Elements In China Research Articles

Central-Subnational Fiscal Relation and Constitutional Safeguard of Subnational Fiscal Autonomy: A Comparative Study on Unfunded Mandates and Intergovernmental Grants in China and the US

Since China’s Tax-Sharing System Reform in 1994, the so-called “Chinese-Style Fiscal Federalism” has been formed, and the issues of conditional grants and unfunded mandates have become essential elements in China’s central-subnational governments’ relation. The defects of legislations in this area have led to tremendous chaotic phenomena. Recent budgetary and fiscal reforms have struggled to redistribute the spending burden between the central and subnational governments, thus to some extent strengthening subnational governments’ fiscal autonomy.As the US also bears a fiscal federalism structure, how it deals with federal-state fiscal relation and safeguards subnational fiscal autonomy through its constitutional regime is inspiring to China. Since different constitutional contexts lead to different central-subnational fiscal relation, this article first examines the constitutional framework of US and China’s central-subnational relation, and then reviews their historic trajectories of fiscal centralization and decentralization. Next, it compares constitutional and legal methods for preserving the subnational fiscal autonomy in the US and China from two specific aspects, the unfunded mandate and intergovernmental grant system. Finally, this article draws some conclusions of their concurrence and differences, and considers what China may (or may not) draw on from American experience.

China’s Tryst with the IORA: Factoring India and the Indian Ocean

Engaging with a multilateral body requires constructive foreign policy forethought, especially for a country that is not a fully fledged member of that body. China’s overtures to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) exemplify this approach. The Indian Ocean and India are the two most immediate elements in China’s policy approach to the IORA. With 20 member states, extra-territorial major powers as important dialogue partners, and the increasing importance of energy politics in the region, the IORA today is a significant multilateral body in China’s calculus. Beijing’s involvement with the IORA bespeaks the construct and strategy of a great power. For India, China’s power construct in this matter poses three challenges: Beijing as a maritime power; Beijing as an economic power; and Beijing as a polygonal power.

Rare earth elements in China: Policies and narratives of reinventing an industry

After top producer China decided in 2010 to tighten its export quotas for rare earth elements (REE), major customers feared being cut off from the valuable metals. The trade dispute intensified when the EU, the USA, and Japan brought the case before the WTO. The export controls raise questions about China’s intentions and strategies. This article argues that China’s export policy should not be viewed in isolation. The export controls are embedded in a greater transformation of the strategic REE industry. Beijing promotes a broad set of policies, including industry reorganization, resource conservation, and environmental protection. Next, the article examines three narratives that may be constitutive of the Chinese policy. Findings indicate that the geopolitical narrative, which sees natural resources as instruments of power politics, can be only partly attributed to China’s REE policies. The major driving motives are domestic concerns for resource conservation and environmental protection, as well as the development of competitive downstream industries.

Uncovering the end uses of the rare earth elements

The rare earth elements (REE) are a group of fifteen elements with unique properties that make them indispensable for a wide variety of emerging and conventional established technologies. However, quantitative knowledge of REE remains sparse, despite the current heightened interest in future availability of the resources. Mining is heavily concentrated in China, whose monopoly position and potential restriction of exports render primary supply vulnerable to short term disruption. We have drawn upon the published literature and unpublished materials in different languages to derive the first quantitative annual domestic production by end use of individual rare earth elements from 1995 to 2007. The information is illustrated in Sankey diagrams for the years 1995 and 2007. Other years are available in the supporting information. Comparing 1995 and 2007, the production of the rare earth elements in China, Japan, and the US changed dramatically in quantities and structure. The information can provide a solid foundation for industries, academic institutions and governments to make decisions and develop strategies.

