Emergent Dualism Research Articles

Artificial Intelligence’s Novel “Mind-Reading” Capabilities through Neuroscience: A Challenge for Mind-Body Dualism?

This paper explores a philosophical problem at the intersection of neuroscience and artificial intelligence (AI), and the potential impact of these novel AI “mind-reading” technologies on various forms of mind–body dualism, including substance, interaction, property, predicate, and emergent dualisms. It critically examines how AI’s ability to interpret and predict mental states from neural patterns challenges traditional dualistic theories, which have historically posited distinct relationships between the mind and body. The paper analyzes each dualistic theory in the context of AI advancements. Substance and interaction dualisms are scrutinized for their claims of mind–body independence and causal interaction, respectively, in light of AI’s capabilities to correlate mental and physical states. Property dualism’s assertion of unique mental properties emerging from physical processes is tested against AI’s potential to map mental phenomena to brain activity. Predicate dualism’s linguistic and conceptual distinction between mental and physical realms is challenged by AI’s ability to bridge these domains. Similarly, emergent dualism, which views mental states as novel phenomena, confronts the possibility of their reduction to physical brain processes. Despite these challenges, the paper argues for the adaptability of dualistic theories to integrate AI insights, suggesting a re-evaluation rather than a negation of dualism. It highlights the enduring relevance of philosophical inquiry into the nature of consciousness and mind–body relationships in the age of AI, suggesting that such technological advancements invigorate rather than terminate the philosophical debate.

A Divine Alternative to Zimmerman’s Emergent Dualism

Dean Zimmerman argues for the existence of souls as they enable us to avoid certain vagueness-inspired, metaphysical puzzles that plague materialist accounts of the person. There are far too many overlapping material thinking candidates for being the referent of “I”. Zimmerman suggests that an emergent soul whose creation is overdetermined by overlapping material entities will avoid the unwelcome overpopulation of physical thinkers. I will argue that parallel problems plague Zimmerman’s emergent dualism, there are too many souls produced where we want just one.

Near-Death Experiences and Emergent Dualism

ABSTRACT Since the Enlightenment, reductionism has been an important part of the development of science and civilization. The process of abstracting features of the world and reducing them to their most basic components has greatly increased our grasp of the physical and chemical rules that govern physical reality at all levels. However, central aspects of reductionism have been challenged with the growing literature on religious/spiritual experiences after near-death experiences (NDEs) that challenge standard reductionistic models of the brain. In this paper, an alternative model of emergent dualism is proposed for examining NDEs and the mind.

Beyond "Traditional" Substance Dualism: A Hindu Soul

This article presents an argument for a Hindu substance-dualist position that has remained largely overlooked by Western analytic philosophers, a position that diff erentiates (ontologically) the body and the mind from the soul. A thought experiment is put forth concerning Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles that foregrounds intuitions which, it is argued, comport more with a Hindu soul than the soul of emergent dualism, currently one of the most attractive forms of substance dualism.

Swinburne’s Are We Bodies or Souls?

Richard Swinburne’s Are We Bodies or Souls? presents a sustained case for a view concerning the nature of persons that can be classified as a form of either Cartesian dualism or emergent dualism. This paper comments on two important arguments developed in the book and concludes by considering the problem of the origin of souls.

Аргумент в защиту эмерджентного субстанциаль­ного дуализма (критические возражения Мартине Нида-Рюмелин)

Аргумент в защиту эмерджентного субстанциаль­ного дуализма (критические возражения Мартине Нида-Рюмелин)

The Emergent Aspect Dualism View of Quantum Physics: A New Ontology to Resolve the Complementarity Conundrum

<em>To resolve the conceptual problem of the conflict between quantal and relativistic formulations of Quantum Physics, this paper proposes a new conceptual ontology, Emergent Aspect Dualism, that reconceptualizes the foundations of the field. Emergent Aspect Dualism is a philosophical approach that starts from the assumption is that the primary “material” of the universe is energy, which can be manifested as kinetic energy, potential energy or matter. The flow of such energy throughout the universe is described by the continuous Schrödinger Equation, but in order to account for the hierarchy of levels of organization reality, we need to invoke the concept of emergence, under which the operative principles of each level of organization of this energy are entirely dissociated from those of the levels below it, and, crucially, the functional emergence of the properties of the conscious mind that are dualistically dissociated from the underlying biochemical principles of brain organization. Rather than assigning probabilities to the quantal realm, Emergent Aspect Dualism treats probability as an operational concept that can be held only by a conscious mind, a philosophical category that incorporates the properties of a) the superposition of states and b) the collapse of this superposition once an observation is made. </em>

Emergent Dualism and Emergent Creationism

Emergent Dualism and Emergent Creationism

Has the Emergent Dualism Overcome the Problems with Cartesian Dualism?

