Egalitarian Justice Research Articles

BASIC EQUALITY AND THE SITE OF EGALITARIAN JUSTICE

The nature of basic equality (what it is that makes us all equals) can have implications not only for the question of the currency of egalitarian justice but also for that of its ‘site’. The latter question is raised by G. A. Cohen in his critique of John Rawls's theory of justice. In this paper I argue that Rawlsian liberals might provide an answer to Cohen's critique by establishing two distinct kinds of basic equality, thus providing a ‘twofold account’ of basic equality. A first kind of basic equality gains moral relevance in the context of respectful relations between individuals, and establishes egalitarian duties between them. A second kind of basic equality gains moral relevance in the context of respectful relations between the state and individual citizens, and establishes egalitarian duties of the state toward citizens. The strength of Cohen's critique depends, in part, on the fact that Rawls identified only one kind of basic equality while at the same time wishing to defend a dualist account of individual and state duties.

On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, and Other Essays in Political Philosophy. By G. A. Cohen. Edited by Michael Otsuka. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. 288p. $85.00 cloth, $22.95 paper.

On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, and Other Essays in Political Philosophy. By G. A. Cohen. Edited by Michael Otsuka. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. 288p. 22.95 paper. - Volume 11 Issue 1

HOW GIFTS AND GAMBLES PRESERVE JUSTICE

This paper examines G. A. Cohen's final criticism of Ronald Dworkin's theory ofequality of resources, which targets its treatment of inequalities that arise when some individuals make luckier choices than others make. Rebutting Cohen's argument that suchoption luck inequalitiesfail to be just in an unqualified sense, the paper argues that choice does not merely render inequality legitimate but instead can sometimes make inequality just. It also examines the relationship between Cohen's criticism and the conception of equality developed in his earlier influential paper, ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’.

Political philosophy: a historical introduction

Acknowledgments and Preface to Second Edition Chapter 1. Introduction Politics and Human Nature The Idea of Human Nature or the Human Good as 'Function': Normative Anthropology My 'Story' of Political Philosophy-and my Cast of Characters Enduring Issues in Political Philosophy Chapter 2. Classical Greek Political Philosophy: Beginnings Nature or Nurture? Protagoras' Democratic Traditionalism The Functionalistic Foundation of the Political Aretai in Nature (physis) Glaucon's Contractarian Political Theory Chapter 3. Plato: Government for Corrupted Intellects Socrates' Polis of Pigs The 'Republic' of Plato's Republic The Human Ergon and the Purpose of Political Organization Furthering Rationality by Means of the Polis? Why Should Anyone Return to the Cave? Plato and 'the Rule of Law' Chapter 4. Aristotle: Politics as the Master Art The Human Good: Intellectual and Political Acting Correctly (eupraxia) as a Grand End? The Polis as a Complete Community The Role of Politics: The Master Art? Concluding Thoughts Chapter 5. Cicero: The Cosmic Significance of Politics Cicero as Champion of the Res Publica What is Right (ius): The Rule of Law (lex) and Normative Anthropology Virtues, Duties, and Laws Chapter 6. Christianity: A Political Religion? The New Testament and Beyond Pauline Cosmopolitanism The Roman Empire Christianized The Advent of Tempora Christiana (the Christian era) Chapter 7. Augustine, Aquinas and Marsilius of Padua: Politics for Saints, Sinners, and Heretics St. Augustine The Two Rationales of Augustine's City of God The Two Cities Theoretical Political Consequences Christians as Good Citizens of Secular States? St. Thomas Aquinas The Human Function: Nature and Praeternature The 'Parts' of the Eternal Law: Divine, Natural, and Human Law Political Forms, Procedures, and Other Particulars Aquinas' Political Philosophy: Some Concluding Observations Marsilius of Padua The Autonomous but Coercive Regnum (Political Community) and its Law The Political Wisdom and Authority of the Whole Body of Citizens (or the weightier part thereof) Chapter 8. Hobbes and Locke: Seventeenth-Century Contractarianism Thomas Hobbes: Natural Law Simplified and Modernized Natural Law, Natural Rights, and the Human Function Law, Contracts, and the 'Leviathan' The Civil State: Sovereigns and Subjects Concluding Thoughts on God and Sovereigns John Locke: Divinely Mandated Autonomy, Natural Rights, and Property Moral Knowledge and Human Motivation The State of Nature and the Social Contract Property and Liberal Political Theory: Lockean Origins Chapter 9. Rousseau and Marx: Reaction to Bourgeois-Liberalism Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Autonomous Citizens for the true Republic The Intertwined Development of Civilization, Corruption, and Morality The Social Contract and the Emile: Republics and Republican Citizens Politics and the Human Function Karl Marx: Distortion of the Human Function within the Bourgeois-Liberal State Political Emancipation and the Bourgeois-Liberal State Alienation and the Human Function Historical Materialism and the Coming of Communism Concluding Thoughts: The Cook Shops of the Future Made Present Chapter 10. Mill and Rawls: Liberalism Ascendant? John Stuart Mill: Perfectionist Liberalism Mill's Liberalism Liberty and Government Democratic Republicanism Concluding Thought on Mill and Liberalism John Rawls: Political (and Non-Perfectionist?) Liberalism Egalitarian Justice as the First Virtue of Social Institutions: Basic Assumptions Rawls' Two Principles of Justice: What they Apply to and Why Consensus, Public Reason, and the Distinction between Citoyen and Bourgeois The Ultimate Justification of Rawlsian liberalism? Epilogue Notes

