Russian Elite Research Articles

War, art, and sanctions: social network analysis on the NACP’s databases of sanctioned Russian individuals and art collectors

AbstractUntil March 2024, Ukraine’s National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) was tasked with maintaining databases of individuals sanctioned for their support of Russian military action in Ukraine and monitoring works of art owned by these individuals to prevent their being sold in violation of sanctions. The present study gathered data from the NACP’s War & Sanctions and War & Art databases through a combination of web scraping and API requests. These data were then examined using measures of network analysis (including degree centrality, eigenvector centrality, and clustering coefficient), which allowed the visualisation and statistical analysis of the network of Russian elite. This research is the first that has conducted scientific analysis on these datasets. Investigation determined that the social network of individuals in the upper strata of Russian society is vast and moderately centralised, with over a dozen clusters around influential Russian oligarchs, politicians, and celebrities. It also determined that art collectors have a more central role in this network than non-collectors of art. The network exhibits a clear presence of hubs and nodes with high degree centrality and a high degree-betweenness centrality correlation, indicating that information can flow quickly and efficiently. However, the network’s dependence on a few key individuals could constitute a vulnerability, with the extraction or isolation of these figures potentially disrupting the network’s function and coordination. This research also identified inconsistencies in the imposition of sanctions, creating grey areas that could allow the continued trade of cultural goods, potentially bypassing international restrictions.

Factors affecting Russian elites’ perceptions of civil protests: evidence from the survey of Russian elites, 2016 and 2020

ABSTRACT Which elites support civil protests, and which ones oppose them? Existing studies of civil protests in authoritarian regimes have mainly examined their triggers, effectiveness and the responses they provoke from authoritarian states. While these studies offer implications regarding the durability of authoritarian states, they have not examined elite perceptions of civil protests, which may contribute to the authoritarian reactions to such protests. Using the Survey of Russian Elites from 2016 and 2020, this paper analyses the factors that affect Russian elites’ perceptions of protests. I argue that elites’ perceptions of protests depend on their democratic value orientation, social position and media use. The findings reveal that elites who value civil liberties approve of protests, while those closely linked to the Kremlin, those who frequently use traditional media and members of the United Russia Party oppose protests. However, the effects of the independent variables differ slightly depending on the protest method’s intensity and the survey’s wave. This study sheds light on the causal relationship between Russian elites’ individual characteristics and their perceptions of protests.

Value model of political communications of the Russian elite in conflictual and deviant polysubject environment

The article, based on the results of a comprehensive political analysis, substantiates that in the modern socio-political reality, the formation of a multipolar world, the problem of the effectiveness of political communications are closely related to the potential of political and administrative power elites. The communicative qualities of a modern politician are enhanced by value-civilizational and moral parameters, the ability of strategic vision and the ability to maintain civilizational and value discourse in the political and economic system and direct it towards sustainable advanced development of society. This, in turn, involves the analysis and development of parameters for diagnosing the quality of modern Russian political and administrative elites, their moral and professional adequacy and aptitude; so is the actualization and solution of the problem of deviations at the elite level of political power. In order to form a value model of political communications of the Russian elite, it is necessary to comprehensively consider management systems based on specific values (including management of public values), identify and position public values as determinants of socio-political development, develop mechanisms to counteract the value degradation and marginalization of national elites, take into account the propensity of the Russian government to identify internal and external enemies in the previous stages of development, and also to the uncritical borrowing of the models of democracy alien to the Russian cultural and civilizational code, and the image imitation of elite qualities.

Defence sector and military cooperation between Turkey and the Central Asian Republics: limitations and prospects amidst intensified regional and global rivalry

ABSTRACT Recent Turkey-Central Asian Republic integration attempts are notable. Regular visits, Turkic World summits, economic steps to build a cooperative development bank, defense procurement, and regional policy collaboration have driven this trend. China's Bridge and Road Initiative, NATO's exit from Afghanistan, the Taliban's ascent, and the Russian elite's use of the “Russkiy Mir” after the Russo-Ukrainian War make the “Turkic world” geopolitically vital. Global and regional power struggles will make the region's natural resources and strategic location more important in coming decades. Turkey-Central Asia defense cooperation may also shape the region. This study aims to determine if Turkey-region defense cooperation improves Turkic integration. The states utilize regional military ties and diverse tools for regional and global objectives. The probe will begin with “Turkic integration” and recent Turkish defense industry achievements, then regional defense ties. Finally, a comparative analysis will reveal regional integration constraints and potential, focusing on defense cooperation.

