Electoral Threshold Research Articles

Winning Alone: The Electoral Fate of Independent Candidates Worldwide

Independent candidates are widely believed to influence the quality of representation through issues as fundamental to democracy as government accountability, responsiveness, and electoral turnout. Their impact, however, hinges on their electoral strength, which varies widely within and across countries. In order to explain this variation, this study examines which aspects of electoral systems affect independents the most and why. Based on a statistical analysis of 34 countries around the world between 1945 and 2003, this study finds that electoral systems influence the electoral strength of independent candidates by defining the opportunities for independents to compete for office (i.e., ballot access requirements), the degree to which politics is candidate centered versus partisan driven (i.e., majority/plurality rule, district magnitude, open-list PR, and democratic transitions), and the extent to which small vote getters win seats (i.e., district size and electoral thresholds). Accordingly, not only do independents influence the nature of representation, but so too do the ways in which electoral systems influence independent candidates.

Law pertaining to political parties and political pluralism — freedom of the foundation and functioning of political parties in post-communist Hungary

This paper studies the law pertaining to political parties in Hungary, from the viewpoint of establishing and maintaining of political pluralism. In the period of 1989–1990, the transition from the one-party system to the democratic and pluralistic state of law could be followed up relative to the development of the law pertaining to the political parties, which is based on the rules that foreclose the contingent development of unconstitutional political system.The paper reviews the concept of the political party according to the constitutional law, the normative framework of functioning and the regulations of the internal organization of political parties. The provisions of primary importance concern: a) equality of political parties, b) forbidden purposes and instruments, c) rules of incompatibility, d) state subvention. Rules concerning the internal organization require the openness and the prevailing of democratic will-making also inside the political parties, so contribute to the maintaining the democratic competition of political parties.The author emphasizes the factors that determine multiparty-system, and argues that electoral thresholds and the effective method of state-financing of political parties contest the principle of equality and harm the fair-competition. Thresholds and subvention are both based on the effectiveness of political parties-though being capable to prevent the party system and the parliament from fragmentation, nonetheless, they prefer extensively, if not unconstitutionally, the political parties in the Parliament, so they can be seen as being designed to protect the current political elite.

ORDENANDO EL CAOS: ELECCIONES LEGISLATIVAS Y REFORMA ELECTORAL EN COLOMBIA

Teniendo en cuenta los resultados de las elecciones al Senado de marzo de 2006, este articulo hace una evaluacion de la reforma politica de 2003 en Colombia a partir de sus elementos constitutivos: el umbral, la cifra repartidora, las listas unicas y el voto preferente. Dicho analisis permite establecer que la reforma cumple con su objetivo basico de fomentar la cohesion partidista en el plano electoral. El articulo incluye, ademas, un analisis de los factores que, en el contexto de las nuevas reglas, estarian incidiendo en las posibilidades de exito electoral de los candidatos al Senado. En la conclusion, se discute como la reforma, por diseno, solo tiene alcances en el comportamiento electoral de los partidos y como, para efectivamente producir un sistema de partidos cohesionados y disciplinados, es necesario modificar tambien el comportamiento legislativo de los partidos y el esquema de financiacion de campanas.

Judicial Review of Electoral Thresholds in Germany, Russia, and the Czech Republic

Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and PolicyVol. 4, No. 3 Original ArticlesJudicial Review of Electoral Thresholds in Germany, Russia, and the Czech RepublicKieran WilliamsKieran WilliamsSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:26 Aug 2005https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2005.4.191AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB Permissions & CitationsPermissionsDownload CitationsTrack CitationsAdd to favorites Back To Publication ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail FiguresReferencesRelatedDetailsCited byEditorial30 April 2022 | ACTA POLITOLOGICA, Vol. 14, No. 2Equality, Proportionality and the Constitutionality of the Czech Electoral System30 April 2022 | ACTA POLITOLOGICA, Vol. 14, No. 2From the Porcellum to the Rosatellum : ‘political elite-judicial interaction’ in the Italian laboratory of electoral reforms2 May 2019 | Contemporary Italian Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2The Growing Litigiousness of Czech Elections6 June 2008 | Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 6 Volume 4Issue 3Sep 2005 InformationCopyright 2005, Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.To cite this article:Kieran Williams.Judicial Review of Electoral Thresholds in Germany, Russia, and the Czech Republic.Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy.Sep 2005.191-206.http://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2005.4.191Published in Volume: 4 Issue 3: August 26, 2005PDF download

