Emergency Agencies Research Articles

Political Communication in Disasters: A Question of Relationships

Politicians are both a help and hindrance in the provision of information to the public before, during and after disasters. For example, in Australia, the Premier of the State of Queensland, Anna Bligh, was lauded for her leadership and public communication skills during major floods that occurred late in 2010 and in early 2011 (de Bussy, Martin and Paterson 2012). Similarly, New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani was praised for his leadership following 9/11. This is in contrast to the poor performance of political leaders during Hurricane Katrina (Cole and Fellows 2008, Olson and Gawronski 2010). Political actors’ lack of credibility and their poor situational awareness contributed to the problems. The involvement of political leaders in disaster communications is also problematic from the perspective of emergency agencies. For example, politicians who move their communication position from supportive to tactical can take over the role of providing official disaster information, such as evacuation warnings, without sufficient expertise, credibility or situational knowledge. This paper builds on the expanding body of research into the politics of disasters by exploring relationships with political actors from the perspective of emergency managers. Drawing on interviews with emergency agencies in Australia, Germany, Norway and the UK, we firstly examine when and what a politician should communicate during disasters and secondly, offer six principles toward a roadmap of involving political actors in the disaster communication process when life and property is at stake.

Hindrance or Help? A Model for the Involvement of Politicians in Communicating with Publics during Disasters

Australia has experienced a number of significant natural disasters during the past few years with politicians increasingly involved in the provision of information to publics before, during and after disasters. Drawing on data from interviews with senior executives of Australian emergency management agencies we explore how these organisations manage the involvement of political actors in the public communication of disasters. We also investigate how emergency agencies manage their relationships with their political leaders in the recovery phase. We identify that improvements can be made to the ways politicians communicate with publics about disasters and we outline a preliminary best practice model for the involvement of politicians in delivering disaster warnings and information in the lead up to and during a disaster, and in the recovery process.

What Happened to Queensland's Disaster Management Arrangements?: From ‘Global Best Practice’ to ‘Unsustainable’ in 3 Years

The Queensland Police and Community Safety Review (PACSR) 2013 headed by Mick Keelty was tasked by the Queensland government to examine the State's emergency management practices and processes. Commissioned before any crisis, the PACSR was still collecting evidence when extensive flooding occurred across many regional centres of Queensland in 2013. It was the subsequent management of this event, and selected evidence from earlier inquiries that underpinned many of the findings in the final PACSR report. Keelty recommended institutional and organizational restructuring that included the abolition of a department, and the tasking of the fire and rescue service with additional oversight and audit functions. PACSR argued too much emphasis was placed on relationships, which made disaster management in Queensland potentially unsustainable in the longer term. Some of the findings replicated those of earlier inquiries (O'Sullivan 2009; QFCI 2012), including the apparent reluctance by police to implement communications systems that are interoperable with other emergency agencies. This reluctance to embrace new technologies indicates institutional and cultural barriers to reform. Despite this, the Police and Fire and Rescue services have been given additional responsibilities by the Newman government, based on Keelty's recommendations. PACSR did not appear to evaluate some of the best practice aspects of the 2010–2011 flooding event, whereas some suggest the report had a predetermined element to it (Byrne 2014). In finding that too much emphasis was placed on informal relationships and networks in 2013, and concentrating on structural reforms instead, this paper argues that the PACSR discounted many features that current crisis literature notes as important for a successful disaster management response.

Combined Impact of Inland and Coastal Floods: Mapping Knowledge Base for Development of Planning Strategies

AbstractConcurrent incidence of heavy rainfall events and coastal storm surges can cause damages of exponential proportion to the coastal habitants and infrastructures. Super Storm Sandy and hurricane Irene were wake up calls that the floodplains and evacuation zones in New York City need major revision. Federal and State emergency agencies have been working on revising the appropriate maps and spatial tools for planning and management purposes. This paper presents an integrated scheme for floodplain delineation in coastal areas, considering the combined effect of inland and coastal flooding. The proposed scheme is applied to the Bronx River watershed in the Bronx section of New York City. Consideration of inland and coastal flooding is provided by developing a conceptual rainfall-runoff model and a sea level simulation model. Climate change has intensified the intensity and frequency of extreme rainfall events and storm surges in the region. In order to evaluate climate change impacts on floodplain, proj...