Trend and characteristics of atmospheric emissions of Hg, As, and Se from coal combustion in China, 1980–2007

Abstract. Emissions of hazardous trace elements in China are of great concern because of their negative impacts on local air quality as well as on regional environmental health and ecosystem risks. In this paper, the atmospheric emissions of mercury (Hg), arsenic (As), and selenium (Se) from coal combustion in China for the period 1980–2007 are estimated on the basis of coal consumption data and emission factors, which are specified by different categories of combustion facilities, coal types, and the equipped air pollution control devices configuration (Dust collectors, FGD, etc.). Specifically, multi-year emission inventories of Hg, As, and Se from 30 provinces and 4 economic sectors (thermal power, industry, residential use, and others) are evaluated and analyzed in detail. Furthermore, the gridded distribution of provincial-based Hg, As, and Se emissions in 2005 at a resolution of 1° × 1° is also plotted. It shows that the calculated national total atmospheric emissions of Hg, As, and Se from coal combustion have rapidly increased from 73.59 t, 635.57 t, and 639.69 t in 1980 to 305.95 t, 2205.50 t, and 2352.97 t in 2007, at an annually averaged growth rate of 5.4%, 4.7%, and 4.9%, respectively. The industrial sector is the largest source for Hg, As, and Se, accounting for about 50.8%, 61.2%, and 56.2% of the national totals, respectively. The share of power plants is 43.3% for mercury, 24.9% for arsenic, and 33.4% for selenium, respectively. Also, it shows remarkably different regional contribution characteristics of these 3 types of trace elements, the top 5 provinces with the heaviest mercury emissions in 2007 are Shandong (34.40 t), Henan (33.63 t), Shanxi (21.14 t), Guizhou (19.48 t), and Hebei (19.35 t); the top 5 provinces with the heaviest arsenic emissions in 2007 are Shandong (219.24 t), Hunan (213.20 t), Jilin (141.21 t), Hebei (138.54 t), and Inner Mongolia (127.49 t); while the top 5 provinces with the heaviest selenium emissions in 2007 are Shandong (289.11 t), Henan (241.45 t), Jiangsu (175.44 t), Anhui (168.89 t), and Hubei (163.96 t). Between 2000 and 2007, provinces always rank at the top five largest Hg, As, and Se emission sources are: Shandong, Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, and Jiangsu, most of which are located in the east and are traditional industry-based or economically energy intensive areas in China. Notably, Hg, As, and Se emissions from coal combustion in China begin to grow at a more moderate pace since 2005. Emissions from coal-fired power plants sector began to decrease though the coal use had been increasing steadily, which can be mainly attributed to the increasing use of wet flue gas desulfurization (WFGD) in power plants, thus the further research and control orientations of importance for these hazardous trace elements should be the industrial sector.

Monitoring of Ambient Air Particles and Inorganic Elements in China and Korea during an Asian Dust Storm

Concentrations of ambient air particles such as total suspended particulates (TSP), particulate matter <TEX>$(PM)_{10}$</TEX>, and <TEX>$PM_{2.5}$</TEX>, were monitored simultaneously from May to June, 2007, at four locations at Alashan and Beijing in China, and Seoul and Gosan in South Korea. These monitoring sites are in the pathway of Asian dust (AD) storms traveling from China to the Korean peninsula. An AD event was observed in the Korean peninsula on May 25-26. During the sampling period, the average concentrations of TSP and PM10 were each higher than <TEX>$150\;{\mu}g/m^3$</TEX> in Alashan and Beijing, but not in Seoul and Gosan. The concentration of TSP in Alashan (where the dust storm originated) on the day of the AD event reached <TEX>$1824.7\;{\mu}g/m^3$</TEX>, this being the highest concentration of air particles observed during the sampling period. The level was decreased to 15% of this (<TEX>$274.7\;{\mu}g/m^3$</TEX>) in Seoul and to 8.7% (<TEX>$159.0\;{\mu}g/m^3$</TEX>) in Gosan when the AD was observed two days later in Korea. Gosan, a representative background site in East Asia, displayed the lowest concentration of particles, with this maximal TSP concentration of <TEX>$159\;{\mu}g/m^3$</TEX>. Inorganic element contents in the air particles were also measured, and the concentrations in the four different regions compared. Concentrations of anthropogenically-enriched heavy metals in <TEX>$PM_{10}$</TEX> and <TEX>$PM_{2.5}$</TEX>, such as lead, arsenic, cadmium, and mercury, were higher in the metropolitan cities of Beijing and Seoul compared to non-industrialized regions of Alashan and Gosan. However, the concentrations of inorganic soil elements including iron, magnesium, aluminum sodium, and manganese, were higher in Alashan compared to those in other sampling sites.

