Electoral motives, constituency systems, ideologies, and a free trade agreement: The case of Japan joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between candidates and voters in the dispute over a free trade agreement. We theoretically show that candidates’ electoral promises about a free trade agreement are related to the economic interests of their districts, the types of constituency systems under which they compete with one another, and their ideologies. We empirically confirm the theoretical expectations, using as a case study the 2012 general election in Japan, where whether to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) talks was one of the biggest issues. The TPP tends to be opposed by voters working in the agricultural sector and those living in districts with a larger amount of cultivated land, whereas it tends to be supported by college-educated voters and those living in districts with more export manufacturers. Accordingly, candidates tend to oppose (support) the TPP when their districts have a larger stake in agriculture (export manufacturers) and a smaller (larger) number of college-educated voters. Further, proportional representation candidates are more supportive of the TPP; likewise, candidates and voters who prefer a small government and who emphasize the Japan–United States relationship tend to support the TPP.