Iran's Efforts Research Articles

Blood donation and donor recruitment in Iran from 1998 through 2007: ten years' experience

Recruiting and retaining blood donors is of utmost importance, especially since there is no alternative for human blood. This article describes different aspects of blood donation to evaluate recruitment activities. Data were obtained from annual reports made by the Statistical Committee of the Iranian Blood Transfusion Organization and the national database. The trend in yearly blood donations has significantly increased from 1,183,630 blood units in 1998 to 1,735,008 by the end of 2007. During this period the overall growth rate was 59.8% (p < 0.005). Yearly blood donation in the northwest region of the country was 13 per 1000 in contrast to 39 per 1000 in the central region. There was a significant decrease in the number of donations during the months of April, September, and January whereas in May, August, and the religious month of Muharram a significant increase was noted. Voluntary donations increased from 77% in 1998 to 100% by the end of 2007. Continuous donor recruitment efforts in Iran have resulted in a significant increase in blood donation rates during the past decade as well as achieving 100% voluntary, nonremunerated blood donors. Nevertheless some provinces will have to put more effort into donor recruitment and retention so as to ensure self sufficiency in their blood supply. Educating blood donors and the public about the continuous need for a sufficient blood supply in every community is equally important and times where supply exceeds demand should be avoided at the most.

Iran's space programme: Riding high for peace and pride

Iran's efforts to develop space technology for civil and peaceful purposes began many years ago. Almost all its success in this connection is the result of indigenous potential in terms of human resources, available expertise and experience along with international cooperation and exchange of knowledge. There are considerable civilian entities involved in space-related development and production in Iran. This article describes the history and current status and capabilities of Iran's space programme and its aim to use space for peace and prosperity and to attain the position that it deserves in the global arena. Stepping into space using an indigenously developed system has provided Iran with a notable and unprecedented national pride. Only international cooperation, as already exists in the framework of COPUOS activities on the peaceful uses of outer space, can improve 21st century understanding of the space policy and visions of Iran for the world community. Iran's space programme is really no different from that of any other nation. It is committed to developing its assets in space both for peaceful purposes and for use as part of various multinational space projects. It should not be ignored that such achievements require a high degree of expertise, ability and comprehensive knowledge about the subject, while the attitudes and visions of leaders in each nation who also influence and contribute to the pace, progress and developmental objectives of any nation's space program should not be disregarded.

Iran and Instability in the Middle East

In the Middle East today, Iran is trying to upgrade its status to a dominant power by demonstrating an ability to penetrate and influence various regional theatres. Meanwhile, despite being the sole global power with considerable military presence in the region, America's strategic initiatives in the Middle East are frustrated by Iran's behaviour. This interaction is destabilizing the Middle East regional order. In this article I demonstrate that instability is mainly driven by the incompatibility ofthe two states' preferences, not their incongruence of capabilities. The regime in Tehran counters American encirclement by manipulating several foreign policy tools. Although its military capabilities are dwarfed by those ofthe United States, these tools still provide Iran with considerable ability to maneuver relatively freely despite international and regional constraints, enabling it to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States.The first tool is Iran's ambition to develop nuclear energy technology, largely within the confines of the international atomic safeguards for civilian technology, but enshrined in confrontational rhetoric. The second tool is Iran's hardened alliance with an increasingly isolated Syria. The third tool is Iran's support of Hezbollah in Lebanon. The fourth is Iran's leverage in Iraq through ties to S hute groups. Two potential tools that the Iranian regime can mobilize more effectively than it currently does are ties to groups in Afghanistan (such as the Hazara), and to Hamas in the occupied territories. Added to its considerable conventional military capability, Iran's advantages stem from the fact that the costs incurred for the manipulation of these tools have so far proven tolerable. In the interim it is willing to use them to destabilize a regional order that it sees as confining. These tools provide access to a wide theatre of operations, and their timed manipulation has proven Tehran's ability to exert formidable influence on other regional states as well as the US. In sum, Iran has been able to match or even overturn Washington's strategic initiatives and military interventions in the Middle East. Tehran would not have developed such resolve in isolation of the regional actors noted above. These state and substate actors are not passive recipients of Iranian influence efforts but have themselves been served through ties to Iran. Their interests coincide or overlap with Iran's own.To fully appreciate the effect of Iran's efforts to assume a higher regional status, we have to better understand the preferences of these regional actors. It is only after unpacking these two sets of preferences that we can better grasp the current sources of instability in the regional order. Embedding analysis in the logic of liberal international relations theory serves such an investigation.1 In studying Iran's behaviour and regional instability, emphasis shifts from focusing on the distribution of capabilities to unpacking the sources of prefer enees. Moreover, instead of asking only what policies should decision-makers (American or otherwise) pursue regarding Iran, we may be able to develop policies averting a regional confrontation between the US and Iran, as well as defuse a variety of potentially destabilizing regional issues.Two important factors are necessary for a full understanding of Iran's behaviour. The first is the nature of the Iranian regime itself. Unpacking Iran's domestic politics can help explain the timing and the reasons behind particular choices in foreign policy. The second factor is American policy in the Middle East. Along with the historic American presence in the Arabian Gulf states, placing US troops in Iraq meant replacing Iraq as a balancer to Iran; the costs of encirclement to Iran became too high to be ignored. What we are witnessing is Washington's regional standing being compromised by its under- appreciation of the role diplomacy can play in bringing Iran around. …

