology, and the correspondence theory in the domain of the theory of truth. Nevertheless, Jin Yuelin’s view on truth was not only a mere imitation or recapitulation or even plagiarized copy of Russell’s, but also contained innovations and characteristics of its own. Jin, for example, emphasized certain general characteristics of truth, including the notion of truth as a relational quality, that truth is not a matter of degree, and that it is relative neither to time and space nor to the different types of knowledge. By so doing, Jin underlined the objectiveness, reliability, and transcendence of true propositions. By arguing that the correspondence theory of truth possessed strong foundations in common sense, Jin set out to defend the role of common sense in philosophy and science, maintaining that the former cannot be completely eliminated and arguing against the notion that any modification of a part of common sense would ultimately be founded on yet another segment of common sense. Moreover, Jin delivered his own response against the theory of the gap between “subject and object/the internal and the external,” which had been used to question the correspondence theory of truth, proposing a variety of cognitivist theory, which defined facts as “the given” (datum) that has been received and arranged. Most importantly, facts are cognitive constructs created on the basis of “the given” and encapsulate both subjectiveness and objectiveness. Jin Yuelin was a modern Chinese philosopher who had achieved profound erudition in both Chinese and Western thought, and, above all, an independent an profoundly original thinker.

Lokāyata/Cārvāka: A Philosophical Inquiry by Pradeep P. Gokhale

Reviewed by: Lokāyata/Cārvāka: A Philosophical Inquiry by Pradeep P. Gokhale Ethan Mills (bio) Lokāyata/Cārvāka: A Philosophical Inquiry. By Pradeep P. Gokhale. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. 222. Rs. 750; £21.99, isbn 978-0-19-946063-2. The greatest strength of Pradeep P. Gokhale's Lokāyata/Cārvāka: A Philosophical Inquiry is its much-needed enrichment of the vocabulary for the study of the Indian Lokāyata/Cārvāka school. For too long this school has been studied in the rather limited terms of its opponents in texts such as Mādhava's Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, which identify a single Cārvāka position advocating extreme empiricism in epistemology, materialism in metaphysics, and hedonism and irreligiousness in ethics. Gokhale establishes frameworks for understanding the diversity of epistemological, metaphysical, and axiological positions of Cārvāka philosophers that ought to be considered by anyone writing on the school in the future. Chapter 1 introduces Gokhale's pluralist approach to understanding Cārvāka. Concerning the various names for this school—Lokāyata, Cārvāka, and Bārhaspatya—Gokhale suggests that while these names have separate histories, they all designate "a family of systems or a family of philosophical trends" (p. 19). While recognizing this diversity, Gokhale follows the practice of most scholars in tending to use "Cārvāka" inclusively to refer to this family, which will also be my practice in this review. Gokhale criticizes what he calls a singularist approach to Cārvāka in the works of scholars such as Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya and Ramkrishna Bhattacarya, who conceive of Cārvāka as a single school with a more-or-less unified set of positions. In opposition, Gokhale supports a pluralist approach according to which "Cārvāka" is to be understood as a family-resemblance term that refers to Indian philosophers with irreligious intentions. Other scholars such as D. R. Shastri and Eli Franco have supported pluralist approaches, but Gokhale's book offers a more fine-tuned and sophisticated version of pluralism. Part of the reason for this is that, while Gokhale [End Page 645] is well versed in the available historical evidence, he considers his inquiry to be more philosophical than historical (pp. 21–22), which allows him to set out philosophically plausible positions that may not always be directly apparent in the primary texts. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 cover Cārvāka epistemology, highlighting skepticism, extreme empiricism, and mitigated empiricism, respectively. Chapter 2 focuses on Jayarāśi (ca. 770–830 c.e.). While singularists tend to claim that Jayarāśi cannot be a member of the Cārvāka school on account of his rejection of materialist principles and perception as a means of knowledge, Gokhale's pluralist model includes Jayarāśi as the primary example of a skeptical branch of the Cārvākas. Jayarāśi can be called a Cārvāka, argues Gokhale, due to his negative doctrines (i.e., critiques of religious philosophy) and acceptance of worldly practices in everyday matters. Gokhale reads Jayarāśi as an epistemological skeptic who denies all means of knowledge (pramāṇas), and offers an interesting treatment of Jayarāśi's response to the "paradox of skepticism" (i.e., the charge that skepticism is inconsistent or self-refuting) by comparing Jayarāśi's response with those of other skeptics like Nāgārjuna and Śrī Harṣa (pp. 37–45). Chapter 3 concerns extreme empiricism, which is the view that "perception is the only means of knowledge and inference is not a means to knowledge at all" (p. 49). This is the view typically assigned to the Cārvākas. Gokhale counters what he sees as misunderstandings of this view. Extreme empiricist Cārvākas do not mean to deny reasoning in general or even that inference (anumāna) can sometimes yield knowledge; their argument is that inference cannot be considered to be a proper means of knowledge because it does not necessarily yield knowledge. They support this view with a dilemma of inference (where it is argued that the object of inference cannot be a particular, a universal, or a particular...

