Einstein's Argument Research Articles

Separating Einstein's separability

In this paper, I accomplish a conceptual task and a historical task. The conceptual task is to argue that (1) Einstein's Principle of Separability (henceforth “separability”) is not a supervenience principle and that (2) separability and entanglement are compatible. I support (1) by showing that the conclusion of Einstein's incompleteness argument would still follow even if one assumes that the state of a composite system does not supervene on the states of the subsystems, and by showing that what Einstein says in “Quantum Mechanics and Reality” (1948) strongly suggests that separability is not a principle about how subsystem states relate to the state of composite systems. I support (2) by showing that if separability was incompatible with entanglement, then Einstein's argument would be incoherent in a trivial way. Thus, by arguing for (1) and (2) I directly challenge what has been, and still is, a very common reading of separability. The historical task is to offer the first detailed review of the different ways in which separability has been defined by physicists and philosophers in the last 60 years. Among other things, such a review distinguishes three different definitions of the principle, and shows that since the 1990s and up until the present date, it became standard to take separability (as presented by Einstein) to be a supervenience principle.

Heisenberg's observability principle

Werner Heisenberg's 1925 paper ‘Quantum-theoretical re-interpretation of kinematic and mechanical relations’ marks the beginning of quantum mechanics. Heisenberg famously claims that the paper is based on the idea that the new quantum mechanics should be ‘founded exclusively upon relationships between quantities which in principle are observable’. My paper is an attempt to understand this observability principle, and to see whether its employment is philosophically defensible. Against interpretations of ‘observability’ along empiricist or positivist lines I argue that such readings are philosophically unsatisfying. Moreover, a careful comparison of Heisenberg's reinterpretation of classical kinematics with Einstein's argument against absolute simultaneity reveals that the positivist reading does not fit with Heisenberg's strategy in the paper. Instead the appeal to observability should be understood as a specific criticism of the causal inefficacy of orbital electron motion in Bohr's atomic model. I conclude that the tacit philosophical principle behind Heisenberg's argument is not a positivistic connection between observability and meaning, but the idea that a theory should not contain causally idle wheels.

Understanding Einstein's 1905 derivation of E= Mc2

H. C. Ohanian maintains that a consideration of the internal structure of a body reveals several mistakes in Einstein's 1905 paper on the mass–energy relation. The “mistakes” he identifies are based on misunderstandings of Einstein's argument.

Climate Change, Capitalism, and the Challenge of Transdisciplinarity

A new sense of urgency has grown among many scientists for policies to address climate change, resulting in unprecedented investments by scientists in public education and, in some cases, political activism. As climate scientists have investigated future climate scenarios—and potential social responses to environmental changes—they have become, ipso facto, social scientists. This article examines these changes to reflect on how they could reshape geography, a discipline that appears well positioned to advance transdisciplinary research. In light of the intellectual and political urgency of transdisciplinary climate research, why have we seen so little substantive collaboration across the science/social science divide? The answer, I argue, stems from differences between research in natural science, on one hand, and the social sciences and humanities, on the other. These problems need not cause paralysis, but to address them they must be understood. The article attends to this challenge by reflecting on Albert Einstein's arguments concerning science and capitalism.

Quantum reality: theory and philosophy

Quantum reality: theory and philosophy

The Self-Consistency of the Kinematics of Special Relativity, Part VI. Einstein's Argument in Special Relativity Concerning "Time Travel" Is Substantially Correct After All; and Smoothed Polygons.

The Self-Consistency of the Kinematics of Special Relativity, Part VI. Einstein's Argument in Special Relativity Concerning "Time Travel" Is Substantially Correct After All; and Smoothed Polygons.

Einstein’s “Zur Elektrodynamik...” (1905) Revisited, With Some Consequences

Einstein, in his "Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Korper", gave a physical (operational) meaning to "time" of a remote event in describing "motion" by introducing the concept of "synchronous stationary clocks located at different places". But with regard to "place" in describing motion, he assumed without analysis the concept of a system of co-ordinates. In the present paper, we propose a way of giving physical (operational) meaning to the concepts of "place" and "co-ordinate system", and show how the observer can define both the place and time of a remote event. Following Einstein, we consider another system "in uniform motion of translation relatively to the former". Without assuming "the properties of homogeneity which we attribute to space and time", we show that the definitions of space and time in the two systems are linearly related. We deduce some novel consequences of our approach regarding faster-than-light observers and particles, "one-way" and "two-way" velocities of light, symmetry, the "group property" of inertial reference frames, length contraction and time dilatation, and the "twin paradox". Finally, we point out a flaw in Einstein's argument in the "Electrodynamical Part" of his paper and show that the Lorentz force formula and Einstein's formula for transformation of field quantities are mutually consistent. We show that for faster-than-light bodies, a simple modification of Planck's formula for mass suffices. (Except for the reference to Planck's formula, we restrict ourselves to Physics of 1905.)

