Abstract
In this paper I would like to defend three interconnected claims. The first stems from the fact that the definition of substance dualism recently proposed by Dean Zimmerman needs some essential adjustments in order to capture the genuine spirit of the doctrine. In this paper I will formulate the conditions for genuine substance dualism, as distinct from quasi-dualisms, and provide a definition for genuine substance dualism that I consider more appropriate than Zimmerman’s. The second is that none of the currently proposed forms of substance dualism are able to provide a satisfactory account of conscious subjectivity. To support this claim I present two arguments, the first against Cartesian Dualism, the other against Emergent Dualism. The third, I believe, derives from the two just mentioned: if the dualistic arguments against the ability of physicalist theories to provide a sound account of the unity of the subject of consciousness are persuasive enough, then, in order to acquire a more adequate account of the unity of the conscious subject, we will have to look more closely at such forms of quasi-dualism as spiritualism or a broadly Aristotelian view of human persons.
Highlights
Some people hold that at least one of the contemporary forms of substance dualism is good enough to account for the fact of the unity of consciousness
There is more than one kind of unity of consciousness,[1] as well as more than just one sort of substance dualism.[2]
It seems to me that every genuine substance dualist should be willing to acknowledge that singularity of the conscious subject (SCS) is something harder to account for by means of the materialist theory of human mind and / or personal identity than is the second kind of unity of consciousness. is is because it is very difficult to understand how the brain or the human nervous system, which are compounds that comprise more than one single particle, might themselves be a single conscious subject
Summary
What is worth noticing first of all is that any sort of dualism amounts to a theory and, like any theory, dualism aims to provide an explanation of some subject ma er or other. us, to be a dualist is, above all, to maintain a set of specific beliefs concerning the subject ma er one seeks to explicate. I intend to place only genuine substance dualisms, as distinct from quasi-substance-dualisms, within the category of substance dualism itself Doctrines such as spiritualism, which, inasmuch as it concerns the nature of human persons, is a dualism in name only, should in my view be considered instances of quasi-substance-dualism. In order to be a form of genuine substance dualism about human persons, a theory should meet the following conditions: A) It should be about one and the same area of reality—in our case the nature of the human, so that it provides a metaphysical answer to the question “What am I?”. I will provide two arguments in support of my answer, each of which is a priori in character
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