Electoral Motivations Research Articles

Does Regional Favoritism Affect Public Investment Budget Allocation? Evidence from Cameroon in the Context of Decentralization

Do officials appointed by the President of the Republic to high positions of responsibility in Cameroon’s public administration influence the allocation of the Public Investment Budget (BIP) in their native departments? If so, what are the motivations and consequences of this type of regional favoritism? To answer this question, we exploited an original database that includes all 58 departments in Cameroon from 2013 to 2020. The results indicate that officials appointed by the President of the Republic who are born in specific departments receive preferential treatment in the allocation of subnational discretionary BIP. This regional favoritism is driven more by electoral motivations than economic considerations. Indeed, to retain their appointed position, which is a discretionary act of the President of the Republic, officials maneuver to ensure that their department of origin benefits more from state subsidies to maximize total electoral and political support. However, regional favoritism has a significant socio-economic impact on the population residing in the native localities of the appointed officials. It creates an inefficient BIP allocation because it leads to an unequal distribution of BIP between departments and the implementation of projects that are not aligned with the actual needs of the beneficiary population. Thus, Cameroon’s public authorities adopt a BIP allocation formula primarily based on budgetary constraints and the socio-economic needs of the population.

How do intra-party dynamics impact the party elite’s immigration policy manoeuvres? The case of German Social Democrats

AbstractThis article examines the Social Democratic Party of Germany’s (SPD) approach to immigration and the role of party activists in shaping its policies. The article delves into the party’s response to the 2015 refugee crisis and its aftermath, utilising the discourse taken by the party’s leading figures and interviews with party elites, exploring their perceptions of activists and their constraints on immigration policies. The findings reveal that the influence of party activists is beyond their official power within the organisational structure, and their nestedness within the party affects the party elite’s policy- and decision-making on immigration. Given the potential backlash from activists, the study underscores the party elites’ cautious approach to policy shifts and emphasises the significance of leadership skills, the party’s image and electoral motivations in navigating intra-party dynamics and policy-making. Ultimately, the research highlights the delicate balance SPD elites seek in addressing immigration issues within its party structure.

Ministers Engage in Favoritism Too

To study favoritism by cabinet members in 36 African countries, we hand-collect birthplace information for all cabinet members (2001–2015). Focusing on health outcomes, we provide causal evidence of favoritism by health ministers and, less so, key ministers. Neonates’ and infants’ mortality is lower when the current health minister originates from their region, especially for children of vulnerable (rural-based or uneducated) mothers. Co-regional health ministers also increase healthcare access at birth, particularly for vulnerable mothers. Thus, healthcare access likely explains part of the mortality-lowering effects. We find evidence for ethnic motives playing a role in favoritism but not (short-run) electoral motives.

Social Learning and Policy Adoption: Evidence from an Education Reform in Brazil

We investigate the role of social learning among local government officials in fostering the diffusion of an education programme presented with a reasonable degree of technological and political uncertainty about its outcomes, the schooling decentralisation reform in the state of São Paulo, Brazil. We consider different natures of the exchange of information on the newly adopted tasks, and assess which aspects of the returns to programme participation were most valued by officials in their learning process. Specifically, we attempt to determine the extent to which adherence to the reform resulted from electoral motivations rather than from concerns regarding the quality of education. We present evidence that social learning constitutes a key factor to policy implementation, and we find that mayors that could run for re-election became more likely to support the programme upon receiving good news about its electoral returns. By contrast, information on experiences that were successful in improving the quality of education appears to have been valued and effectively put to use only by term-limited officials or when conveyed by copartisan neighbours.

Do Peers respond? Attendance and critical events

What motivates Peers to attend legislative sittings? Sitting attendance is a symbolic way for legislators to show citizens that they are being productive and hence is often explained by electoral motivations that Peers lack. I argue that Peers make decisions to attend sittings when critical events threaten their position in the legislature. Attending at these times—namely after scandals and House of Lords reform debates—is an attempt to counteract negative impressions about the House and its members. Other critical events that may impact elected legislators such as terrorist attacks and natural disasters should have no impact on Peers attendance. Using a newly compiled dataset on attendance and critical events, I show that Peers respond by increasing attendance only after House of Lords reform debates in either House; attendance after scandals, natural disasters, and terrorist attacks is unchanged. This suggests that Peers are responsive in only the most urgent cases: when they are in the spotlight and the future of the House is on the line. More broadly, I offer the first empirical investigation of symbolic responsiveness among unelected legislators and show that there are some situations where said legislators feel the need to respond.