From Einstein's theorem to Bell's theorem: a history of quantum non-locality

In this Einstein Year of Physics it seems appropriate to look at an important aspect of Einstein's work that is often down-played: his contribution to the debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Contrary to physics ‘folklore’, Bohr had no defence against Einstein's 1935 attack (the EPR paper) on the claimed completeness of orthodox quantum mechanics. I suggest that Einstein's argument, as stated most clearly in 1946, could justly be called Einstein's reality – locality – completeness theorem, since it proves that one of these three must be false. Einstein's instinct was that completeness of orthodox quantum mechanics was the falsehood, but he failed in his quest to find a more complete theory that respected reality and locality. Einstein's theorem, and possibly Einstein's failure, inspired John Bell in 1964 to prove his reality – locality theorem. This strengthened Einstein's theorem (but showed the futility of his quest) by demonstrating that either reality or locality is a falsehood. This revealed the full non-locality of the quantum world for the first time.

On the Diffusion Coefficient: The Einstein Relation and Beyond

We present a detailed derivation of the closed-form expression for the diffusion coefficient that was initially obtained by Einstein.[4] The present derivation does not make use of a fictitious force as did the original Einstein derivation, but instead concentrates directly on establishing a dynamic equilibrium between the forces of pressure and friction acting on a Brownian particle. This approach makes it easier to understand the true essence of the argument, and thus makes it simpler to apply the argument in a more general case or setting. We demonstrate this by deriving the equation of motion of a Brownian particle that is under the influence of an external force in the fluid with a non-constant temperature. This equation extends the well-known Smoluchowski approximation[24] to the case of non-constant temperature, and offers new insights into the Ludwig–Soret and Enskog–Chapman effects (providing also a scholar example explaining the need for a stochastic integral). The key point in the derivation is reached by applying the Einstein dynamic equilibrium argument together with the conservation of the number of particles law. We show that this approach leads directly to the Kolmogorov forward equation whenever the setting is Markovian. The same method can also be applied in the case of interacting Brownian particles satisfying the van der Waals equation. In this setting we first demonstrate that the presence of short-range repulsive forces between Brownian particles tends to increase the diffusion coefficient, and the presence of long-range attractive forces between Brownian particles tends to decrease it. The method of derivation then leads to a nonlinear partial differential equation which in the case of weak interaction reduces to the Fokker–Planck equation. One of the main aims of the present article is to demonstrate that the Einstein argument leads to a truly dynamical theory of diffusion.

Hydrodynamic Dispersion of Noncolloidal Suspensions: Measurement from Einstein's Argument

Following Einsteins's argument for the diffusion coefficient of colloidal dispersions, we postulate that the steady state concentration profile in a suspension of noncolloidal monodisperse particles reflects the dynamic equilibrium resulting from a balance between gravity-driven convection and hydrodynamic dispersion. Using an acoustic technique, the steady state concentration profile of a counterflow-stabilized suspension (a fluidized bed) as well as stationary propagating sedimentation fronts inside the bed were determined. From these profiles we can derive the concentration dependence of the hydrodynamic dispersion coefficient.

The nature of Einstein's objections to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics

In what follows, I examine three main points which may help us to understand the deep nature of Einstein's objections to quantum mechanics. After having played a fundamental pioneer role in the birth of quantum physics, Einstein was, as is well known, far less enthusiastic about its constitution as a quantum mechanics and, since 1927, he constantly argued against the pretention of its founders and proponents to have settled a definitive and complete theory. I emphasize first the importance of the philosophical climate, which was dominated by the Copenhagen orthodoxy and Bohr's idea of complementarity: What Einstein was primarily reluctant to was to accept the fundamental character of quantum mechanics as such, and to modify for it the basic principles of knowledge. I thus stress the main lines of Einstein's own programme in respect to quantum physics, which is to be considered in relation to his other contemporary attempts and achievements. Finally, I show how Einstein's arguments, when dealing with his objections, have been fruitful and some of them still worthy, with regard to recent developments concerning local nonseparability as well as concerning the problems of completeness and accomplishment of quantum theory.