THE EUROPEAN MIRROR OF HYBRID WAR: HOW RUSSIA TRIES TO DESTABILIZE THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

The unprovoked Russian aggression against Ukraine, which is the biggest war after the World War II, has caused a number of problems in Europe and in the whole democratic world, which is concerning regarding the functioning of the international institutions, the security of the countries that are part of international organizations, but aren't members of the EU and NATO, the protection of human rights mechanisms and the lack of mechanisms for the prevention of war and conflicts. It is clear that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is no accident. The Russian elites, led by President Vladimir Putin, have been preparing for this move for years. Not only have they acted openly, but they have also been waging a hybrid war. Moreover, the war in Ukraine has been going on since 2014, when Russia supported the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics for succession. And before that, Moscow unilaterally annexed Crimea. The European response to Russian aggression has been diplomatic expressions of concern and threats, and some sanctions, which Russia has successfully evaded. It seemed that Europe had consistently adapted to the new geopolitical environment. But only after 24th of February 2022, all civilization's words stand by Ukraine and the Ukrainians. The Western allies of Ukraine give money and weapons, humanitarian aid, training of military and deminers and take in Ukrainian refugees. The war in Ukraine is in its third year. This analysis elaborates the Russian influence on different levels and the European reactions to their attacks and provocations.

Medical Sovereignty of Russia: the Problem of Dependence of Domestic Elites on Therapy Abroad

The article considers the problem of dependence of Russian elite groups on foreign medicine. The analysis of world practice has shown that the foreign medical dependence of elites is characteristic of a number of developing countries, as well as countries with an "oil curse", when foreign economic dependence and foreign medical dependence complement each other. Over the past decades, including the period of anti-Russian sanctions since 2014, publicly available information on cases of medical care provided to federal and regional high-level officials, well-known artists and professional athletes has been systematized. Using the example of the accessibility of foreign medicine for the political and managerial establishment of Russia, the selectivity of anti-Russian sanctions, convenient for external opponents, is shown. At the same time, Russia did not decide on a directive ban on elites using medical care abroad. The stories of media pressure on politicians and businessmen (E.M. Primakov, O.Y. Tinkov) have been revealed, showing the personal vulnerability of people who have become dependent on foreign medicines and therapy. At the same time, a number of examples have confirmed the operability of a possible scenario of a complete ban on elites receiving medical care abroad as a catalyst for the development of domestic medicine, pharmaceutical and medical industries, as well as a way to equalize elites before the "collective West" in the rights to external medical care.

Theoretical and Practical Issues of Governing Elite Functioning in Russia

Based on a comparative analysis of the study of the Russian elite we consider current theoretical and practical issues related to the conditions and processes characterizing the activities of the elite. The study subjects are: clarifying the concept of “elite”, assessing the instability of the state and the presence of elements of the structural transformation of elites; revealing the features of the formation of Soviet and post-Soviet elites, the mechanisms of their renewal based on plutocracy, professionalization, consolidation of a synthetic type of mobility, readiness for change. The research focuses on understanding the elite as a social community with signs of mentality, worldview, and ideology. We reveal the role of conservative and liberal ideologies in the formation of state ideology and its significance for the Russian elite in the context of confrontation with the collective West.