Emergency Preparedness and Response to Ibadan Flood Disaster 2011: Implications for Wellbeing

Purpose –This paper aims to investigate the emergency preparedness and response to Ibadan 2011 Flood Disaster in Oyo State, Nigeria. This is with a view to derive recommendations for improving preparedness for emergency situations to reduce impact of disaster and providing prompt response to victims. Design/Methodology/Approach – Both qualitative and quantitative methods were utilised to collect the data analysed in this research. Key informant interviews were conducted using open ended questions with participants from National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), Oyo State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), Nigerian Meteorological Agency (NIMET) and other stakeholders. The survey made use of questionnaires to collect primary data for the quantitative aspect. Triangulation of the data collected was done to enhance credibility. Findings- The respondents agreed that the flood disaster was caused by acts of man and nature. Also the affected community in Ibadan were not effectively informed to enable them prepare. for the flood disaster by the state emergency agencies due to financial constraints and ineffective communication system. Although the various emergency agencies within the state and the country fairly responded when the flood occurred, the disaster could not be managed due to lack of adequately trained personnel for response and rescue operation and inadequate equipment for rescue operation. Flood disaster can often cause short-term or long-term disruptions within the family which could change the lives of family members dramatically and negatively impact the family members’ wellbeing. Recommendations were suggested to the public and to the appropriate authorities. Originality value – This study established the gap in preparedness and poor response to disaster and provides recommendations. Flood affects and displaces more people than any other disaster either naturally induced or man-made in Nigeria. It also causes more damage to properties and disrupts businesses. Flood disaster has negative implications on the wellbeing of affected people in the community, society and on the nation as a whole. DOI: 10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n8p500

Assessment of State- and Territorial-Level Preparedness Capacity for Serving Deaf and Hard-of-Hearing Populations in Disasters

Substantial evidence exists that emergency preparedness and response efforts are not effectively reaching populations with functional and access needs, especially barriers related to literacy, language, culture, or disabilities. More than 36 million Americans are Deaf or hard of hearing (Deaf/HH). These groups experienced higher risks of injury, death, and property loss in recent disasters than the general public. We conducted a participatory research study to examine national recommendations on preparedness communication for the Deaf/HH. We assessed whether previous recommendations regarding the Deaf/HH have been incorporated into state- and territorial-level emergency operations plans (EOPs), interviewed state- and territorial-level preparedness directors about capacity to serve the Deaf/HH, and proposed strategies to benefit Deaf/HH populations during emergencies. We analyzed 55 EOPs and 50 key informant (KI) interviews with state directors. Fifty-five percent of EOPs mentioned vulnerable populations; however, only 31% specifically mentioned Deaf/HH populations in their plan. Study findings indicated significant relationships among the following factors: a state-level KI's familiarity with communication issues for the Deaf/HH, making relay calls (i.e., calls to services to relay communication between Deaf and hearing people), and whether the KI's department provides trainings about serving Deaf/HH populations in emergencies. We found significant associations between a state's percentage of Deaf/HH individuals and a KI's familiarity with Deaf/HH communication issues and provision by government of any disability services to Deaf/HH populations in emergencies. Further, we found significant relationships between KIs attending training on serving the Deaf/HH and familiarity with Deaf/HH communication issues, including how to make relay calls. This study provides new knowledge that can help emergency agencies improve their preparedness training, planning, and capacity to serve Deaf/HH populations in emergencies.

On the Design of an Intelligent Sensor Network for Flash Flood Monitoring, Diagnosis and Management in Urban Areas Position Paper

We propose an intelligent sensor system based on a new sensing methodology, relying also on 3D map reconstruction techniques, for computing with high precision, in real-time and without human intervention the parameters needed for stream-flow computa- tion: water levels, morphology of the streams of all potentially flooded areas by each controlled stream. The collected data will be continuously transmitted, through a communication infrastructure, to software agents designed to compute the stream-flow and to quantify the spatial distribution of flood risk for each controlled watershed. The computed risks, together with other data coming from other sources (barometric sensors, camera operators of public organizations, emergency agencies, private citizens), will be analyzed by a diagnostic decision system implementing a risk-alert scheduling strategy. This system will be able to diagnose the health state of the controlled environment and to define specialized alarm levels for each potentially interested area that will be used to alert all citizens (ubiquity) locally present (alerting locality).

Flood Risk in Australia: Whose Responsibility Is It, Anyway?