Why parties adapt: Electoral reform, party finance and party strategy in Belgium

From the May 2003 elections on, a new 5% electoral threshold was introduced in Belgium. The threshold was intended to curb a further fragmentation of the Belgian party system, and indeed, three small parties are now in danger of losing their autonomy. Mechanical effects, however, proved to be quite limited with only three seats shifting as a result of the threshold. Since we find no strong indications of strategic voting, Duverger's psychological mechanism seems to have a stronger impact at the elite level than at the mass level. Rules on party finance play a key role in this process: in Belgium, as in other countries, parties have become increasingly dependent on state money and this dependency serves as a powerful incentive for strategic co-ordination. Rules on party finance should be integrated more fully in the future study of the results of electoral reform.

Electoral Systems and Political Transformation in Post-Communist Europe by Sarah s> Birch (review)

REVIEWS 153 lie. They are criticalof the failureof the United Statesto do more to promote democracy and economic reform, particularly in I99I-92. The fact that acrimony over such issuesas NATO enlargement or Kosovo did not resultin a return to the Cold War is taken to show that 'historyhas vindicated those Wilsonians in all three U.S. administrations who believed that Russian transformationwas a U.S. securityinterest'(p. 365). 'Realists' might respond that Moscow's acquiescent attitude reflected consciousness of its weakness. The authors themselves remark on the 'breathtakingspeed' of Russia's decline as a major power (p. 359); where Khrushchev once dreamt of overtakingthe West, Putin now aspiresto catch up with Portugal.As ispointed out, therewas a lag inWashington'sperception of this, and in his firstterm Clinton had no higherforeignpolicy prioritythan the support of El'tsin. But later in the decade Russia received much less attention, and lessconsiderationwas given to thewishesof itsleaders.In other respects,too, the storytold here seems to vindicate a 'realist'perspective.The valuable statistics(and tables) on aid not only show how small the American effortwas in comparisonto that of Europe (especiallyGermany)but also how much more aid was provided for securitypurposes (thedismantlingof Soviet nuclear and chemical weapons) than for economic assistance or democracy promotion. This reflected the prioritiesof Congress, which of course has to appropriatethe funds. Whatever latitude of choice the United States enjoys with respect to its external environment, there are significant internal constraintson policymakers'ability to chart the nation's course. In this case, the influence of domestic lobbies is apparent over NATO enlargement, the distribution of aid between Russia and the Newly Independent States (especiallyUkraine)and the amount thatwent in the form of food. Finally, there is the question of how much influence on Russian internal developments the United States could have had a subject on which the authors seem in two minds (p. 40). The dream that propaganda and foreign aid can produce an American-styledemocracyin Russiadatesbackat least to I9I7. The authors are evidently close to Russian reformerswho shared this aspiration,but historysuggeststhatin both countriesmost people have always had otherpriorities. StCatharine's College, Cambridge JOHN A. THOMPSON Birch, Sarah. ElectoralSystemsand Political Transformation in Post-Communist Europe. One Europe or Several? Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke and New York, 2003. xii + 2 I2 pp. Notes. Tables. Appendices. Bibliography. Index. ?45.00? THIS is an important and well-written contribution to the fast-growing literature on electoral systems and party politics in the new democracies of Eastern Europe. The main aim of the book is to explore the influence of electoral systemson the degree of inclusion of citizens into political processes and to establish the patterns of impact of electoral systems on party system institutionalization. Included in the study are lower house parliamentary elections between i990 and 2002 in twenty states of East-Central Europe 154 SEER, 83, I, 2005 (ECE);only Azerbaijan,Belarusand Yugoslaviabefore 2000 were left out on the basis of not being democratic enough by international standards. The book convincingly demonstrates its main hypothesis, namely that electoral systems have a systematic impact on how representativestructuresfunction even in the period shortly after regime change. The first part serves as an introductionto the generaldiscussionaboutthe originsof electoralinstitutions in ECE. In the second part the relationship between electoral rules and inclusion of voters into political processes is explored. The third part deals with questions of how electoral institutions influence the size and shape of partysystemsanditsoverallstabilityandchange. The analysisissupplemented with a summaryof electoralresultsin all countriesunderconsideration. Even though the relationshipbetween electoralsystemsand partycompetition is notoriously complex, the author argues that in establishing electoral institutions,politicians in ECE in many cases took a long-term view and did not necessarilychoose the electoral rulesthat would enhance theirindividual or party chances. Moreover, despite ratherfrequent tampering with various aspects of electoral systems (e.g. gradual increases in electoral thresholds), generallythe electoralinstitutionsshow considerablestabilityand persistence. Unlike the single member district (SMD) majority systems used in the Communistperiod, all new democraciesuse electoralsystemswith important (or only) proportional representation components. In addition, in many countrieselectoral systemsare specifiedin the constitutions,a practice rather unusualin WesternEurope. Because no countryin ECE adopted compulsoryvoting, variousaspectsof electoral institutions and other political variables (e.g. closeness of political competition or support for the left...