스마트(Smart)와 플레이스(Place)의 심물 동일론(identity theory)의 쇠퇴 이후에 심리철학(Philosophy of Mind) 내에서는 다양한 이론 및 입장들이 등장하였다. 그런 흐름을 타고 데카르트의 후계자들이 새로운 형태의 실체 이원론을 모색하기 시작했다. 데카르트의 실체 이원론(substance dualism)은 인간을 신체와 생각하는 것(thingking thing), 즉 물질적 실체와 정신적 실체(mental substance)의 결합체로 봄으로써, 인간의 정신적 영역의 실재성을 이론적으로 옹호하고자 하였다. 그러나, 20세기에 급속도로 발전한 신경과학은 영혼이나 정신적 실체를 가정하지 않고도, 인간의 정신적 능력 및 현상들의 많은 부분을 과학적으로 설명할 수 있다는 것을 보여주고 있다. 그런 이유로 데카르트의 비물질적 실체가 자연 내에 들어설 자리를 점점 더 좁히고 있다. 뿐만 아니라, 데카르트적 이원론(cartesian dualism)은 두 상이한 실체가 어떻게 서로 접촉하며, 인과적 영향을 주고받을 수 있는지에 대해 설득력있는 대답을 제시해주고 있지 못하고 있다. 윌리엄 해스커(William Hasker)는 데카르트적 이원론이 직면한 이러한 난국을 창발 이론을 통해 타개하고자 한다. 해스커는 물질적 토대 요소로부터 새로운 실재(entity)가 창발되며, 그 새로운 실재는 그것의 물질적 토대 요소들로 환원되지 않는 새로운 형태의 인과력을 행사할 수 있다는 새로운 아이디어를 선보였다.BR 본 논문은 해스커의 창발적 이원론(emergent dualism)이 과연 데카르트적 이원론의 난점들을 잘 극복하고 있는지를 검토하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 본 논문에서 데카르트적 이원론이든 창발적 이원론이든, 실체 이원론은 해결될 수 없는 ‘인과적 상호작용의 문제’에 직면하게 되거나 아니면, ‘정체성의 위기’에 직면할 수밖에 없음이 드러날 것이다.

Considering Souls of the Past for today: Soul Origins, Anthropology, and Contemporary Theology

SummaryDue to the rise in philosophical anthropology and the philosophy of mind there is a need to re-consider afresh the theological debate surrounding the origin of the soul. I address this particular issue in the context of the recent philosophical and theological literature that is also conversant with Ecclesiastical literature surrounding the topic by suggesting that there are, at least, three distinct options within the theology of origins. I proceed in two sections. First, I lay out the variety of positions on the soul within the philosophy of mind literature often called substance dualism. In this section, I suggest there are broadly three variations of substance dualism. These include pure substance dualism, composite or compound substance dualism, and emergent substance dualism. I compare and contrast these variations, discuss the particular problems related to each, and argue that each ‘naturally’ coheres with a particular view of origins based on the metaphysical relationship between the body and soul. Second, I lay out the three positions on the soul’s origin in the remainder of the paper. I put forth that there is not only traducianism and creationism the two most obvious positions within Ecclesiastical history, but also emergent substance dualism with materialist origins deserving further consideration in the theological literature. Furthermore, within the positions, excluding emergent substance dualism with materialist origins, there is variation within each yet still naturally falling under the particular said category. This, then, contributes to literature not only by drawing from recent philosophical literature in the fortification of the Christian view on origins, but, additionally, by putting forth one relatively new position that has not been systematized in the theological literature. Finally, I offer that theologians will benefit in three specific ways from the discussion over substance dualism and the theology of the soul’s origin.