Comment on Marchman Andersen et al.: Social inequality in health, responsibility and egalitarian justice

In their paper ‘Social inequality in health, responsibility and egalitarian justice’, Marchman Andersen et al. argue that on a luck egalitarian account, personal choices which negatively affect individual health cannot morally justify health inequalities. The authors suggest that even in the case of lifestyle-related diseases, the resulting health inequality is neither just nor desirable, and consequently stress the importance of providing free and equal access to health care to everyone. Much of this argument rests on a definition of personal responsibility as being causally regressive. This is to say that no person can ever be fully responsible for her actions, since the causes for a person’s own choices will at least partly be determined by socio-economic or historical circumstances outside of that person’s control. This, the authors suggest, is morally relevant, since only full responsibility for any action creates conditions under which a person can be held accountable for the consequences. Marchman Andersen et al. propose some important challenges to the concept of luck egalitarianism. Here, two observations regarding the argument shall briefly be discussed. First, the conclusion that the authors reach may in fact be narrower than they claim. They do not so much show that appeals to individual responsibility for health cannot justify health inequalities, as that they point out the incompatibility between a broadly conceived notion of luck egalitarianism and a very specific definition of personal responsibility. The authors acknowledge that the condition of causality regression on which their definition of personal responsibility rests is contested and as a result, the strength of their argument largely depends on whether or not the reader shares their views. More importantly, the argument made here is primarily a specific application of a familiar and more general critique of luck egalitarianism, namely that in order to be consistent, luck egalitarians require a detailed account of what can count as personal responsibility. Of course, we need not share the specific understanding of personal responsibility which the authors outline—but neither are we compelled to take a luck egalitarian approach in the first place, and herein lies the second observation. Luck egalitarianism places a singular focus on personal responsibility as a morally relevant category to establish desert for compensation, and views responsibility as dichotomous. Consequently, luck egalitarianism struggles to make sense of multifactorial causes of disease, and cannot account for varying degrees of individual responsibility which would better capture responsibility for health. It therefore stands to question, if luck egalitarianism is in fact an appropriate distributive theory to apply to health care. To summarise, Marchman Andersen et al. provide an argument which rests on a very narrow definition of personal responsibility, and should probably not lead us to dismiss the role of personal responsibility for health outcomes just yet. Their approach does however highlight some important challenges to luck egalitarianism and underlines the importance of revisiting carefully the conditions under which personal responsibility can be seen to be morally relevant for the allocation of health care.

Social inequality in health, responsibility and egalitarian justice

Are social inequalities in health unjust when brought about by differences in lifestyle? A widespread idea, luck egalitarianism, is that inequality stemming from individuals' free choices is not to be considered unjust, since individuals, presumably, are themselves responsible for such choices. Thus, to the extent that lifestyles are in fact results of free choices, social inequality in health brought about by these choices is not in tension with egalitarian justice. If this is so, then it may put in question the justification of free and equal access to health care and existing medical research priorities. However, personal responsibility is a highly contested issue and in this article we first consider the case for, and second the case against, personal responsibility for health in light of recent developments in philosophical accounts of responsibility and equality. We suggest-but do not fully establish-that at the most fundamental level people are never responsible in such a way that appeals to individuals' own responsibility can justify inequalities in health.