Electoral Institutions, Unemployment and Extreme Right Parties: A Correction

In their 1996 article in this Journal, Robert Jackman and Karin Volpert analyse the systematic conditions that influence the electoral success of extreme right parties in sixteen West European countries from 1970 to 1990. In particular, they focus on the effects of unemployment, electoral thresholds and multi-partism.

Individual characteristics, institutional incentives and electoral abstention in Western Europe

Abstract. This article examines the interaction between individual characteristics and institutional incentives in non–voting, with a special focus on the interaction between these two types of explanatory variables. The analysis of survey and contextual data for parliamentary elections in 15 Western European countries shows that the effect of individual resources and motivations on abstention is not constant across different countries. Conversely, the effect of institutional incentives (compulsory voting, voting facilities, electoral thresholds of representation and preference expression) on non–voting depends on the elector's level of resources and motivations. One of the four institutional incentives considered has even opposite effects for citizens with different individual characteristics. The analysis also shows that when analysing interactions it is fundamental to distinguish between magnitudes and consequences of the effects of explanatory variables. This has important implications for the interpretation of the results of logistic regression analysis.

Determinants of disproportionality and wasted votes

The aim of this article is to explain differences in disproportionality. The dependent variable has two components. One is the index of disproportionality created by Michael Gallagher (1991). The other component consists of the amount of wasted votes, i.e. votes that are given to representatives of parties which fail to gain representation in parliament. Three independent variables are used: district magnitude, electoral thresholds, and the combined measurement of these variables, namely the effective threshold. The test reveals that while Gallagher's index of disproportionality is affected by district magnitude and the effective threshold, the amount of wasted votes remains, with the possible exception of a weak link to electoral thresholds, unaffected by changes in the independent variables. Explanations for the findings are introduced and discussed.

Maximising small party potential: The effects of electoral system rules on the far right in German sub‐national elections

Drawing on a data base of election results at national, regional and sub‐national level, this paper examines the impact of the German electoral system on the representation of far right parties. While the electoral threshold of five per cent is a hindrance to small parties at all levels, low district magnitude at sub‐national level tends to exacerbate under‐representation and the minority status of small parties while high district magnitude may result in over‐representation, in particular if a party secures around ten per cent. The paper concludes that electoral representation of small parties with limited resources is affected by votes gained, district magnitude and seat distribution at a given electoral level. Depending on the combination of these factors, the system of translating votes into seats may favour or disadvantage small parties.

