Electoral Clientelism Research Articles

Pork barrel spending: The missing link between electoral clientelism and political budget cycles

Pork barrel spending used in the political budget cycles literature via a preference approach is identified as the link tying clientelism to political budget cycles. This paper looks at the supply and demand sides of electoral clientelism using the case study of shipyards in Croatia. The strategic, symbolic and everyday importance of the shipbuilding industry in Croatia is evident to the general public, but even more so to politicians. This paper examines the supply side – whether incumbents increase central budget funds (state guarantees) in election years (pork barrel spending) toward shipyards in Pula, Rijeka, Kraljevica, Trogir and Split – and the demand side – whether voters reward incumbents who engage in these pork barrelling practices. The theoretical foundations of the paper are based on the literature on clientelism, political budget cycles and the political economy of fiscal policy. Panel data analysis conducted on a sample of 5 shipyards over the 2001-2022 period confirms the existence of pork barrelling but does not confirm voters’ reactions to them. The empirical exercise identified the share of shipyard workers in the manufacturing industry at the county level as the main mechanism of electoral clientelism in Croatia.

Debt, credit and obligation in Kenya’s 2022 elections

ABSTRACT Asked why they intended to vote for William Ruto in Kenya’s 2022 presidential election, many people in central Kenya had a simple answer: ‘we owe Ruto a debt’. This was not the only kind of debt, nor the only idea of obligation, to feature in the election campaigns: the extent of personal and national debt in Kenya were both frequently discussed. At the same time, voters were being offered more debt – through national and local schemes to provide credit to entrepreneurs. Meanwhile, even though the distribution of cash was an absolutely expected feature of campaign events, politicians and the public were consistently scathing in their denunciation of ‘handouts’: to simply give away money was widely viewed as deeply immoral. Drawing on traditional and digital media as well as interviews, this paper brings the literature on money debt in Africa into dialogue with work on electoral clientelism to explore how questions about the morality of obligations ran through the elections – in ways that suggest a degree of change but also point to deeper continuities.

Does Money Triumph over Identity? a Survey Findings from the Local Levels

In this article, we try to analyze which factors emerged as the strongest determinants of voters’ behavior in a new democratic country dominated by the web of patronage and clientelistic exchanges. We examine two main variables in this study, vote buying and identity politics. Previous studies on electoral clientelism in Indonesia are mostly centered on its causes and mechanisms as an electoral strategy to garner electoral votes during an election. The socio-political contexts that follow the electoral dynamics are less explained. Initially, we assume that the intensive mobilization of identity politics that made the 2019 Indonesia election more explosive would decrease since voters would also solidify their voting preference into identity lines. However, through a post-election survey at the local level by selecting four districts (N=503), we find that vote buying emerges as a more robust variable in driving voters’ behavior rather than identity politics. Moreover, regional differentiation – land and coastal areas – also matter in this study where voters in the coastal regions are more likely to accept material inducements from candidates. Finally, our findings add many tasks for Indonesian democracy since clientelistic exchanges work as a more effective instrument for affecting voters' decision-making in elections rather than programmatic politics.

Natural disasters and the limits of electoral clientelism: Evidence from Honduras

The changing climate is leading to more frequent weather extremes across the globe, altering many aspects of social, economic and political life. In this paper we examine the impact of natural disasters on clientelism, a form of particularistic exchange in which voters are induced to eschew policy-oriented electoral decision-making in favour of voting for a party or candidate that offers them a targeted reward. We hypothesize that extreme weather should increase clientelism in contexts where it operates. But we also anticipate that multiple severe disasters may overwhelm clientelist networks, as demand outstrips supply. Triangulating quantitative and qualitative data, we test our expectations and find strong evidence that flood-based resources have been clientelized in Honduras, but that the combination of especially widespread flooding and the COVID-19 pandemic generated a situation where political parties were unable to use their clientelist networks effectively, as citizen need was too great.

Partisanship and Tolerance for Clientelism: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in Romania

Studies on electoral clientelism are increasingly focusing on the demand side and explaining how voters react to electoral inducements. However, there is limited research about how candidate attributes and partisanship can determine citizens’ reactions to clientelism. This article therefore tests the relative weight that voters place on candidate attributes and partisanship in their reactions to clientelistic targeting in the context of a new democracy. We use evidence from an original conjoint experiment conducted in 2021 in Romania, where electoral clientelism is frequent. Our findings show that citizens react negatively to clientelistic inducements in general, but the effects vary based on the targeting strategy used by politicians. These negative effects are considerably weaker among co-partisans. This observation is especially relevant when testing the effect of partisanship in a political setting where it is low.