This paper presents research into four key stakeholders in flood risk management in Australia: local councils, the insurance industry, the State Emergency Service (SES), and local residents; examining the perception of their own roles and responsibilities, and those of the other stakeholders. Key informant interviews were conducted in four locations—Brisbane and Emerald, in Queensland, Dora Creek, in New South Wales, and Benalla, in Victoria. We find that understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder varied considerably between research participants. Insurance representatives felt their concerns about increasing flood risk costs were unheeded until the 2010–2011 floods made them the “canary in the coal mine”. Councils felt they had limited options for reducing flood risk. SES representatives felt they were too relied upon for event response, with requests for assistance outstripping their capacity to assist, and many residents were uncertain how to prepare for flood, relying on emergency agencies and the local council to protect them. Key lessons for flood risk management in Australia are (a) an urgent need for all stakeholders to better understand each others’ roles and responsibilities; and (b) residents must take greater responsibility for their own personal protection. Only then can the vision of shared responsibility presented by the 2009 National Strategy for Disaster Resilience be achieved.

Information seeking in a flood

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to address the gaps in knowledge about how people get information in a flood and what they want to know.Design/methodology/approachA total of 27 people were interviewed from two communities that suffered flooding in the 12 months before the interviews. Slow‐moving flood and flash flood were covered.FindingsThe type of disaster determines how people seek information. In slow‐moving flood, people heard from others, tracked it visually and via web‐available river gauge information, and talked to others with more flood experience. Radio was an important confirmation tool in the slow‐moving flood. In flash flood, people first heard from others and then turned to television.Research limitations/implicationsParticipants made up a small sample skewed toward regional areas and were selected by snowball/convenience sampling methods. A survey is required to confirm or refute findings.Practical implicationsWord of mouth needs to be tapped into by agencies, and mobile phone networks and social media are critical to this. Radio and television should be more proactively used by emergency agencies and maps should be a feature of all flood communication.Originality/valueThe focus of disaster communication research tends to have been on agency use of communication rather than the individual's use of a range of communication channels. This study encourages agencies to look at how individuals look for information, the channels they use to get information and the type of information they seek.

FireWatch: Creative Responses to Bushfire Catastrophes

FireWatch: Creative Responses to Bushfire Catastrophes

Disaster coordination preparedness of soft‐target organisations

This paper introduces a network-enabled model to examine the disaster coordination preparedness of soft-target organisations (STOs). Little attention is devoted to this matter in recent research. This study places emphasis on such organisations and the proposed model tests hypotheses related to network relation and coordination preparedness. It analyses the data set entitled 'Preparedness of large retail malls to prevent and respond to terrorist attack, 2004', which contains 120 completed surveys of security directors of retail malls in the United States.(1) The following questions form the basis of this study: 'What do STOs need to be better prepared to respond to a disaster?'; 'How does network relationship between STOs and emergency agencies affect the coordination preparedness of STOs for disaster recovery?'; and 'Which centrality measure needs to be followed to measure network variables in order to analyse coordination preparedness?' The results show that STOs with a high level of connectedness and strong ties to other emergency agencies are better prepared for disaster response.

Real-time notification and improved situational awareness in fire emergencies using geospatial-based publish/subscribe

Emergency agencies seek to maintain situational awareness and effective decision making through continuous monitoring of, and real-time alerting about, sources of information regarding current incidents and developing fire hazards. The nature of this goal requires integrating different, potentially numerous, sources of dynamic geospatial information on the one side, and a large number of clients having heterogeneous and specific interests in data on the other side. In such scenarios, the traditional request/reply communication style may function inefficiently, as it is based on point-to-point, synchronous, and pulling mode interaction between consumer clients and information providers/services. In this work, we propose Geospatial-based Publish/Subscribe, an interaction framework that serves as a middleware for real-time transacting of spatially related information of interest, termed geospatial events, in distributed systems. Expressive data models, including geospatial event and geospatial subscription, as well as an efficient matching approach for fast dissemination of geospatial events to interested clients, are introduced. The proposed interaction framework is realized through the development of a Real-Time Fire Emergency Response System (RFERS) prototype. The prototype is designed for transacting several topics of geospatial events that are crucial within the context of fire emergencies, including GPS locations of emergency assets, meteorological observations of wireless sensors, fire incidents reports, and temporal sequences of remote sensing images of active wildfires. The performance of the system prototype has been evaluated in order to demonstrate its efficiency.