The Foundations of Russian Statehood

The content of Russian educational material on moral-cultural issues has gradually shifted over the Putin tenure toward a standard that emphasizes state patriotism, syncretic pride in the achievements and heroes of the Tsarist, Soviet, and post-Soviet periods, and traditional sociocultural values, including respect for religious authorities. The onset of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War has caused a shift in debates over national pedagogic inculturation among domestic Russian elites, with many calling for the return of “ideology” to properly ensure the formation of future, regime-loyal generations. This article analyzes the first official document of the wartime period that deals with questions of Russia’s ideology—the educational curriculum guidance packet titled “Foundations of Russian Statehood” (FORS) and promoted by the Presidential Administration for use in Russian universities. The article typifies the state of pre-war Russian moral-cultural pedagogical material within its shifting, illiberal ideological context, compares this pre-war setting with the FORS document and the concomitant discursive shift among key Russian officials, and provides a descriptive analysis of FORS itself. In doing so, the article identifies the evocative “pentabasis” framework of the FORS document as a potential core of a crystallizing, official ideology in modern wartime Russia.

Peter III’s Relatives at Petersbourg Сourt

The author examines the political history of the eighteenth-century Russian Empire and its relations with members of the royal family from the Holy Roman Empire. Based on the study of unpublished sources, mainly in Austrian and Russian archives, as well as published Russian, British, and French sources, he presents a new interpretation of Peter III’s relations with members of the House of Holstein. The research aims to answer the following questions: What role did Peter III’s “German kinsmen” play at the St. Petersburg court and in the administrative system of the state? What impact did their actions have on the Russian elite’s perception of the Tsar’s rule? Did Peter III’s personnel policy, which favoured the Holstein dynasty members for key positions in the state apparatus, differ from the previous practice of Russian monarchs? A detailed analysis of the sources eads to the following conclusions: Peter III’s Holstein relatives exerted considerable influence on the policy of the St. Petersburg court, occupying key positions in the military and political establishment of the Russian Empire in the early 1760s. At the same time, most of them did not speak Russian and did not try to adapt to their new cultural environment. The behaviour of some “Holsteinites”, as well as the preferential treatment they received at the expense of members of the royal family and St. Petersburg nobles, caused an extremely negative reaction in Russian society, contributing to the growth of hatred towards the Germans. Peter III’s decision to surround himself with relatives from Central Europe was reminiscent of the reign of Anna Ivanovna, whose closest confidants were of non-Russian origin. On the other hand, Anna Ivanovna’s cronies came from different parts of the Holy Roman Empire.

Sino-Russian rapprochement after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

The goal of the present article is to analyse if there was an observable change in the impact of Chinese normative power on Russia after the start of the war in Ukraine. The article finds that despite Russia’s growing dependence on China there have been no significant changes in the measure of success of Chinese normative power in Russian discourse. Russian officials refuse to copy Chinese initiatives and instead produce competitive initiatives of their own. At the same time the article observes a significant change in the perception of China among the Russian elites: while before the invasion they had a tendency to look down on China, after the invasion they portray China in a radically more positive manner.

Габитус правящей элиты современной России

The purpose of the article is to establish the peculiarities of the habitus of the ruling elite in modern Russia. The methodological basis is the position according to which certain points of view, type of thinking, habitus correspond to the social position. As a method of collecting information, one of the varieties of document analysis is thematic analysis. According to the results of the study, the following characteristic of the habitus of the ruling elite of modern Russia was given. The ideological attitudes of the Russian elite are oriented towards the patterns of Western culture, but the stability and depth of the referential orientation towards the West of the Russian elite groups depends on the political and economic situation. The ruling elite of Russia is conservative, it is generally satisfied with its position in Russia. The same reason leads to its negative attitude to any significant social transformations. The conservatism of the Russian elite leads to the rejection of analytical thinking, with the help of which reality is decomposed in order to construct from its parts the future that is fundamentally different from the present. The ruling elite strives to see the world as integral and organic. The elite strata, at least, are suspicious and distrustful of the intellectual abilities and moral qualities of the Russian population. Attributing certain stable socio-psychological qualities to the population (irresponsibility, low ability to self-organize and adapt to changing socio-economic conditions, infantilism, inadequate assessment of reality) indicates a deep gap between the elite and other social groups, which, given such an obvious stigmatization, becomes not only political or economic, but also psychological. And this, in turn, is an additional conflictogenic factor. Failure to take into account the peculiarities of the situation of opposing social groups, which is a consequence of socially determined stigmatization, will be perceived as an arrogant and dismissive attitude, which often becomes the detonator of social clashes. Such a negative and exaggerated assessment of the socio-psychological qualities of the population is reflected in the quality of public administration. In the latter, there is a tendency to primitivization and one-sidedness of influence, a constant search for simple solutions. The failures caused by this are justified by the immaturity of the people, their low moral qualities, which only intensifies the social gap and differentiation.

