Empirical Statements Research Articles

Is language acquired through imitation?

The role of imitation in language acquisition is examined, including data from the psycholinguistic, operant, and social learning areas. From the psycholinguistic data, four empirical statements have been extracted: (1) there is no evidence that spontaneous imitations of adult speech influence grammatical development, (2) imitation of speech does not appear to occur with frequency beyond age 3 years, (3) speech and hence imitation are not necessary for the comprehension of linguistic structures, and (4) most utterances of a child are novel and therefore could not have been exactly modeled. The first and second propositions are seen to be based on a too restrictive definition of imitation-immediate and exact copying. Selective imitation-a functional relationship involving similarity of a particular form or function of the model's responses-is proposed as an alternative, thus leaving the validity of statements (1) and (2) in question. Concerning assertion (4), certain data from the operant literature are presented as evidence of the compatibility of novel responding and modeling, imitation, and reinforcement. Finally, it is proposed that statement (3) suggests a mechanism by which selective imitation can be understood. A three-stage process is proposed in which comprehension of a grammatical form sets the stage for selective imitation of that structure, which leads in turn to spontaneous production. Thus imitation is a process by which new syntactic structures can be first introduced into the productive mode.

Comment on "The Effects of Exchange Rate Adjustment on International Investment" by Dennis E. Logue and Thomas D. Willett

This comment will concentrate exclusively on the direct investment aspects of the Logue & Willett-paper. Throughout the paper the authors make a number of theoretical and empirical statements applicable to the analysis of foreign investment. Their general concludion, albeit tentative, is that both theory and fact imply that a devaluation of the dollar will discourage U.S. direct investment outflows and encourage direct investment into the United States. Thus, on page 1 they point to the trade-off between production abroad by U.S. subsidiaries and exports, stating: "During the period of overvaluation of the dollar, U.S. investment abroad was artificially stimuatled in relation to exports where as foreign investment in the U.S was discouraged relative to exporting to the U.S." Later in section III.C they come ot the same conclusion for apparently different theoretical reasons, emphasizing the lower foreign currency price of existing American assets after the U.S. devaluation. Finally in section III.C They adduce empirical evidence to supprot the same overall result.

Automatic masters for eigenvalue economization

AbstractIn dynamic analyses using the finite element method very large matrices are derived. The size of the matrices is usually reduced using an eigenvalue economization method. This paper describes an automatic technique for selecting the optimum variables to be kept as masters using the economization method. Some examples are presented and these lead to an empirical statement about expected accuracy.

Probability Magic Unmasked

It has been alleged that Bayesian usage of prior probabilities allows one to obtain empirical statements on the basis of no evidence whatever. We examine this charge with reference to several examples from the literature, arguing, first, that the difference between probabilities based on weighty evidence and those based on little evidence can be drawn in terms of the variance of a distribution. Moreover, qua summaries of vague prior knowledge, prior distributions only transmit the empirical information therein contained and, therefore, their consequences for long-run frequency behavior are “a priori” in at best a Pickwickian sense.

A survey of the mean turbulent field closure models.

C solutions to the differential boundary-layer equations have for some years now been applied to turbulent boundary layers where relief from the difficulty of solution permits more concern for the physical elements of models which purport to simulate some statistical features of turbulent flowfields. A first step has been accomplished; that is, accurate, quite versatile, and practically/useful computer programs have been combined with rather simple and successful empirical statements which allow one to estimate the Reynolds shear stress in the equations for the mean velocity field. We call this Mean Velocity Field (MVF) closure since it predicts only the mean velocity field in addition to the mean shear stress. For boundarylayer flows a set of empirical constants must be selected. However, it is then possible to accurately predict flows with wall transpiration, heat transfer, and a variety of other boundary conditions, and, remarkably, with no adjustment in the constants. However, the constants must be adjusted for, say, pipe or channel flow or free shear flows. By moving on to the more complicated Mean Turbulent Field (MTF) closure there is some hope of discovering increasingly universal models and a greater range of predictability. There are two other incentives: First, it is rather comforting actually to compute the turbulent kinetic energy; it is, after all, the premier property that distinguishes turbulent from laminar flow. Second, it appears possible to include body forcelike effects such as curvature, buoyancy, and Coriolis effects with no further empiricism. The latter is a line of thought that is not new,' and it has occupied the present authors' interest for some time. However, in this paper we avoid these topics in order to simplify discussion of an already complicated field. We also assume that the fluid is incompressible. Extension to high Mach number flows does not, however, seem to be a major problem. A basis for MTF calculations began appropriately enough with the semiheuristic models of Kolmogoroff and Prandtl in the early 1940's; they include the turbulent kinetic energy transport equation, a turbulent-energy-related eddy viscosity, and either a prescribed length scale function or a differential equation for a length scale. We wish to call this Mean Turbulent Energy (MTE) closure which together with Mean Reynolds Stress (MRS) closure forms two subsets of MTF closure.* MRS closure implies a closed set of equations which include equations for all nonzero components of the Reynolds stress tensor. Chou' seems to be the first to initiate a study of the full set of equations with an eye towards closure. However, it was Rotta in 1951 who laid the foundation for almost all of the current models. In the Reynolds stress tensor equation (the tensor equation for the single-point, double-velocity correlations, the trace of which is the kinetic energy equation) there appear pressure-velocity gradient correlations, (pdujdxj), which Rotta called the energy redistribution terms and which he argued should be proportional to the deviation from isotropy — dtj(uky/3. On the whole, the assumption seems physically correct, but of further importance is the fact that it provides a unity that was lacking, say, in the 1940's.f Thus, the Reynolds shear stress is now determined as a part of the whole; MTE closure can be obtained as an analytic simplification of MRS closure, and, furthermore, MVF closure (that is, eddy viscosity or mixing length concepts) can be viewed as a further simplification. We shall follow this process of simplification in this paper. Despite the unity of thought provided by Rotta's basic assumption, it is, of course, an approximation to nature and is subject to modification in the hands of investigators eager to achieve agreement with data. Furthermore, there are other terms in the Reynolds stress equations, such as the dissipation and diffusion terms, which are modeled differently by different investigators and represent some impass to a consensus theory such as is the near state of MVF closure. In the present development we have attempted to present the basic ideas and a core model for MRS and MTE closure and