Chinese‘Anti-Soviet’Policy in 1970's

In 1970's, A few important elements in China's modified understanding of the forces shaping the course of international politics were Soviet's expansionism, Nixon doctrine, and Japan's rise as a major power. At that time, in Chinese eyes, the expansion of Soviet in Asia represented a present threat to China security, and of the two superpowers the Soviet was clearly the more aggressive. In order to cope with international situation, China adopted 'Three Worlds' diplomatic strategy which purposes to 'anti-Soviet'.<BR> This paper intends to analysis chinese 'anti-Soviet' policy in realistic aspect. First, make Chinese realistic perception to international situation clear in 'Three World' diplomatic strategy. and next, base on these Chinese perception tries to find out What was 'anti-Soviet' policy and estimate Chinese foreign policy to every region of the world include US in 1970's.

China's Legal and Policy Frameworks for Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit‐Sharing from their Use

Access to genetic resources and benefit‐sharing has been an issue heatedly debated and negotiated in the past decade, at both national and international levels. While most of the international negotiations are slowly dragging on, countries have begun to turn to national legislation or policy making to safeguard their interests. As one of the countries rich in genetic resources, China's responses under these circumstances are important in shaping the final outcomes of the international negotiations, but also the future implementation of relevant international instruments, if any. This article captures important access and benefit‐sharing‐related provisions or elements in China's key related laws and policies, in particular the most recent ones, with a view to identifying existing gaps and future challenges.

Distribution Characteristics of Sulfur and the Main Harmful Trace Elements in China's Coal

Abstract: To promote the rational development and use of clean coal resources in China, data on the regional and age distribution of sulfur, arsenic and other harmful elements in Chinese coal was broadly collected, tested for content, and analyzed. Coal in northwestern China is characterized by low to extremely low levels of sulfur; the coal of the Taiyuan Formation in northern China mainly has high‐sulfur content; that of the Shanxi Formation is mainly characterized by low sulfur coal; and the Late Permian coal in southern China has overall higher sulfur content; other regions have low sulfur coal. The average content of harmful trace elements in the bulk of China's coal is similar to the corresponding content in the coal of the North America and the rest of the world, whereas the content of various elements (Hg, Sb and Se) is different in magnitude to the corresponding percentage in the crust. The average content of the elements Cr, Se, Co, Be, U, Br in Late Permian coal in S China ranks first in the country whereas the average content of Hg and CI in the coals of Late Carboniferous to Early Permian age in N China are the highest. The average content of Mn in Early and Middle Jurassic coal is higher in NW China. The high content of harmful elements in some coal should cause particular concern both in the development and utilization of coal.

Landscape Elements and Hantaan Virus–related Hemorrhagic Fever with Renal Syndrome, People’s Republic of China

Hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome (HFRS) is an important public health problem in the People’s Republic of China, accounting for 90% of human cases reported globally. In this study, a landscape epidemiologic approach, combined with geographic information system and remote sensing techniques, was applied to increase our understanding of HFRS due to Hantaan virus and its relationship with landscape elements in China. The landscape elements considered were elevation, normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI), precipitation, annual cumulative air temperature, land surface temperature, soil type, and land use. Multivariate logistic regression analysis showed that HFRS incidence was remarkably associated with elevation, NDVI, precipitation, annual cumulative air temperature, semihydromorphic soils, timber forests, and orchards. These findings have important applications for targeting HFRS interventions in mainland China.

