Knowledge and PrivacyAs U.S. health care slowly moves toward an integrated system of electronic health records, questions of justice with respect to the use of health information become more pressing (Safran et al., 2006). Better information should mean more knowledgeable providers and patients. But it also will mean more knowledgeable insurers, which in the U.S. gives health insurers greater selectivity about whose coverage to deny or whose premiums to increase. This paper argues that from a social contract point of view of health information, such risk selection by insurers is unjust. The argument is based on the definitive work of John Rawls (1971; 1996; 2001). The injustice of risk selection can easily be remedied by regulation.It is misleading to view moral issues about health information as entirely about privacy. A morally significant idea of privacy depends on the situation in which information is used (Havani, 2007). In health care and in insurance, sharing information on health risks is a necessary and normal part of management. The 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, for instance, reflects this by giving the entities covered by this law permission to disclose protected health information, if this disclosure is part of treatment, payment, or health care operations (45 CFR 164.502[a][1][ii]). This reasonable exception for health care operations, however, is quite broad and includes insurers.Suppose that a patient checks into a hospital and gives consent for relevant information to be shared among care providers, but then the patient is found to have another condition requiring treatment by other providers; for example, the patient has an infection but is found to have HIV. No one would want to impose a barrier to the provision of care, even if the patient is incapacitated and unable to give consent.But payment for care is also part of health care operations. As is explained below, in nearly every case this must be done by some form of health insurance, whether public or private. It is inevitable and necessary to share information with health insurers. The important moral question is what insurers do with this information. This paper argues that there are clear moral limits on this.Health InsuranceInjustice with respect to access to health insurance is especially pressing because, in nearly all cases, health care must be distributed by means of insurance, either public or private. It is worth noting, however, why this point may not have always seemed important, and has not figured in the literature on health care justice. Moral problems about health insurance are superficial in contrast with the morally deeper problem of prioritizing care. Access to health insurance coverage does not determine what is covered and in what order of priority. So this paper will leave untouched the deeper problem of health care justice.But for a social contract theory of health justice it is helpful to distinguish the issue of health insurance access from the deeper issues. Moral questions about health insurance resemble the questions about equity with respect to class and wealth that motivate social contract theories. It is helpful to see that this part of the problem of health care justice can be treated in this familiar way. The leading social contract theorist of health care justice, Norman Daniels (1985), overlooks the possibility of this partial solution to the problem of health care justice, perhaps in part because the deeper problem of prioritization is not addressed this way.This paper, however, does not deal with the issue of income distribution because equity in wealth and income is already a central issue in any social contract theory. This paper moves beyond this issue by assuming that if any of the parties does not have enough money to make insurance payments, wealth or income is redistributed to make these payments on that party's behalf. This paper then argues that the problem of health insurance access can be reduced to the familiar problem of equity with respect to wealth. …