Electoral Goals Research Articles

Why Do They Tweet? The Use of Twitter by U.S. Senate Candidates in 2010

Recently, pundits and scholars have suggested that social network sites (SNSs) have fundamentally changed political campaigns. While SNSs may certainly have changed how information flows between citizens, activists and political elites, candidates still use SNSs to fulfill their electoral goals. Therefore, this paper explores Twitter use by Senate candidates in the weeks prior to the 2010 Midterm Election in an effort to determine what leads to use of SNSs during campaigns. The central findings of this paper are: 1) candidates tweet and spend money more when in competitive electoral setting, which suggest in both cases that resources are allocated strategically, and 2) outcomes are not influenced by the allocation of resources in one universal way. Different resources may have different influences on important electoral outcomes.

An Integrated Model of U.S. State Attorney General Behavior in Multi-State Litigation

AbstractMulti-state lawsuits, filed by U.S. state attorneys general (AGs), have become an important method by which state consumer protection laws are enforced. Patterns of participation in these lawsuits vary tremendously across the states, yet little is known about the factors driving this variation. I argue that state AGs are primarily concerned with achieving electoral and policymaking goals. Consequently, I expect AGs to be responsive to strong consumer interests and to participate in cases with severe infractions. Additionally, whether it is for public interest or electoral goals, AGs should be attracted to cases that promise bigger settlements. My analysis of each state's decision to join each of 172 multi-state lawsuits filed and settled between 1989 and 2002 provides support for each of these hypotheses.

Neighborhood Associations, Social Movements, and Populism in Brazil, 1945–1953

Neighborhood Associations, Social Movements, and Populism in Brazil, 1945–1953

Black Mayors in Non-Majority Black (Medium Sized) Cities: Universalizing the Interests of Blacks

The nature of political representation of Black constituents' interests from their elected Black representatives is changing in the twentyfirst century. Increasingly, African Americans are being elected to political offices where the majority of their constituents are not African American. Previous research on this question tended to characterize Black politicians' efforts to represent their Black constituents' interests in two frames: deracialized or racialized (McCormick and Jones 1993; Cruse 1990). However, the advent of the twenty-first century has exhausted the utility ofthat polarization. Black politicians no longer find explicit racial appeals appropriate for their electoral goals, given the changing demographic environment, and greater acceptance of African American politicians in highprofile positions of power. Black politicians also increasingly find that a lack of attention to racial disparities facing constituents within their political boundaries does not effectively address why certain groups like Blacks are disproportionately and negatively affected than others, across a range of issues. Rather than continue to make efforts to represent Black interests within those two frames, Black politicians have begun to universalize the interests of Blacks.

Applying the Methodology of Mechanism Design To the Choice of Electoral Systems

In this article we inquire into the strategic intent behind the design of election laws. Presuming that institutional designers are strategic and rational, we identify the extent of information incompleteness as determining their objectives for rule choice. For different levels of information incompleteness, we assess empirically the validity of explaining actual choices with designers' electoral goals. Using parameter-specific predictions for players' institutional preferences (obtained from a game-theoretic model which assumes electoral success as the design goal) we find that design does not always meet the criterion of elections-aimed rationality (electoral rationalizability). We identify a structural difference between levels of electoral rationalizability in two sets of European electoral reforms, those that accompanied the late 19th—early 20th-century franchise expansion, and those during the post-communist franchise creation in East—Central Europe. For the later sub-sample we rely on a qualitative assessment of electoral rationalizability since extremely high levels of information incompleteness in these cases do not allow us to apply the model reliably. We provide evidence linking the structural difference in electoral rationalizability between the two sub-samples and the sub-sample variation in electoral rationalizability in the late 19th—early 20th century to the quality of information available to the designers.