Establishing the reference range of urinary formed elements by UF-100 in china

目的 调查中国健康人群尿沉渣有形成分正常参考范围.方法 在全国6个城市(北京、上海、广州、重庆、武汉和哈尔滨)的9家医院,使用相同的方法,检测正常人群(7 453名,其中男4 164名,女3 289名,年龄为1～93岁)随机中段尿液,了解其红细胞、白细胞、上皮细胞及管型的数量.研究期间,各实验室均进行严格的室内质量控制,保证结果的准确性和稳定性.结果 UF-100检测尿液有形成分生物参考范围:(1)红细胞:男:0～17个/μl;女:儿童 0～21个/μl,成人0～27个/μl.(2)白细胞:男:儿童0～12个/μl,成人0～16个/μl;女:儿童0～21个/μl,成人0～36个/μl;(3)上皮细胞:男:儿童0～6个/μl,成人0～8个/μl;女:儿童0～11个/μl,13～55岁成人0～40个/μl,55岁以上成人0～22个/μl;(4)管型:男:儿童0～0.6个/μl,成人0～1.0个/μl;女:儿童0～0.6个/μl,成人0～0.8个/μl.正常人群尿液红细胞、白细胞、上皮细胞及管型检测结果性别之间、儿童与成人之间(除红细胞外)差异显著.结论 本研究为建立中国健康人群随机尿液红细胞、白细胞、上皮细胞及管型的正常参考范围建立基础性数据,为尿液有形成分检查规范化、标准化推广和临床应用提供中国人自己的依据。

Regional differences in Chinese agriculture: Results from the 1997 First National Agricultural Census

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINESE AGRICULTURE The development of the Chinese agricultural sector and its capability to increase agricultural production is gaining a greater importance for food security and food trade on a worldwide scale. Considering the size of China, this could influence international food prices, and thus determine major problems for food-importing developing countries. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) remains predominantly a rural country, but its economy is characterized by strong macro-regional differences owing to factor endowments (human capital, resources and infrastructure) and differences in the structure of agriculture and other economic sectors. Economic development in China has registered uneven economic growth in favour of the coastal region (vs. inland and border ones), the urban areas (vs. rural areas) and the industrial sector (vs. the agricultural sector). During its transition the Chinese economic system faced strong structural changes. One of the main changes is certainly the reduction of the share of the agricultural sector in relation to total GDP and labour force. Indeed, the rural enterprises (or township and village enterprises, TVEs) are the leading and most dynamic elements in China’s economy. Therefore, the integration of agricultural activities with other economic activities in the rural areas is of great importance and interest [Biggeri, M., 1998; Giovannini, 2000].

Sustainable development in China: from knowledge to action

China has been at the forefront of initiatives designed to translate some of the outputs of the 1992 Earth Summit into reality. It was the first country to produce a national Agenda 21 (in early 1994). Since then, a conscious attempt has been made to integrate sustainable development considerations into the country's national development strategy. Little attention, however, has been given to the mechanisms through which China has attempted to move from debates on the meaning of sustainable development to practical actions that are intended to promote it. This paper discusses key elements in China's response to the imperatives of sustainable development and reviews the actions taken at the national level and in the case of Guangdong Province.

Food Culture and Thought of Five Elements in China

Food Culture and Thought of Five Elements in China

Chinese Press Coverage of Political and Economic Restructuring of East Central Europe

The systemic changes in East Central Europe (ECE)1 in 1989-90 caused weighty concern among the decision makers in the People's Republic of China (PRC). There were at least three factors behind their anxiety. First, past Sino-ECE interactions included several instances in which ECE domestic developments exerted a substantial impact upon Chinese domestic politics. Twice before, in 1956 and 1980-81, the Chinese leadership took the perceived influence of ECE developments seriously and acted accordingly.2 Since the fall of communism in ECE offered a set of practical guidelines (readily available to all anti-socialist elements in China) on how to overthrow the rule of the Communist Party, it unquestionably posed a new, and to date probably the most serious, challenge to the Chinese political status quo. Second, throughout the 1980s, East Central European economic and political reforms constituted a source of inspiration, guidance, and justification for similar reform efforts in China.3 Many of China's leaders believed

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Chinese Constitutional Movement

The revolutionary elements in China, which moved into the foreground with the impromptu Wuchang insurrections of 1911, were by no means in agreement with programs and tactics. A radical group headed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), wished to abolish the monarchical system altogether and convert China into a republic. A number of liberal reformists headed by K'ang Yu-wei (1858-1927) and his disciple, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (1873-1929), clung to the ideal of a limited monarchy. They would accept the continuation of the Manchu, or Ch'ing, dynasty (1644-1911) if it were willing to renounce absolutism and promote progress.

