Effect Of State Ownership Research Articles

A study on the effects of state ownership on auditing cost

A study on the effects of state ownership on auditing cost

Effects of State Ownership on the Capital Structure and Profitability of Vietnamese Listed Companies

Effects of State Ownership on the Capital Structure and Profitability of Vietnamese Listed Companies

“The effects of market liberalization and privatization on Chinese telecommunications”

Abstract The Chinese telecommunications sector is undergoing fundamental changes as it moves towards liberalization. This paper examines how liberalization and privatization have affected the performance of Chinese telecommunications industry. We identify greater liberalization with increases competition as measured by reductions in industrial concentration and privatization with deceases in state equity-ownership in firms. With a new panel dataset of thirty-one Chinese provinces from 1998 through 2007, we examine the effects of reforms on prices and subscription levels of both of mobile and fixed line telecommunications operators within both the mobile and fixed line platforms. We find large gains in market performance from decreased concentration among mobile providers not for fixed-line service. The evidence on the effects of state-ownership is similarly mixed. We then estimate substitution patterns between these telecommunications platforms and find evidence of consumer substitution between the fixed and mobile platforms for subscription, but not usage.

The FIEF-Specific Factors in the Chinese Economy: The Effects of State Ownership

According to the research by Boisot and Child (1988), fief is defined as a transaction-governance structure with low information codification and diffusion. Based on this definition, this article highlights the existence of fief-specific factors, such as state-ownership, in China's publicly listed firms. It is hypothesised that the state ownership, as a fief specific factor, has a negative effect on product diversification among the listed firms in China. The ownership also has a positive effect on the firms' stock marker, performance. Moreover, the effects can be moderated by several factors, such as firm size, age and managerial ownership. The authors collected data from listed firms in China and conducted an empirical study to test the hypotheses. The results support the hypothesised effects of the fief-specific factor and demonstrate the importance of studying fief factor to understanding organisational behaviours and performance in China. It is also indicated that the predictive validity of Western theories could be improved by taking into account the effects of fief-specific factors when studying organisational behaviours and performance in an emerging economy such as China. The paper concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications.

Player and Referee Roles Held Jointly: The Effect of State Ownership on China’s Regulatory Enforcement Against Fraud

This paper examines the impact of the prevailing state ownership in the Chinese stock market on corporate governance and the financial regulatory system respectively as the internal and external monitoring mechanisms to deter corporate fraud and protect investors. In line with the literature that state ownership exaggerates the agency problem, we find that the retained state ownership in privatised firms increases the incidence of regulatory enforcements against fraud. For the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), however, larger state ownership is associated with a lower incidence of enforcement actions. This is attributed to the mutual political affiliation of the fraudulent SOEs and the regulatory commission. A new regulation “Solutions for Listed Firm Checks” promulgated in March 2001 has mitigated this effect by empowering the regulatory commission to increase the severity of regulatory conditions. Our evidence confirms the improvement in the regulatory environment and investor protection in the Chinese stock market brought about by the regulatory reform and development.

Player and Referee Roles Held Jointly: The Effect of State Ownership on China’s Regulatory Enforcement Against Fraud

This article examines the impact of the prevailing state ownership in the Chinese stock market on corporate governance and the financial regulatory system, respectively, as the internal and external monitoring mechanisms to deter corporate fraud and protect investors. In line with the literature that state ownership exaggerates the agency problem, we find that the retained state ownership in privatised firms increases the incidence of regulatory enforcements against fraud. For the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), however, larger state ownership is associated with a lower incidence of enforcement actions. This is attributed to the mutual political affiliation of the fraudulent SOEs and the regulatory commission. A new regulation “Solutions for Listed Firm Checks” promulgated in March 2001 has mitigated this effect by empowering the regulatory commission to increase the severity of regulatory conditions. Our evidence confirms the improvement in the regulatory environment and investor protection in the Chinese stock market brought about by the regulatory reform and development.

State Ownership in the Russian Economy: Its Magnitude, Structure and Governance Problems

This article analyzes the extent and sectoral distribution of state ownership in the Russian economy. The different legal forms of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Russia are described. Official data on the evolution of the size of the state sector is provided, where the size is measured by the number of SOEs, their share in employment, fixed assets, investment and industrial production. The sectoral distribution of SOEs, the degree of their internationalization and data on the subset of listed SOEs are described. The latter gives a picture of a much stronger involvement of the government in medium and large sized companies than what can be inferred from the official data. Furthermore, this article discusses the objectives and challenges for corporate governance of SOEs in Russia, and provides an international perspective of the performance of SOEs as compared to privately owned companies. Recent trends in the policy and management of state property are presented. The problems of corporate governance in Russia are described in an agency perspective, and survey evidence on corporate governance and transparency of Russian SOEs is provided. Particular attention is given to the legal construction of the state corporation. The final section on the performance effects of state ownership summarizes the key contributions in the international economic literature in this field.

The determinants of firm performance after ownership transformation in Slovenia

In the last decade there has been an extensive debate in transition countries on whether ownership matters for company performance. The key issue has been whether outsider ownership outperforms insider ownership. This paper examines the influence of several variables — insider ownership, ownership by the state and municipalities, market share and the share of exports — on company performance in a sample of 488 Slovenian industrial companies after their ownership transformation. Econometric estimations demonstrate, contrary to the expectations based on previous Slovenian studies, that insider ownership does enhance performance. Market share has the expected positive influence on value added, whereas the influence of exports is negative due to the export reorientation to Western markets and the exchange rate policy in 1998. The effect of state ownership is statistically insignificant.

Efficiency and Firm Ownership: Some New Evidence

The paper investigates the effect of state ownership on efficiency of firmsusing an econometric model that allows for the separation of technical from allocative efficiency in adynamic setting. The estimation results, based on a sample of international airlines, suggest that state ownershipis associated with lower technical and allocative efficiency. State ownership's effect on technical efficiencyis mainly a dynamic one – lowering the rate of cost decline, whereas its effect on allocativeefficiency is static – raising the level of costs. Thus lower technical, rather than allocative, efficiency isthe main reason for state-owned firms to be less efficient than their private counterparts.