Egocentric Bias Research Articles

Legislative Staff and Representation in Congress

Legislative staff link Members of Congress and their constituents, theoretically facilitating democratic representation. Yet, little research has examined whether Congressional staff actually recognize the preferences of their Members’ constituents. Using an original survey of senior US Congressional staffers, we show that staff systematically mis-estimate constituent opinions. We then evaluate the sources of these misperceptions, using observational analyses and two survey experiments. Staffers who rely more heavily on conservative and business interest groups for policy information have more skewed perceptions of constituent opinion. Egocentric biases also shape staff perceptions. Our findings complicate assumptions that Congress represents constituent opinion, and help to explain why Congress often appears so unresponsive to ordinary citizens. We conclude that scholars should focus more closely on legislative aides as key actors in the policymaking process, both in the United States and across other advanced democracies.

The unreliability of egocentric bias across self-other and memory-belief distinctions in the Sandbox Task.

Humans are often considered egocentric creatures, particularly (and ironically) when we are supposed to take another person's perspective over our own (i.e. when we use our theory of mind). We investigated the underlying causes of this phenomenon. We gave young adult participants a false belief task (Sandbox Task) in which objects were first hidden at one location by a protagonist and then moved to a second location within the same space but in the protagonist's absence. Participants were asked to indicate either where the protagonist remembered the item to be (reasoning about another's memory), believed it to be (reasoning about another's false belief), or where the protagonist would look for it (action prediction of another based on false belief). The distance away from Location A (the original one) towards Location B (the new location) was our measure of egocentric bias. We found no evidence that egocentric bias varied according to reasoning type, and no evidence that participants actually were more biased when reasoning about another person than when simply recalling the first location from memory. We conclude that the Sandbox Task paradigm may not be sensitive enough to draw out consistent effects related to mental state reasoning in young adults.

Egocentric bias in affective perspective taking

Egocentric bias in affective perspective taking

Not in my back yard: Egocentrism and climate change skepticism across the globe

Unusually warm or cool weather has a short-term influence on public opinion of "global warming." This paper extends this idea by showing that both regional climate (average long-term temperature) and seasonal variation in average temperature predict variation in public skepticism about global warming. Analyses of both polling data and Google search volume data show that in regions with colder climates (both U.S. states and nations), there is more public skepticism about global warming. The effects of climate remained even after controlling for regional confounds such as age, education, income, cultural values, and political attitudes. Follow-up analyses suggested that cold temperatures play a stronger role than hot temperatures in shaping public skepticism about global warming. A third study set focusing on four English-speaking nations suggested that seasonal variation in temperature is also predictably related to public skepticism about global warming. Public opinion about the reality of this specific aspect of climate change appears to be susceptible to egocentric biases such as memorial availability and construct accessibility. All else being equal, climate change educators will likely face more pushback about global warming in places with cold climates and at times of the year when the weather is cold.

Accounting for Taste: A Multi-Attribute Neurocomputational Model Explains the Neural Dynamics of Choices for Self and Others.

How do we make choices for others with different preferences from our own? Although neuroimaging studies implicate similar circuits in representing preferences for oneself and others, some models propose that additional corrective mechanisms come online when choices for others diverge from one's own preferences. Here we used event-related potentials (ERPs) in humans, in combination with computational modeling, to examine how social information is integrated in the time leading up to choices for oneself and others. Hungry male and female participants with unrestricted diets selected foods for themselves, a similar unrestricted eater, and a dissimilar, self-identified healthy eater. Across choices for both oneself and others, ERP value signals emerged within the same time window but differentially reflected taste and health attributes based on the recipient's preferences. Choices for the dissimilar recipient were associated with earlier activity localized to brain regions implicated in social cognition, including temporoparietal junction. Finally, response-locked analysis revealed a late ERP component specific to choices for the similar recipient, localized to the parietal lobe, that appeared to reflect differences in the response threshold based on uncertainty. A multi-attribute computational model supported the link between specific ERP components and distinct model parameters, and was not significantly improved by adding time-dependent dual processes. Model simulations suggested that longer response times previously associated with effortful correction may alternatively arise from higher choice uncertainty. Together, these results provide a parsimonious neurocomputational mechanism for social decision-making, additionally explaining divergent patterns of choice and response time data in decisions for oneself and others.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT How do we choose for others, particularly when they have different preferences? Whereas some studies suggest that similar neural circuits underlie decision-making for oneself and others, others argue for additional, slower perspective-taking mechanisms. Combining event-related potentials with computational modeling, we found that integration of others' preferences occurs over the same timescale as for oneself while differentially tracking recipient-relevant attributes. Although choosing for others took longer and produced differences in late-emerging neural responses, computational modeling attributed these patterns to greater response caution rather than egocentric bias correction. Computational simulations also correctly predicted when and why choosing differently for others takes longer, suggesting that a model incorporating value integration and evidence accumulation can parsimoniously account for complex patterns in social decision-making.