The Existential World of George Oppen

salute serious craftsman, wrote Ezra Pound in his preface to Discrete Series, George Oppen's first volume, a sensibility which not every man's sensibility and which has not been got out of any other man's books. Oppen's sensibility indeed not every man's but it one clearly belongs to its age. And he has turned out to be much more than serious craftsman. Metaphysically inclined, even in the earlier imagistic pieces Pound was describing, Oppen presents stark but intense world in which nothing certain but the sheer existence of nature and the pressure of feelings and sensations on the mind encounters it. From the beginning, imagism was, for Oppen, cognitive as well as formal technique: objects could only be known imagistically, by one's sensation of them, and not discursively.1 Thus Oppen sought to method of thought from the imagist . . . intensity of vision, method would represent test of truth or at least test of sincerity, based on the idea that there moment, an actual time, when you believe something to be true, and you construct meaning from those moments of conviction. Discrete Series ( 1934) in effect Cartesian investigation by imagistic rather than rationalistic means. A discrete series, Oppen explains, is series of terms each of which empirically derived, each one of which empirically true. And this the reason for the fragmentary character of those poems. I was attempting to construct meaning by empirical statements, by imagist statements.2 Imagist thought form of nominalism in which, to repeat, appreciation of the existence of the object in its tangibility replaces thought about the object:

Multidimensional Aspects of Local Political Systems: a Conceptual Approach To Public Policy

THE LAST DECADE of political science research is characterized by the development of empirical theory.' behavioral mood and its emphasis on observable phenomena was the immediate predecessor of current attempts to develop systematic statements of relationships. normative philosopher was viewed as a consumer of the past, yet the early social science attempts to explain behavior were equally inadequate in their emphasis on raw empiricism. current renaissance of political theory attempts to build bridges between divergent schools of thought2 within a context of common concern for political action. In the process, conflicts over theory and methods, philosophy and empiricism, have seriously constrained our search for knowledge about local political systems. Research on local politics has progressed from a social engineering to a political analysis approach. Further developments await the meshing of approaches into theoretically meaningful, empirical statements about normative ends (public policy). reformist approach to local politics emphasized specialized reporting,4 and shortly before this decade we were able to categorize the literature on local systems into such classes as history, municipal reforms, law, government structure, politics (e.g., histories of partisan activity), management, and power.5 A category emphasizing empirical-theoretical concern for systematic statements of relationships was impossible. In 1957, Daland described this stage as follows: The technique is normally to describe existing governmental arrangements, measure them against a set of 'principles' or basic considerations, and prescribe a remedy which involves greater integration in one form or another. 6 need for comparative studies is now occupying political scientists,7 and there is an increasing concern for theoretical constructs.8 goal is to maximize