Comment on Marchman Andersen et al.: Social inequality in health, responsibility and egalitarian justice

There is a growing distaste for the use of the term ‘lifestyle’ in connection with health issues. It is a phrase that only entered common parlance around 1970 and would, in my view, be better reserved for the pages of glossy consumer focussed magazines from which it originated. It does not seem to me either accurate or appropriate that an addiction to nicotine, alcohol or fast food is regarded as a ‘lifestyle’ over which free choice can be exercised. Neither should it be a potential excuse for limiting access to health care necessary to deal with the detrimental effects. The role of the global commercial interests behind the mass production and skilful marketing of tobacco, alcohol and food cannot be extracted from the analysis of the decisions made by individuals, communities or indeed, countries. Such vested interests seek to profoundly alter the decisions made by individuals through pricing and promotion in all its many forms. They also seek to impede public health measures aimed at protecting population health— witness the global campaign by the tobacco industry against those advocating plain packaging of tobacco products. Given the reach of anti-health forces into all areas of society it is wrong to consider causative factors of noncommunicable diseases as if individual choice can operate insulated from social, commercial and exploitative influences. Karl Marx could not have put it better when he wrote in the opening paragraphs of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte published in 1852:

Egalitarian Justice and Expected Value

According to all-luck egalitarianism, the differential distributive effects of both brute luck, which defines the outcome of risks which are not deliberately taken, and option luck, which defines the outcome of deliberate gambles, are unjust. Exactly how to correct the effects of option luck is, however, a complex issue. This article argues that (a) option luck should be neutralized not just by correcting luck among gamblers, but among the community as a whole, because it would be unfair for gamblers as a group to be disadvantaged relative to non-gamblers by bad option luck; (b) individuals should receive the warranted expected results of their gambles, except insofar as individuals blamelessly lacked the ability to ascertain which expectations were warranted; and (c) where societal resources are insufficient to deliver expected results to gamblers, gamblers should receive a lesser distributive share which is in proportion to the expected results. Where all-luck egalitarianism is understood in this way, it allows risk-takers to impose externalities on non-risk-takers, which seems counterintuitive. This may, however, be an advantage as it provides a luck egalitarian rationale for assisting ‘negligent victims’.

Political Self-Determination and Global Egalitarianism

Proponents of global egalitarian justice often argue that their positions are compatible with the principle of self-determination. At the same time, prominent argu ments in favor of global egalitarianism object to one central component of the principle: namely, that the borders of states (or other political units) are normatively significant for the allocation of rights and duties; that duties of justice and democratic rights should stop or change at borders. In this article, I propose an argument in defense of the normative significance of territorial boundaries that draws on a political interpretation of the princi ple of self-determination. The political interpretation is distinct from the two major ap proaches to self-determination: the national and the democratic. It makes a twofold con tribution to the debates about global justice and democracy; while it (a) challenges the position that political memberships and political borders are morally arbitrary; it (b) helps define the realm of permissible autonomy for self-governing political units, which does not ignore duties to nonmembers and outsiders.

Book Review: Political Theory: On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, and Other Essays in Political Philosophy

Book Review: Political Theory: On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, and Other Essays in Political Philosophy

De gevolgen van de functiemix voor het psychologisch contract in het voortgezet onderwijs

Effects of the ‘function mix’ on the psychological contract in secondary education Effects of the ‘function mix’ on the psychological contract in secondary education The Dutch government tries to increase the attractiveness of the job as a teacher in several ways. One of the methods is so-called the function mix. With this instrument a relatively large group of teachers can be promoted to a higher salary scale. Using psychological contract theory, we aim to explain teacher’s attitudes towards this function mix instrument. The analysis shows that especially feelings of procedural and egalitarian justice are an important determinant of this attitude towards this new system. More specifically, our analysis shows that a system by which teachers prove their eligibility themselves for promotion, combined with a fast implementation, has a positive effect on the attitude towards the function mix instrument. The analysis also shows that effects on teacher’s attitudes (like commitment and motivation) are – contrary to the expectation – rather limited.

