Elite Settlement Research Articles

Theoretical Interpretations of Elite Change in East Central Europe

AbstractElite theory enjoyed a remarkable revival in Central and Eastern Europe, and also in international social science research, during the 1990s. Many researchers coming from different schools of thought turned to the analysis of rapid political and social changes and ended up doing centered research. Since democratic transition and elite transformation seemed to be parallel processes, it was understandable that sociologists and political scientists of the region started to use elite theory. The idea of "third wave" of democratization advanced a reduced, more synthetic, "exportable" understanding of democracy in the political science literature. The main focus of social sciences shifted from structures to actors, from path dependency to institutional choices. Transitions, roundtable negotiations, institution-building, constitution-making, compromise-seeking, pactmaking, pact-breaking, strategic choices — all of these underlined the importance of elites and research on them. Elite settlements were seen as alternatives of social revolution. According to a widely shared view democratic institutions came into existence through negotiations and compromises among political elites calculating their own interests and desires. The elite settlement approach was then followed by some important contributions in transitology which described the process of regime change largely as "elite games." By offering a systematic overview of the theoretical interpretations of elite change from New Class theory to recent theorizing of elite change (conversion of capital, reproduction, circulation, political capitalism, technocratic continuity, three elites and the like), the paper also gives an account of the state of the arts in elite studies in different new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.

Elites, Crises, and the Origins of Regimes

Part 1 Theoretical Chapter 2 Elites, Crises, and Regimes in Comparative Analysis Chapter 3 Historical and Theoretical Considerations Chapter 4 Political Crises and Elite Settlements Chapter 5 Mexico and Latin America in Comparative Perspective Part 6 Case Studies Chapter 7 The Soviet Union: Revolution and Transformation Chapter 8 Russia: Elite Continuity and Change Chapter 9 Hungary, Poland, and Russia: The Fate of Nomenklatura Elites Chapter 10 Germany: Twentieth-Century Turning Points Chapter 11 Japan: The Elite Legacies of Meiji and World War II Chapter 12 South Africa: From Apartheid to Democracy Chapter 13 Conclusion Chapter 14 Index

Elite Settlements in Taiwan

Elite Settlements in Taiwan

Regional party system formation in Russia: The deviant case of Sverdlovsk oblast

The level of organizational development achieved by competitive political parties in Sverdlovsk oblast is higher than in many other regions of Russia. In cross‐regional comparative perspective, the deviant case of Sverdlovsk oblast suggests that, for a political system lacking a recent history of competitive political parties, establishing free elections can promote the development and institutionalization of a party system in the following political conditions: an intra‐elite conflict occurs that emerges in (1) electoral competition among the elite participants where (2) political parties, and not alternative forms of mass electoral mobilization, are meaningfully employed in the competition by some competitors, and (3) the conflict's outcome does not result in one set of elites possessing all or virtually all the political rewards. Thus the achievement of ‘elite settlements’ and the consolidation of monopolistic regimes in most regions of Russia leave little space for the development of political parties.

Elite Settlements and the Taming of Politics

A BASIC QUESTION IS HOW POLITICS ARE TAMED AND CEASE BEING A deadly, warlike affair. The most dramatic way is through sudden, deliberate and lasting compromises of core disputes among political elites – what we think of as ‘elite settlements’. Prior to settlements elites disagree about government institutions, engage in unchecked fights for dominance, and view politics as winner-take-all. After settlements, elite persons and groups continue to be affiliated with conflicting parties, movements, and beliefs, but they share a consensus about government institutions and the codes and rules of political competition. Settlements tame politics by generating tacitly accommodative and overtly restrained practices among competing political elites.

