Pork barrel spending: The missing link between electoral clientelism and political budget cycles

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Pork barrel spending used in the political budget cycles literature via a preference approach is identified as the link tying clientelism to political budget cycles. This paper looks at the supply and demand sides of electoral clientelism using the case study of shipyards in Croatia. The strategic, symbolic and everyday importance of the shipbuilding industry in Croatia is evident to the general public, but even more so to politicians. This paper examines the supply side – whether incumbents increase central budget funds (state guarantees) in election years (pork barrel spending) toward shipyards in Pula, Rijeka, Kraljevica, Trogir and Split – and the demand side – whether voters reward incumbents who engage in these pork barrelling practices. The theoretical foundations of the paper are based on the literature on clientelism, political budget cycles and the political economy of fiscal policy. Panel data analysis conducted on a sample of 5 shipyards over the 2001-2022 period confirms the existence of pork barrelling but does not confirm voters’ reactions to them. The empirical exercise identified the share of shipyard workers in the manufacturing industry at the county level as the main mechanism of electoral clientelism in Croatia.