Emission Trading Price Research Articles

Investment Strategy of Emission-Reduction Technology in a Supply Chain

Greenhouse gas emissions have serious impacts on the natural environment. Therefore, the restrictions imposed on carbon emission force enterprises to take carbon emission into consideration when making production decisions. In this paper, in the context of allowing emission trading and investment of emission reduction technology, models were presented for a two-stage supply chain to analyze the optimal investment and pricing decisions. The results indicate that manufacturer’s endurance capacity of reduction difficulty is higher in the cooperation model than in the Stackelberg game model, and that perfect coordination of supply chains can be realized by a revenue sharing contract. From the perspective of a consumer, low-carbon products mean higher price, so that subsidies or tax exemptions should be provided to keep low prices. Meanwhile, the government can promote investment in emission-reduction technologies and achieve its emission reduction targets by controlling emission trading price, strengthening emission reduction publicity and providing technology investment subsidies.

Equilibrium Analysis of Upstream and Downstream Enterprises in the Emissions Trading Based on the Model of Treatment Costs

This article saw upstream and downstream enterprises in the same watershed as two overalls.Firstly, created a mathematical programming model of pollution control costs and upstream and downstream enterprises’ emissions reductions.Harnessed the method which solved the feasible solutions of the vector optimization problems meeting Kuhn-Tucker conditions to calculate two companies’ marginal treatment costs and put them as the market price of emission rights trading.Then created two companies’ benefit functions and found their Nash equilibrium outputs and incomes.Next analyzed the impacts of the emission trading price on two companies’ equilibrium and calculated the specific range of price parameter.Finally, gets the conclusion that only a reasonable emission trading price can lead to rational resources allocation.

THE EUROPEAN EMISSION TRADING SCHEME: IMPLICATIONS FOR LONG-TERM INVESTMENT VALUATION

As the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) moves towards its third phase (2013–2020) it has undergone numerous improvements, including a gradual increase in the use of auctions as a distribution mechanism and the prevalence of sectoral criteria over National Allocation Plans. At the same time, emission allowances with maturities up to December 2020 have begun to be traded on the futures markets, reflecting the impact that the new measures are expected to have on prices. This paper sets out to obtain a financial valuation of the impact and analyze whether the resulting prices will facilitate investment in installations to bring about reductions in emissions. The effect on investments of the potential introduction of caps and floors on emission trading prices is also studied.

Energy Benefits of Electronic Controls at Small and Medium Sized U.S. Manufacturers

Energy Benefits of Electronic Controls at Small and Medium Sized U.S. Manufacturers

Invoking Household Cooperation in the Commons Dilemma of CO2 Emission Reduction

In the modern community, global effort is required to reduce the CO2 emissions resulting from human actions to acceptable levels. However, global objectives may contradict individual benefits; attempts to reduce CO2 emissions can result in the commons dilemma. This paper explores how the cooperation of individual households can be invoked to achieve a global target of reducing CO2 emissions from households (HACO2) in cities. A commons payoff function linked household benefits to the number of cooperators in a city: a CO2 emission trading scheme (CETS) for households was introduced into the payoff function as a way to support cooperators. A multi-agent simulator was applied to a search for relationships among parameters in the payoff function and social cooperation from households (R). Results indicate that levying only household maintenance charges is an ineffective way to gain the cooperation of more than half of the households in a city, and extremely high maintenance also discouraged cooperative behavior; the use of CETS could increase cooperation, and R > 0.6 when emission trading prices were five times higher than unit reduction costs, and when unit maintenance charges were almost the same as reduction costs; and it was impossible to gain cooperation from all households until opinions about resource use and reducing emissions were changed.