Zwischen System und Experiment. Johann Gottlob Krügers Versuch einer Experimental-Seelenlehre

Johann Gottlob Kruger’s Experimental psychology (1756) is commonly considered as one of the first empirical anthropologies in the German-speaking space. On closer examination, however, the foundations of his psychology appear to be both Wolffian rationalism and an epistemological empiricism of Lockean origins. His methodical conception of experimentalism, thus, expands Wolffian empirical psychology. On this basis, Kruger also supplies a quite precarious defence of materialism, and a view of experiments on humans that conflicts radically with present standards.

Perbandingan Konsepsi Epistemologi Empirisisme Ibnu Taymiyyah dan John Locke

This paper examined the epistemological empiricism conception of Ibn Taimiyyah and John Locke based on the comparative analysis to obtain the complete description of epistemological empiricism thought of both, as well as its implications and consequences for the development of science and religious thought. To obtain the detailed answer about the two figures thought, it would be revealed the similarities and differences of epistemological empiricism of each by showing the elements that became the focus of both studies. Furthermore, from those, it will be sought the strange and weaknesses, and possible relevance of the two thought to find a new alternative as a reflective systematic model for the development of science and religious thought in the present and future. Comparing the empirical thought of both figures above is important to do, due to the empirical tradition in the two mens’ world have a very extreme differences. In the west, Empiricism had contributed significantly to the epistemological assets or legacy and had led to the development of science and technology. In contrast, empiricism in the east, was suspected as a harmful tradition to the Islamic ideology. It was considered as the seed that gave birth to atheism. Based on the two thinkers empiricism, will appear the strategic idea that can be synthesized to developed modern science as well as Islamic thought. Bot of epistemology thought can be combine to reconstruct the Islamic epistemology which is more open and more mature, because in that context will emerge the theories of knowledge without eliminating the metaphysical and ethical authority. In the context of combination, the natural tendency of foundation of Islamic teaching should be the bases of policy as descript by Ibnu Taimiyyah, that human nature becomes the foundation of the human responsibility in the end after and imposition of responsibility or duty, are the necessities to obey Allah order and to leave the Allah prohibition. The natural tendency is a gift from Allah that guides the human being to the right path.

Prolepsis and Ennoia in the Early Stoa (review)