On the Arbitrary Choice Regarding Which Inertial Reference Frame Is “Stationary” and Which Is “Moving” in the Special Theory of Relativity

Einstein's argument on the relativity of simultaneity itself is the first result of the special theory of relativity. This argument is reflected in the structure and functioning of the physical world. The arbitrary nature of the decision regarding the particular inertial reference frame from which the argument on the relativity of simultaneity begins is discussed. It is this arbitrary, or freely made, decision that is the basis for the significance of the argument of the relativity of simultaneity itself on the structure and functioning of the physical world. The same concrete circumstances in the physical world can support either direction in the argument on the relativity of simultaneity, as well as other results, in the special theory (i.e., with either of two inertial reference frames in uniform translational motion relative to one another considered stationary while the other inertial reference frame is considered moving). There are different sets of results in the physical world associated with the choice in direction that is made, for example as concerns the temporal durations of occurrences or the spatial lengths of existents in these inertial reference frames. Experiments testing the equations derived in the special theory that relate the temporal durations of occurrences or the spatial lengths of physical existents in inertial reference frames in uniform motion relative to one another generally have not tested predictions with both of the two inertial reference frames considered, in separate scenarios, the stationary reference frame. It is proposed that empirical tests in two directions be developed and conducted. If empirical results from such tests support the predictions of the special theory, these empirical results would support the thesis that there is a cognitive factor in Einstein's argument on the relativity of simultaneity that affects results derived in the special theory concerning the physical world. One such test is proposed.

Paradoxes of gravitational redshift

Elementary proofs of gravitational redshift, as well as Einstein's historical ones, hold approximately only under special circumstances-weak and uniform field. If the redshift formulae are naively applied several paradoxes result. The whole topic is reviewed and rigorous derivations are presented, moulded on Einstein's classical ones. It is shown that Einstein's arguments can be used to infer a general relationship between redshift and gravitational acceleration, holding under the condition that a coordinate system exists where the metric tensor depends only on one space coordinate. A uniformly accelerated frame in flat spacetime is one instance; Schwarzschild geometry is another.

Sedimentation and brownian diffusion coefficients of interacting hard spheres

Abstract Einstein (1905) derived an expression for the diffusion coefficient of an isolated spherical colloid. Since that work, there have been two general methods for analyzing Brownian diffusion in colloidal suspensions at finite concentrations. One follows Einstein's thermodynamic argument postulating a gradient in chemical potential as being the driving force behind diffusion together with a thermodynamic analysis of sedimentation-diffusion equilibrium (Batchelor, 1976). The other approaches diffusion in a statistical fashion, deriving the macroscopic diffusion coefficient from a microscopic analysis of Brownian motion (Felderhof, 1978). In principle, both methods are correct and should give identical results, but the distinctly different approaches have produced some controversy. To test the various theories, of Brownian diffusion, experiments were conducted measuring the sedimentation and Brownian diffusion coefficients of uncharged rigid spheres. Sterically stabilized silica spheres dispersed in cyclohexane were used as a model colloid. The osmotic compressibility of this system was found to be well described by the Carnahan- Starling equation for hard spheres. The sedimentation coefficient of the silica spheres was measured over a wide range of concentration in a closed bottom container. A light extinction method was used to monitor the fall speed of the interface that develops during gravity sedimentation. The diffusion measurements were made using Taylor's hydrodynamic stability method. A laser optical-fiber system capable of direct monitoring of the penetration depth and concentration profile of the diffusing species along the diffusion column was developed. The measurements were found to be in fair agreement with Batchelor's theoretical results for sedimentation and Brownian diffusion of hard spheres.