La oposición política: Otra cara del siglo XX mexicano

This book seeks to form a general portrait of the history of political opposition during the so-called century of the Mexican Revolution. According to the author, most of the literature on political opposition has examined it from the point of view of the post-revolutionary regime and its official party; thus, her aim is to present a counterpoint by outlining a narrative from the perspective of “the other side” (p. 9).Expanding the interpretative framework she developed in her study of the dissident movement of General Henríquez (Ruptura y oposición: El movimiento henriquista, 1945 – 1954, Cal y Arena, 2001) Elisa Servín defines opposition as an “organized political expression, almost always but not only around electoral goals, that is increasingly institutionalized in the form of a political party and that competes, questions, and confronts constituted power through political non-armed action, and whose oppositional path is variable” (p. 11). Her argument is that, notwithstanding the authoritarian character of twentieth-century Mexican politics, opposition mattered as a testimony of the country’s social diversity, as a limited but enduring channel for participation and protest, and as a force pushing for change long before the actual democratization process of the 1990s.The book is divided into six chronological sections spanning from the late Porfiriato to the defeat of the PRI in 2000. It encompasses a large and somewhat motley assortment of people, ideologies, parties, and episodes: among others, the Flores Magón brothers and the radical Partido Liberal Mexicano (1900s); the maderista anti-reelection movement (1910); the Partido Comunista Mexicano (1920s); the conservative Partido Acción Nacional founded by Gómez Morín (1939); Lombardo Toledano’s frustrated initiative to unify the left in a loyal opposition party (1940s); the defeat of the henriquista “revolutionary opposition” (1952); the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional, a progressive coalition headed by former president Lázaro Cárdenas (1960s); the reconfiguration of the left following Reyes Heroles’s electoral reform (1977); the boom of protests against fraud and the gradual acknowledgement of opposition victories in local elections (1980s); Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas heading the Corriente Democrática’s split from the PRI, and its eventual consolidation with a myriad of left-wing groups in the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (1989); Zedillo’s pivotal electoral reform (1996); and the victory of the PAN’s pro-business presidential candidate, Vicente Fox (2000).Ironically, the only common thread between such dissimilar individuals, organizations, and developments in Servín’s analysis is none other than the very target of their opposition: the PRI government. Thus, instead of producing a truly different understanding, La oposición politica simply inverts the same old PRI-centered perspective without breaking away from it — as do works such as Barry Carr’s Marxism and Communism in Twentieth-Century Mexico (University of Nebraska Press, 1992), Jeffrey Rubin’s Decentering the Regime (Duke University Press, 1997), or Soledad Loaeza’s El Partido Acción Nacional, la larga marcha, 1939 – 1994 (Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1999).There are, in addition, some analytical gaffes in the narrative. The claim about the opposition’s relentless aspiration to “the democratic ideal” in its struggles against “the authoritarianism of the regime that emerged from the revolution” (pp. 13 – 14) fails to problematize the changing meanings of democracy from the 1920s to the 1950s or the 1980s, nor does it take into account the differences between the authoritarianisms of Cárdenas, Alemán, Díaz Ordaz, López Portillo, or Salinas de Gortari. The assessment that the electoral fraud leading to the defeat of the opposition in 1952 “delayed the political development of the country by 30 years” (p. 55) is oblivious to the fact that authoritarian modernization was, alas, a form of political development. The reading of the 2000 election as the culminating point of “the long history of struggles for the democratic exercise of power that unfolded in the course of the twentieth century” (p. 75) is blatantly teleological and takes at face value the debatable democratic credentials of some opposition movements.On a positive note, besides providing the reader with a first-rate bibliographical section, Servín succeeds in qualifying the notion that there was no politics beyond the PRI (an overstatement that priístas took advantage of for decades); in spelling out the stakes of the opposition’s dilemma of participation in undemocratic elections; and in arguing insightfully that a telling sign of the opposition’s influence is to be found not in its electoral performance per se but in the political establishment’s varying responsiveness to its discourse and demands.Due to the contemporary relevance of its subject and to its potential for casting new light on the apparently familiar but still quite unknown history of the Mexican political system, La oposición política puts forth a multitude of riddles historians will have to unravel in the years to come.

Electoral goals and center-state transfers: A theoretical model and empirical evidence from India

We construct a model of redistributive politics where the central government is opportunistic and uses its discretion to make transfers to state governments on the basis of political considerations. These considerations are the alignment between the incumbent parties at the central and state levels and whether a state is a swing state or not. A testable prediction from the model is that a state that is both swing and aligned with the central government is especially likely to receive higher transfers. We test this prediction using Indian data for 14 states from 1974–75 to 1996–97. We find that a state which is both aligned and swing in the last state election is estimated to receive 16% higher transfers than a state which is unaligned and non-swing.

The Politics of Congressional Earmarking

Earmarking represents a particularly salient form of distributive politics in Congress. Drawing on the literature on distributive politics, we develop an argument that implies that party leaders will allocate earmarks to advance the electoral goals of the party. We test our expectations using a unique dataset that comprehensively matches legislative earmarks with their individual sponsors for the 110th Congress. The data provide clear support for the argument. Members of the majority party do considerably better than members of the minority party. Moreover, within parties, the distribution of earmarks favors electorally vulnerable members and those holding agenda-setting positions.