Investigating DRG cost weights for hospitals in middle income countries

Identifying the cost of hospital outputs, particularly acute inpatients measured by Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs), is an important component of casemix implementation. Measuring the relative costliness of specific DRGs is useful for a wide range of policy and planning applications. Estimating the relative use of resources per DRG can be done through different costing approaches depending on availability of information and time and budget. This study aims to guide costing efforts in Iran and other countries in the region that are pursuing casemix funding, through identifying the main issues facing cost finding approaches and introducing the costing models compatible with their hospitals accounting and management structures. The results show that inadequate financial and utilisation information at the patient's level, poorly computerized 'feeder systems'; and low quality data make it impossible to estimate reliable DRGs costs through clinical costing. A cost modelling approach estimates the average cost of 2.723 million Rials (Iranian Currency) per DRG. Using standard linear regression, a coefficient of 0.14 (CI = 0.12-0.16) suggests that the average cost weight increases by 14% for every one-day increase in average length of stay (LOS).We concluded that calculation of DRG cost weights (CWs) using Australian service weights provides a sensible starting place for DRG-based hospital management; but restructuring hospital accounting systems, designing computerized feeder systems, using appropriate software, and development of national service weights that reflect local practice patterns will enhance the accuracy of DRG CWs.

Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction

This article reviews Iran's past and current use of terrorism and assesses why U.S. attempts to halt Iran's efforts have met with little success. With this assessment in mind, it argues that Iran is not likely transfer chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons to terrorist groups for several reasons. First, providing terrorists with such unconventional weapons offers Iran few tactical advantages as these groups are able to operate effectively with existing methods and weapons. Second, Iran has become more cautious in its backing of terrorists in recent years. And third, Tehran is highly aware that any major escalation in its support for terrorism would incur U.S. wrath and international condemnation. The article concludes by offering recommendations for decreasing Iran's support for terrorism.

Nuclear Iran facing the USA

Iran's efforts to endow nuclear capacities date back to the Shah's era, and were at that time developed through a close collaboration with the USA. Those plans were presented as civil programmes, but comprised, beyond any doubt, some military potentialities. As a first step, the 1979 Islamic Revolution completely interrupted any activity in this field. But more recently, uranium enrichment activities were developed to a pace that triggered the reaction of the USA, preoccupied by the potentiality to see a nation of the 'Axis of evil' to endow massive destruction weapons. Although they did not find any proof of any prohibited activity, IAEA inspections did not dissipate the doubts, and pressure grew up against Teheran (such as sanctions taken by the Security Council). Nevertheless, it may be thought that the line taken by Teheran is more subtle, and does not consist in having the nuclear weapon, but rather to be in a position to have it.

Professor Joseph Tomasch, the founder of the anatomy department of Shiraz Medical School.