Can I see the real me? Leadership ability and the better-than-average effect

ABSTRACTMilitary organizations typically emphasize the importance of leadership. The quality of military leadership might be inhibited because individuals tend to overestimate their respective leadership abilities. We hypothesized that military professionals generally overestimate how well they lead compared to their peers (Hypothesis 1). We also hypothesized that an egocentric bias, where self-ratings are weighted more strongly than other-ratings, contributes to this better-than-average effect (Hypothesis 2). The results obtained across two studies supported both hypotheses. Most notably, 242 of 251 United States Air Force Academy cadets and 31 of 34 United States Air Force officers rated themselves as above average compared to their peers. The obtained results have important implications for understanding the better-than-average effect generally and leadership in military and nonmilitary organizations.

Undervaluing Gratitude: Expressers Misunderstand the Consequences of Showing Appreciation

Expressing gratitude improves well-being for both expressers and recipients, but we suggest that an egocentric bias may lead expressers to systematically undervalue its positive impact on recipients in a way that could keep people from expressing gratitude more often in everyday life. Participants in three experiments wrote gratitude letters and then predicted how surprised, happy, and awkward recipients would feel. Recipients then reported how receiving an expression of gratitude actually made them feel. Expressers significantly underestimated how surprised recipients would be about why expressers were grateful, overestimated how awkward recipients would feel, and underestimated how positive recipients would feel. Expected awkwardness and mood were both correlated with participants’ willingness to express gratitude. Wise decisions are guided by an accurate assessment of the expected value of action. Underestimating the value of prosocial actions, such as expressing gratitude, may keep people from engaging in behavior that would maximize their own—and others’—well-being.

Does social distance modulate adults' egocentric biases when reasoning about false beliefs?

When given privileged information of an object’s true location, adults often overestimate the likelihood that a protagonist holding a false belief will search in the correct location for that object. This type of egocentric bias is often labelled the ‘curse of knowledge’. Interestingly, the magnitude of this bias may be modulated by the social distance between the perspective taker and target. However, this social distance effect has yet to be fully demonstrated when adults reason about false beliefs. Using a continuous false belief task, we investigated i) whether adults were biased by their own knowledge when reasoning about another’s false belief, ii) whether the magnitude of this egocentric bias was modulated by social distance, and iii) whether this social distance effect extended to a heterospecific out-group, namely a dog. To test these hypotheses we conducted three experiments. In Experiment 1 (N = 283), we used an established continuous false belief task, in Experiment 2 (N = 281) we modified this task, and Experiment 3 (N = 744) was a direct replication of Experiment 2. Across these experiments, the curse of knowledge effect was reliably replicated when adults mentalised about an in-group protagonist, and replicated in two of the three studies (Experiments 1 and 3) when adults mentalised about out-group protagonists. In an internal-meta analysis, the curse of knowledge effect was present across all conditions, and there was no effect of social distance. Hence, overall these data are not consistent with the hypothesis that social distance modulates adults’ egocentric biases when reasoning about false beliefs. The finding that egocentric biases of a similar magnitude were observed when adults mentalised about an in-group protagonist and a dog suggests that interpersonal dissimilarity is not in itself sufficient to reduce egocentric bias when reasoning about false beliefs.