Electoral Goals and Center-State Transfers: A Theoretical Model and Empirical Evidence from India

We construct a model of redistributive politics where the central government is opportunistic and uses its discretion to make transfers to state governments on the basis of political considerations. These considerations are the alignment between the incumbent parties at the central and state levels and whether a state is a swing state or not. A testable prediction from the model is that a state that is both swing and aligned with the central government is especially likely to receive higher transfers. We test this prediction using Indian data for 14 states from 1974-75 to 1996-97. We ?nd that a state which is both aligned and swing in the last state election is estimated to receive 16 higher transfers than a state which is unaligned and non-swing.

Race, Party, and Contested Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives

Recent studies of contested elections in the House have pointed to party electoral goals as motivating their resolution in Congress. However, little systematic research has been conducted on why such elections were contested to begin with. Using historical data and new statistical analysis of such elections from the late nineteenth century, I find that, in contrast to the claims of some scholars, political principles as well as electoral objectives mattered to parties seeking to contest elections. In addition, election conditions, particularly the means by which southern white Democrats attempted to repress the vote of southern blacks, independently influenced the probability of contestation. This finding has implications for our understanding of Republican Party strategies and electoral conditions in the South during the period, and the origins of contested elections at other times in American history.

Crisis Communications After 9/11 in the U.S. Congress: The Use (and Abuse?) of Constituent Communications to Achieve Electoral and Institutional Goals

Crisis Communications After 9/11 in the U.S. Congress: The Use (and Abuse?) of Constituent Communications to Achieve Electoral and Institutional Goals

Political Parties, the Internet and the 2005 General Election: From Web Presence to E-Campaigning?

This article argues that the use of the Internet by the main British political parties during the 2005 general election campaign needs to be understood in terms of the ongoing transformation of e-campaigning in the UK. Since the emergence of the World Wide Web in the mid-1990s the main political parties have been quick to try and exploit the new technology to mobilise their supporters and persuade undecided voters. Over the course of three campaigns – 1997, 2001 and 2005 - clear patterns in the use of this technology have emerged. This article looks at how political parties in a competitive electoral marketplace try to adapt new information and communication technologies, such as the Internet, to help ensure they achieve their electoral goals. It argues that the evolution of the use of the Internet needs to be understood in terms of an ongoing series of responses of a vote maximising reflexive organisation, to the emergence of a new technology in a competitive electoral marketplace.

Predictors of Interest Group Lobbying Decisions

Both popular opinion and existing research suggest that money is the key predictor of interest group lobbying activity. However, this new research on interest group lobbying argues that the decision to spend money on lobbying is dependent on a range of resources, not just organizational wealth. Using a sample containing organizations that did and did not make lobbying expenditures in the 1998 election cycle, it shows how interest group resources explain differences in lobbying behavior among organizations with similar political goals. Despite the fact that both advocacy groups and labor unions seek electoral goals like getting new legislators into office, advocacy groups are less likely to spend money on lobbying than labor unions. In addition, firms are less likely to spend money on lobbying than trade associations, even though both types of groups primarily seek access to legislators. The availability of interest group resources, such as a committed membership and organizational experience, helps explain these differences in behavior. These findings suggest that fears about the corrupting influence of money on politics may be overstated.

Epistemic Communities and the Diffusion of Ideas: Central Bank Reform in the United Kingdom

In May 1997 the incoming Labour government gave the Bank of England operational independence in the setting of interest rates. This reform is puzzling as it was introduced by a party whose roots lie with the trade union movement, and resisted by the Conservatives whose political support comes largely from business, the financial sector and homeowners who stand to benefit most from price stability. Economic ideas are central to explaining the outcome. The Labour Chancellor was convinced by an epistemic community of monetary experts that central bank independence would achieve New Labour's electoral goals. These political incentives were absent for the Conservatives, who preferred to set interest rates strategically to increase their popularity with voters.

The Office of Communications

The Office of Communications is front and center in the White House effort to publicize the president and his policies. The importance of presidential communications can be seen in the manner in which the topic drives the agenda of daily staff meetings, the size of the commitment to it of White House and administration resources and people, and the way the function has insinuated itself into the operations of almost every White House office. While most White House offices are defined by the functions that come with the unit, the communications director's position is defined by his or her relationships with officials working inside and outside of the White House, including the president, the chief of staff, the press secretary, and officials in departments and agencies. There are three basic models for communications directors as they manage their operations: advocate with the press, strategist and planner, and events coordinator. At its minimum, the job entails events management, but its larger role is defining the message and strategic plan of a presidency.