Shiraz Faculty of Medicine was officially inaugurated in 1952. In 1958, an eminent Austrian anatomist Professor Joseph Tomasch joined Shiraz Medical School. Professor Tomasch was a great teacher and an active researcher. He published about 40 original papers mainly on neuroanatomy in some reputable international journals. Presented here is a brief account of his fruitful academic efforts in Iran.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM IRAN'S PURSUIT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Tipped off by Iran's efforts to acquire uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, despite the economic illogic, the United States and its allies identified Tehran's nuclear weapons intentions early on and took effective action to stop several countries from inadvertently assisting that program. This postponed the worst-case scenario of when Iran might have the bomb, which for 15 years has been estimated at being five to ten years away. The intelligence success gave insufficient attention, however, to Iran's procurement efforts through non-state actors on the black market. Intelligence on Iran's motivations also will be important to devising effective policies. Those motivations include a need to achieve prestige, assert national pride, and secure dominance in the Gulf region. Iran's clerical leaders also see a nuclear capability as the best way to ensure their survival despite outside threats and internal opposition. At least 10 indicators of military involvement in the program have become known, reinforcing the judgment that Tehran is still intent on developing a latent nuclear weapons capability. Despite the confirmed evidence, the international community has not been able to change Iran's strategic calculations. The intelligence indicators will need to be corroborated if the world is to summon the will to put firm pressure on Iran to stop its nuclear pursuits.

Global Threats and American Strategies: From Communism in 1955 to Islamism in 2005

America's current security threats—the insurgency in Iraq, Islamic terrorism, and Iran's efforts to obtain nuclear weapons—seem strange and unprecedented. Parallels can be drawn, however, between the security threats of 2005 and those of fifty years ago. The U.S. foreign policy developed to confront the communist threat offers lessons as we develop strategies to combat today's threat. Two contemporary perspectives on strategic issues—one conservative/realist, one neoconservative/idealist—apply lessons of the Cold War to today's U.S. foreign policy, but each has serious flaws. A third, neorealist perspective, suggests that by leveraging the divisions already present in the Muslim world, the United States can win the global contest against Islamic terrorism. However, this would require a transformation in American strategy that will not be easily achieved.

Curriculum internationalisation

Investigates the increasing interest by educators to provide students with the international management and research skills that are becoming more necessary as we enter the twenty‐first century. Highlights the need for the internationalisation of curriculum, as well as the faculty and instructors who teach such courses. Presents two cases of such internationalisation efforts in Iran and Sweden. Explores the internationalisation of the courses and the instructors who taught them over a three‐year period; certain positive and negative aspects to these experiences are identified and presented. Suggests that such research on the successes and failures in such cases serve as a foundation to continue research in other settings, so as to learn more about how to continue with efforts to internationalise both curriculum and faculty.

Iran and the Future of U.S. Technical Assistance: Some Afterthoughts

Iran and the Future of U.S. Technical Assistance: Some Afterthoughts

Asian Influences on European Metallurgy

The communication by Cyril Smith giving Dr. Spencer welldeserved praise for translating Filarete's treatise on iron stirs anew the issue of Asian influences on European metallurgy. Dr. Smith has shown becoming caution in forbearing a claim of possible Chinese antecedents for the wheel, bellows, and their connecting mechanisms, as described or suggested by Filarete. This caution is justified since Filarete never describes the wheel. Dr. Smith's suppositions deserve to be explored for the readers of Technology and Culture, however, since they reveal so well the nature of cultural communication of technology, past and present. This commentary calls attention to my own efforts in Iran in tracking down a primitive type of blast furnace with evident ancestry in China of Ming Dynasty or before, a furnace whose practice suggests solutions to the riddles posed by Filarete. During my three-year stay in Iran, I twice retraced the route of Dr. Erich Bdhne's 1927 voyage into the mountains of Mazanderan, on the Caspian coast. The reader who wishes a sketch of this moist region of mountains and forest should consult the article by this German geologist in Stahl und Eisen (Vol. XLVIII, No. 2 [1928], pp. 1577-80). Many aspects of Dr. B6hne's description of the small blast furnace of the Caspian were vague to me. I wanted in any event to study water mechanisms in the Chinese-type villages of the Caspian, with the thought of preparing an article for Technology and Culture, for with the advent of land reform and new technology these will soon disappear. In the company of a seigneur of the Mahdavi family, which in years past had attempted to modernize the flourishing primitive iron industry of the Caspian, we set off on horseback in May 1962 to visit the villages in the upper mountains of Mazanderan, villages combining many features of Han China and eighteenth century Kentucky. Led by a musket-bearing guide, we travelled first to the village of Irka some 12 miles south of Amol, then began the ascent to Angetarud and Mahan, scene of old slag heaps and metallurgical mounds. Though rumor had one furnace still in operation in the forest of Lavij (Lavij-tenge), we were unable on this trip or that in June 1963 to find any traces of it. However we managed to interrogate workers, who confirmed Dr. B6hne's description of nearly four decades ago, which follows: