Attempts to comprehend, through empirical inquiry and philosophical reflection, the likely effects of deeper, seemingly unstoppable processes of socioeconomic change on patterns of violent conflict within and across societies are not new. Indeed, the relationship between the momentous transformations wrought by industrialization and the longterm prospects for war and peace was a prominent theme of political and sociological thought in nineteenth-century Europe. In a celebrated lecture, delivered at the London School of Economics in 1957, Raymond Aron observed how thinkers such as Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, both profoundly conscious of in a period of transition, had been prepared to make prophecies about the future of war boldness and dogmatism astound us. (1) By the time Aron himself came to reflect on the subject, the horrors of two world wars and the terrifying prospect of another even more destructive conflict ensured that long-range historical predictions were decidedly out of fashion. Instead, the Cold War came to be marked by an acute concern with the present; a concern that shaped and, in important respects, also distorted thinking about war and peace. The latter was true in particular for the study of civil or intrastate wars, wars whose local sources and regional dynamic were often overshadowed by a preoccupation with the central strategic balance and the competition for influence between East and West. The end of the Cold War, then, involved more than just a release from the balance of terror. It also had a liberating impact on the study of conflict, causing a strong feeling of living in a period of transition to again permeate much of the writings and debates about sources of war and peace in the international system. While the emergence of industrial society had preoccupied an earlier generation of thinkers, has, to many, assumed a similar role of describing the sense that we are living through a period of universal, far-reaching, and irreversible changes. Structure, Qualifications, and Argument in Brief Of special interest to this article is the more specific suggestion that processes of globalization have contributed to changes in the nature of war so profound that one is justified in talking of Wars. (2) This claim to newness rests, in part, on the assertion that changes in the nature and workings of the global economy, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, are impacting uniquely on the patterns and character of intrastate and/or region-wide conflict around the world. This article examines this assertion in greater detail. It does so, however, against the backdrop of a wider debate, one that has focused on the economic agendas of belligerents, local populations caught up in conflict, and external actors in the emergence and consolidation of contemporary wars. There are two reasons for thus widening the debate. In the first place, the salience of economic agendas in contemporary wars is considered by many to be directly and causally connected to changes in the global economic environment over the past quarter century or so. Secondly, by assessing the comparative importance of one set of factors, the article hopes to contribute to a broader discussion, which the New Wars debate has helped to stimulate, about the nature of contemporary wars. It is a basic premise of the article that this can most usefully be done by drawing upon the actual knowledge, however incomplete and fragmentary, that we now have of individual conflicts. As such, what follows is not an exercise in grand theorizing about global economic change and war. It represents a more modest, though necessary, effort to test generalizations, unspoken assumptions, and implied causal connections that are often made about contemporary forms of warfare, against our understanding of individual cases. To this end, special attention is given throughout the article to what we know (and, indeed, what we do not fully comprehend) about wars in West and Central Africa, Algeria, and the former Yugoslavia. …