The neural signatures of egocentric bias in normative decision-making.

Bargaining parties often disagree on what fair is, due to the reason that people are prone to believe that what favors oneself is fair, i.e., an egocentric bias. In this study, we investigated the neural signatures underlying egocentric bias in fairness decision-making, conjoining an adapted ultimatum game (UG) with event-related fMRI and functional connectivity. Participants earned monetary rewards with a partner in a production stage, wherein their contributions to the earnings were manipulated. Afterwards, the joint earnings were randomly divided, and the distribution was presented simultaneously with contribution information to participants, who accepted/rejected distributions of earnings as the same manner in standard UG. We identified an egocentric bias in fairness decisions, such that participants frequently rejected self-contributed disadvantageous outcomes, but much less so in response to other-contributed advantageous outcomes, although both involved mismatch between contribution and payoff. This bias was underpinned by regions involved in representing fairness norms, including the anterior insula and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC). Furthermore, the thalamus activity was predictive of the bias, such that the level of egocentric bias decreased as a function of the activation level of the thalamus. Finally, our functional-connectivity findings indicated that the thalamus worked together with insula and dACC to modulate behavioral egocentric bias in fairness-related decisions. Our findings uncover the neural basis underlying the modulation of egocentric bias in normative decision-making, and highlight the role of neural circuits associated with norm enforcement in this phenomenon.

The effect of e-health information on nurse-patient encounters: Mutual feelings and perceptions

Patients commonly search for e-health information about their illnesses which may be drawn from sites with varying reliability, and might contradict treatment recommendations. The present study was an early phase study that examined nurses’ and patients’ feelings and perceptions after an encounter with patients who present e-health information. Altogether 87 nurses and 118 patients answered a scenario-based questionnaire, in which patients presented nurses with e-health information of varying reliability that contradicted the nurse’s own treatment recommendations. Respondents were asked to appraise their own feelings (control, comfort and knowledge expertise) in such a situation and how they thought their role-partner would feel in such a situation (nurses about patients; patients about nurses). The results show that regardless of the information reliability, the nurses thought that they would feel more positive than the patients, while patients thought they would feel less positive than the nurse. Positive correlations were found between nurses’ feelings and their expectations of patients feelings. The same was not true for patients. In conclusion, both parties agreed that the nurse’s response would be more positive than the patients. However, when appraising patient’s reactions and feelings, nurses expressed an egocentric bias.

Perspective mistaking: Accurately understanding the mind of another requires getting perspective, not taking perspective.

Taking another person's perspective is widely presumed to increase interpersonal understanding. Very few experiments, however, have actually tested whether perspective taking increases accuracy when predicting another person's thoughts, feelings, attitudes, or other mental states. Those that do yield inconsistent results, or they confound accuracy with egocentrism. Here we report 25 experiments testing whether being instructed to adopt another person's perspective increases interpersonal insight. These experiments include a wide range of accuracy tests that disentangle egocentrism and accuracy, such as predicting another person's emotions from facial expressions and body postures, predicting fake versus genuine smiles, predicting when a person is lying or telling the truth, and predicting a spouse's activity preferences and consumer attitudes. Although a large majority of pretest participants believed that perspective taking would systematically increase accuracy on these tasks, we failed to find any consistent evidence that it actually did so. If anything, perspective taking decreased accuracy overall while occasionally increasing confidence in judgment. Perspective taking reduced egocentric biases, but the information used in its place was not systematically more accurate. A final experiment confirmed that getting another person's perspective directly, through conversation, increased accuracy but that perspective taking did not. Increasing interpersonal accuracy seems to require gaining new information rather than utilizing existing knowledge about another person. Understanding the mind of another person is therefore enabled by getting perspective, not simply taking perspective. (PsycINFO Database Record

Egocentric bias across mental and non-mental representations in the Sandbox Task.