Emergent Dualism and the Challenge of Vagueness

Emergent Dualism and the Challenge of Vagueness

Emergent Substances, Physical Properties, Action Explanations

This paper proposes that if individual X ‘inherits’ property F from individual Y, we should be leery of explanations that appeal to X’s being F. This bears on what I’ll call “emergent substance dualism”, the view that human persons or selves are metaphysically fundamental or “new kinds of things with new kinds of causal powers” even though they depend in some sense on physical particulars (Baker in Persons and bodies: a constitution view. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, 22, 20; Lowe in Erkenntnis 65(1):5–23, 2006; Personal agency. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). Two of the most prominent advocates of this view, Lynne Rudder Baker and E.J. Lowe, suggest that emergent particulars have physical properties in virtue of the relations they bear to physical particulars—they ‘inherit’ their physical properties. In Sect. 1, I argue that having a property F this way is not instantiating F. In Sect. 2, I raise concerns that if emergent particulars don’t instantiate physical properties, then facts about emergent particulars don’t explain intentional actions. I suggest that emergent dualism would be more attractive if it could avoid this apparent consequence. In Sect. 3, I propose a view according to which some instances of physical properties are instantiated by both an emergent particular and its body.

Property Reductive Emergent Dualism

This paper sketches and motivates a metaphysics of mind that is both substance dualist and, to a large extent, property reductive. Call it “property reductive emergent dualism”. Section “Emergent Dualism” gives the broad outlines of the view. Sections “Problems of Mental Causation” and “Theoretical Virtues” argue that it can claim several advantages over non-reductive physicalist theories of mind. Section “Problems of Mental Causation” considers metaphysical challenges to mental causation in detail. Section “Theoretical Virtues” considers overall theoretical virtues: ontological and ideological economy, unification with physical sciences, the promise of explanatory gain. On these grounds, I propose that the view coupling substance dualism with property reductivism deserves further philosophical attention.

Emergent creationism: another option in the origin of the soul debate

AbstractIn the debate over the theology of the soul's origin, there have traditionally been three broad views on origins. These include creationism, traducianism, and Origen's pre-existence view. In the recent philosophy of religion and mind literature, William Hasker posits an alternative view of origins called emergent substance dualism. As a contribution to this discussion, I put forward one novel option as a via media between simple creationism and Hasker's emergent substance dualism, wherein it has relevant overlapping features found in the two contrary positions. I suggest that this view is a variation of creationism like emergentism where the material part (i.e. the brain) has some positive causal role in the soul's coming to be as a discrete effect of one divine cause. I argue that emergent creationism (as I call it) is a viable option deserving the attention of philosophers and theologians.

Substance Dualism and the Unity of Consciousness

In this paper I would like to defend three interconnected claims. The first stems from the fact that the definition of substance dualism recently proposed by Dean Zimmerman needs some essential adjustments in order to capture the genuine spirit of the doctrine. In this paper I will formulate the conditions for genuine substance dualism, as distinct from quasi-dualisms, and provide a definition for genuine substance dualism that I consider more appropriate than Zimmerman’s. The second is that none of the currently proposed forms of substance dualism are able to provide a satisfactory account of conscious subjectivity. To support this claim I present two arguments, the first against Cartesian Dualism, the other against Emergent Dualism. The third, I believe, derives from the two just mentioned: if the dualistic arguments against the ability of physicalist theories to provide a sound account of the unity of the subject of consciousness are persuasive enough, then, in order to acquire a more adequate account of the unity of the conscious subject, we will have to look more closely at such forms of quasi-dualism as spiritualism or a broadly Aristotelian view of human persons.

The Philosophical "Mind-Body Problem" and Its Relevance for the Relationship Between Psychiatry and the Neurosciences

Parallel to psychiatry, "philosophy of mind" investigates the relationship between mind (mental domain) and body/brain (physical domain). Unlike older forms of philosophy of mind, contemporary analytical philosophy is not exclusively based on introspection and conceptual analysis, but also draws upon the empirical methods and findings of the sciences. This article outlines the conceptual framework of the "mind-body problem" as formulated in contemporary analytical philosophy and argues that this philosophical debate has potentially far-reaching implications for psychiatry as a clinical-scientific discipline, especially for its own autonomy and its relationship to neurology/neuroscience. This point is illustrated by a conceptual analysis of the five principles formulated in Kandel's 1998 article "A New Intellectual Framework for Psychiatry." Kandel's position in the philosophical mind-body debate is ambiguous, ranging from reductive physicalism (psychophysical identity theory) to non-reductive physicalism (in which the mental "supervenes" on the physical) to epiphenomenalist dualism or even emergent dualism. We illustrate how these diverging interpretations result in radically different views on the identity of psychiatry and its relationship with the rapidly expanding domain of neurology/neuroscience.

