Effective Contract Management Research Articles

The Economics of Long‐term Contracts in the Footballers' Labour Market

AbstractPeter Sloane's seminal article in this journal on the objectives of football clubs argued that utility maximising clubs would seek out player talent more aggressively than profit maximising clubs and that this accumulation of player talent by larger teams might need to be checked by redistribution of revenues. We suggest in this article that, in a context of rising revenues and high rewards, the pressures to acquire more and better talent so as to out‐perform other teams on the football pitch leads to a requirement for teams to practise effective contract management. Using a large dataset from the German Bundesliga, we find that players with longer term contracts perform better, ceteris paribus. Hence, selection effects in the award of long‐term contracts dominate moral hazard (shirking) effects in the Bundesliga.

Determinants and constraints to effective procurement contract management in Uganda: a practitioner's perspective

The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants and constraints of effective contract management and its implications on service delivery since public procurement authority has persistently reported low compliance levels as far as contract management is concerned. Empirical research in this area is relatively sparse. Data was collected using a closed ended questionnaire. Significant predictors of determinants for effective contract management were: clear definition of processes and having in place contract management plans, appropriate methods of capturing key lessons from contract management process, accurate definition of roles and having a knowledgeable contract manager. While the major constraints were found to be: lack of political will to monitor contracts; inadequate capacity and lack of integrity. These findings offer a useful foundation for policy and practical improvement in this important area in Uganda.

Strengthening district health service management and delivery through internal contracting: Lessons from pilot projects in Cambodia

Following a decade of piloting different models of contracting, in mid-2009 the Cambodian Ministry of Health began to test a form of ‘internal contracting’ for health care delivery in selected health districts (including hospitals and health centers) contracted by the provincial health department as Special Operating Agencies (SOAs) and provided with greater management autonomy. This study assesses the internal contracting approach as a means for improving the management of district health services and strengthening service delivery. While the study may contribute to the emerging field now known as performance-based financing, the lessons deal more broadly with the impact of management reform and increased autonomy in contrast to traditional public sector line-management and budgeting. Carried out during 2011, the study was based on: (i) a review of the literature and of operational documents; (ii) primary data from semi-structured key informant interviews with 20 health officials in two provinces involved in four SOA pilot districts; and (iii) routine data from the 2011 SOA performance monitoring report. Five prerequisites were identified for effective contract management and improved service delivery: a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities by the contracting parties; implementation of clear rules and procedures; effective management of performance; effective monitoring of the contract; and adequate and timely provision of resources. Both the level and allocation of incentives and management bottlenecks at various levels continue to impede implementation. We conclude that, in contracted arrangements like these, the clear separation of contracting functions (purchasing, commissioning, monitoring and regulating), management autonomy where responsibilities are genuinely devolved and accepted, and the provision of resources adequate to meet contract demands are necessary conditions for success.

MANAGERIAL CHALLENGES IN PUBLIC SERVICE CONTRACTING: LESSONS IN GREEN‐SPACE MANAGEMENT

In this article, we address a series of interrelated issues in the managerial challenge of public service contracting. This is done by prompting ten issues within four objectives and highlighting their relevance and potential interrelatedness in effective contract management. In contrast to prevalent piecemeal and theoretically one‐dimensional approaches, the objectives and issues constitute a holistic framework that advances a comprehensive and pragmatic understanding of contracting processes. We hope that the framework merits further in‐depth exploration that may generate new insights, themes and questions for research in public service contracting. We identify and exemplify the framework by combining insights from different theoretical perspectives with empirical evidence through an iterative process. The evidence is educed as a set of observed and self‐reported stories in a cross‐national sample of 15 cases of contracting‐out in urban green‐space management.

The Challenging Business of Long‐Term Public–Private Partnerships: Reflections on Local Experience

Many widely publicized arrangements bearing the popular “public–private partnership” label are complex, long‐term contracts between municipalities and private companies. In theory, these innovative contracts offer substantial public benefits, including improved service quality, risk sharing with the private sector, and cost savings. In practice, however, the challenges that long‐term contracts pose can undermine their successful implementation at the local level. Drawing on illustrative cases, this article explores some practical impediments to achieving market‐driven competition, equitable risk sharing, effective performance guarantees, and appropriate transparency in innovative long‐term contracts. It examines the inapplicability of the partnership model to most commercial transactions between government and business, the risks of uncontrollable circumstances, the impact of local resource constraints, and barriers to transparency in long‐term contracts. It concludes that local governments embarking on long‐term contracts must invest in specialized expertise, effective contract management, and strong governance structures.