Elite Settlements in the Roman and Sub-Roman Period

Elite Settlements in the Roman and Sub-Roman Period

The Persistence of Postcommunist Elites

The Persistence of Postcommunist Elites John Higley (bio), Judith Kullberg (bio), and Jan Pakulski (bio) A precondition of democratic consolidation is what Giovanni Sartori calls the “taming” of politics so that it “no longer kills” and stops being a “warlike affair.” 1 This is first and foremost a question of relations and perceptions among political elites—senior governmental, economic, military, professional, media, religious, and other leaders, including the leaders of opposition parties and movements, who participate in or directly influence political decision making. A nation’s politics is “tamed” only when broad support for democratic procedures and institutions, as well as a shared acceptance of norms of accommodation and cooperation, develops among political elites. The collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe has involved dramatic changes among political elites from the relations and behaviors of Soviet-style politics to those of at least nascent democracy. Under communist rule, especially in its early phase, politics was a zero-sum game: winners took all, and losers lost everything, often including their lives. By examining the extent to which consensual elite support for democratic rules, values, and behaviors has emerged from the inhospitable soil of communism, we can refine ideas about the importance of elites in democratization and make firmer judgments about democracy’s progress in the major countries of Central and Eastern Europe. [End Page 133] Many analysts think that the elite patterns necessary for democratic consolidation are produced by deep and wide changes in societies: economic development that gives both elites and mass publics a stake in democracy; the rise of a civil society that channels elite power-wielding in a democratic direction; the flowering of a civic culture that shapes elite and mass behavior alike. Analysts who take a more elite-centered approach to democratic development concentrate instead on continuities and changes in the composition, relations, and behaviors of elites that may or may not be associated with broad economic and social trends. They focus on contingent, explicitly political circumstances and the ways in which previously divided elites may “settle” their most basic disputes or “converge” toward more accommodative relations that make restrained but free and fair democratic contests possible. 2 The scenarios in which such elite settlements or elite convergences occur are complex. Generally, they take place only after periods of long, costly, and inconclusive conflict reach a crisis that threatens a worsening of strife and induces the leaders of opposing elite camps to look for some better way of conducting politics. If these leaders enjoy enough freedom from cadre and mass pressures, as well as enough authority to drag their followers along, they may be able to settle basic disputes secretly and speedily and thus usher in more cooperative relations and restrained competition. Dramatic historical instances were the sudden and deliberate coming together of Tory and Whig elites in England’s Glorious Revolution of 1688–89, and of Hat and Cap elites in Sweden’s constitutional revolution of 1808–09; a contemporary instance was the settlement negotiated among Spanish elites in 1978–79. 3 Alternatively, where no settlement has occurred but an unstable democratic regime has nonetheless emerged, the imperatives of electoral contests may over time induce elites to converge toward the shared relations, behaviors, and sense of security that are essential if the new democracy is to be consolidated. 4 A Gradual Evolution As in previous historical movements toward democracy, the path of democratization in the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe began with a desire among elites for greater security. Under Stalinism, elite status did not confer security; on the contrary, it exposed elite members to the vicissitudes of intraparty strife and to ever-present threats of demotion, purge, arrest, imprisonment, and death. The desire of Soviet elites to achieve greater security after Stalin died in 1953 resulted in a tacit consensus to rein in the internal-security apparatus, to attempt to rule collectively, and to institute a rough “socialist legality” that placed some checks on the use of power. This lowered the stakes of factional struggle in the post-Stalin era: rather than [End Page 134] imprisonment or execution, losers faced the comparatively mild penalties of forced retirement or demotion. These changes...

Revisiting Rokkan: On the Determinants of the Rise of Democracy in Europe

Abstract: This article is an attempt to extend Rokkan's analysis of the rise of democracy in western Europe also to include eastem Europe. Which relevance do Rokkan's fac-tors - economy, territory, culture - have when applied to both western and eastern Europe? Through the mapping of the development of democracy following the four thres-holds suggested by Rokkan - legitimacy, incorporation, rep-resentation, executive power - a crossnational analysis, based upon at most 28 cases, is made in order to test various explanatory factors. Territory and culture has an impact an the rise of democracy in Europe in general, but in particular an the passing of the First threshold of democracy, i.e. the legitimacy threshold. Other factors, not suggested by Rok-kan, that are conducive to the rise of democracy are what kind of family systems that exists and the occurrencies of elite settlements. Thus, Rokkan's main ideas about the rise of democracy in Western Europe also holds true when ex-tended to cover the whole of Europe.

