Electoral Mechanisms Research Articles

Citizenship Rights for Immigrants: National Political Processes and Cross-National Convergence in Western Europe, 1980–2008

Immigrant citizenship rights in the nation-state reference both theories of cross-national convergence and the resilience of national political processes. This article investigates European countries' attribution of rights to immigrants: Have these rights become more inclusive and more similar across countries? Are they affected by EU membership, the role of the judiciary, the party in power, the size of the immigrant electorate, or pressure exerted by anti-immigrant parties? Original data on 10 European countries, 1980-2008, reveal no evidence for cross-national convergence. Rights tended to become more inclusive until 2002, but stagnated afterward. Electoral changes drive these trends: growth of the immigrant electorate led to expansion, but countermobilization by right-wing parties slowed or reversed liberalizations. These electoral mechanisms are in turn shaped by long-standing policy traditions, leading to strong path dependence and the reproduction of preexisting cross-national differences.

Playing the Game of Democracy Through the Electoral Mechanism: The Democratic Party Experience in Turkey

The commitment to the procedural rules of democracy, particularly to the electoral mechanism, on the part of political leadership is considered necessary for the establishment and survival of democracy. However, the political actors' commitment to the electoral mechanism does not guarantee the well-being of the democratic regime. In newly established democracies, the electoral mechanism itself can also function as a disadvantage to democracy if it is manipulated by the political elite. Based on this assumption, this article analyzes the case of Turkey's Democratic Party (DP, Demokrat Parti) under the leadership of Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes between 1946 and 60 and demonstrates that political actors can exploit the electoral mechanism by either rescheduling elections or amending the electoral regulations despite their acceptance of it as one of the basic procedural rules of democracy.

From Patron-Client Mobilization to Constitutionally Constrained Competition

When the difference between winning and losing elections is large, elites have incentives to use ethnicity to control access to spoils, mobilizing some citizens and excluding others. This paper presents a new electoral mechanism, the turn-taking institution, that could move states away from ethnically-mediated patron-client politics. With this mechanism, the whole executive term goes to a sufficiently inclusive super-majority coalition; if no coalition qualifies, major coalitions take short, alternating turns several times before the next election. A decision-theoretic model shows how the turn-taking institution would make it easier for mass-level actors to coordinate on socially productive policy and policy-making processes. We argue this institution would raise the price elites would pay to deploy and enforce exclusive ethnic markers.

A Difficulty in the Concept of Affirmative Action: Evidence From Females in Legislatures

History’s societies vary on a number of dimensions, but appear more homogenous in distributing socioeconomic status across sexes. This appearance prompts the question of whether forces that are robust to laws and regulations might contribute to the persistence of sex-differences in hierarchical attainment. Given this motivation, we empirically evaluate Suzanne Scotchmer’s (2008) model of sex differences in risk aversion where (1) winner-take-all games (e.g., promotions in hierarchies) favor inherently risk-taking males, but (2) successful females maintain greater skill on average and (3) see this skill-advantage depreciate with repeated play. This model formally identifies an internal inconsistency in affirmative action law, an inconsistency for which we find empirical support in how the sex composition of national legislatures differs across electoral mechanisms (i.e., winner-take-all chambers employ a significantly greater proportion of males) and how re-election prospects for US Representatives differ by sex (i.e., females enjoy significantly longer durations, but only when evaluated early in their incumbencies). These results cannot easily be dismissed as statistical artifacts, and alternative models can (at best) rationalize our cross-sectional or time series results, but not both.

Replacement Effects and the Slow Cycle of Ideological Polarization in the U.S. House

Ideological polarization and partisan enmity is arguably the driving force of the past several decades of U.S. electoral history. Today there is a vast ideological gulf between elected Democrats and elected Republicans in Congress and elsewhere. But this pattern is not unique in U.S. political history. McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006), using the first dimension of DW-NOMINATE scores for the U.S. House, show compelling evidence for a cyclic pattern of ideological convergence and divergence over the period 1856-2006 that we call the accordion effect. Our interest is in the electoral mechanisms that must be in place to generate observed contemporary dynamics rather than in causality per se. First, in a model of one-dimensional ideological competition, for a fixed distribution of constituency medians, we model the gap between the mean Democratic and the mean Republican position in Congress as the product of two (potentially interrelated) factors: (1) the mean difference in roll call voting scores (first DW-NOMINATE dimension) when a Republican in a district is replaced by a Democrat (or conversely) and (2) the likelihood that districts of a given ideological stripe will elect Democrats (Republicans). We then formally model possible dynamics involving partisan replacement, leading to either increasing or reduced polarization. We suggest that one such dynamic, where each party “chases the tail” of the other party that is closest to its own position, has been the driving force in enhancing polarization since 1980. We suggest however, that a quite different replacement dynamic was found in much of the first half of the 20th century, one leading to considerable overlap in party ideologies by the 1950s that lasted through the 1970s.