In the Sandbox Task, participants indicate where a protagonist who has a false belief about the location of an object will look for that object in a trough filled with a substrate that conceals the hidden object's location. Previous findings that participants tend to indicate a location closer to where they themselves know the object to be located have been interpreted as evidence of egocentric bias when attributing mental states to others. We tested the assumption that such biases occur as a result of reasoning about mental states specifically. We found that participants showed more egocentric bias when reasoning from a protagonist's false belief than from their own memory, but found equivalent levels of bias when they were asked to indicate where a false film would depict the object as when they were asked about a protagonist's false belief. Our findings suggest that that egocentric biases found in adult false belief tasks are more likely due to a general difficulty with reasoning about false representations than a specialised difficulty with reasoning about false mental states.

Kognitivne pristrasnosti u pravnoj oblasti - mesto susreta pravne i biheviorističke nauke

The paper presents typical cognitive biases of representatives of different legal professions and participants in court and other proceedings (judges, arbitrators, mediators, lawyers, parties), including: the anchoring, the framing effect, the hindsight bias, the representativeness heuristic, and the egocentric bias. The goal of this paper is to examine their implications on the legal and other decision-making processes, as well as the importance they have in the legal field. The starting assumption is that the making of legal decisions is not solely determined by legal norms, but also by a number of factors that have a nonlegal character, whose cognitive factors are distinguished by their importance. On these grounds, the paper presents numerous studies of cognitive biases of those participants who decide in the legal field which belong to the domain of behavioral science. All of them clearly prove the existence of numerous systematic thinking mistakes of participants in court and other proceedings. Based on this research, the authors discuss the implications of these mistakes in making legal and other decisions, as well as techniques for their alleviation or elimination (the so-called debiasing techniques), thus setting the conceptual framework for future research in this field, particularly related to the domestic legal system.

Inequity Aversion, Incentives, and Personal Norms: The Effects on Budget Preparation and Use

ABSTRACTWe examine two features of control environments expected to affect the honesty of budget submissions by subordinates and their use by managers for planning purposes. First, we predict that subordinates' awareness of incentives available to their managers that they are not eligible to share in, is likely to induce inequity aversion and dishonest budgeting. However, we expect the egocentric bias will make managers insensitive to this increased dishonesty when using budgets for planning purposes. Second, we predict that making subordinates eligible to participate in incentives available to their managers will activate a personal norm of other-regarding behavior resulting in more honest budgeting. Third, we predict that managers whose subordinates are eligible to share in their incentives will recognize factors motivating their subordinates' behavior and, as a result, rely more on their budget submissions for planning purposes. Experimental results confirm all predictions. Implications for practice and research are discussed.

Beliefs about Climate Beliefs: The Importance of Second-Order Opinions for Climate Politics

When political action entails individual costs but group-contingent benefits, political participation may depend on an individual’s perceptions of others’ beliefs; yet detailed empirical attention to these second-order beliefs – beliefs about the beliefs of others – remains rare. We offer the first comprehensive examination of the distribution and content of second-order climate beliefs in the United States and China, drawing from six new opinion surveys of mass publics, political elites and intellectual elites. We demonstrate that all classes of political actors have second-order beliefs characterized by egocentric bias and global underestimation of pro-climate positions. We then demonstrate experimentally that individual support for pro-climate policies increases after respondents update their second-order beliefs. We conclude that scholars should focus more closely on second-order beliefs as a key factor shaping climate policy inaction and that scholars can use the climate case to extend their understanding of second-order beliefs more broadly.

Thinking about others and the future: Neural correlates of perspective taking relate to preferences for delayed rewards