Bridging the Gap between Electoral and Participatory Democracy: The Electoral Motivations behind Participatory Budgeting in Chicago

This paper explores the electoral dynamics of participatory budgeting projects in Chicago, IL, a topic neglected in the participatory democracy literature. Combining qualitative fieldwork with electoral data, I argue participatory budgeting is more likely to be adopted by elected officials who identify as progressive, face strong electoral competition, and are non-incumbents. These officials mobilize support for participatory budgeting to enhance their democratic legitimacy and build their constituency networks. In contrast to research focused on participatory budgeting as a non-partisan deliberative initiative, I attribute the uneven emergence of participatory budgeting projects in Chicago to the strategic electoral interests of aldermen, suggesting explanations of participatory budgeting focused on the drivers of the process should assign a greater role to electoral interests. More broadly, this research suggests approaching policy transfer as a contextually embedded process that precludes normative assumptions about particular policies absent a consideration of the institutional and social environment.

Electoral motives and the subnational allocation of foreign aid in sub-Saharan Africa

This paper examines how electoral motives shape the subnational allocation of foreign aid commitments by employing a newly constructed geocoded dataset for 14 sub-Saharan African countries over the period 2000–2012. Our results provide strong evidence of a core voter strategy: African leaders diverting Chinese aid towards regions with a high concentration of political supporters. However, no evidence of such preferential treatment is found for World Bank aid, suggesting that aid from traditional donors is less vulnerable to political manipulation. Our results also reveal that checks and balances in recipient countries are an important mediating factor of aid misallocation: while copartisan regions receive larger amounts of Chinese aid in environments with weak checks and balances, these effects disappear when stronger checks and balances are in place. This paper also offers case study evidence from Ghana. Exploiting the 2009 regime change in Ghana and using a difference-in-differences framework, we provide further support of copartisan targeting and confirm that Chinese aid is more manipulable than World Bank aid in this respect.

Fiscal stance, election year and 2007 crisis, evidence from OECD countries (1980–2017)

The purpose of this article is to explain the rapid narrowing of fiscal room of manoeuvre following the 2007 crisis in the Eurozone by analysing the fiscal cyclicality of a sample of 19 OECD countries over the period 1980–2017, with a focus on the election year, the government ideology and the pre-crisis period. We adopt a comparative approach based on the introduction in the dynamic panel model the dummy variables relating to the subgroups of the sample and applying the system generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator. During the period before the crises, in the upswings in the Eurozone, we find evidence for the existence of procyclical stance in the election year with a symmetric effect regarding to the government’s ideology. Also, in the downturns, the election year leads to a countercyclical fiscal stance in the non-PIIGS countries with a larger effect in the case of left-wing government. Moreover, the effect of the left-wing government in the downturns depends exclusively on electoral motivations in the Eurozone but both electoral motivations and Keynesian ideologies in non-Eurozone countries. Then we show that the change in the fiscal stance due to political factors has contributed to weakening the resilience to the 2007 crisis particularly in Eurozone countries.

General or central government? Empirical evidence on political cycles in budget composition using new data for OECD countries

Previous studies used general government data to examine whether national governments’ electoral motives and ideology influenced budget composition in OECD countries. General government data includes, however, the state and local level. Using new data for general and central government over the period 1995–2016, I reexamine political cycles in budget composition. The results suggest that, both at the general and central government level, leftwing governments spent more on education and less on public services than rightwing governments. Defense expenditure was somewhat lower under leftwing than rightwing governments and in election years; especially in federal states. Effects of government ideology on the individual expenditure categories are larger at the central than general government level. Scholars need to re-examine results on ideology-induced effects that have been derived from general government data where central government data should have been used.

General or Central Government? Empirical Evidence on Political Cycles in Budget Composition Using New Data for OECD Countries

Previous studies used general government data to examine whether national governments’ electoral motives and ideology influenced budget composition in OECD countries. General government data includes, however, the state and local level. Using new data for general and central government over the period 1995-2016, I reexamine political cycles in budget composition. The results suggest that, both at the general and central government level, leftwing governments spent more on education and less on public services than rightwing governments. Defense expenditure was somewhat lower under leftwing than rightwing governments and in election years; especially in federal states. Effects of government ideology on the individual expenditure categories are larger at the central than general government level. Scholars need to re-examine results on ideology-induced effects that have been derived from general government data where central government data should have been used.