IMPACT OF RUSSIA’S ELITES ON THE 2024 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

This article examines the issue of the relationship between the elites of Russia, as well as their possible influence on the course of the election campaign for the election of the President of the Russian Federation. The work analyzes the varying degrees of influence on the formation of approaches in the process of transformation of the Russian political system. The purpose of preparing a scientific article is to study the problems of the influence of significant elite groups on pre-election scenarios, with an assessment of the position of competing political structures during the federal election campaign. In addition, there is speculation about possible steps they will take to acquire more influential positions in the next six months, when preliminary nominations of candidates take place and the prospects for election “battles” are outlined. The conclusions underlying this work make it possible to determine the current state of the elites in their competition in the field of political influence on candidates in the presidential “race”.

Escape from Political Freedom. The Constitutional Crisis of 1993 and Russia’s Political Trajectory

Abstract The constitutional crisis of 1993 was one of the major turning points in the failed democratization of Russia and subsequent turn of the country towards personalist authoritarianism. The October 1993 conflict, as the crisis is commonly called in Russia, was driven by a strategic choice of priorities by Russia’s political leadership during the post-Communist “triple transition”. After the overthrow of the Communist regime in August 1991, Russian elites prioritized market reforms and sacrificed further democratization of the country for the sake of preserving the new political status quo. This choice, made at the expense of building new democratic institutions, greatly contributed to the clash between the plebiscitary legitimacy of President Boris Yeltsin and unconstrained legality of the parliament, which was resolved in a violent zero-sum game in October 1993. The new Russian constitution sought to drastically reduce institutional constraints to presidential power. Its approval paved the way to authoritarian regime building and served as a role model for other post-Soviet countries.

Three Decades on Russia’s Path of the Second Demographic Transition: How Patterns of Fertility are Changing Under an Unstable Demographic Policy

This study aims to highlight the changes in fertility patterns of Russians which occurred after the USSR’s dissolution or disintegration, taking a long historical perspective. After that disruption, thirty cohorts were born and raised who never lived under the Soviet system. Fifteen more cohorts (those who were born between 1975 and 1990) remember that system only as a part of childhood, but their adult life started after the iron curtain had fallen and a flood of new ideas and practices spilled into all spheres of life.
 At the same time, the increased concern among the Russian elite about the declining population and low birth rates led to the adoption of a pronatalist family policy based on monetarist approaches reinforced by conservative-traditionalist ideology.
 Our main research question asks: To what extent did state social and family policies in Russia, which are based on the ideology of traditionalism and conservatism, derail or slow down the modernization of the quantitative and structural parameters of fertility patterns within the Second Demographic Transition context?
 Our analysis is based on indicators from period and cohort fertility tables, specific for age and parity. Extrapolations are used for Russia’s female cohorts born 1971-1994 to arrive at expected ultimate fertility outcomes.
 Our evidence, obtained from the comprehensive analysis of fertility tables, reveals that the transformation of the Russian fertility model continues to be in line with the Second Demographic Transition common to developed countries, and that two decades of active pronatalist policy in the context of strengthening the conservative family ideology did not stop the modernization of fertility patterns.
 * This article belongs to a special issue on “Demographic Developments in Eastern and Western Europe Before and After the Transformation of Socialist Countries”.