We infer the thoughts and feelings of others by taking their perspectives. Similar processes could be used to understand how we will be affected by future events, by allowing us to take the perspective of our future self. In this paper, we test this idea using a previously presented framework for guiding predictions. The framework proposes that a shared neural mechanism is involved in controlling egocentric bias, both while shifting our perspective away from self and towards others, and while shifting our perspective from immediate to future perspectives. To test this framework, 36 adults performed an intertemporal choice task. They were then scanned using 3T functional magnetic resonance imaging while completing a false-belief “localizer” task, which requires egocentric bias control. A positive correlation was observed between the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) response during the false-belief task, and preferences for delayed rewards in intertemporal choices. A subset of participants performed the intertemporal choice task again in the scanner, which revealed that the response of the same rTPJ cluster, individually localized during the false-belief task, was higher during delayed over immediate reward choices. In addition, functional connectivity between the rTPJ and ventromedial prefrontal cortex was found to differ between immediate and delayed choices. The current results indicate an overlap in processes of egocentric bias control and those that determine preferences in intertemporal choices, offering a social cognitive explanation for why rewards are devalued with delay in temporal discounting.

Knowledge, belief, and egocentric bias

Changes in conversationally salient error possibilities, and/or changes in stakes, appear to generate shifts in our judgments regarding the correct application of ‘know’. One prominent response to these shifts is to argue that they arise due to shifts in belief and do not pose a problem for traditional semantic or metaphysical accounts of knowledge (or ‘know’). Such doxastic proposals face familiar difficulties with cases where knowledge is ascribed to subjects in different practical or conversational situations from the speaker. Jennifer Nagel has recently offered an ingenious response to these problematic cases—appeal to egocentric bias. Appeal to this kind of bias also has the potential for interesting application in other philosophical arenas, including discussions of epistemic modals. In this paper, I draw on relevant empirical literature to clarify the nature of egocentric bias as it manifests in children and adults, and argue that appeal to egocentric bias is ill-suited to respond to the problem cases for doxastic accounts. Our discussion also has significant impact on the prospects for application of egocentric bias in other arenas.

How can mindfulness enhance moral reasoning? An examination using business school students

Given the comprehensive influence of mindfulness on human thought and behavior, and the importance of moral reasoning in business decisions, we examine the role of mindfulness as an antecedent to moral reasoning through two studies. In Study 1, we propose and test a theoretically derived model that links mindfulness and moral reasoning, mediated by compassion and egocentric bias using a survey design. In Study 2, we examine whether mindfulness training enhances moral reasoning using an experimental design with graduate students of business management. The findings of Study 1 substantiate the positive association of mindfulness with moral reasoning. We found that this relationship is fully mediated by compassion and egocentric bias. The results of Study 2 suggest that mindfulness meditation training has a positive impact on individuals' states of mindfulness, compassion, and moral reasoning, and decreases egocentric bias. We relate the findings of the study with contemporary neurological research and discuss the theoretical, pedagogical, and managerial implications.

Social Perception in the Volunteer's Dilemma: Role of Choice, Outcome, and Expectation

The volunteer's dilemma (VoD) is a challenging interpersonal situation in which one person must bear a cost for the benefit of the group. If no one volunteers, all suffer. Research shows that many individuals are willing to volunteer, but little is known about the impressions volunteers and defectors make on social perceivers. In three studies, we find that observers judge volunteers to be more competent and more moral than defectors. The outcome of the dilemma, as co-determined by the other person's decision, and the target person's expectations regarding the other's decision systematically affect judgments of competence but have little effect on judgments of morality. Observers' own preferences to volunteer versus defect influence their judgments of targets consistent with well-known egocentric biases. Taken together, these findings reveal normative social pressures on the potential volunteer, thereby indicating the insufficiency of the conventional game-theoretic analysis.

Anti-intellectualism, egocentrism and bank case intuitions

Salience-sensitivity is a form of anti-intellectualism that says the following: whether a true belief amounts to knowledge depends on which error-possibilities are salient to the believer. I will investigate whether salience-sensitivity can be motivated by appeal to bank case intuitions. I will suggest that so-called third-person bank cases threaten to sever the connection between bank case intuitions and salience-sensitivity. I will go on to argue that salience-sensitivists can overcome this worry if they appeal to egocentric bias, a general tendency to project our own mental states onto others. I will then suggest that a similar strategy is unavailable to stakes-sensitivists, who hold that whether a true belief amounts to knowledge depends on what is at stake for the believer. Bank case intuitions motivate salience- but not stakes-sensitivity.