Reviewed by: Prolepsis and Ennoia in the Early Stoa Jacob Klein Henry Dyson. Prolepsis and Ennoia in the Early Stoa. Sozomena: Studies in the Recovery of Ancient Texts, 5. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009. Pp. xxxiii + 265. Cloth, $99.95. According to the Stoics, the psychology of adult human beings is unified in a striking sense: each of the soul's perceptive, discursive, and motivational functions belongs to the single faculty of reason. Reason, in turn, is constituted by a set of conceptions (ennoiai) and preconceptions (prolêpseis) acquired on the basis of experience. The few secure sources that bear on this theory in the early Stoa suggest that certain of these empirically acquired conceptions function, somehow, as a criterion of truth in human perception and rational cognition generally. The conceptions associated with this cognitive role are sometimes said to be shared or common (koinai). These tenuous but intriguing claims are the focus of Henry Dyson's book, which surveys most of the surviving evidence for the old Stoic theory of concepts. Dyson's central aims are two: first, to offer a reconstruction of the early and orthodox Stoic theory, for which available evidence is slight; second, to establish this theory's relation to a body of later evidence, including that of Cicero and Epictetus, which has sometimes been regarded as contaminated by Platonist influence. Chapters 1 to 3 of Dyson's book are largely occupied with taxonomical concerns. Here Dyson argues, contra Sandbach and others, that the set of common conceptions as conceived by early Stoic theory is in fact identical with the set of preconceptions, which comprise a form of tacit knowledge shared by all humans qua rational. This conclusion appears to be in tension with Dyson's further suggestions that the Stoics describe as common conceptions only those preconceptions made articulate by dialectic, and that common conceptions and preconceptions are in fact functionally distinct. These latter claims amount to a plausible reading of the sources, but they tend to support the conclusion Dyson is concerned to refute: that common conceptions are, after all, better characterized as a proper subset of preconceptions. Chapters 4 and 5 offer a more detailed account of the role of preconceptions in early Stoic theory. Dyson accepts the now standard view that the Stoic account of concept acquisition amounts to a form of dispositional innatism: we are providentially disposed by nature to acquire the conceptions in which reason consists. Dyson argues further that although preconceptions do not themselves underwrite the perception and discrimination of "natural kinds or sensible qualities" (108), they nonetheless support a range of subsequent inferences about the necessary features of natural kinds. Accordingly, when rendered explicit by dialectic, the knowledge encoded by preconceptions provides a basis for philosophical definition and demonstration. In Dyson's view, the resulting position may be fairly described as a form of psychological but not epistemological empiricism: though preconceptions are acquired solely though experience on the Stoic account, they provide epistemic warrant for a range of non-sensory cataleptic impressions. Finally, Dyson presents the distinction between psychological and epistemological empiricism as the key to understanding the relation of the early Stoic theory to later evidence. In his view, the alleged Platonism of later sources in fact reflects a rationalist element equally present in the older Stoa. Though this is an attractive suggestion, it appears for the most part to be a guiding supposition of Dyson's method rather than a conclusion for which he argues in [End Page 115] detail. While early fragments are interpreted in the light of later material, little attention is given to later accounts as such. On the whole, Dyson's book advances discussion of the Stoic theory of concepts at a number of points and provides a helpful synthesis of much recent scholarship on the subject. Unfortunately, it is marred by an untidy presentation of its main conclusions and by a heavily layered manner of exposition. Dyson tends to address one topic or question by introducing new ones (section 5.2 is a case in point), and a number of central proposals appear in a rather unusual summary of "interim conclusions" interposed between chapters 3 and 4. Much of this material would...

Quantum cosmology, possible worlds, and modal actualism

The growth of modern science resulted in a radically new cognitive approach to many problems of classical philosophy. In the context of contemporary theoretical physics, if only one avoids easy apologetic, it is no longer possible to defend this version of epistemological empiricism that was defended half a century ago. Whereas in the 1930’s the traditional distinction between theoretical and observational terms was called into question, due to its arbitrary nature, in the 1980’s the basic philosophical opposition between material and immaterial (resp. between physical and mathematical) objects seems arbitrary since the very notion of matter appears nothing but a terminological relic of the bygone epoch.

Searching for the Searchlight Theory: From Karl Popper to Otto Selz

The aim of this article is to show that one of Popper's key ideas in epistemology, his so-called theory of the searchlight, is derived from early German Denkpsychologie, in particular the theory of schematic anticipations of Otto Selz. With his theory of schematic anticipations Selz intended to replace various forms of association psychology. Likewise Popper's theory of the searchlight aims to replace empiricism in epistemology (the Bucket theory, as he calls it). On the basis of Popper's still unpublished manuscripts on psychology between 1927 and 1931, it is shown that his position became increasingly Selzian. The term "Bucket theory" is used by him for the first time in an article in which he defends Selz, and in his earlier Ph.D. thesis there occur passages which show him in complete agreement with the theory of schematic anticipations. It is argued that Popper's Selzian stance in psychology finally enabled him to develop his characteristic deductive stance in epistemology and philosophy of science. It is also emphasized that Popper never credits Selz for this formative role.