Win big, buy more: political parties, competition and electoral clientelism

ABSTRACT Political parties use electoral clientelism to mobilise their core voters and to persuade swing voters to support them. Earlier research shows that clientelism occurs more often in highly competitive elections. Against these conclusions, this article argues that a large margin of victory can drive the use of electoral clientelism irrespective of the type of constituency. The analysis uses county-level data from the 2020 election campaign in Romania and shows that electoral clientelism is used more in those constituencies with a clear winner. These effects are robust when controlling for socio-economic vulnerability and the percentage of the urban population.

The impact of corruption and clientelism on voter turnout in Africa

This article explores the effect of corruption and clientelism on voter turnout in a sample of 34 African countries. It draws on Afrobarometer survey data from Round 5 and utilises a multilevel model to estimate individual and country-level effects. The article contributes to the literature on voter turnout, particularly by exploring the conditional effects of corruption and clientelism on individual voting decisions in Africa. We find that turnout is higher among those with more experience with electoral clientelism (which is especially strong in poorer countries) and that people with dimmer assessments of corruption are less likely to turn out, with the relationship being stronger as overall levels of corruption increase.

Who accepts electoral clientelism? The role of personality traits in Romania

ABSTRACT Personality traits have an impact on citizens’ political participation especially in relation to voting. However, we know little about how personality traits can influence people’s attitudes towards electoral clientelism. The latter is associated with voting in many societies and has been explained so far mainly through political, social and economic determinants. This article focuses on the psychological dimension and seeks to analyze how personality traits have an effect on citizens’acceptance of electoral clientelism. It distinguishes between three forms of clientelism: vote-buying, product provision and job promises. The statistical analysis uses the Big Five framework and individual-level data from an original survey conducted in Romania after the September 2020 local elections. The results show that only a small share of voters accept electoral clientelism.Conscientiousness, Extraversion and Agreeableness drive the acceptance of different forms of clientelism under specific circumstances.

Female representation and electoral clientelism: New insights from South African municipal electionss

Do citizens experience less electoral clientelism in polities with more elected female representatives? The current literature is remarkably silent on the role of gender and female political representation for electoral clientelism. Due to gender differences in issue priorities, targeted constituent groups, networks and resources, we argue that voters experience less clientelism in municipalities with a higher proportion of female politicians because either female politicians are likely to engage less in clientelism or women are less likely to be viable candidates in more clientelist settings. Through either mechanism, we expect all voters – and female voters in particular – to experience less exposure to clientelism in municipalities with higher female representation. We examine this idea using survey data from the 2016 municipal elections in South Africa – a country with high levels of female representation in politics but increasing problems of corruption and patronage in the political system. Our findings are consistent with the argument that municipalities with more elected female councilors have considerably lower rates of electoral clientelism and that this mostly affects whether female voters are targeted by clientelist distribution. These findings shed new light on how women's representation in elected political office shapes the incidence and use of clientelist distribution during elections.

More than users: How political parties shape the acceptance of electoral clientelism

Political parties use electoral clientelism to augment their support in many societies around the world. Extensive research shows how parties use clientelism and how citizens’ attitudes towards clientelism are shaped by broad social and economic factors. However, we know little about how political parties can influence people’s attitudes towards clientelism. To address this gap in the literature, this article analyzes the extent to which the development of a party organization and the interactions of citizens with these organizations can favor the acceptance of electoral clientelism as a practice of the political game. The analysis uses individual-level data from an original nationwide survey conducted in 2021 on a national representative sample of 4313 respondents in Romania. The results indicate that political parties, through their activities and networks, are not only main users of clientelism but also important drivers for its acceptance in society.

Electoral competition, political parties and clientelism: evidence from local elections in South Africa

ABSTRACT How does electoral competition shape parties’ use of clientelist strategies during elections? In this article, we present a theoretical framework which suggests that in contexts where electoral clientelism is present but not ubiquitous, clientelist strategies take a distinctive form by being more considered and rationally targeted at individuals and areas that maximize the value of the transaction for the clientelist party. Using individual-level survey data collected in the aftermath of the South African municipal elections of 2016, we find considerable evidence to suggest that electoral competition moderates the relationship between several individual and municipal level variables and individuals’ exposure to clientelist campaigns. Our results also demonstrate how the subtleties of targeting strategies differ between dominant and opposition parties depending on the level of competitiveness. These findings suggest the presence of a rational political economy of clientelism where parties carefully tailor their clientelist strategies to suit the local context.