The Political Economy of Resource Rent Distribution

I model the link between political regime and level of diversification following a windfall of natural resource revenues. The explanatory variables I make use of are the political support functions embedded within each type of regime and the disparate levels of discretion, openness, transparency, and accountability of government. I show that a democratic government seeks to maximize the long-term consumption path of the representative consumer, in order to maximize its chances of re-election, while an authoritarian government, in the absence of any electoral mechanism of accountability, seeks to buy off and entrench a group of special interests loyal to the government and potent enough to ensure its short-term survival. Essentially the contrast in the approaches towards resource rent distribution comes down to a variation in political weights on aggregate welfare and rentierist special interests endogenized by distinct political support functions.

Rewriting Nigerian Federal Constitution: A Prescriptive Argument for a Self-Sustaining Arrangement

What is required for Nigeria's federal constitutional arrangement to be stable and self-sustaining? This article answers this question by drawing on the classical and contemporary theories of federalism that explain the ways in which federalism survives. It combines these classical and modern theories and uses the combined ideas to make a context-sensitive normative argument in four issue areas, namely: the constituent units; the party system; the allocation of competencies; and fiscal autonomy. The article notes that a stable and self-sustaining federal constitutional arrangement will require the following: allowing the states to stabilize as genuine self-governing units; power separation to make the country's electoral incentive mechanism effective; devolved responsibilities to make statehood meaningful for groups; and a fiscal arrangement that permits the constituent units to fend for themselves but does not eliminate transfer payments completely.

Explanations for States Adopting Limits on Educational Spending

It is not obvious why voters choose to constrain themselves by imposing term limits on politicians or spending limits when they can throw an official out of office if he or she spends too much or makes other decisions that displease them. Between 1976 and 1983, voters in nearly a third of the states adopted spending limits on school districts. This paper tests a number of untested hypotheses about why some states adopt spending limits and others do not. The novel results suggest that spending limits are adopted in states in which (1) voters can easily place initiatives on the ballot, (2) house prices are outstripping income, (3) the electoral mechanism is less effective in getting rid of politicians who selected the wrong tax rates, (4) there is excessive state spending due to common-pool problems found in large legislatures, and (5) schools are less efficient due to little competition among school districts.

Why was democracy lost in Russia's regions? Lessons from Nizhnii Novgorod

The phenomenon of crony capitalism has been explored primarily with reference to its impact on economic growth. This study investigates the political implications of crony capitalism and, specifically, the interaction between political competition and crony capitalism. Based on a case study of a political trajectory in one of the regions of the Russian Federation, I argue that under crony capitalism political competition can undermine the legitimacy of state authorities and such democratic institution as the electoral mechanism. Played out in public during the electoral campaigns unrestricted political competition uncovers the predatory nature of crony elites engaged in struggle for power and wealth and increases public perceptions of corruption.

Cuotas de género y tipo de lista en América Latina

Las reformas electorales llevadas a cabo en algunos países de América Latina, a partir de los '90, han producido resultados cuyo análisis es ineludible para la comprensión del acceso de las mujeres a los cargos electivos. En la actualidad, no existe un consenso respecto a cómo afectan los elementos del sistema electoral a la participación política femenina bajo las leyes de cuotas, en particular en lo referente al tipo de lista (bloqueada o desbloqueada) y la magnitud de distrito. Este artículo intenta, a través del análisis de los resultados electorales de esas provincias, aportar nuevos elementos empíricos al debate sobre los efectos del tipo de lista en el acceso de las mujeres a los legislativos, en sistemas con cuotas de género.

Sex Differences in Risk-Taking? Evidence from Female Representation in Legislatures

History's societies vary on numerous dimensions, but appear relatively homogenous in how they distribute socioeconomic status across sexes. This homogeneity begs the question of whether forces that are robust to formal and informal institutions influence sex differences in status. We address this question by empirically evaluating evolutionary models of hierarchical attainment where sex-differences in risk-taking play an axiomatic role. These models imply that (1) winner-take-all games favor males, but (2) successful females maintain greater skill on average. We find support for these implications in how the sex-composition of national legislatures differs across electoral mechanisms (i.e., majoritarian chambers employ a significantly greater proportion of males) and how US Representatives' re-election prospects differ by sex (i.e., females enjoy significantly longer durations). These results cannot easily be dismissed as artifacts of endogeneity bias, and alternative models can (at best) rationalize our cross-sectional or time series results, but not both.