The distribution of P elements in D. melanogaster along the coast of China studied by DNA hybridization method.

The distribution of the P-M system in four local Drosophila melanogaster populations obtained in southern China has been examined by mating tests. There was no P strain. A HindIII fragment of the P element has been cloned, named as pPH 0.86, and used as probe in this study. The distribution of the P element itself in thirteen local D. melanogaster populations along the eastern coast of China has been studied by the method of DNA hybridization. It is found that all the populations obtained from the north of Shanghai carry P elements but few populations from the south of Shanghai carry P elements. In comparison with the mating test, the method of DNA hybridization is more direct and reliable. The origin and trends of distribution of P elements in China are discussed in this paper.

Li Tsung-Jen and the Demise of China's "Third Force"

The decision of the former Acting President of China, Li Tsung-jen, to end his self-imposed exile in the United States, appeared to many as an anti-climax to turbulent career. As the chief figure in the powerful Kwangsi clique, Li had been the focus of several national movements in pre-war China, standing in opposition to Chiang Kai-shek. During the period prior to 1949, however, Li had not been considered as serious personal rival to Chiang for national leadership. His opposition was principleand policy-oriented, based upon divergent conception of China's problems and the strategies necessary to achieve their solution. Both men were aware of the need for national unity and the necessity of strong military power for its realization. But during the period between 1925 and 1936, General Li Tsung-jen hesitated to cooperate on behalf of national unity at the cost of sacrificing all local and provincial autonomy. He frequently referred to the dangers inherent in building nation-state from the top and the center. Unity founded and maintained merely on military and political manipulation represented both an expensive and an ephemeral deceit in his view. The high point of Li's career as national figure in 1948-49 may be considered classical exercise in political futility. First as Vice-President and later as caretaker President, he was supported by the remaining liberal elements in China at moment when the Republic was on the brink of military disaster and when its morale and legitimacy were at the lowest ebb. When Li chose exile in the United States, it was decision when Li's basic mood toward the two major forces in Chinese politics was best expressed by the oft-repeated phrase, a plague on both your houses, and with the hope that an aseptic and democratic third force could still be established. General Li was often fond of referring to himself as the son of Kwangsi peasant. Although his family had formerly been of middle-peasant status, their fortunes declined while he was still boy. He studied the classics and traditional histories for time and then entered nearby military academy, where he secretly joined the revolutionary T'ung Meng Hui. After graduation from the academy in 1912, he was appointed commander of company of local troops and soon found himself involved in local conflicts among the Kwangsi warlords. The first few years after the collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty were characterized by rapid political disintegration in Kwangsi, as in the rest of

The Future of Foreign Concessions in China

.ALTHOUGH completely ignored in the present conflict between Japan and China, a contributing factor has, in all probability, been Chinese resentment over the question of the Settlements and Concessions held by various foreign Governments, including Japan, which in conjunction with corollary privileges of tariff control and extraterritoriality constitute a denial of Chinese sovereignty over territories ostensibly their own. To some extent, therefore, in their hatred for the Japanese there is doubtless considerable anger against the entire system of imperialistic enterprise as practiced in China, with its implied stigma of racial inferiority and backwardness. As a matter of fact, since the Shanghai Incident of I925 this privileged position of foreign has been the object of outright challenge by nationalistic elements in China, and in certain instances retrocession of has been secured. The determination of the Chinese Government to effect this return has become so strong as to raise the question whether here as well Western enterprise is not on the way out. In the past year of the Sino-Japanese conflict there has been considerable sympathy in the Occident for China as the under-dog in the struggle against the stronger Japan. Therefore, as a logical sequitur it would appear only natural to expect, if China emerges successful from the present conflict and proceeds to put its house in order, that the Western Powers will translate their former sympathy into concrete terms by the voluntary surrender of present holdings, including claims to special rights and privileges, to the Chinese Government. Of course, it might be added that it is very surprising that no action of this kind has been taken up to this time. The cry in China for the recovery of interests has gone on for more than a quarter of a century, and was a contributory factor in the fall of the Manchu dynasty in i9ii. However, no definite