Buying loyalty: Volatile voters and electoral clientelism

Electoral volatility and clientelism were traditionally analysed through the lenses of clientelistic behaviour by political actors. However, we know very little about the importance of volatility for the formation of attitudes towards clientelism within the electorate. This article addresses that gap by analysing the extent to which volatile voters are more likely to accept electoral clientelism as a political practice. We bring evidence from Romania, which is a crucial case due to its extensive use of clientelism in elections over time and high electoral volatility. The analysis uses individual-level data from a survey conducted on a national representative sample of 4316 respondents in 2021. Contrary to the theoretical expectations, the findings illustrate that loyal voters accept clientelism easier, which holds when controlling for variables such as targeting awareness, political interest, income, or education. These results have important implications for the study of elections and voting behaviour.

Informal Exercise of Power: Undermining Democracy Under the EU’s Radar in Hungary and Poland

Hungary and Poland have seen the most widespread erosion of democracy in the European Union since Fidesz and Law and Justice started their authoritarian remaking in 2010 and 2015, respectively. Despite the EU’s introduction of various doctrinal innovations, it could not force these regimes to comply with the core values of the EU. While the literature has focused on the formal violation of the rule of law, the links between informal power and the limited constraining role of the EU have remained undertheorized. This article aims to fill the gap by studying the informal exercise power of the Fidesz and PiS governments that helped them to create an uneven political playing field. Connecting the literature on hybrid authoritarian regimes and informality, it will be shown through three main domains how the Hungarian and Polish governments (1) distributed informal political-economic decision-making power informally throughout clientelist corruption, (2) captured the media through loyal oligarchs/allies, and (3) employed electoral clientelism to tilt the electoral playing field in their favor. While the study proposes a theoretical framework related to the Hungarian and Polish examples, it is also a warning for the EU to take the informal exercise of power seriously.

Buying Brokers

AbstractStudies of electoral clientelism—the contingent exchange of material benefits for electoral support—frequently presume the presence of strong parties. Parties facilitate monitoring and enforcement of vote buying and allow brokers to identify core voters for turnout buying. Where money fuels campaigns but elections center around candidates, not parties, how do candidates pitch electoral handouts? The authors analyze candidates’ distribution of cash during an Indonesian election. Drawing upon varied data, including surveys of voters and brokers, candidates’ cash-distribution lists, and focus-group discussions, they find heavy spending but little evidence of vote buying or turnout buying. Instead, candidates buy brokers. With little loyalty or party brand to draw on, candidates seek to establish credibility with well-networked brokers, who then protect their turf with token payments for their own presumed bloc of voters. The authors find little evidence of monitoring of either voter or broker behavior, which is consistent with their argument that these payments are noncontingent.

Pathways of Electoral Clientelism in University Student Elections in Ghana: An Exploratory Study

Recent studies on student politics and governance have shown that electoral clientelism (EC) in university student elections is often facilitated by clientelist relations between student leaders and political parties. However, there is a dearth of empirical research investigating the various forms of electoral clientelism, as manifested through vote-buying practices in campus electoral politics in African universities. This article, therefore, investigates the multifaceted and changing dynamics of vote-buying in student electoral processes in Ghanaian universities. The study adopted a qualitative approach based on semi-structured interviews with 15 student leaders, 4 university staff working with student leadership, and 4 focus group interviews involving students at the University of Ghana and Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology. From our finding, we argue that electoral clientelism takes place in five crucial ways in university student elections in Ghana. These include the provision of direct cash payments, exchanging electoral support for student government positions and appointments, provision of food and beverage consumables, award of student-related business contracts, and provision of educational materials and souvenirs.

Preferential Roma Representation in the Hungarian Parliament is Obstructed by the Fidesz Government?