Electoral Systems in a Divided Society: The Case of Afghanistan

Electoral systems can be powerful instruments for shaping the content and practice of politics in divided societies, such as Afghanistan; and their design needs to be closely linked to context. This paper explores the suitability of Afghanistan's electoral mechanisms in light of the nation's political system, social divisions, and the process, which led to their adoption. There is no perfect electoral system; and the winners of the country's first-ever presidential election and the subsequent assembly elections face the formidable challenge of transforming Afghanistan from a war torn fiefdom into a nation. Hamid Karzai's victory and Afghanistan's improved, although fragile, security environment appear to represent an important step toward democracy. Yet, elections and electoral mechanisms are a necessary but insufficient means to the introduction and endurance of constitutional democratic government. The legitimacy of Afghanistan's new democratic institutions will rest on the government's progress in producing results, such as disarming the private militias of powerful commanders, some of whom represent sizeable ethnic minorities, and curbing the burgeoning poppy cultivation. An electoral system is but one piece, significant but not the linchpin, of the schema of Afghan political dynamics.

Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns

Despite a pervasive presence in politics, lying has not traditionally played a role in formal models of elections. In this paper we develop a model that allows candidates in the campaign stage to misrepresent their policy intentions if elected to office, and in which the willingness to lie varies across candidates. We find that candidates more willing to lie are favored, but that this advantage is limited by the electoral mechanism and to such an extent that more honest candidates win a significant fraction of elections. Most notably, the possibility that some candidates lie more than others affects the behavior of all candidates, changing the nature of political campaigns in an empirically consistent manner. This effect also implies that misleading conclusions will be drawn if homogeneous candidate honesty is assumed.

Of Iron Or Rubber?: People's Deputies of Hong Kong to the National People's Congress

This paper discusses the tension between the legal and political limits placed on Hong Kong deputies to the National People's Congress (NPC) of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and their increasing assertiveness in representing Hong Kong in both national and Hong Kong matters. It discusses how the Central Authorities control the membership of the Hong Kong deputies to the NPC through controlling its electoral mechanism, and analyzes the rights and duties of the Hong Kong deputies in Hong Kong and in the Mainland, and the obstacles they encountered in performing their functions. This paper analyses this issue through case studies and illustrates the gradual change of the Central Authorities from prohibiting comments by deputies on Hong Kong affairs to encouraging deputies to support the Hong Kong government. The paper concludes that while the political influence of the Hong Kong deputies are increasing, their role, as well as the extent of the application of the NPC system in general, within Hong Kong's political structure remains ambiguous. To enable the Hong Kong deputies better serve their bridging functions between Hong Kong and the Mainland, their functions must be institutionalized and regularized.

On the Persistent Political Under-Representation of Muslims in India

This Paper is divided into three sections. In the first section I provide a brief historical overview of Hindu-Muslim relations in India and of the condition of Indian Muslims today. I conclude by claiming that Indian Muslims are a marginalized minority who have been persistently underrepresented in political institutions, particularly in the Indian Parliament. This section is important for those who are less informed about these issues—and I assume that most readers fall in this category. In the second section, I examine the case for political representation for Muslims. This was a much debated issue in pre-independent India. It was debated with subtlety and in considerable detail in the Constituent Assembly debates on the Indian constitution. However, with the partition of the country and the formation of the separate state of Pakistan, all debate on the political representation of Muslims ceased. I examine the merits and demerits of the case for the political representation of Indian Muslims. I also attempt a brief explanation of why this issue has virtually disappeared from the public arena in India. I conclude in the section that although political representation of Muslims qua Muslims is desirable, it is still unfeasible in the prevailing situation in India. In other words, I would support the recommendation to the Indian State that political rights not to be granted to any religious community. If political theory was to remain a handmaiden of state policy, then the matter ends right here. However, since I believe that political theory must think for the long run and design just institutions and policies for the future, and since, there is, I claim, no principled objection to the political representation of Muslims, in the third and final section I briefly outline which of the several electoral mechanisms are best suited to ensure fair political representation for Muslims in the future. In my view, the principle of fair political representation for Indian Muslims is best fulfilled by a complex mechanism consisting of preferential voting in multi-member constituencies with intra-party quotas in proportion to the overall population of Muslims in the country.