Poland's Three Parliaments in the Era of Transition, 1989-1995

Poland's experience in democratic transformation is to some degree different from that of other post-communist nations because of its having been the first country to depart from a communist regime. It therefore had a relatively long period of power-sharing, negotiated at the Round Table conference in early 1989. The first parliament (1989-91) reflected the contractual arrangements of the Round Table and was not fully representative. The second parliament (1991-93) was paralyzed by extreme fragmentation. The third parliament, elected in 1993, is more consolidated but suffers from the absence of right-wing parties due to their failure to reach the required electoral threshold. During Lech Walesa's presidency (1990-95), relations between the president and parliament were tense, particularly after the left's victory in the 1993 election. Nonetheless, parliamentarism has survived in Poland and the democratic system has avoided constitutional crises. Poland's experience confirms the superiority of parliamentarism over presidentialism in new democracies.

Votes, seats and power: 1996 parliamentary election in the Czech Republic

This paper gives a brief survey of the results of the 1996 election to the Lower House and the Upper House of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. Methodology of power indices is used to evaluate voting power and relative influence of the parties represented in the parliament. A comparison with the 1992 electoral results is provided. The regional dimension of the electoral results is discussed, and a hypothetical impact of different values of electoral threshold on the structure of parliament is analyzed.

Electoral System Effects on Women's Representation

This study considers the effects of electoral system structure on women's representation in national legislatures. Research done in Western Europe finds women's representation is positively affected by party magnitude; tests for similar effects in Costa Rica are done and confirm this hypothesis. The effects of electoral thresholds are also considered. The Costa Rican electoral threshold increases disproportionality and enhances the likelihood of producing parliamentary majorities, as expected. Moving beyond these traditional findings, the threshold also has a positive effect on the descriptive representativeness of the legislature by increasing party magnitudes and thereby increasing the representation of women. The study ends by suggesting the electoral studies field needs to expand its evaluation criteria to not only consider representativeness in terms of reflecting party support, but also consider representativeness in terms of accurately mirroring society at large, that is, descriptive representation.

Conditions Favouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe

We examine the systemic conditions that have influenced the electoral success of parties of the extreme right in West European politics from 1970 through 1990. Empirical estimates based on 103 elections in sixteen countries suggest that electoral and party-system factors interact with each other to generate conditions conducive to these parties. Specifically, increasing electoral thresholds dampen support for the extreme right as the number of parliamentary parties expands. At the same time, multi-partism increasingly fosters parties of the extreme right with rising electoral proportionality. Our analyses also indicate that higher rates of unemployment provide a favourable environment for these political movements. These results suggest that levels of electoral support for the extreme right are sensitive to factors that can be modified through policy instruments.

The Politics of Electoral Reform in Israel

This article falls into three main sections. The first outlines the basic features of the Israeli electoral system established in 1949, with minor amendments in the allocation formula (in 1973) and the electoral threshold (in 1992). The second covers unsuccessful proposals to reform Knesset elections in the periods 1949-77, 1977-90, and 1990 to date. The last section explains the causes of the introduction in 1992 of direct elections for the prime minister, and evaluates their possible conse quences.Since its first Knesset (parliamentary) elections in 1949 Israel has employed an electoral system with a single nationwide district, a propor tional representation allocation formula, and a strict list ballot. The basic alternative considered by Israeli politicians was the employment of a mixed system. Although reform proposals have been raised since the establishment of the state of Israel, no major change of the system has taken place until the March 1992 reform of the Government Basic Law. Following Israel's only successful vote on no-confidence, the Knesset adopted a governmental reform according to which the prime minister will be elected directly by voters. The directly elected prime minister must gain, however, the Knesset's confidence in his or her government. The present nature of the reform is such that a possible conflict between the prime minister and the Knesset may lead to a political and constitutional catastrophe.