Theological Empiricism: Aspects of Johann Georg Hamann's Reception of Hume

Theological Empiricism: Aspects ofJohann Georg Hamann's Reception of Hume Hans Graubner The philosophical Enlightenment in Germany executed in none of its phases as clean a break with the theological tradition as the English and especially the French. To its very end it pleaded for a theology of Creation, however thin this plea had become, that is, for an adherence to the first article of the Creed. On the other hand, a philosophical adherence to the second article, that is, to christology, had no chance left owing to the rationalist Bible criticism of the 17th and 18th centuries and was not considered a serious philosophical position in the controversy between natural religion and revealed religion. Its mere link-up with historic facts that were considered epistemologically inferior made it unthinkable in the eyes of the dominating rationalists. In 18th century Königsberg this controversy determined the life-long argument between Hamann and Kant. Hamann attacks Kant and the German philosophy ofthe Enlightenmentfrom the position ofrevealed religion. In doing so, he refers to David Hume from the very beginning. In Hume's thoughts Hamann saw a chance of regaining a serious position for the Christian religion, that is, of its christology, in philosophical discussion. Thisveryaim ofHamann's shows thathe proceeds fromcompletely different philosophical interests than does Hume. But there are certain basic attitudes that make it understandable why Hamann refers to Hume, even declares him to be his philosopher. These attitudes, which they have in common, maybe called criticism ofreason, epistemological empiricism, and subjectivism. In spite of these attitudes, which they share, the difference between their ways ofthinkingleads to Hamann's practise of not adopting any of Hume's ideas unchanged. Instead of speaking ofreception it would be better to speak ofa transformation of Hume's thoughts into the totally different world of Hamann's ideas. The latter is determined by at least three basic motives: Firstly, by the sharp criticism of an over-estimation of reason in philosophy. This criticism is directed both against the rationalism of the recognized German philosophy as well as against Hume's scepticism and Kant's transcendental philosophy. Secondly,- by his personally being affected by Christianity, which renders itimpossible for him to separate the personal from the theoretiVolume XV Number 2 377 HANS GRAUBNER cal, and philosophy from the way a philosopher sees himself and from his own historical background. Thirdly, by a concentration of all philosophical energy on language as the fundamental empirical and historical fact, which, for Hamann, becomes the centre of his theological, ontological and anthropological reflection. It is my intention to show how Hamann unfolds his basic motives by following certain ideas of Hume's, for example, the idea of geometry, that of belief and that of image. In the end I shall summarize Hamann's criticism of scepticism and point out the significance ofanthropomorphism in Hume's and Hamann's understanding ofreligion. Referring to the understanding of Hamann's Hume-reception so far, I want to emphasize three results: 1.Hamann's Hume-reception is due, above all, to his repeated study ofthe Treatise, which musthave begun earlier than was assumed before. 2.Hamann's reference to Hume is not restricted to the discussion of the concept of belief, but is far more extensive. 3.Neither is Hamann's Hume-reception a total "misunderstanding "1 of Hume nor is his passing-on of Hume's ideas to the German romanticism "a strange paradox"; rather it is a conscious transformation ofempiricism into a theology oflanguage, which has had an effect even on romantic and idealistic secularization. Now I shall come to my first point. I. Geometry After having finished his studies in Königsberg and before his conversion experience at London in 1758 that was to determine his whole life, Hamann, from 1752 to 1756, became a private tutor for two aristocratic families in Courland. During this time he definitely read the German translations ofHume's "Political Essays" and ofhis Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. That Hamann, who had a good command of the English language, knew even the Treatise at this time, can, according to my hypothesis, be gathered from his use of Hume's conception ofgeometry in an unpublished philosophic...

Dummett on Meaning and Classical Logic

IRecent criticisms of Michael Dummett's views on meaning tend to focus on the fundamental presuppositions that lie behind his views on language understanding. Theories ofunderstanding, the a-rgument goes, are epistemological theories, theories concerning a special type of knowledge, namely knowledge of sentence meaning. Dummett claims that philosophy of language has replaced epistemology as the foundation of philosophy. But, in reality, Dummett has merely pressed forward the claims of a particular type of epistemological problem to be of especial importance, bringing uncritically to the solution of this problem assumptions from the supposedly superseded discipline of epistemology that self-confessed epistemologists have long rejected as inadequate. Thus Dummett's three-pronged attack against what he terms realism in the theory of meaning based on the manifestation, acquisition, and communication arguments1 is held to represent nothing more than the crudest empiricism in epistemology. Dummett claims that no teacher could manifest and communicate to a pupil, about to acquire a language, grasp of sentences which are determinately true or false though we may be incapable of determining which. But the argument seems to hinge on the empiricist dogma that what is learned cannot radically transcend the experiential or stimulatory inputs to learning. This dogma, taken literally, is clearly false. The same sequence of stimulation can lead to very different cognitive states in organisms with different initial psychologies, including different innate endowments. An anti-empiricist in epistemology will claim that it is an empirical matter how much the innate component contributes; after the fashion of Chomsky, he can say that learning and communication situations simply act as catalysts for the transmission of beliefs whose content greatly transcends what is given in experiential input. The anti-realist cannot legislate a priori that beliefs with recognition-transcendent truth conditions cannot be transmitted via public signals which would, in other organisms, be used to transmit beliefs with much more empirically accessible contents.2 These criticisms of Dummett's arguments for his position seem to me to be just. But though his arguments are bad, the position he argues for may none the less be correct. I have argued elsewhere3 that the molecular view of