Russian Strategic Culture in Retrospect

The article analyzes the transformation of Russian strategic culture over the past 100 years. During this period, Russia veered away from the strategic goal-setting practices that its elite had implemented previously. Since the end of the 18th century, Russia was an integral part of the Concert of Europe, and its ruling circles absorbed the European ideas of peace, language of diplomacy, and approaches to military planning. Soviet power essentially “reinvented” the strategic culture of the Russian state, adopting The Second World War imbued Soviet strategic culture with a great-power attitude. The crisis of Soviet ideology seriously affected the strategic thinking of the elites, provoking its decline. The article concludes that some key categories of Soviet strategic culture still affect the strategic culture of modern Russian elites.

"Славян должно прижать к стене"

. The relevance of this topic is associated with numerous attempts of Western countries to subjugate Russia, which was traditionally associated with the protection of the Slavic world. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the struggle of the Slavic peoples for the preservation of their identity going on for centuries. In the course of numerous wars, many Southern and the Western Slavs came under the influence of Western states and the Ottoman Empire. The significance of the impact of the religious factor on the historical development of Slavic people is noted. The expansion of the Catholic Church and Islam began to play a significant role in the socio-political life of these peoples. Russia is the only country, which preserved not only state, but also religious sovereignty. It is noted that the struggle of the Slavic people was the subject of not only historical research, but also reflected in the works of Russian writers and poets. Some of the works of foreign authors, who studied the history of the Eastern Slavs, and the works of domestic representatives of Russian literature were analyzed. Views of Russian and Soviet writers and poets F.M. Dostoevsky, F.I. Tyutchev, A.A Blok, A.A. Zinovieva, V. Pikula promote understanding of historical processes related to the Slavic peoples and a special role of Russia in the Slavic World. Their works help to understand the current position of Russia in the world, as well as in Slavic world. Particular attention in their works is paid to the evaluation of the positions of the Russian intelligentsia, which groveled before Europe and took a pro-Western position. In the post-war period, the West concentrated their efforts to destroy the system of education and culture in Russia. At present, the collective West has achieved some success, it managed to make most of the Slavic states dependent and put two closely related peoples – Ukrainians and Russians – against each other and complicate Russia's foreign policy and economic situation. However, the politics that the West pursues towards Russia does not give expected results. Maintaining Russia’s leading role in Western Europe depends to a large extent not only on strengthening the country’s socio-economic situation, but also on the position of the Russian elite, which must understand that the West assigns a secondary role to our country, a place on the outskirts of Western civilization.

Hubungan Rusia-Ukraine Pasca Keruntuhan Kesatuan Soviet: Dari Perselisihan Kecil Ke Kancah Perang

After the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine and Russia established good cooperation in various aspects despite some shifts in domestic issues. Ukraine adopted a policy of neutrality in its administration because it needed cooperation from various parties, including Russia and the West. However, everything changed when Ukraine expressed its desire to join NATO in 2008. This desire was welcomed by NATO but opposed by Russia, leading to an ongoing conflict with Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Donbas. This study aims to explain the development of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and identify the triggering factors between the two countries. The library method was used to gather secondary information from books, journals, reports, newspapers, and credible Internet sources. The study found that Russia's attack on Ukraine was driven by the need to ensure its survival and sovereignty against major powers such as the US and NATO, which were increasingly approaching the Eastern Europe region. The study also found two factors that triggered the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, namely internal and external factors. External factors such as the expansion of power and influence of the United States, the European Union, and NATO approaching Russia's borders, as well as Russia's geo-economic power beyond its borders, played a role in triggering the conflict. Meanwhile, internal factors include the presence of Russian elite groups that play a role in making important state decisions and Russia's formidable military capabilities.

