Elite Defection Research Articles

Failed hereditary succession in comparative perspective: The case of Senegal (2000–2024)

Abstract Contrary to enduring theoretical expectations on neopatrimonialism, family successions are rare in sub-Saharan Africa. This article demonstrates that family successions are difficult to set up and might fail when rulers attempt to implement them. Building on the scholarship on political dynasties and family successions in broader comparative politics, I demonstrate that the study of failed attempts helps unveil the specific mechanisms of such failure. While scholarship documents how formal rules (such as term limits) constrain the ruler’s succession agenda, I contend that other types of constraints -party politics, opposition coalition, and public opinion-might also strongly impact it but have remained underexamined. The Senegal case study helps uncover these constraints. The article begins by emphasizing the theoretical importance and empirical challenges of studying non-cases of family successions and, more specifically, failed attempts. Then, the article examines the Senegalese failed hereditary succession between former President Abdoulaye Wade and his son Karim. Through a longitudinal single-country case study (2000–2024), this article employs process-tracing to uncover the three main interrelated mechanisms, which led to this failure: Popular resentment towards the succession attempt, a succession crisis due to the ruler’s not leaving power, and elite defection leading to party split. In mutually reinforcing each other, these dynamics converged to block the transfer of power from the ruler to his son. Therefore, this single case study of a failed attempt enhances our empirical and theoretical understanding of what drives variation in the success or failure of family succession. I argue that the role of actors (party elites and voters) in the succession process and how they engage with the rules of the game (mainly over party leadership selection and elections) impact the succession outcome.

Assessing centralization: on Turkey’s rising personalist regime

ABSTRACT Research on non-democratic regimes has accelerated in the post-Cold War world, but inordinate attention paid to procedural definitions of regime type and democratization has reduced the study of utilitarian components in assessing cases of political transition. We utilize two frameworks oft-cited within the comparative authoritarianism literature to evaluate our claim that Turkey has moved from a dominant-party system to one resembling a personalist regime while arguing that elite defection and institutional degradation may catalyse political centralization. In doing so, we refocus evaluative attention on the substantive content of the regime rather than mere modes of perpetuation while reasserting the value of the literature’s diagnostic frameworks to empirically place Turkey’s subtype of authoritarianism.

Making Sense of a Surprise: Perspectives on the 2020 “Belarusian Revolution”

AbstractDrawing on three theoretical perspectives—“protest-democracy,” “authoritarian/patronal regime dynamics,” and “contentious politics”—developed in the study of popular protests in post-Soviet electoral autocracies, this article argues, first, that the 2020 postelection mobilization in Belarus was not to be expected for both structural and agency-related reasons. Second, by the summer of 2020, the political opportunity structure had opened up because of contingent choices by individual actors, with Alyaksandr Lukashenka committing several major mistakes, particularly on pandemic (non)control and the administration of the upcoming presidential election, and political newcomers taking on the role of challenging him. After the election, mass mobilization unfolded in two waves triggered by two additional regime mistakes: blatant electoral fraud and excessive repression. These mistakes served as focal points for spontaneous coordination, substituting for the deliberate “engineering” of protest by an organized opposition typical of the post-Soviet color revolutions. Third, Lukashenka survived in office because popular protests did not lead to elite defection. Instead, he was able to secure the loyalty of elites because he avoided gross blunders against both regime insiders and Russia. The case of Belarus indicates that hegemonic-authoritarian regimes are more vulnerable to mistakes by incumbents than to challenges from below and outside the regime.

Going, going, gone? Varieties of dissent and leader exit

We examine how popular dissent affects the likelihood that political leaders lose power, distinguishing between types of dissent in terms of nonviolent/violent primary tactics as well as the level of individual participation. We posit that protests threaten leaders both directly through the governance costs of citizen non-compliance, and indirectly through the increased risk of elite defections in the ruling coalition. In a series of propositions we detail how the type of dissent and the magnitude of participation influence the odds of leaders surviving in office. We argue that mass nonviolent challenges tend to be more threatening to a leader’s rule than violent dissent, given the characteristics of movements likely to choose nonviolent tactics. Moreover, the effectiveness of the challenge increases in the scale and size of the dissident campaign, and movements that can mobilize larger numbers have a comparative advantage in nonviolent tactics. Employing data on political leaders’ tenure and dissident campaign characteristics, we provide evidence consistent with our expectations.