Sjæl-legeme problemet I ny idémæssig belysning

Four different psychiatric disease models: the classical medical model, the medico-epidemiological model, the psychodynamic model and the sociologic model and their epistemological impact are discussed. Scientific psychiatry has brought itself in a philosophical dilemma between ontological realism and epistemological empiricism. This may be due to the classical mind-body conflict, as represented by the two philosophical principles. Cartesian dualism and monism. The paradox vanishes and so does the conflict between biological psychiatry and psychological psychiatry, if mind and body are conceived not as separate entities and not as two sides of the same coin, but as complementary phenomena in the sense of atomic physics. Consequently, the more precise biochemical brain processes are to be identified the more is lost in the effort of simultaneously understanding the essence of the mind. A complete simultaneous description of the biochemical and the psychological brain processes is impossible.

Classical Moral Philosophy and Metaethics

Tff9HE distinction between metaethics and normative ethics, with moral philosophy identified with the former, has been widely accepted in some quarters. Yet there are those who seem to think contemporary moral philosophers, in pursuing metaethical studies, have forsaken the traditional task of moral philosophy, the task of searching for moral wisdom, for normative principles of conduct having to do with matters of right and wrong and what worthwhile. Indeed, some recent writers have returned to the position moral philosophy at least in part a normative discipline. Brandt, in Ethical Theory,1 regards moral philosophy as embracing both metaand normative ethics. He regards metaethics as concerned with the analysis of ethical concepts and the method by which ethical principles may be supported. Normative ethics . . ., as a philosophical discipline, he says, is an inquiry aiming to state and defend as valid or true a complete and economic set of general ethical principles, and also some less general principles are important for what we may call 'providing the ethical foundations' of the more important human institutions. Hospers, in Human Conduct,2 seems to be in thorough agreement with Brandt on these matters. The body of the text given to classical moral theories as proposed normative principles of conduct. He regards only the last chapter, which concerned with how moral principles can be verified, as metaethical. Singer, in Generalization in Ethics,regards his task to be to show the generalization argument, which he contends a moral principle, valid and that it serves as a test or criterion of the morality of conduct, and provides the basis for moral rules.4 I have the suspicion there a great deal of misunderstanding and confusion on this subject, for it seems to me metaethics not the study of some new set of problems but the problems with which moral philosophy has always been concerned. The difference lies in method and style rather than subject matter. It might be helpful to think of this matter in light of the contrast between classical and contemporary metaphysics. In the grand tradition, metaphysics was correlated with a rationalistic epistemology based on mathematics as a paradigm of knowledge. It not surprising metaphysics was conceived after the model of mathematics. It was thought to be concerned with fundamental truths about the essential and necessary structure of reality, selfevident principles from which the truths of the special disciplines could be deduced. With the shift from rationalism to empiricism in epistemology, metaphysics, as traditionally conceived, was left stranded. It appeared unintelligible and ridiculous to empiricists. They heaped scorn upon it. What they did not realize immediately was epistemology and metaphysics

The Aim of the Critique of Pure Reason

My topic is historical rather than philosophical. I want to consider what Kant aimed to achieve in the Critique of Pure Reason. In 1909 Prichard wrote, “Kant's problem is similar to Locke's. Locke states that his purpose is to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge.” Many have maintained that Kant's purpose was to mediate between rationalism and empiricism in epistemology. Hermann Cohen held that the aim of the Critique is to provide a theory of experience, an account of empirical knowledge. Ernst Cassirer and other neo-Kantians have held that its aim is to furnish a philosophy of science.