Electoral incentives and Public Employees’ Retirement Systems in Brazilian municipalities

This paper tests whether Brazilian mayors manipulate the funding policies of Public Employees’ Retirement Systems (PERS) owing to electoral motivations, using an unexplored dataset containing the statements of contributions prepared by municipal governments that we match to four nationwide elections. In Brazil, PERS are active in more than 2000 municipalities and must collect contributions from public-sector employees and local governments to meet their defined benefit promises. The institutional context provides variation in both reelection incentives and the funding of PERS that allows for credible estimation: term limits and close races generate exogenous variation in incentives, and the large increases in contribution rates mandated by a national pension reform, implemented by municipalities with different lags, provide the necessary variation in the funding practices. Overall, the regression discontinuity estimates support the hypothesis that mayors seeking reelection in competitive environments reduce the flows of funding to municipal PERS. Moreover, the results confirm the notion that while politicians have benefited from the changing legislation and a lack of supervision in the past, less room for strategic maneuvering has been open recently.

“We are Rodrigo Duterte”: Dimensions of the Philippine Populist Publics' Vote

Populism is about populist publics as much as it is about populist leaders. Presently, they are pejoratively represented in public and academic conversations. Populist voting is mostly approached as a social pathology, especially in mainstream populism studies. This study is a contribution to the emerging tradition of extending empathetic approaches to the study of populist publics by interrogating how populist supporters make sense of their votes and politics through their own perspectives. Using a year‐long political ethnography of supporters of populist Philippine president Rodrigo Roa Duterte in a big slum community in Metro Manila, this research offers an intimate understanding of the electoral motivations of those who voted for him. Specifically, their vote for the populist Duterte is about making their everyday misery visible, bringing authenticity to politics, and overcoming bureaucratic inertia. Empirical observations in the field reveal the unique threefold representational, experiential, and action‐oriented dimensions of populist publics' vote in the Philippines.

Living abroad, voting as if at home? Electoral motivations of expatriates

Abstract The share of voters participating in national elections from abroad is evergrowing. Despite this, expatriates constitute one of the most understudied groups of electors. Some existing analyses have shown that expatriates support different parties than voters residing at home. However, the reasons for this effect remain in the dark. In this article, we test common electoral theories—socio-structural, socio-psychological, and issue voting—and their relevance for voters at home and abroad. Additionally, we test if differences in voting behaviour are due to compositional or behavioural reasons. In line with previous studies, we show that expatriates support other parties, in the Swiss case left parties, than voters at home. We further show that this gap cannot be explained by the different composition of the expatriate community but rather by their different behavioural motivations. Expatriates more often base their vote choice on their social class and religious beliefs. Partisanship voting and, to some extent, issue voting are less important in the expatriate community. The findings are based on the Swiss National Election Study 2011 and additional interviews conducted among Swiss residing abroad.

A little justification goes a long way: audience costs and the EU referendum

That governments may not always keep their election promises or that they change policy positions may be unsurprising. However, failed promises, backing down on threats or flip-flopping on policy positions may be associated with a loss in support. Bringing together literature on the politics of electoral promises, policy shifts and audience costs, we examine the conditions under which a political leader can back down on a promise, using the EU referendum in the UK as a case study. Based on a survey experiment conducted in the aftermath of the 2015 general election, we examine whether justifications grounded on electoral motives, internal and external opposition would have allowed then Prime Minister David Cameron to avoid paying audience costs for going back on his campaign promise. Our results indicate that domestic audience costs might have been manageable, with only slightly more than a quarter of the participants in our study punishing executive inconsistency regardless of the justification employed. Of particular interest for European Union scholars, justifying backing down due to opposition from other EU member states is particularly effective in mitigating domestic audience costs.

Elected MPs, Traditional Chiefs, and Local Public Goods: Evidence on the Role of Leaders in Co-Production From Rural Zambia

What types of leaders are effective in organizing public goods that require community contributions? In many settings, both citizens and state agencies provide financing, labor, and oversight of local projects. This article analyzes the effects of elected Members of Parliament (MPs) and hereditary chiefs in facilitating co-produced public goods in Zambia. MPs have electoral motivations to provide public goods but may not be well-positioned to organize community contributions. Chiefs lack electoral incentives but typically have long time horizons and local social connections. I analyze the effects of both types of leaders on the provision of co-produced public goods through a natural experiment. I take advantage of lapses in leadership following the deaths of leaders in office to show that chiefs have a significant effect on co-produced public goods but MPs do not. Auxiliary analysis suggests that chiefs’ effect on community contributions depends on the length of their time horizons.