Strategic Uncertainty and Elite Defections in Electoral Autocracies: A Cross-National Analysis

Defections within the ruling elite often endanger authoritarian rule, emboldening opposition groups and paving the way for regime breakdown. Yet, the consequences of elite defections are better understood than their causes. Why do some authoritarian regimes experience more defections to the opposition than others? This paper develops a theory of the origins of elite defection and tests it using a novel dataset based on the political careers of 15,013 legislative deputies and ministers in 12 electoral autocracies. The theory predicts that regime elites defect when there are greater opportunities to capitalize on the discontent of other regime elites and voters. Regimes with weak party mechanisms that are also supported by many factions experience more defections. Finally, defections increase during economic downturns and when the government’s control of mass media declines, which helps potential defectors coordinate with anti-regime voters.

Religious Support for Civil ResistanceMovements: When and How DoesIt Contribute to Regime Change?

There is substantial research on the influence of elite defections on civil resistance campaign outcomes. Yet most studies focus on defections among security forces, political leaders, and economic elites. In this article, the author examines religious elite defections. Analyzing

Russia’s 2020 Constitutional Reform: The Politics of Institutionalizing the Status-Quo

Abstract The articles in this issue explore the longer-term implications of Russia’s 2020 Constitutional Reform process. Assessing constitutional change from different theoretical and empirical approaches, these authors find that the constitution largely codified the status-quo as it had evolved over the past decade. The resulting institutional changes solidified the personalist political system that concentrates power in one leader. These reforms also created new mechanisms to preclude elite defection and generate societal quiescence. At the same time, the three-staged reform process that included formal adoption, national vote, and legal reconciliation, introduced new political risk by raising societal expectations, reinforcing cleavages through patriotic legitimization strategies, introducing new rigid structures, and relying on personalism and networks over institutional governance. These risks do not predict state failure but they suggest new challenges that will continue to shape Russian political development.

Introducing authoritarian diasporas: causes and consequences of authoritarian elite dispersion

ABSTRACT Scholarship on democratization has made significant progress in theorizing the trajectories of former authoritarian elites, with considerable attention given to authoritarian successor parties in particular. However, the literature has largely failed to contend with cases in which the cohort of former authoritarian officials scatters widely across the political system. We identify these patterns of dispersion as authoritarian diasporas and investigate their potential causes and consequences. In launching a new research agenda on this understudied phenomenon, we review not only contending causes for elite defection from authoritarian ruling parties, but also various options for political reincarnation of these officials (e.g. new party creation, colonization of existing parties, and independent candidacies). We hypothesize that the initial decision to defect is contingent upon a number of intervening regime- and individual-level variables. The destinations of former authoritarian incumbents are shaped by regime legacies, personal political resources, and institutional rules. We conclude by reflecting on the ways in which authoritarian diasporas are likely to be more harmful to democracy than the continued presence of an authoritarian successor party.

Religious Support for Civil Resistance Movements: When and How Does It Contribute to Regime Change?

There is substantial research on the influence of elite defections on civil resistance campaign outcomes. Yet most studies focus on defections among security forces, political leaders, and economic elites. In this article, the author examines religious elite defections. Analyzing 99 civil resistance struggles, the author explores whether religious leaders’ support is associated with regime change in authoritarian contexts. The author also uses qualitative comparative analysis to determine the conditions and pathways that lead to a successful outcome. The author illustrates these pathways with four cases (Ukraine’s orange revolution, Mali’s uprising against General Traoré, the Philippine People Power movement, and Malawi’s struggle against President Banda). The results indicate that religious elite defections are not necessary for civil resistance success. However, religious support can contribute critical resources to movements, create a positive flank effect, facilitate security force defections, provide space for resistance in conditions of indiscriminate repression, and activate international networks that can pressure a regime.

«ЦВЕТНЫЕ РЕВОЛЮЦИИ» НА ПОСТСОВЕТСКОМ ПРОСТРАНСТВЕ: СТАБИЛЬНОСТЬ И ИЗМЕНЧИВОСТЬ РЕЖИМА КАК СЛЕДСТВИЕ ОТСТУПНИЧЕСТВА ЭЛИТ

Why did «coloured revolutions» in Georgia (2003), Kyrgyzstan (2005) and Ukraine (2004) happen? To answer the question, the paper focuses on the shared feature of post-Soviet states – regime cyclicity, explained by the existence of the entrenched patronal presidentialism institutions. At critical moments when the incumbent turns into a lame duck and her departure is mostly expected, the regime runs the risk that elites become disunified and strong opposition consequently emerges. Then the relationship between the incumbent’s designated successor and elites revolves around the possible defection of the latter to the challenger. The article models such a situation in the form of a repeated game, where elites appear as a receiver in the «bargain» during the presidential campaign. Depending on who is preferred – the successor or the challenger – an outcome is either regime perpetuation or a “coloured revolution” caused by mass elite defection to the opposition. The derived hypotheses are tested on the cases of presidential elections in Russia (1999-2000) and Ukraine (2004). As analysis reveals, the three theoretical expectations draw sufficient empirical support, while a special role in determining a winner is ascribed to candidates’ popularity, which becomes of utmost importance closer to the end of the race.