The Empirical Content and Longevity of Ricardian Economics

There is generally recognized gap, though of uncertain width, between abstract analytical propositions of Ricardian economics and concrete implicit in their use by contemporaries as guides to legislative action. The first purpose of this paper is to inquire into nature of economic statements made by Ricardo, and by John Stuart Mill. Can their key propositions be construed as, and did they intend them to be, empirical statements? What tests did they accept to measure truth of their theory? How did they bridge gap between their abstractions and real world? A second purpose, to which first inquiry is necessary preliminary, is to throw some light on related historical issue of some importance. Mark Blaug has recently charged Mill with having given an artificial extension of life to Ricardian system, after it had become empirically untenable. Blaug argues that the body of doctrine which Ricardo bequeathed to his followers rested on series of about course of economic events which were subject to empirical verification, in strictest sense of term. These included a rising price of corn, rising share of national income going to rent receivers, constant real wages, and gradual vanishing of investment opportunities in industry. But statistical evidence, available in 1830s and 1840s, falsified these predictions. At that stage, Blaug argues, system was retained only because of its usefulness to opponents of Corn Laws. Still more, therefore, with repeal of those laws in 1846, should system have been rejected as obsolete. For then even its basic assumption-an insulated economy-was no longer realistic. Thus, in 1848 Mill revived system which, it is claimed, had been falsified as to its key deductions, and rendered irrelevant by attainment of its chief policy objective.2 Mill effected this in some instances, Blaug suggests, by conveniently ignoring gap between facts and his theory. In others, it is charged, he actively sought to remove theory from any possibility of falsification by facts. This involved two gambits. One was to turn Ricardo's definite predictions into vague statements of tendency, guarded by

Material Conditions on Tests of Statistical Hypotheses

Orthodox statistical theory, which is the theory used by most practicing statisticians, physicists, biologists, and social scientists, assumes there are objective probabilities which are properties of physical systems. Statistical hypothesis testing is a branch of statistical theory concerned with a theory for accepting or rejecting statements which ascribe these objective probabilities to particular physical systems. Since use of the theory of statistical hypothesis testing leads to the acceptance or rejection of a kind of empirical statement, I shall assume that this theory is a part of inductive logic. Recent philosophical inquiries have largely ignored orthodox statistical theory, and personalistic (or Bayesian) statisticians have attacked it. Since the theory is so widely used, it is important to reexamine its foundations and its place in the canon of inductive logic.

The Existence of Rules

About b) 1. and 2. nothing much needs to be said. Statements of this form are clearly empirical statements, and they are clearly general statements. That is the force, in both cases, of 'as a rule'. Clearly too, they contextually imply, whether or not they logically imply, that there are counter-instances, that 'as a rule' could be replaced without a change in truth-value by 'usually' but not by 'always'. The question whether or not 'as a rule' logically implies counter-instances is the question whether, e.g. 'As a rule, I shave before breakfast' and 'I always shave before breakfast' are or are not logically contrary to each other-on the assumption, of course, that 'I always shave before breakfast' logically implies that I never do not shave before breakfast. Some people would want to say that it did not. In that case 'As a rule I . . . .' and 'I always ....' would not necessarily be contraries. It would all

Empirical certainty and the theory of important criteria

Philosophers frequently treat certainty as some sort of absolute, while ordinary men typically do not. According to the Theory of Important Criteria, on which the present paper is based, this difference is not to be explained in terms of ambiguity or vagueness in the word ‘certain’, but rather in terms of disagreement between ordinary men and philosophers as to the importance of one of the criteria of the ordinary sense of ‘certain’. I argue that there is reason to think that certainty is some sort of absolute, and thus that no empirical statement is certain. And in any case, the problem of empirical certainty is not a pseudo‐problem, as metaphilosophers like Wittgenstein and Wisdom have thought.

Religious Statements and the World

In the past few years philosophers of religion and theologians have devoted much attention to the status of religious statements. There are three main positions: (1) The statements as generally understood are (false) empirical statements. The people who make them have either made honest mistakes (they are unaware of the counter evidence) or they are irrational. This view may be coupled with the claim that religious language can be reconstructed in such a way that we may continue to use it and yet avoid making false assertions. (The position Braithwaite outlines in An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief seems to be close to this.) (2) The statements are not empirical and are therefore not significant. (3) The statements are not empirical— common sense and science are irrelevant to the truth and falsity of religious claims—and yet they are significant.

Open questions in contemporary Soviet theory of social law

The present paper gives an exposition of the Soviet discussion on the role of statistics in the knowledge of social phenomena and on the concept of social law as opposed to mere description by means of statistics. In the following critical evaluation of the Soviet arguments, the ‘open questions’ i.e. those treated by the Soviets in an unsatisfactory way, will be elaborated. Their philosophical discussion, which is still going on, began some years ago in connection with the application of statistical methods in investigating social affairs in the Soviet Union. This is of high interest, since empirical statements and their philosophical evaluation are directly confronted.