Towards Egalitarian Distributive Justice: The Need for a Transitional Retributive Justice in International Climate Negotiations

This paper questions the notion that 'common but differentiated responsibility' is blocking progress on achieving a new international agreement and argues that 'equal responsibility' between countries is in fact not an egalitarian approach. Through a re-reading of egalitarian distributive justice, I will be exploring the difficulties that the issue of climate change poses to an egalitarian distributive model, using Marx's theory of uneven development to highlight the importance of transitional retributive justice in achieving egalitarian justice.

Brock’s Cosmopolitanism: Sensible but Incomplete

Political philosophers of an egalitarian bent have been engaged in a debate between two views of global justice. One, simplistically stated, holds that egalitarian justice is fundamentally a domestic requirement. Societies need to promote an egalitarian-type1 distribution of the goods of life among fellow members of their society, but they do not have similar obligations to members of other societies. This view, often called liberal nationalism, is an ―associationist‖ account of distributive justice in that it limits the scope of egalitarian justice to fellow members of an association, one‘s own society. The other view demands an egalitarian distribution of goods among all human beings regardless of their location. On this view, cosmopolitanism, the scope of egalitarian justice is not limited to fellow citizens, but is universal. Many, but not all cosmopolitans, base their view on the common humanity of all human beings.2 In Global Justice Gillian Brock defends cosmopolitanism.3 Her book has many virtues, of which I will mention three. First, she not only considers the theoretical question of what global justice requires, but she develops thoughtful practical proposals about how to bring about change. This is a refreshing contribution to a debate that has largely been theoretical. Among other things, she discusses, in some detail, changes in tax policy, the importance of freedom of speech and the press for protecting rights to liberty, immigration, humanitarian intervention, and democratic possibilities for forms of international governance. Second, she covers a great many issues, providing interesting and succinct arguments both for the views she accepts and those she rejects. Third, she writes comprehensively and clearly; her work should interest ordinary readers as well as academic theorists. It makes an excellent text for undergraduate courses in global justice.

Fairness in international economic cooperation: moving beyond Rawls’s duty of assistance

In this paper, I will argue that Rawls’s duty of assistance offers an incomplete picture of our international social and economic responsibilities. I will start by presenting the two main interpretations of the ‘Rawlsian circumstances of egalitarian distributive justice’ – the first requiring the existence of a ‘certain kind’ of cooperation, the second the existence of a ‘certain kind’ of interaction with the will – and then show that none of them rules out the applicability of international principles of egalitarian distributive justice. My argument will draw on societies’ participation in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). So, in the second section I will show that even though this organization is not endowed with a centralized coercive authority, its participants are asked to accept significant constraints on their behaviour and are therefore owed a special justification for these constraints. I will also suggest that the alleged voluntariness of this organization may not only be contested (especially when developing societies are involved), but may also not be sufficient to rule out requirements of distributive equality. In the third section, I will show that, as any system of cooperation, the WTO gives rise to requirements of fairness and that, given the purpose it claims to serve, not all inequalities that can be traced back to so-called ‘domestic’ factors can be considered justified. More specifically, I will argue that the fairness of the WTO requires that all its participants be given a fair chance of benefiting from global market competitions, and that this is likely to entail significant egalitarian distributive duties among societies.

Citizenship, egalitarianism and global justice

Many of the foremost defenders of distributive egalitarianism hold that its scope should be limited to co-citizens. But this bracketing of distributive equality exclusively to citizens turns out to be very difficult to defend. Pressure is placed on it, for instance, when we recognize its vulnerability to ‘extension arguments’ which attempt to cast the net of egalitarian concern more widely. The paper rehearses those arguments and also examines some – ultimately unsuccessful – responses which ‘citizenship egalitarians’ might make. If it does turn out that citizenship egalitarianism cannot be defended, then two options are open to its adherents: to modify that position substantially in order to embrace at least some global egalitarian components, or to argue for a reorganization of citizenship regimes in such a way that citizenship might properly track the subjects of egalitarian justice. Both are radical options. Finally, the paper then briefly considers one way in which an attenuated form of citizenship egalitarianism might still be defended.