Einstein, Newton and the empirical foundations of space time geometry

Abstract Einstein intended the general theory of relativity to be a generalization of the relativity of motion and, therefore, a radical departure from previous spacetime theories. It has since become clear, however, that this intention was not fulfilled. I try to explain Einstein's misunderstanding on this point as a misunderstanding of the role that spacetime plays in physics. According to Einstein, earlier spacetime theories introduced spacetime as the unobservable cause of observable relative motions and, in particular, as the cause of inertial effects of ‘absolute’ motion. I use a comparative analysis of Einstein and Newton to show that spacetime is not introduced as an explanation of observable effects, but rather is defined through those effects in arguments like Newton's ‘water bucket’ argument and Einstein's argument for special relativity. I then argue that to claim that a spacetime theory is true, or to claim that a spacetime structure is ‘real’, is not to claim that a theoretical object explai...

Einstein and EPR

Recent studies have shown that Einstein did not write the EPR paper and that he was disappointed with the outcome. He thought, rightly, that his own argument for the incompleteness of quantum theory was badly presented in the paper. We reconstruct the argument of EPR, indicate the reasons Einstein was dissatisfied with it, and discuss Einstein's own argument. We show that many commentators have been misled by the obscurity of EPR into proposing interpretations of its argument that do not accurately represent Einstein's own views. Finally, we evaluate Einstein's own incompleteness argument, concluding that recent experimental findings have likely shown it to be unsound.

A Relativistic Account of Einstein's Relativity

This paper explores in some detail a semi-popular text written by Einstein to present his theory of relativity. Semiotic tools are used to compare what Einstein says about the activity of building spaces and times with what sociologists of science can tell us. Einstein's text is read as a contribution to the sociology of delegation. Once the drama of Einstein's argument has been reconstructed, it is possible to learn from his theory of relativity something about the classical problem of `relativity' in the STS field. A comparison is established between the notion of social context and that of the aether, and an argument is developed to lead us beyond `social' explanations. The goal of such a semiotic study is twofold: to allow the adaptation of the strong programme to the peculiar conditions of the theoretical sciences; and to find a vocabulary for an activity best defined as infra-physics.

On the corpuscle-wave transition of electrons in mesoscopic systems

The electron phase coherence length xi determines the size regime where a three-dimensional (3D) confinement becomes an electron resonator. xi may become as large as some mu m in mesoscopic metal and semiconductor crystals if inelastic scattering is strongly suppressed. Depending on the confinement size, electrons exhibit either more wave or more corpuscular character. This was recently observed in isolated metal particles as well as in silicon inversion-layer nanostructures. The experimental results favour Einstein's arguments against those of Bohr in the famous dispute as to whether such a wave-corpuscle transition is sharp or not.

Einstein et la complémentarité au sens de Bohr : du retrait dans le tumulte aux arguments d'incomplétude

SUMMARY. — In this article, I examine Einstein's objections to quantum mechanics, with the formalism's interpretation in terms of complementarity as the historical setting. From 1924 to 1927, the period of development of a formalised quantum theory, Einstein raised certain questions that kept him from joining the throng of ardent supporters. Against the theory and its interpretation of 1927, he at first advanced arguments with the idea of eventually finding a flaw in quantum mechanics, and casting doubts upon its pretensions of completeness. Finally acknowledging, in 1931, the theory's coherence and accuracy at describing phenomena, he then tried to put forth objections to the theory's interpretation, which aimed at demonstrating the theory's incompleteness. These arguments culminated in the « Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen » article of 1935, and Einstein repeated them continually until his death. The analysis here calls, of course, for assessments of both the import of Einstein's arguments in relation to physics today, as well as to Einstein's own conceptions where theoretical physics is concerned, but these go beyond the aims of the present article.

Noumenalism and Einstein's argument for the existence of God

Einstein argued in his latter years that the intelligibility of the world was in the nature of a miracle, and that in no way could one have expected a priori such a high degree of order; this is why he rejected the atheist, positivist standpoint, and believed in a Spinozist God. Einstein's argument, however, is essentially a form of the ‘argument from design’ for a personal God based on the existence of beautiful, mathematically simple laws of nature; that physical order is a unique, improbable alternative compared to the infinite number of chaotic universes that might have existed. Einstein, in his early manhood, was a Humean, but in later years, as he moved toward Spinoza, from phenomenalism to noumenalism, he clearly rejected Hume's restriction of probable inferences to observed sequences. Darwin's arguments against biological design did not apply to Einstein's argument, because the laws of physics are not the outcome of any cumulative struggle for existence and natural selection. Perhaps the beautiful...