Induction and Objectivity

This paper is an attempt at a vindication of induction. The point of departure is that induction requires a justification and that the only kind of justification possible is a vindication. However traditional vindications of induction have rested on unjustified assumptions about the aim of induction. This vindication takes the end pursued in induction simply to be correct prediction. It is argued that induction is the only reasonable way of pursuing this end because induction is the only objective method of predicting. While objectivity is not a necessary condition for successful predicting, it is a sufficient condition for the possession of a property that is, in turn, a necessary condition for correct predicting; and further there could be no reason to expect any non-objective method to possess this necessary condition for success.Induction is the only objective method of predicting for it alone uses facts which must be identified by any predicting method based on rules; and it alone uses these facts according to a relationship that must hold between facts and any meaningful empirical statement. Any alternative to induction must assume that the factual regularities that have been detected will alter in the future and the way they are expected to alter must be arbitrary. It is further claimed that this vindication is proof against the criticisms that have been advanced against practicalist justifications of induction.

Mach's Critique of Newtonian Mechanics

Mach's reinterpretation of Newtonian mechanics is examined and found ambivalent. His criticism of absolute time and absolute space was sound whereas his attempt to replace Newton's whole theory by an allegedly empirical statement and a definition was logically untenable. The whole program of reducing mechanics to kinematics is found to be unfeasible for logical reasons. The impossibility of deriving masses and forces from observations alone is discussed in detail. The driving force behind Mach's ideas on the foundations of mechanics is shown to be his empiricist philosophy which, while allowing him to impugn inscrutables, also suggested him to minimize the role of ideas. It is recalled that the discussion of the foundations of mechanics proceeds nowadays in a way far removed from Mach's operationalistic approach, namely via the axiomatic reconstruction of classical theories on the basis of undefined but meaningful concepts.

On the Verifiability of Universal Empirical Statements

On the Verifiability of Universal Empirical Statements

On the verifiability of universal empirical statements

Journal Article On the verifiability of universal empirical statements Get access S. Cannavo S. Cannavo Brooklyn College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 26, Issue 1, October 1965, Pages 21–25, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/26.1.21 Published: 01 October 1965

Comment: Mental Events and the Brain

Shaffer’s note (Paper XIII) and the preceding discussion to which it refers show very clearly the dilemma of any identity hypothesis concerning mental events and brain processes. Such hypotheses are usually put forth by physiologically inclined thinkers who want also to be empiricists. Being physiologically inclined, they want to assert the material character of mental processes. Being empiricists, they want their assertion to be a testable statement about mental processes. They try to combine the two tendencies in an empirical statement of the form: X is a mental process of kind A≡ X is a central process of kind α (H) But this hypothesis backfires. It not only implies, as it is intended to imply, that mental events have physical features; it also seems to imply (if read from the right to the left) that some physical events, viz. central processes, have non-physical features. It thereby replaces a dualism of events by a dualism of features. Moreover, this consequence seems to be the result of the way in which the physiologist has formulated his thesis. Even if he is a convinced monist he seems to be forced, by the very content of his thesis of monism, to acknowledge the correctness of a dualistic point of view.

Are there any incorrigible empirical statements?

Are there any incorrigible empirical statements?

A Postulate for Linguistics in the Sixties

The approach to language study represented by postulates and corollaries was once the basis of Bloomfieldian linguistics, yet it is now somewhat out of fashion. Sets of postulates have a tendency to grow in number and unwieldiness, and transformational investigators favor a more operational analysis and statement. Yet transformational study itself rests upon a postulate which is at present implicit. Stated without setting it into the Euclidian language and style favored by Bloomfield, it is that the relations between utterances are capable of being stated in the form of manipulations.l Such an approach to utterances forces us to assume that all utterances contain items in combination, and that all items can appear in other utterances, which are then new combinations. Thus language is described as having three constituents: items, combinations, and relationships operationally statable between combinations. I believe that this postulate of possibly fictitious manipulability is fundamental both to transformational and to structural analysis. It is quite obvious that the formulae for 'deriving' a passive sentence from an active one could not be stated as a manipulation unless the active sentence contained isolable items capable of being manipulated at least in the form of rules on paper. It is equally obvious that when a structuralist sets up such units as morphemes and phonemes, and describes their sequences in morphotactics and phonotactics, he is setting up items, combinations of items, and relationships capable of being described as manipulations. Further, it seems to me that the statement I have just given is quite properly formulated as a postulate or axiom, since I do not see how it is capable of proof. At best, it is an empirical statement about observed languages. Since not all languages have been, or will be, observed, there is always the possibility that some language does not contain items in manipulable arrangements. Yet since the postulate is necessary for more than one kind of analysis, these analyses themselves constitute good reasons for acceptance. The fact that it underlies more than one kind of analysis is merely further strengthening. Since the postulate does not seem to have been explicitly stated, it is not surprising that its implications have not been fully explored. A beginning at such an exploration is the purpose of this paper. The first implication is that any utterance is separable into discrete units, since only chunks and pieces can be arranged and manipulated. Continua can be blended and stirred, perhaps, but