Disentangling political and institutional determinants of budget forecast errors: A comparative approach

This paper provides a unique comparison between French and Portuguese local governments with respect to the nature and determinants of budget forecast errors. It starts by documenting and comparing their statistical properties. The results point at biased and inefficient budget forecasts, which seem to have been more cautious in French departments than in Portuguese municipalities. Second, we examine the political, institutional and economic determinants of forecast biases. Overall, we find that they are essentially driven by electoral motivations and by institutional differences across the two countries. In particular, opportunistic forecasting is more prevalent where governments enjoy greater margin of maneuver, and there is evidence of conservatism in French departments where fiscal autonomy is greater.

The Birth of Pork: Local Appropriations in America’s First Century

After describing a newly assembled dataset consisting of almost 9,000 local appropriations made by the U.S. Congress between 1789 and 1882, we test competing accounts of the politics surrounding them before offering a more nuanced, historically contingent view of the emergence of the pork barrel. We demonstrate that for most of this historical period—despite contemporary accusations of crass electoral motives—the pattern of appropriations is largely inconsistent with accounts of distributive politics grounded in a logic of legislative credit-claiming. Instead, support for appropriations in the House mapped cleanly onto the partisan/ideological structure of Congress for most of this period, and only in the 1870s produced the universalistic coalitions commonly associated with pork-barrel spending. We trace this shift to two historical factors: the emergence of a solid Democratic South, and growth in the fraction of appropriations funding recurrent expenditures on extant projects rather than new starts.

#NeverTrump: Why Republican members of Congress refused to support their party’s nominee in the 2016 presidential election

In an election characterized by countless headlines, the refusal of Republicans to support their party’s nominee was a constant topic of discussion in 2016. Our paper looks to explain why Republican members of Congress joined the so-called #NeverTrump movement. In the first part, we document the varied—and often contradictory—explanations of the #NeverTrump movement offered by journalists, pundits, and politicians during the campaign. We then categorize these popular explanations into four theoretical categories: policy preferences, identity, electoral motivations, and establishment dynamics. In the second part, we test the varied claims. We believe two findings stand out and have broader implications for American politics. First, despite the popular belief that members of Congress are single-minded in their pursuit of reelection, we found that a lawmaker’s religion and sex—both in the identity category—had the largest effects on the decision to join the #NeverTrump movement. Second, the results show that establishment Republicans were more likely to support Donald Trump’s candidacy. Notably, the direction of this effect is inconsistent with popular explanations of the #NeverTrump movement but consistent with a range of academic studies.

Electoral motives, constituency systems, ideologies, and a free trade agreement: The case of Japan joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations

This study examines the relationship between candidates and voters in the dispute over a free trade agreement. We theoretically show that candidates’ electoral promises about a free trade agreement are related to the economic interests of their districts, the types of constituency systems under which they compete with one another, and their ideologies. We empirically confirm the theoretical expectations, using as a case study the 2012 general election in Japan, where whether to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) talks was one of the biggest issues. The TPP tends to be opposed by voters working in the agricultural sector and those living in districts with a larger amount of cultivated land, whereas it tends to be supported by college-educated voters and those living in districts with more export manufacturers. Accordingly, candidates tend to oppose (support) the TPP when their districts have a larger stake in agriculture (export manufacturers) and a smaller (larger) number of college-educated voters. Further, proportional representation candidates are more supportive of the TPP; likewise, candidates and voters who prefer a small government and who emphasize the Japan–United States relationship tend to support the TPP.

The economic determinants of party support for European integration

Parties and their elites play an important role in shaping public opinion towards European integration. As determinants of party support for European integration, the literature has identified ideological and strategic electoral motives. In this article, we examine the impact of economic factors on party support for European integration. We find that party support from right-wing parties is larger in countries with greater financial benefits from the EU budget. On the contrary, benefits from trade creation by the introduction of the euro as a common currency show no significant influence on party support. In the period after the introduction of the euro, we find that right-wing parties were much more Euro-sceptical than left-wing parties when their country did not fulfil the Maastricht debt or deficit criteria. We also observe more support for European integration by left-wing parties in countries that would benefit from welfare state convergence due to European integration. While our analysis indicates that different economic factors always have been important to explain party support for European integration, we also find that, in the period after the financial crisis in 2008, these motives have gained importance at the expense of the ideological motives.