Simpler than its reputation: The electoral system in Denmark since 1920

Studies of electoral systems sometimes have difficulties in puzzling out the intricacies of the Danish Folketing electoral system. This paper aims at demonstrating that this particular electoral system is less complicated than it seems. It will also be demonstrated that the system has been remarkably stable in its basic structure, not having been subjected to major changes since 1920. However, changes in some of the system's components have been introduced over the years, permitting a discussion of the effects of such changes. In order to provide an adequate understanding of the system, relevant seat allocation rules, electoral thresholds, and district magnitude problems are presented and discussed. Furthermore, the effects of these electoral law variables on the representation of parties in parliament are tested empirically. One conclusion is that the Danish electoral system is simpler than it is usually regarded. This conclusion accepts the assertion that the system's central level is the national level, where seat allocation rules provide for a very proportional representation of major as well as minor parties (above an electoral threshold). The congruity between vote and seat shares is measured by Loosemore and Hanhy's D, while the reduction in the effective number of parties—going from elective to parliamentary panics—is measured by Taagepera and Shugart's r. This interpretation of the Danish electoral system also entails its categorization among those electoral systems where the decisive allocation of seats takes place at the national level.

Comparative Green Politics: Beyond the European Context?

It is argued that there are significant differences between green electoral politics in Europe and green developments in the affluent non-European west, and that these are such that, despite the greater political formalization of the green movement in Western Europe, there is a sense in which North American and Antipodean developments are ultimately more fundamental than those that have occurred in Europe. Loosely adopting explanatory categories employed by Rudig and Lowe in a Political Studies article, we examine evidence under four sub-heads: electoral thresholds; the historical legacy of the environment movement; the different contextual roles played by the anti-nuclear movement and wilderness experience, and ecology, Marxism and the new left.

Political Equality and Election Systems

Previous articleNext article No AccessPolitical Equality and Election SystemsJonathan W. StillJonathan W. Still Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 91, Number 3Apr., 1981Special Issue: Symposium on the Theory and Practice of Representation Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/292249 Views: 44Total views on this site Citations: 12Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1981 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Nicholas Dzoba Guarding against imperium : The implications of Pettit’s theoretical framework for a model of neo-republican democracy, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 46 (Jul 2022): 1–23.https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2022.2104554Arash Abizadeh Representation, Bicameralism, Political Equality, and Sortition: Reconstituting the Second Chamber as a Randomly Selected Assembly, Perspectives on Politics 19, no.33 (Jan 2020): 791–806.https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719004626Gregory Conti Parliament the Mirror of the Nation, 24 (Apr 2019).https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108582469Nenad Stojanović Bibliographie, (Sep 2013): 321–346.https://doi.org/10.3917/scpo.stoja.2013.01.0321RYAN PEVNICK Democratizing the Nonprofit Sector*, Journal of Political Philosophy 21, no.33 (Feb 2012): 260–282.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2011.00414.x Political equality, wealth and democracy, (May 2010): 1–32.https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511844805.002Eliora van der Hout, Anthony J. McGann Liberal political equality implies proportional representation, Social Choice and Welfare 33, no.44 (Mar 2009).https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0382-8Stig Jarle Hansen, Mark Bradbury Somaliland: A New Democracy in the Horn of Africa?, Review of African Political Economy 34, no.113113 (Sep 2007): 461–476.https://doi.org/10.1080/03056240701672585Kieran Williams Judicial Review of Electoral Thresholds in Germany, Russia, and the Czech Republic, Election Law Journal 4, no.33 (Jul 2005): 191–206.https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2005.4.191Guy-Uriel E. Charles Mixing Metaphors: Voting, Dollars, and Campaign Finance Reform, Election Law Journal 2, no.22 (Jun 2003): 271–283.https://doi.org/10.1089/153312903321578232Albert Weale Social Choice Versus Populism? An Interpretation of Riker's Political Theory, British Journal of Political Science 14, no.33 (Jan 2009): 369–385.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400003653Samuel Long Abstracts of Documents in this Supplement, (Jan 1982): 1–576.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-5214-1_1