Handling Mass Death by Integrating the Management of Disasters and Pandemics: Lessons from the Indian Ocean Tsunami, the Spanish Flu and Other Incidents

At first glance, there appear to be significant differences between mass death from disasters and catastrophes and mass death from pandemics. In a disaster or catastrophe the major problem is identifying the dead and, sometimes, determining cause of death. This can be very frustrating for next of kin. In a pandemic, the identity of the dead is usually known as is the cause of their death. There is an immediate certainty in pandemic death. Despite these major differences there are many similarities. Because it takes time to identify the dead after a disaster or catastrophe, there is a steady release of bodies for cremation or burial, just as in a pandemic. In both types of incidents, there tends to be a shortage of supplies and personnel and, therefore, a need for use of volunteers. There are also massive amounts of paper work. This would suggest a need in both cases for stockpiling and for training of volunteers. And, although this does not always happen, both types of incidents tend to strike harder among the poorer elements in cities yet both create serious economic problems. Despite these many similarities, planning for the first tends to be done by emergency agencies, especially the police; planning for the second by health agencies. Given the many similarities this separation makes no sense. Since both types of mass death incidents lead to similar problems, it would make sense to take an all‐hazards approach to planning for dealing with mass death.

Nelson A. Rockefeller’s Office of Inter-American Affairs (1940-1946) and Record Group 229

Nelson A. Rockefeller’s Office of Inter-American Affairs (1940-1946) and Record Group 229

The Southern Region Burn Disaster Plan

A regional burn disaster plan for 24 burn centers located in 11 states comprising the Southern Region of the American Burn Association was developed using online and in-person collaboration between burn center directors during a 2-year period. The capabilities and preferences of burn centers in the Southern Region were queried. A website with disaster information, including a map of regional burn centers and spreadsheet of driving distances between centers, was developed. Standard terminology for burn center capabilities during disasters was defined as open, full, diverting, offloading, or returning. A simple, scalable, and flexible disaster plan was designed. Activation and escalation of the plan revolves around the requirements of the end user, the individual burn center director. A key provision is the designation of a central communications point colocated at a burn center with several experienced burn surgeons. In a burn disaster, the burn center director can make a single phone call to the communications center, where a senior burn surgeon remote from the disaster can contact other burn centers and emergency agencies to arrange assistance. Available options include diversion of new admissions to the next closest center, transfer of patients to other regional centers, or facilitation of activation of federal plans to bring burn care providers to the affected burn center. Cooperation between regional burn center directors has produced a simple and flexible regional disaster plan at minimal cost to institute or operate.

Theory, training and timing: Psychosocial interventions in complex emergencies

The Asian tsunami of December 2004 galvanised mental health and emergency agencies in a way that no other recent disaster has done. The loss of life and forced migration focused national and international agencies on the need to provide appropriate psychosocial care from the very beginning. The prior academic arguments surrounding early intervention paled into insignificance against the urgent need to reduce distress and prevent chronic mental health problems. This chapter notes that there was a major, planned and early intervention following the earthquake in Bam, exactly one year earlier. The lessons from that are only now beginning to filter through and help shape better responses to disasters. It is argued that too many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and even IGOs are following theoretical positions that have little empirical justification. There is an urgent need for training for mental health and NGO personnel alike to deliver evidence-based psychological first aid. There is no justification for mental health responses to be delayed until weeks after a disaster happens.

Évaluation de l’insécurité alimentaire dans le Comté de Sacramento

A report on food security in Sacramento County In 2001, about 56,000 adults were estimated to be food insecure in Sacramento County. This number tends to keep rising eventhough several federal food assistance programs are available to the low-income population. The objectives of our study were to describe the population using emergency food assistance programs and to evaluate the federal food programs available to low-income people. Two different methods were used. Personal interviews of key informants in charge of the federal programs were made and a self-administered questionnaire was delivered in emergency food agencies. A total of 338 food aid recipients answered the questionnaire. Among individuals receiving emergency food assistance, 80% lived below the poverty level and 62% had a member in their household who experienced hunger in the past year. More than 27% of the households had an income related to work. Among them 73 % lived below the poverty level and more than 82 % were food insecure. The study showed that eligible residents often did not access federal food programs either because they do not know about them or because there are too many barriers to their utilization such as : the lack of information regarding the programs, the language barrier, especially for immigrants, the difficult access to the program sites and the administrative burden of most programs. People using emergency food programs also declared that food stamps were insufficient to feed the household during a month, which explained why they seek assistance from emergency agencies. In order to decrease the number of people using emergency food programs it is necessary to improve the outreach efforts of the federal food programs towards the low-income community.