Eroding Support from Below: Performance in Local Government and Opposition Party Growth in South Africa

AbstractHow does support for opposition parties grow in dominant party systems? Most scholarship on the rise of competitive elections in dominant party regimes focuses on elite defections from the ruling party and coordination by opposition parties as key explanations, but there is less focus on how politics at the local level contributes to opposition victories. This article argues that effective service delivery in local government helps opposition parties grow support in local elections. Examining the case of the Democratic Alliance (DA) in South Africa, this article provides a systematic analysis of local elections and opposition party performance. Using an original data set of electoral, census and spatial data at the lowest electoral unit in South Africa (the ward), this article shows that in the areas where it is the incumbent party, support for the DA grows as the delivery of basic services to non-white households improves, and when DA-run wards outperform the neighbouring ones run by the ruling African National Congress party, support for the DA increases in neighbouring wards. Overall, this study contributes to our understanding of how local politics erode dominant party rule.

Elite Defection under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia

Elite cohesion is a fundamental pillar of authoritarian stability. High-level defections can signal weakness, embolden the opposition, and sometimes, lead to regime collapse. Using a dataset of 4,291 ruling party candidates in Russia, this paper develops and tests hypotheses about the integrity of elite coalitions under autocracy. Our theory predicts that ruling elites defect when there is greater uncertainty about the regime’s willingness to provide spoils. Regimes that share power with the opposition, limit access to spoils, and lack formal institutions see more defections. Co-opting the opposition assuages outside threats but leaves regime insiders disgruntled and prone to defection. Those with personal followings and business connections are the most likely to defect, since they can pursue their political goals independently of the regime. Taken together, our results highlight important tradeoffs among authoritarian survival strategies. Many of the steps autocrats take to repel challenges simultaneously heighten the risk of defections.

Elite defection and grassroots democracy under competitive authoritarianism: evidence from Burkina Faso

ABSTRACTOne determinant of the success or failure of political revolutions is whether there is a split among the ruling elites. Elite defections in a competitive authoritarian regime can tip the balance in favour of regime change and democratization. This article examines when and why elites defect through the case of Burkina Faso. In October 2014, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso was forced to step down after 27 years in power and multiple term limits contraventions. We propose a new theory linking growth in democratic attitudes at the grassroots to elite defection from hegemonic parties. We argue that a broad increase in popular democratic attitudes can both decrease the costs and increase the benefits of elite defection, creating conditions that enable elites to rescind their loyalty to the regime. We support this argument with interviews with ruling-party defectors in Burkina Faso and two rounds of Afrobarometer survey data. Our findings demonstrate that democratic attitudes can grow under competitive authoritarian regimes, and that these citizen attitudes can impact regime change by increasing the likelihood of elite defection.

Elite Defection Under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia

Elite cohesion is one of the fundamental pillars of authoritarian regime stability. Defections from the ruling coalition can signal regime weakness, embolden the opposition, and, sometimes, lead to regime collapse. Using a unique dataset on 4,313 regional legislative candidates from Russia's ruling party, United Russia, this paper examines the determinants of elite defections in one prominent electoral autocracy. We believe this to be the first study to use quantitative, micro-level data to test hypotheses about the integrity of elite coalitions under autocracy. Our theoretical framework predicts that elites will be more likely to defect when there is increased uncertainty about the willingness and/or ability of the regime to provide electoral benefits, spoils, and career advancement. Regimes that limit points of access to spoils, share power with the opposition, and lack strong formal institutions see higher rates of defection. While opposition co-optation may help the regime assuage threats from outside the regime, it may also leave regime insiders disgruntled and prone to defect. Finally, elites with personal followings and private business connections are most likely to defect, since they are better equipped to pursue their political goals independently of the regime. This result suggests that allowing elites to accumulate autonomous resources can undermine an authoritarian regime's hold on power.

Managing elite defection in Museveni’s Uganda: the 2016 elections in perspective

ABSTRACTLike other semi-authoritarian leaders, Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni faced constant threats of elite defections during successive general elections since 1996. Except in 2011 when he lured prominent opposition members to his ruling party, Museveni faced defections on the eve of four out of the five general elections during his rule: in 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2016. The 2015 defection of former Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi was billed as Museveni’s toughest challenge ever. However, Museveni successfully countered this threat with ministerial appointments, cash handouts along with targeted use of state coercive apparatus, chiefly the police, thus stopping Mbabazi from taking many National Resistance Movement (NRM) party elites into his camp to mount a serious electoral challenge. This article situates Mbabazi’s defection, and his poor performance at the polls going by the official election results, in the context of previous episodes of elite defections. The article argues that defections have been avoided and mitigated by a triple-strategy of elite inclusion, deterrence and the maintenance of various networks that constrain potential defectors. By documenting this theory with examples from previous and the 2016 elections, the article concludes that Mbabazi’s poor showing in the February 2016 election was predictable, in spite of his clout as heretofore the second most powerful figure in NRM and Museveni’s heir apparent.