On the Persistent Political Under-Representation of Muslims in India

This Paper is divided into three sections. In the first section I provide a brief historical overview of Hindu-Muslim relations in India and of the condition of Indian Muslims today. I conclude by claiming that Indian Muslims are a marginalized minority who have been persistently underrepresented in political institutions, particularly in the Indian Parliament. This section is important for those who are less informed about these issues—and I assume that most readers fall in this category. In the second section, I examine the case for political representation for Muslims. This was a much debated issue in pre-independent India. It was debated with subtlety and in considerable detail in the Constituent Assembly debates on the Indian constitution. However, with the partition of the country and the formation of the separate state of Pakistan, all debate on the political representation of Muslims ceased. I examine the merits and demerits of the case for the political representation of Indian Muslims. I also attempt a brief explanation of why this issue has virtually disappeared from the public arena in India. I conclude in the section that although political representation of Muslims qua Muslims is desirable, it is still unfeasible in the prevailing situation in India. In other words, I would support the recommendation to the Indian State that political rights not to be granted to any religious community. If political theory was to remain a handmaiden of state policy, then the matter ends right here. However, since I believe that political theory must think for the long run and design just institutions and policies for the future, and since, there is, I claim, no principled objection to the political representation of Muslims, in the third and final section I briefly outline which of the several electoral mechanisms are best suited to ensure fair political representation for Muslims in the future. In my view, the principle of fair political representation for Indian Muslims is best fulfilled by a complex mechanism consisting of preferential voting in multi-member constituencies with intra-party quotas in proportion to the overall population of Muslims in the country.

Democracy-Promoting Judicial Review in a Two-Party System: Dealing With Second-Order Preferences

The tension between judicial review and democratic principles remains the most significant problem in modern constitutional theory. Yet this tension may be resolved in the context of “political stalemate.” Political stalemate arises when both parties in a two-party system find it electorally advantageous to ignore a given political issue, even when majorities favor reform on that issue. This can occur when (a) majorities favor reform as only a secondary preference, and (b) a swing-voting minority exists which has intense preferences against reform. When political stalemate materializes, judicial activism toward reform serves democratic ends primarily by breaking the stalemate and encouraging open contestation on the issue. These are functions that electoral mechanisms simply cannot perform, and they point toward a democratic defense of the Supreme Court's decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut and Lawrence v. Texas.

Credit Assignment and Federal Encroachment

Opportunistic encroachment by the national government on state policy domains erodes the robustness of federal unions. Theories of electoral and political safeguards of federalism suggest that the political process protects federalism’s boundaries. This article develops a theory distinguishing riskseeking and risk-avoiding political behavior and applies its insights to the debate about the sufficiency of the political process to police federalism. Under average conditions, the political process deters encroachment, but under more extreme conditions it fails: elected officials set policy according to the risk associated with their electoral retention rather than the policy’s expected return to the voters or the health of the federation; this manipulation of the risk environment may lead a central government to encroach upon a state’s domain opportunistically. The federal problem of credit assignment exposes a weakness in the political safeguards theory to protect federalism’s boundaries: electoral mechanisms both encourage and discourage encroachment. Due to this fallibility in the political process, judicial intervention in federalism disputes may be justified.

Corruption, Democracy, and Economic Growth

Scholars have long suspected that political processes such as democracy and corruption are important factors in determining economic growth. Studies show, however, that democracy has only indirect effects on growth, while corruption is generally accepted by scholars as having a direct and negative impact on economic performance. We argue that one of democracy's indirect benefits is its ability to mitigate the detrimental effect of corruption on economic growth. Although corruption certainly occurs in democracies, the electoral mechanism inhibits politicians from engaging in corrupt acts that damage overall economic performance and thereby jeopardize their political survival. Using time-series cross-section data for more than 100 countries from 1982–97, we show that corruption has no significant effect on economic growth in democracies, while non-democracies suffer significant economic harm from corruption.

Expatriates and Elections

This article offers an analysis of an important aspect of transnational politics: emigrants' participation by voting in the elections that take place in their countries of origin. In the past few decades, an increasing number of countries have allowed their expatriates to vote in such home state elections. Expatriate voting might be considered a form of transnational politics, or political globalization, or a way to adjust democracy to conditions of greater human mobility. Italy and Mexico recently enfranchised their expatriate citizens, and expatriates first voted in the elections of 2006 in both countries. Tager's article examines the different electoral mechanisms the two countries established to accommodate expatriate citizens, the procedures they enacted for registration, and the similarities and differences between the expected and actual impact that expatriate voters had on the 2006 elections in Italy and Mexico. Using the Italian and Mexican cases, Tager explores reasons for the trend toward allowing expatriates to vote and also evaluates the implications for democratic practice in having relatively large transnational populations potentially deciding the outcome of elections in countries in which they no longer reside.