Terrorism, Homeland Security and the National Emergency Management Network

On September 11, 2001, officials and agencies that are part of the national emergency management system orchestrated the responses to the collapse of the World Trade Center towers and the fires at the Pentagon. The efforts of local, state, and federal emergency agencies were augmented by nonprofit organizations, private firms, and organized and unorganized volunteers. The system reacted much as it would have for a major earthquake or similar disaster. In the rush to create federal and state offices to deal with the threat of terrorism and, ultimately, to create a Department of Homeland Security, the very foundation of the nation's capacity to deal with large scale disasters has been largely ignored. Although the human and material resources that the emergency management network provides may again be critical in a terrorist-spawned catastrophe, the new Homeland Security system may not be capable of utilizing those resources effectively. The values of transparency, cooperation, and collaboration that have come to characterize emergency management over the past decade seem to be supplanted in the new command-and-control-oriented Homeland Security system. If that occurs, when the resources of the national emergency management system are needed most, the capacity to utilize the system may be severely damaged and cultural interoperability will be a serious problem.

Swedish vision zero experience

The objective of this paper is to present the Swedish Vision Zero Experience concerning separating car traffic with cable barriers and upgrading traffic safety on existing 13 m roads using low cost measures. There is a significant difference in traffic performance, safety, investment and maintenance costs, land requirement and intrusion between normal two-lane and four-lane cross-sections. In Sweden, this gap has been narrowed with a 13 m road with 3.75 m traffic lanes and 2.75 m hard shoulders. The traffic performance of these roads is quite satisfactory but there are safety problems with fatal accidents. The main problem on all two-lane roads is run-off road and head-on accidents causing more than 66% of all fatalities. The event process tends to be the same. The driver loses control for some reason and crashes against some obstacle in the roadside area or opposing vehicle. In 1998, the Director General of SNRA decided on a full-scale programme to improve traffic safety on six existing 13 m roads using low-cost measures, preferably within the existing right-of-way. The main alternative is the 2+1 solution with a separating cable barrier, preferably within the existing 13 m width. This solution was estimated to have a potential to prevent some 50% of all severe link accidents. Findings so far have been so successful that SNRA has decided to generally replace the old 13 m roads with the 2 + 1 solution. The main results and findings up to May 2001 are as follows: Level-of-service for normal traffic is better than expected. Speed performance on 2 + 1 roads with cable barrier is the same, or even better than an ordinary semi-motorway at one directional flows up to 1 400 v/h. The capacity is estimated to be about 1 650 v/h in one direction, some 300 v/h less than for an ordinary 13 m road. Emergency and tow agencies are complaining as their workload have increased. The transition zones from 2 to 1 lane have performed well. The proportion of vehicles in the beginning of the zone is small. Drivers tend handle the design of the transition zones in a cautious and responsible manner. The traffic safety effect on severe accidents was expected to be high on 2 + 1 road with cable barrier. So far in eight objects total length there has not been any fatal and only 6 persons with severe injuries. This is about 60% less than on ordinary semi-motorways and supports the prediction that fatal and severe injuries can be reduced with up to 50%. Median cable barrier crashes are very frequent but normally without person injuries. They are often caused by skidding, flat tire or loss of control. A number of possible severe accidents have been converted by means of the median cable barrier to crashes with slight or no injuries. Driver attitude surveys show that drivers attitude to roads with cable barrier have been changed in a positive direction. About 40% of the drivers say it is the best design. General survey shows that about 76% say that they want all major roads to have median barrier. The maintenance costs are increased with about 120 Thousand SEK (12000 USD) per km per year. The main costs are cable repairs with 80 Thousand SEK (8000 USD) per km per year. Work zone safety at cable barrier repairs is a major concern.

Facing the Unexpected: Disaster Preparedness and Response in the United States

Facing the Unexpected presents the wealth of information derived from disasters around the world over the past 25 years. The authors explore how these findings can improve disaster programs, identify remaining research needs, and discuss disaster within the broader context of sustainable development. How do different people think about disaster? Are we more likely to panic or to respond with altruism? Why are 110 people killed in a Valujet crash considered disaster victims while the 50,000 killed annually in traffic accidents in the U.S. are not? At the crossroads of social, cultural, and economic factors, this book examines these and other compelling questions. The authors review the influences that shape the U.S. governmental system for disaster planning and response, the effectiveness of local emergency agencies, and the level of professionalism in the field. They also compare technological versus natural disaster and examine the impact of technology on disaster programs.