Black knights and elections in authoritarian regimes: Why and how Russia supports authoritarian incumbents in post‐Soviet states

AbstractIn the last decade, studies have documented how autocrats use elections as a way of legitimising and stabilising their regimes. Simultaneously, a literature on negative external actors (also known as ‘black knights’) has developed, emphasising how various international actors use anti‐democracy promotion strategies to undergird authoritarian regimes. In this article, these two literatures are fused in an attempt to shed light on the external dimension of authoritarian elections and what is termed ‘black knight election bolstering’. First, five mechanisms are elucidated, through which external assistance increases the chances of ‘winning’ elections in authoritarian settings (signaling invincibility, deterring elite defection, undermining opposition activities, dealing with popular protests, and countervailing pressure from foreign democracy promoters). Second, it is argued that external actors are most likely to offer election bolstering when they face a particularly acquiescent partner or when electoral defeat is perceived to lead to radical and undesired regime change. The relevance of both factors is augmented when uncertainty of the electoral outcome is high. Finally, four cases of Russian intervention during elections in three authoritarian neighbour countries (Ukraine in 2004, Belarus in 2006, and Moldova in 2005 and 2009) are analysed. The case studies corroborate the theoretical arguments: not only does Russia engage in all five types of black knight election bolstering, but it does so only when one or more of the three explanatory factors are present.

Privatization and elite defection in de facto states: The case of Transnistria, 1991–2012

What factors determine the timing of elite defection in conditions of post-Soviet personalistic presidentialism? How do relations with a powerful patron state affect this process? This article analyzes these questions on the basis of a case study of Transnistria, a de facto state with strong links to Russia. It argues that privatization processes involving actors from the patron state provide a unique opening for elite defection by heightening tensions between the rent-seeking interests of the personalistic president and those of new owners; direct or indirect signals from the patron state may also affect elite's perceptions of incumbent durability and their corresponding decisions.

The Sources of Authoritarian Control after the Cold War: East Africa and the Former Soviet Union

Why have some post-Cold War autocrats consistently been able to sideline opposition and avoid debilitating elite defections while others have faced repeated challenges? Drawing on interviews, the media, and the academic literature, this article focuses on two sets of factors affecting the extent of incumbent control over opposition: the degree of state economic control and the extent of divisions in national identity. Two sets of most similar cases are compared: Belarus and Ukraine, and Kenya and Tanzania. These comparisons are used to highlight the importance of distinguishing between the causes of democracy and those of authoritarian breakdown.

Cracks in the Firmament of Burma's Military Government: from unity through coercion to buying support

Despite holding recent elections, Burma's military government does not intend to relinquish power; its new constitution guarantees the army the right to do whatever it wants. Democracy will therefore not come to Burma through legal, peaceful, incremental steps. Instead, democracy will come to Burma outside the legal process, because the basis for the regime's power has changed, becoming markedly weaker. When it first seized power in 1961, the military was united and therefore able to rule through coercion alone. In the past several decades, by contrast, the generals have increasingly sought to purchase support by giving income and resource streams to key players. But if people support the regime only because it pays them, they will stop doing so when it stops paying. In recent years the regime has alienated many traditional supporters by taking away the income and resource streams on which they had come to rely. As these groups become alienated from the top generals, they may turn to each other to forge new deals, and ultimately some may try to enlist the people as political allies. Burma therefore fits the most common pattern for democratisation: it will come through elite defections rather than popular insurrection.

Autocrats' modes of exit, rents, and crisis in Africa

Studies analyzing dictators’ duration in power do not generally distinguish the way through which rulers are booted out. In consequence, a destabilizing effect is attributed to some variables without specifying and testing the mechanisms through which this effect may operate. In this paper, we argue that ‘regular’ leadership changes stem from the incumbent’s incapacity to thwart elite defection and opposition groups coordination through the use of patronage, whereas, ‘irregular’ changes are mainly brought about by economic collapse and the widespread of poverty. We also analyze the patterns behind the steady institutionalization of African politics. Data from all African countries between 1946 (or the year of independence) and 2000 permit us to put such general hypotheses under scrutiny and confirm them using multinomial logistic duration regressions. It is also shown that foreign pressure, aid conditionality and domestic opposition have been the major determinants of institutionalization of African dictatorships, making, thus, possible the decrease in the number of irregular ousters. Key words: Regular leadership changes, irregular changes, Africa, institutionalization.