Climate change mitigation and intergenerational justice

Existing climate change mitigation policies are particularly concerned with the reconciliation of two seemingly conflicting aims: environmental protection and economic efficiency. The normative principles underlying these policies meanwhile focus on two central ideas: fair burden-sharing and agents' responsibility. However, both existing policy instruments and their supporting philosophical principles are highly problematic in terms of intergenerational justice and truly effective climate change mitigation. Three competing conceptions for allocating and distributing the burdens of climate change mitigation (cap-and-trade schemes, carbon emission taxes, and personal ecological space quotas) and their compatibility with principles of intra- and intergenerational justice are analysed and evaluated. None of the proposed instruments is able to satisfy the demands of effective mitigation and egalitarian justice on its own, which suggests that existing proposals for the distribution of emission rights and climate change-related costs need to be supported by a thicker account of intergenerational justice.

Justice as Fairness and Reciprocity

Abstract This paper tries to reconcile reciprocity with a fundamentally ‘subject- Centred’ ethic by interpreting the reciprocity condition as a consequence of the fact that justice is in part a relational value. Duties of egalitarian distributive justice are not grounded on the duty to reciprocate benefits already received, but limited by a reasonable assurance of compliance on the part of those able to reciprocate, because their point is to constitute a valuable relationship, one of mutual recognition as equals. We have unconditional duty to help establish just global institutions, institutions which would allow us to share fairly in the burdens and benefits of global economic cooperation, but no unilateral duty to share fairly, where such institutions are not in place. Since non-contribution on the part of those unable to contribute involves no failure of recognition, the disabled do not fall outside the scope of distributive justice.

Respect and the Basis of Equality

In what sense are persons equal, such that it is appropriate to treat them as equals? This difficult question has been strangely neglected by political philosophers. A plausible answer can be found by adopting a particular interpretation of the idea of respect. Central to this interpretation is the thought that in order to respect persons we need to treat them as ‘opaque', paying attention only to their outward features as agents. This proposed basis of equality has important implications for the currency of egalitarian justice, ruling out a number of the equalizanda favored by contemporary egalitarians.

Global migratory potential and the scope of justice

We live in an era of global migratory potential — a time when a vast number of people have the physical capacity to move relatively quickly and easily between states. In this article, I use this fact to motivate a powerful objection to ‘statism’, the view that the egalitarian principles of justice which apply to citizens have no application outside the boundaries of the state. I argue that, in a world characterized by global migratory potential, the supposed contrast between the normative standing of citizens and non-citizens on which the doctrine of statism depends is much harder to establish than proponents of the doctrine seem to realize. Focusing initially on the well-known justification for statism based on the notion of reciprocity between cooperators in a joint venture for mutual advantage, I argue that non-citizens play just as important a role as citizens in upholding schemes of cooperation, and that non-citizens should therefore be included in the scope of egalitarian justice along with citizens. I then go on to explain why the problem raised by the fact of migratory potential threatens to undermine not only the reciprocity-based conception, but all other conceptions of statism. The challenge for the proponent of statism is to show that the relationship in which each individual citizen stands with the state is not only a justice-grounding relationship, but also one in which no non-citizen stands with the state. The challenge has not been met so far, and I argue that it is unlikely to be met in the future.

The relational approach to egalitarian justice: a critique of luck egalitarianism

This article contributes to the critical engagement with luck egalitarianism by advancing two arguments. Firstly, it questions the cogency of the dichotomies – e.g., luck/choice, person/circumstance, agency/structure – and the accompanying moral ideal of pure voluntarism. This makes it difficult for luck egalitarianism to dissect appropriately the inequalities embedded in social relations, such as social networks and involuntary associations, in which voluntariness and contingency as well as agency and structure are intertwined. Secondly, it suggests that the relational approach, which has been developed, inter alia, in the empirical study of inequality, provides a morally and practically adequate perspective on egalitarian justice. The relational approach achieves this by converging upon those in‐between social relations that are irreducible to the macro‐level structure and to micro‐level agency. Moreover, a relationally sensitive perspective on inequality can adeptly respond to the difficulties that luck‐egalitarian theories encounter.