In the approach to the 2022 elections in Hungary, ORÖ, the National Roma Self-Government, was supposed to draw up their national minority list but failed to do so before the deadline. This paper argues that this is not just the result of serious political disagreements within the Roma community, but the outcome of different external effects as well. The paper unfolds the two major modes of influence which effect the parliamentary representation of Roma. First, there are institutional constraints hindering the autonomous decision-making processes of the relevant bodies. As the competitive element of elections is pushed down to the level of national self-government, the whole process is more vulnerable to external influences. Second, these institutional weaknesses are complemented by personal bonds and pressures coming from the Fidesz government. Thus, the paper concludes that the system is intended to serve electoral clientelism and as such limits the ‘effectiveness’ of minority representation in Hungary, especially in the case of Roma.

Klientelizm w procesie wyborczym jako wyraz korupcji politycznej (przykład Ukrainy)

Authors consider political corruption and clientelism in the electoral process as destructive phenomena that violate the normal principle of society and artificially create obstacles within the political system. The understanding of clientelism by different authors as a component of political corruption, the conditions of its existence, as well as the consequences and influence on political power are analysed. Basing on the achievements of foreign scientists, the content and the essence of the concept of “electoral clientelism” is determined, the main reasons and preconditions of this phenomenon emergence are found, the authors’ own definition, summarizing the known scientific approaches, is offered. The devastating impact of clientelism on the electoral process that results in violating the principle of competition between political forces, and further leads to the development of corruption in the power system, is elucidated. Varieties of electoral clientelism in accordance with the tasks set by corrupt subjects of the electoral process in order to gain an advantage over opponents during the voting are found out. Apart from the approach, where electoral clientelism provides material benefits to voters, an approach, where the voters are constantly informed of the clientele character data, basing on which the unfair politicians create a mobilization campaign, is considered. The authors showed their own vision of the connection between electoral clientelism and political corruption manifested in the occupation of political positions by ineffective candidates and further use of their powers for private purposes, which will threaten the long-term prospects of social development. A number of ways to regulate clientelism’s impact on the electoral process, in particular through electronic voting introduction, established compulsory voting, agitation campaign financing control, severe penalties for clientele activity etc., are traced.

Political parties, state resources and electoral clientelism

Contemporary political parties often use state resources to win elections. In this context, electoral clientelism evolved from the straightforward vote buying to sophisticated exchanges in which the relationship between patrons (parties or candidates) and clients (voters) is sometimes difficult to grasp. We address the question how do the distributive politics and electoral clientelism interact, how these forms of interactions differ across various context, and what implications they bring for the functioning of political systems. The special issue provides theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions to the burgeoning literature about the multi-faceted feature of electoral clientelism. It unfolds the complex relationship between distributive politics and clientelism, and conceptualizes electoral clientelism as a dynamic process that occurs through different sequences. It enriches the methodological tools aimed at investigating electoral clientelism. Finally, the special issue approaches clientelism from several perspectives and brings together substantive empirical evidence about the varieties of clientelism around the world.

Dissatisfied, uninformed or both? Democratic satisfaction, political knowledge and the acceptance of clientelism in a new democracy

ABSTRACT In many countries, voters are targeted with clientelistic and programmatic electoral offers. Existing research explores the demand side of clientelism, but we still know very little about what determines voters’ acceptance of clientelistic and programmatic electoral offers. This article builds a novel theoretical framework on the role that democratic dissatisfaction and political knowledge play in shaping voters’ acceptance of different types of electoral offers. We test the implications of the theory with a survey experiment conducted after the 2019 local elections in Bulgaria. Our results show that low-knowledge voters and those who are dissatisfied with the performance of democracy and democratic institutions are more likely to accept clientelistic offers from politicians. The findings contribute to the literature on electoral clientelism and political attitudes.

Clientelism and identity

Electoral clientelism or vote buying has been regarded as undermining democratic institutions and weakening the accountability of the state towards its citizens, especially the poor. Social identity as a form of political mobilisation may contribute to this, enabling support to be won with clientelist transfers. This paper reports data from a novel laboratory experiment designed to examine whether clientelism can be sustained as a political strategy, and whether identity impacts the nature or efficacy of clientelism. Specifically, we design a voting and leadership game in order to examine whether individuals vote for clientelist allocations by a leader even at the expense of more efficient and egalitarian allocations. We find group identity does not significantly impact the prevalence of clientelist plans. Leaders are more likely, however, to choose allocations that provide fewer benefits (lower rents) to themselves when they are part of the majority in-group than when they are in the minority.