Elites, Elite Settlements, and Revolutionary Movements in Latin America, 1950–1980: Introduction

Social revolutions as well as revolutionary movements have recently held great interest for both sociopolitical theorists and scholars of Latin American politics. Before we can proceed with any useful analysis, however, we must distinguish between these two related but not identical phenomena. Adapting Theda Skocpol’s approach, we can define social revolutions as “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by” mass-based revolts from below, sometimes in cross-class coalitions (Skocpol 1979: 4; Wickham-Crowley 1991:152). In the absence of such basic sociopolitical transformations, I will not speak of (social) revolution or of a revolutionary outcome, only about revolutionary movements, exertions, projects, and so forth. Studies of the failures and successes of twentieth-century Latin American revolutions have now joined the ongoing theoretical debate as to whether such outcomes occur due to society- or movement-centered processes or instead due to state- or regime-centered events (Wickham-Crowley 1992).

Elites, Elite Settlements, and Revolutionary Movements in Latin America, 1950-1980

Social revolutions as well as revolutionary movements have recently held great interest for both sociopolitical theorists and scholars of Latin American politics. Before we can proceed with any useful analysis, however, we must distinguish between these two related but not identical phenomena. Adapting Theda Skocpol's approach, we can define social revolutions as rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures; and they are

Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe

Preface 1. Introduction: Elite transformations and democratic regimes Michael Burton, Richard Gunther and John Higley 2. Spain: the very model of the modern elite settlement Richard Gunther 3. Elite settlements and democratic consolidation: Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela John A. Peeler 4. Mexico's elite settlement: conjuncture and consequences Alan Knight 5. Elite unification and democratic consolidation in Italy: an historical overview Maurizio Cotta 6. The role of civil-military pacts in elite settlements and elite convergences: democratic consolidation in Uruguay Charles Guy Gillespie 7. Patterns of elite negotiation and confrontation in Argentina and Chile Marcelo Cavarozzi 8. Elites in an unconsolidated democracy: Peru during the 1980s Henry Hietz 9. Brazil's political transition Thomas Bruneau 10. Redefining the Portuguese transition to democracy Lawrence S. Graham 11. The Dominican case Peter Sanchez 12. Elites and democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe: an overview Michael Burton, Richard Gunther and John Higley.

The Political Origins of African Military Coups: Ethnic Competition, Military Centrality, and the Struggle over the Postcolonial State

Military interventions are strategic in understanding “who gets what, when, and how” in postcolonial Africa. Building on past structural explanations of African coups, we examine two waves of military interventions and different types of coup events, as well as the coup intensity index, the traditional focus of analysis. We find strong support for military centrality and theories of ethnic plurality and competition. There is little evidence of a participation “overload” or of the “social unrest” produced by economic dependency. The early independence coups were rooted in ethnic plurality and competition plus strong militaries; those in the 1970s were rooted in ethnic political competition. Plots had a strong ethnic basis, attempts were facilitated by multipartyism and mobilization levels, and successful seizures by strong militaries. Domestic conflicts played only a small role, and lagging growth, although destabilizing, could not be explained by dependency. Future work should focus on ethnic struggles inside the military as well as civilian governments, the political institutions that regulate these power struggles, and the prospects for an elite settlement that would regularize political competition, eliminating irregular means for acquiring power.

Panama’s Democratic Transition

Panama’s transition from military dictatorship to civilian government is considered in terms of stages of the democratization process. During the decline of the dictatorship (stage one), four transitions -- two electoral, and two negotiations for an elite settlement -- were attempted but failed. Consequently, Panama did not experience a normal second, transitional stage. Instead Panama’s transition was abrupt and unexpected: civilian government was installed during a U.S. invasion. Challenges and progress in consolidating democracy (the third stage) are assessed with special attention to restoration of civilian governance, democratic habits and values, and demilitarization-- a central priority of the new regime.

A Critical Assessment of the New Elite Paradigm

A critical evaluation of the new elite paradigm proposed by Field, Higley and Burton suggests that it is beset by a number ofproblems. Two issues are explored: the relationship between consensual unity among elites and political stability, and the role of elite settlements and two-step transformations as routes to consensual unity of elites. I argue that the proponents of the new paradigm fail to establish the priority of political explanations over social structural explanations for global patterns of political stability. They also fail to develop theories of wide explanatory power from the central contentions of classical elite theory.

Elite Settlements

Elite Settlements