The Split in the Political Elite of the Empire as an Obstacle to the Activities of Mikhail Muravyov: Lessons for Nowadays

In 1863, the Russian Empire faced a formidable challenge – an armed rebellion of the Polish nobility, supported by Western Europe aspiring to divide Russia into regions dependent on it. The Tsar persuaded the brilliant oppositional politician and 1812 Patriotic War hero M.N. Muravyov, possessing experience in fi ghting the Poles during their last rebellion in 1831, to lead the suppression of the new riot as Governor-General of the Western Region. However, our conservative hero, relying on the Russian spirit and the collectivism of the Russian people, was opposed not only by obvious enemies – rebel Polish gentry, but also by ministers who were adherents of Westernized cosmopolitanism and became the main force restraining the conservative reformer. On the contrary, the spiritual and cultural Russian elite, led by the Metropolitan of Moscow Filaret and poet and thinker F.I. Tyutchev warmly supported Muravyov’s patriotic course. However due to the tsar’s mental dependence on the high-ranking “Рarty of cosmopolitans” and the lesser infl uence on him of the “Russian party”, Muravyov was not allowed to complete the reform program. The author comes to the conclusion that in our time of growing threats to Russia’s security due to the new onslaught of the West on Russia, our political elite should take into account the experience of Muravyov’s struggle “on two fronts” with the inadmissibility, in fact, of internal betrayal. In other words, our political class must avoid splitting while striving for unity on a nationally oriented basis with appropriate personnel recruitment.

Ancient Heritage in the History of the Synod by Paisius Ligarides, Metropolitan of Gaza: Dedication to the Russian Tsar

The History of the Synod, compiled at the beginning of 1667 by Paisius Ligarides, Metropolitan of Gaza († 1678), shortly after the condemnation of Patriarch Nikon († 1681) at the Great Moscow Synod (1666), has long attracted the attention of researchers. However, it is studied without involving the Greek text and its complete translation into Russian. The arrangements made between the middle and second half of the nineteenth century differ from the original in their selectivity and inaccuracy. The anonymous Russian translation, short and unprofessional, resembles a free paraphrase; in comparison with the Russian version, the English one, belonging to the British theologian and historian W. Palmer († 1879), is closer to the original in content. However, it omits complex phrases and designations of culture-specific Russian elements and contains the translator’s comments. The stumbling block for interpreters was Ligarides’ appeal to Antiquity, a literary device that characterises the writer’s style in the Moscow period of his life (since 1662). Appeals to ancient authors and writings and techniques dating back to ancient rhetoric are scattered throughout the History of the Synod, but there are many of them in the dedication to the client, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich. This article considers the problem of ancient heritage in the History of the Synod with reference to this introductory section. An analysis of the content of his three themes – the idealisation of Antiquity, the appointment of history and the dignity of the ruler – helps reveal the significance of ancient culture and mythology to the writer. The appeal of the Metropolitan of Gaza to the classical heritage correlates with didactic and educational tasks. Ligarides supported the messianic idea, popular with the Greek clergy, about the significance of Moscow – the heir of Rome and the ruler of Moscow as the liberator of Christian peoples from the Muslim yoke. Approving the Byzantine model in the issue of separation of powers, according to which the secular ruler was an absolute monarch, Ligarides oriented Alexei Mikhailovich to follow the example of the rulers of the ancient era, who had the virtues of the kingcreator, triumpher, and enlightener. Encouraging the Russian elite to become more familiar with the ancient heritage and thus contributing to the Europeanisation of court culture, the Metropolitan brought closer the situation called the antiquity of Russian culture by philologists.

Kant and “tabula Russia”

The article offers an attempt to understand the present state of Kant’s legacy in Russia on the threshold of the Tercentenary. An explanans is found in the metaphors of “tabula rasa” and “unplowed virgin soil,” first used by Leibniz in relation to Russia in his letters and memoranda addressed to tsar Peter I and other members of the Russian elite, which became the country’s “absolute metaphors to live by” up to present time. Several known and unknown episodes from the history of the reception of Kantian ideas, his followers in Russia, and the transformation of the urban environment of Kant’s life in Königsberg, as it was becoming Kaliningrad, are presented through the prism of this metaphor. Without hoping to make specific recommendations of any use from such metaphorical grounds, this study aims to emphasize the depth, interconnectedness, and basic, metaphysical tension of the relationship between Europe and Russia, which cannot be terminated at will by either side, or by a third party. In a situation where the sides are doomed to dialog, Kant, appropriated by Russia as its “subject,” occupies the unique position of mediator of philosophical understanding and peaceful action.