Explaining why this body gives rise to me qua subject instead of someone else: an argument for classical substance dualism

AbstractSince something cannot be conscious without being a conscious subject, a complete physicalist explanation of consciousness must resolve an issue first raised by Thomas Nagel, namely to explain why a particular mass of atoms that comprises my body gives rise to me as conscious subject, rather than someone else. In this essay, I describe a thought-experiment that suggests that physicalism lacks the resources to address Nagel's question and seems to pose a counter-example to any form of non-reductive physicalism relying on the mind–body supervenience thesis, which would include William Hasker's emergent dualism. Since the particular thought-experiment does not pose any problems for classical substance dualism (CSD) and since the problem, as I call it, of explaining subjectivity is the central problem of mind, I conclude that CSD is better supported than any form of non-reductive physicalism.

I—Dean Zimmerman: From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism

Property dualism is enjoying a slight resurgence in popularity, these days; substance dualism, not so much. But it is not as easy as one might think to be a property dualist and a substance materialist. The reasons for being a property dualist support the idea that some phenomenal properties (or qualia) are as fundamental as the most basic physical properties; but what material objects could be the bearers of the qualia? If even some qualia require an adverbial construal (if they are modifications of the thing that is conscious because of them, not properties of something else to which the subject of consciousness is related), then the property dualist can be driven to speculative forms of materialism none of which, at this point, looks more likely to be true than the more modest versions of emergent dualism defended by contemporary substance dualists.

The Soul of Trans-Humanism

Abstract: This article tackles the question: how should Christian theologians think about the human soul in light of the challenges posed by the new emphasis in brain-mind identity in neuroscience and trasn-humanism? Ways of improving human nature through medical therapy, genetic enhancement, and trans-human cybernetic immortality are explored; and their assumptions are correlated with a spectrum of Christian theories of the soul such as substance dualism, emergent dualism, nonreductive physicalism, and materialism. Finally, the article concludes that the human person should be thought of relationally, and the dimension that is decisive for resurrection is the relation of the soul to God.

Taking consciousness seriously: A defense of Cartesian dualism

Most western traditional (theistic) philosophers have argued that the existence of consciousness requires some form of substantial non-material soul or self. Both God and the self are non-material, but the self has a material component that God does not. There have been several varieties of non-material substantial souls among western philosophers past and present. Three prominent conceptions are the Platonic/Cartesian, the Aristotelian/Thomistic, and now “emergent” dualists. All three are thought to be dead by the majority of contemporary philosophers of mind. My purpose in this paper is to defend what is standardly called Cartesian dualism, as it has been modified over time since Descartes. This view of the self is derived from the examination of consciousness as we are aware of it directly, but does have interesting relationships with western theism. It is often claimed that God is needed to explain the existence of souls, and, conversely, that the existence of souls provides important evidence to justify belief in a western theistic God. Descartes was convinced that the present existence of a non-substantial self could not be contradicted, and found other reasons to support his view that this self was not material, persisted in time, was possibly immortal, and had a relation to its body which was merely contingent and with which it interacted frequently. Taking consciousness seriously requires a non-material self. Briefly stated, modern Cartesians have defended the existence of a nonmaterial persisting conscious self, justifying its persistence in order to account for continuity of experience, character and memory, and justifying its non-materiality by the fact that its contents (qualia, feelings, thoughts, etc.) cannot be located in the physical world (inside or outside the self) and that its ways of responding (reasoning, free will, intentionality, etc.) are not ways that material bodies operate. So far I am merely stating the obvious about substance dualism. It is my claim that if we are to take consciousness seriously, take it as we experience it ourselves, a substance view of the self is required. As I have said, there are currently three forms of substance dualism, and I cannot defend and analyze all three. What I have chosen to do is defend the Cartesian view, commenting on some of the reasons why emergent dualist views are not adequate, and ignoring for the present project Aristotelian/Thomistic views, though I think such views share deficiencies with emergent dualism. It is important now to defend substance dualism because there are clear signs that some of the more important defenders of non-substance philosophies of mind have realized that their hopes for doing justice to consciousness and many of the traditional values embedded in our view of the self cannot be worked out