Democratizing Party Leadership Selection

Because the task of choosing a candidate for a country's highest office is so important, political parties seek to devise more inclusive processes of selection, processes that are commensurate with the party's electoral goals. Often this has involved reforming an existing process in ways that open up the mechanisms of leadership choice to a wider `selectorate'. In such a process parties sometimes undergo changes well beyond what may have been anticipated when the reforms were first introduced. This article examines the process of leadership selection in three political parties that have undertaken major reforms in the process of leadership selection in recent years - the Democratic Party in the United States, the Labour Party in Britain and the Progressive-Conservative Party in Canada. In each instance, it is possible to demonstrate that the method chosen has had significant consequences for the parties themselves and for the party system as a whole, in part because of variations in the inclusiveness of the selectorates created, and also through effects on candidate recruitment.

Manipulating the Message in the U.S. Congress

This article focuses on politicians' efforts to shape the issue agenda outside Congress. Control of the issue agenda inside the institution is a central part of congressional politics. The majority party exerts extensive control over this agenda, and the minority party often works to subvert that control. However, legislators (particularly those in the minority party) may extend the battle over the congressional agenda beyond the internal operations of Congress by promoting their arguments in the news media. Shaping this broader issue agenda can help politicians pursue their policy and electoral goals. If legislators draw media attention to an issue, they may more successfully move related legislation through Congress. In addition, media attention may publicize legislators' claims and accomplishments to constituents. I find that coordinated support for a single message increases the likelihood that the message receives news coverage. This article illustrates how these media campaigns may be an underappreciated source of bias in our news coverage.

The Politics of Federal Credit Subsidy

Policy outcomes contain important information about how public sector managers respond to economic innovation and balance electoral and policy goals of elected officials. This article examines the quarterly distribution of Small Business Administration (SBA) credit subsidies across 14 industries to test the link between loan guarantee activity and economic and political variables. Changes in the level of SBA guarantees are dependent on aggregate economic performance and the proximity of presidential elections. The analysis confirms that agency managers are compelled to balance programmatic goals with electoral goals. The results suggest that elected officials influence the timing and magnitude of credit subsidies to business but have little influence over the industry-level distribution of the subsidies.

Political conflict and institutional design: Paths of party development in Russia

Partisan conflict in the Russian parliament sheds light on the question of how institutional arrangements affect the development of a party system. Russian parliamentary parties divide along a left‐right axis, but share an integralist outlook on federalism issues. These cross‐cutting issue dimensions generate intra‐cameral and inter‐branch conflict over property rights and fiscal policy, while inter‐cameral disputes frequently centre on federalism issues. Despite the asymmetry of the Constitution and the severity of left‐right divisions, parliamentary parties all employ their existing institutional resources for electoral and policy goals. Party dominance of the Duma and the alignment of Duma parties on the same side of the federalism issue have tended to partition conflict in Russia, stabilizing the political system at the expense of coherent policy‐making.

Pork Barrel Spending—On the Wane?

Is pork barrel spending on the wane? Many think it is, including reformers inside and outside of Congress. Citing the recent decline of earmarks in House appropriations bills for projects in members' districts, reformers suggest that a new era of congressional spending practices is dawning.This article argues instead that the rise in number of earmarks in the last decade as well as the recent decline depends on whether Congress and the executive branch are controlled by the same or different parties. It further predicts that the Republican takeover of the House and Senate after the 1994 congressional elections could lead to a resurgence of earmarking, in a different form, as long as the Democrats control the White House.Among scholars, pork barrel spending analysis represents a venerable specialty in the profession, generating some of the most engaging debates and finest research in recent years. This literature analyzes how members of Congress create institutions and use legislative rules to enhance their electoral goals. While not mutually exclusive, the two dominant approaches in recent years are the “distributive” and “informational” models of congressional policy making. (For a good review of the last two decades of scholarly research on the subject, see Krehbiel 1991).Reformers in the 103rd Congress were emboldened by the success of groups such as the “pork busters,” an informal group led by Representative Harris Fawell (R-IL), who routinely offered amendments to cut pork and unnecessary directed spending in appropriations bills.