Election Spending Research Articles

An Individual-Level Multiequation Model of Expenditure Effects in Contested House Elections

We shall address questions concerning the impact of candidate spending in congressional elections in a new way. We develop a multiequation model of congressional vote choice that takes the endogeneity of expenditures into account. We then estimate both this model and the more traditional single-equation model using individual level survey data. The substantial differences we find between the two models indicates that the simultaneity bias present in the single-equation model is not trivial. The challenger and incumbent expenditure terms are each significant (whereas only challenger expenditures are in the single-equation setup) and of much greater magnitude in the multiequation case. In addition, we evaluate hypotheses grounded in persuasive communications theory concerning the type of individuals most affected by the messages emanating from the campaigns. We find that individuals with higher education, those with greater interest in campaigns, and those with strongly held convictions are unaffected by candidate spending, whereas individuals lacking each of these attributes are greatly influenced by campaign expenditures.

Campaign Spending in Local and State Elections: An Examination of One State House and Five Local Elections

Campaign Spending in Local and State Elections: An Examination of One State House and Five Local Elections

CAMPAIGN SPENDING IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Past research of the effects of campaign spending in Congressional elections has found, contrary to expectations, that incumbent spending lowers votes he or she receives. Our model simultaneously determines votes and spending and eliminates this anomaly. A measure comparing the incumbent's voting record to constituent preferences aids model identification. Using two‐stage least squares, we find that both incumbent and challenger spending are signficant determinants of the popular vote received. Tenure and spending appear to have diminishing returns, and voters appear to punish incumbents who vote against their wishes.

The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments

The question of how campaign spending affects election results remains open because the simultaneity problem has proven so intractable. Green and Krasno's (1988) recent attempt to solve the problem-and to demonstrate that marginal returns on spending are as great for incumbents as for challengers-again comes up short. A panel feature of the ABC NewslWashington Post Congressional District Poll conducted during the 1986 elections offers a fresh perspective on the question. Analysis of changes in voting intentions during the final six weeks of the campaign shows that, as the tainted OLS studies have invariably suggested, the amount spent by the challenger is far more important in accounting for voter's decisions than is the amount spent by the incumbent.

Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections

This paper reevaluates Jacobson's well-known finding (1978, 1980, 1984, 1985) that campaign spending by House incumbents has little influence on the vote. Analysis of the 1978 House election shows that three forms of model misspecification cause Jacobson to underestimate the effect of incumbent expenditures: failure to control for the quality of the challenger, inattentiveness to interaction effects, and inadequate treatment of reciprocal causation. When these biases are corrected, the marginal effect of incumbent spending is found to be substantial and, under certain circumstances, on par with the effect of challenger spending. In addition, challenger quality is shown to be an important determinant of the vote, particularly when the challenger spends heavily on his or her campaign. These findings imply that revisions to Jacobson's policy recommendations are necessary if House races are to be made more competitive.

The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections

Incomplete understanding of the connection between campaign spending and election outcomes has hindered evaluation of enacted and proposed congressional campaign finance reforms. Reanalysis of the 1972 and 1974 House and Senate campaign spending data using both OLS and 2SLS regression models shows that spending by challengers has a much greater impact on the outcome than does spending by incumbents. A similar analysis of the effects of spending on voters' recall of candidates in the 1972 and 1974 SRC surveys supports the explanation that campaign expenditures buy nonincumbents the necessary voter recognition already enjoyed by incumbents prior to the campaign. The 1974 survey questions on Senate candidates indicate that, although the inability to remember candidates' names does not preclude having opinions about them, voters recalling candidates are much more likely to offer evaluative comments, and these more frequently refer to candidates personally. Aware voters offer more negative as well as positive evaluations (though positive outnumber negative); familiarity is not automatically advantageous. And voters' evaluations of candidates strongly influence how they vote. The implications of these findings for congressional campaign finance policy are readily apparent.